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Abstract 
Since 1994, the new democratically elected government has embarked on a series 
of massive initiatives, policies and programmes to improve municipal service delivery 
performance.  Municipalities are, however, still incapable of fulfilling their designated 
service delivery mandate. The preliminary study of this research discovered that the 
current municipal monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems, although they are  
legislated to serve as an early warning system (EWS), do not have essential 
components of an EWS and, as a result, cannot alert key players and stakeholders 
of developing problematic trends in municipal service delivery processes.  
The research examined the extent to which the current M&E system of the City of 
Johannesburg contains the components of an EWS. The purpose is to design and 
propose a model of M&E system that can serve as an EWS and enable 
municipalities to receive advance information about potential problems, and then to 
implement the necessary corrective interventions. Using a qualitative and a case-
study methodology, data were collected through observation, interviews, focus-group 
discussions (FGDs) and documentary study. Root cause, thematic analysis and data 
categorisation were used to analyse data.  
The findings indicate that early warning signals exist and are noticed by some 
officials and staff, but no mechanism or budget exists to enable them to use the 
knowledge (i.e., no EWS exists). An important original finding this study makes is 
that one of the root causes of municipal problems is the state of alienation municipal 
workers and managers across race and class experience, which results in silo 
mentality of workers, departments and sectors, and fragmentation throughout 
planning, functionalities, information and knowledge, as the effects of alienation on 
municipal performance have not been in the local government discourse.   
Conceptually, it argues that the M&E concept and framework need to be re-designed 
to encompass and build-in the concept of EWS, and, in turn, proposes a model of 
proactive M&E (pM&E), i.e., an M&E system integrated with EWS components, and 
therefore serves as an EWS. Moreover, it also suggests that concept and approach 
of the Weak Signals Theory (WST) is applicable in an M&E framework, but would be 
hard to use in “municipal” M&E systems, for three reasons: capacity constraint, 
political, and the multi-sectorial nature of the municipal system.                     ■ 
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“How shall we take a demoralised, devalued, 
inadequately skilled and underpaid public service and 
transform it into an efficient, proud and caring force for 
delivery and change?” 
Mac Maharaj (2009: 9) 
 
 
 
 
  1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
This thesis explores the service delivery processes, and the Monitoring and 
Evaluation (M&E) systems used in providing four basic services in the City of 
Johannesburg Metropolitan area. It gives background insight into why this topic needs 
to be studied, and highlights the boundaries of the study. This chapter presents the 
general background of the study, problem statement, and purpose of the research, 
research questions and the outline of the thesis. It also explains a responsibility and 
requirement (by legislation) of an M&E system to serve as an EWS (Early Warning 
System), and the introduction of Weak Signals Theory as the M&E theory—The 
Theory of Change (TOC)—does not provide any mechanism to detect and monitor 
warning signals. 
 
1.1 General background of study 
Public services translate political visions into implementable policies and programmes 
that transform the daily lives of people (Chimhowu, 2009: 111). Public service delivery 
is not only attached to the economic growth and the alleviation of poverty (Goldstein, 
2008: 01), but also affects the social and political status of citizens (Shah, 2005: 40). 
In order to meet the objective of creating and sustaining a better life for its citizens, 
government requires a public service that performs effectively (Malefane, 2010: 1).  
 
The great realisation of requiring structural reform of the public sector in South Africa 
was first understood and discussed in 1993. The concern was raised during the 
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Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA). It was agreed that in order to 
have a more equitable society and improve the standard of living of the general 
population, the public sector had to be equipped, so that it could be developed to 
deliver effective services to the whole population. After coming into power in 1994 the 
new democratically elected government embarked on a series of massive initiatives 
and programmes to fundamentally restructure the public service to fulfil its role in the 
new dispensation (Rakate, 2006). 
 
The overall aim of public sector reform is to upgrade the performance of the whole 
sector, which is comprised of national, provincial and local government. Improving 
service delivery performance of municipalities is one of the important objectives of the 
public sector reform. The area of this study—the service delivery performance and the 
M&E systems of municipalities—is located in this broader context of the public sector 
reform. Figure (1.1) describes the interconnection among public sector reform, its 
objective to improve public sector performance, and the improvement of municipal 
service delivery performance, which is an essential part of wider public sector. The 
performance of the local government and municipalities is an important area that must 
be studied, understood and improved because, as Tsatsire (2008) argues, the 
success of the national and provincial governments depends on the success and 
survival of local government. 
 
Figure 1.1 Public sector reform to municipal service delivery 
Public Sector 
Reform  
Public Sector 
Performance  
Service delivery 
performance of 
Municipalities 
 
To effectively deal with chronic service delivery challenges and to comply with five 
Constitutional mandates—to provide democratic and accountable government for 
local communities, to ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable 
manner, to promote social and economic development, to promote a safe and healthy 
environment, and to encourage the involvement of communities and community 
organisations in the matters of local government (RSA, 1996, 1998a), new policies 
and programmes, which are backed up by a well-conceptualised and highly 
progressive Constitution, Acts, White Papers and Legislation, were implemented. 
Despite these policies, municipalities are, however, still incapable of fulfilling their 
designated service delivery mandate. Incapacity to manage and deliver services to 
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the public has been exposed as the most daunting challenge of the last two decades 
since the inception of democracy in 1994 (CoGTA, 2015, 2014; Presidency, 2011; 
Tshandu & Kariuki, 2010: 204). The new local government system has failed to live up 
to its expectations (Jolobe, 2014). As both the CoGTA (2015, 2014) and the 
Presidency (2011b) acknowledge that effective and efficient service delivery from 
most municipalities remains elusive and does not meet the legitimate expectations of 
the citizens.  
 
The trust of citizens toward local government and municipal authorities has been 
declining steadily. Moreover, Powel (2009) argues that government’s apparent faith in 
local government as the sphere that is closest to people and the delivery arm of the 
state is not shared by its citizens. Local government is the least trusted of all public 
institutions in the country since 2000 (CoGTA, 2015; Alexander & Kane-Berman, 
2014; Powel, 2009; Idasa, 2010a, HSRC, 2009). It is worrying because there is a 
direct, strong relationship between public trust and paying taxes and service fees, and 
participation in cooperative and consultative exercises (Turok, 2015). 
 
Inadequate services, combined with unemployment and continued poverty, have 
frequently ignited township protests and riots (known as “service delivery protests”), 
started in the townships of Harrismith in 2004, and now spread to all provinces of 
South Africa (CoGTA, 2015; Jolobe, 2014; Alexander & Kane-Berman, 2014; Allan & 
Heese, 2011; World Bank, 2011: ix).  
 
The preliminary study of this research discovered that the current municipal 
Performance Management and M&E systems are required by various legislations to 
serve as an early warning system (EWS). The White Paper on Local Government, 
1998 (RSA, 1998: Section 3.2) states that a performance management system “would 
provide 'early warning' where municipalities are experiencing difficulties, and enable 
other spheres of government to provide appropriate support before a crisis develops. 
It would also enable municipalities to compare their own performance with that of 
similar municipalities across the country, identify successful approaches or 'best 
practice', and learn from one another. 
 
Similarly, the 2000 Local Government: Municipal Systems Act (MSA), 2000, Annexure 
A Part 1 Legislation (RSA, 2000: 2) states that as one of core components of the 
Monitoring and review of performance management system: “The system applied by a 
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municipality in compliance with subsection (10 (c) must be advised to in such a way 
that it may serve as an early warning indicator of under performance”. Likewise, the 
Municipal Planning and Performance Management Regulation 2001 states that: The 
mechanisms, systems and processes for monitoring in terms of sub-regulation (I) 
must (a) provide for reporting to the municipal council at least twice a year; (b) be 
designed in a manner that enables the municipality to detect early indications of 
under-performance; and (c) provide for corrective measures where under-
performance has been identified (RSA, 2001: 13).  
 
It should be stated that the White Paper on Local Government and the Municipal 
Systems Act (MSA) require the municipal Performance Management and M&E to 
provide 'early warning' (in White Paper) and “early warning indicator” (in MSA). But in 
the Municipal Planning and Performance Management Regulation, the mechanisms, 
systems and processes for monitoring is not only required “to detect early indications” 
but also to “provide for corrective measures”. These two tasks (i.e., detecting early 
indications and providing for corrective measures) of the municipal PM and M&E 
system can be understood as an early warning system. The requirement of an EWS in 
municipal PM and M&E system is clearly stated in the Chief Financial Officers 
Handbook for Municipalities published by the National Treasury (2012). The 
Handbook (NT, 2012: 87) states that “[t]he in-year monitoring and reporting system is 
intended to act as an “early warning system” for budget spending and to guide 
corrective action or control measures necessary to ensure that budget spending is 
effectively managed”. Moreover, in his 2004 State of the Nation address the former 
President Mbeki emphasised the necessity of M&E to provide “an early warning 
system and a mechanism to respond speedily to problems, as they arise” (Mbeki, 
2004). 
 
However, the M&E systems of municipalities do not have components and 
characteristics of an EWS, and, as a consequence, cannot alert key players and 
stakeholders of developing problematic trends in municipal service delivery processes 
(Sejeng, 2013). As a result, municipal management, staff and stakeholders are unable 
to see an integrated and holistic picture of the key performance situation, to check 
against the performance and outcomes of each and every step of the service delivery 
processes. At the same time, the national and provincial governments cannot conduct 
their oversight and intervention functions in local government (AG, 2016; 2012a: 35; 
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Moore, 2011; The Presidency, 2011a: 10; The Presidency, 2011b; Jonas, 2011: 29-
30).  
 
At this point, it is necessary and important to state the differences between an EWS 
that is incorporated into M&E systems and an EWS that is applied in disaster, risk, 
strategic management, etc. Although the same name EWS is used in this concept, 
there are fundamental differences in the nature and functions of these two kinds of 
EWS. An EWS in an M&E system focuses on common known or expected problems 
and crises while an EWS in other fields focuses on unexpected problems and 
disasters. (This is discussed more in Chapter 2: Conceptual Framework). 
 
This research hypothesises that there are many problems and failures in the 
municipal service delivery processes that are avoidable if early warning signals or 
indicators could be developed, detected and used to defuse or pre-empt these 
burgeoning problems and failures while they are still in the early stages of 
development. This hypothesis is grounded in two premises: firstly, the current level 
and quality of municipal service delivery performance could be improved and in turn 
become capable of fulfilling its constitutional obligations, and secondly, the existing 
M&E systems are not functioning or serving as an EWS.  
 
The first premise holds that in order to be able to achieve better service delivery 
performance, it is essential to develop and detect early warning signals of forthcoming 
problems. Only then can preparation and planning be done to deal with them before 
they mature into fully fledged problems and challenges. The second premise is that 
the existing M&E systems of local government are by legislation obliged to serve as 
an EWS, but the essential components of an EWS are lacking in the systems. As a 
result, these systems cannot alert key players and stakeholders of developing 
problematic trends in municipal service delivery processes. They are neither effective 
nor helpful for oversight or identification of intervention and corrective actions from 
national and provincial governments to intervene and help local government (Engela 
& Ajam, 2010).  
 
Local Government legislation such as the Municipal Systems Act, 2000 (RSA, 2000), 
the Municipal Planning and Performance Management Regulations, 2001 (RSA, 
2001) and the Municipal Systems Amendment Bill, 2003 (RSA, 2003), Presidential 
speeches such as the address of then President Mbeki (2004), handbooks and 
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guidelines for M&E systems such as the White Paper on Local Government, 1998 
(RSA, 1998; DPLG, 2001), Implementing the Municipal Finance Management Act, 
2003 (National Treasury, 2004) and performance management and M&E frameworks 
and policies of municipalities stress the importance of an EWS in M&E systems (See 
Appendix G for the list of municipalities). They state that municipal M&E systems are 
required to serve as EWSs. However, none of them explain how to achieve those 
ends, nor describe “in detail” how an M&E system must be designed to be able to 
work as an EWS. They do not provide examples of M&E systems that have the 
required components and characteristics of an effective EWS. 
 
The information and indicators provided by municipal reports are neither reliable nor 
helpful for national or provincial governments to detect early warning signs in the 
municipal service delivery processes. This leaves them unable to fulfil or carry out 
their constitutional obligations of oversight and intervention in local government 
whenever necessary (Carrim, 2009, 2010; Chabane, 2009, PMG, 2010). Having a 
M&E system that can serve as an EWS, would forewarn of potential problems and 
crises in the municipal service delivery process, and allow municipalities—as well as 
national or provincial governments when necessary—to take the required remedial 
actions and interventions before problems and crises become full-blown.  
 
A theory related to an M&E system is ‘Theory of Change’ (TOC). It explains the causal 
relationships and linkages among inputs, outputs, outcomes and impacts, and assists 
which indicators and data to be monitored and evaluated in order to see whether the 
implementation of the programme or the project is in the right track. However, the 
TOC does not provide means to monitor, detect and utilise early warning signals of 
possible challenges and problems. The limitation of M&E change theory (Theory of 
Change) and the absence or lack of articulated theories underpinning the early 
warning sector of a M&E system led this research to apply the Weak Signals Theory 
(WST) developed by Ansoff (1975; 1979), which are generally used in military and 
intelligence sciences, disaster and strategic management, banking and private sector, 
but have never tried (or tested) to apply neither in M&E system nor in local 
government sector. The weak signals theory is built on a premise that any change 
developed is preceded by some forms of warnings, and monitoring, capturing and 
understanding those warnings provide a means of proactive management to prevent 
or pre-empt emerging problems and challenges (Ansoff 1975; 1979). One of the 
purposes (or the research question) of this study is to investigate (or answer) whether 
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the WST could be applied in municipal M&E systems in order to be able to function as 
an EWS, and whether or not the WST contributes to the effectiveness of a municipal 
M&E to receive advance information about potential problems or emerging 
challenges.  
 
The point of departure this research suggests is not just recognising the implications 
of factors and problems that impede municipal service delivery processes, but 
explaining how the current M&E systems, lacking the components of an EWS, are 
failing to equip municipal management, its employees, as well as stakeholders, such 
as national or provincial governments, and the public, with accurate data about the 
service delivery processes. Consequently, they are unable to oversee, assist, guide 
and intervene timeously in local government. This research explains how an effective 
and efficient M&E system that has the characteristic of an EWS can serve as an early 
warning system. It can help and enable municipalities to address their service delivery 
problems before they mature into fully-fledged challenges. It can also enable the 
national and provincial spheres of government to effectively oversee, guide and 
intervene in municipal challenges and problems.  
 
In the same vein, since this research explored to what extent the problems of 
providing basic services experienced by municipalities are influenced and affected by 
the existing M&E systems of local government, this research represents a necessary 
shift from focusing on financial accountability per se, which is currently the main 
objective of oversight of the national and provincial governments and municipal 
reporting systems, to ensure the integration of the components of an EWS into the 
M&E systems of municipalities. 
 
1.2 Problem statement 
The problem is that the existing M&E systems of local government do not have the 
characteristics of an EWS and, as a result, cannot provide early warning functions 
(Sejeng, 2013; Moore, 2011; Engela & Ajam, 2010; CoGTA, 2009; Gibb & Goldman, 
2006). The lack of EWS components and the failure to serve as an EWS of the 
municipal M&E systems is one of the vital areas that local government and 
municipalities should explore, understand and address in order to improve their 
service delivery performance.  
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The conceptual question whether an M&E system is meant to provide early warning 
signals and serve as an EWS system has not been adequately answered. Moreover, 
And the theoretical question on the feasibility of applying the Weak Signals Theory in 
municipal M&E and EWS processes is also still have to be investigated. 
 
1.3  Purpose of the research 
The purpose of this study is, first, to investigate the current M&E systems of 
municipalities in order to understand to what extent they incorporate the essential 
components of an EWS; and second, to design and propose a model of M&E system 
that serves as an EWS. That will enable municipalities to receive advance information 
about potential problems and implement the necessary preventive interventions. 
 
It will also assist local government, municipalities, municipal entities, municipal front-
line staff, service providers and community members to track performance of their 
front-line service delivery processes, to gather information on the quality of service 
delivery, to monitor, detect and identify problem areas such as human resources (HR) 
such as skill and capacity level; the financial health, such as budgetary constraints, 
cash flow condition, and profits and losses; the conditions and needs of infrastructure; 
administrative and governance quality and situations, for example potential tension 
between political and administrative organs of the municipality as well as municipal 
entities, potential conflicts among  municipalities, municipal entities; and levels and 
conditions of public participation in municipal processes, such as whether a 
municipality communicates effectively with its local community so that community 
members know to what they are entitled. Furthermore, the EWS and its reports can 
also build institutional memory and knowledge, systematically, and provide lessons of 
previous failures and problems, and how to adopt and improve plans and preparations 
in order to decrease the possibility of them happening again, and to detect any 
possible problems and failures, and, in turn, to be able to pre-empt them from 
maturing into real problems and failures.  
 
The original contribution to knowledge of this study is fourfold. First, it makes new 
interpretations of municipal service delivery problems and some of the root causes, 
which have not been aware of, researched before or discussed substantially, i.e., 
alienation in society, workplace and community, silo mentality, and resultant 
fragmentation throughout planning, functionalities, information and knowledge. It is an 
important original finding of this study for a fact that the concept of Alienation and the 
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effects of alienation on municipal service delivery performance has never been in the 
local government and public sector discourses. Second, it provides a new M&E 
method (pM&E, or proactive M&E, i.e., application of an EWS system integrated to the 
municipal M&E system, required by legislation, but never been designed or applied 
before), to tackle or handle the municipal service delivery challenges and problems. 
Third, it extends the applicability of the Weak Signals Theory, which has previously 
never been used in public sector management. Fourth, it argues that the boundary, 
functions and objectives of conventional M&E systems need to be extended in order 
to accommodate the components and functions of the early warning concept. 
 
1.4  Research questions 
In order to examine, explore and find the solutions to the above mentioned research 
problems, the following central research question and supporting research questions 
were used to guide this research: 
 
The central research question  
1. Can the effectiveness of M&E systems be improved by integration of the weak 
signals theory, and why? 
 
In order to further explore the central research question, the following guiding 
questions framed the research:  
2. To what extent does the current M&E system of municipalities have the 
characteristics of an EWS?  
3. Can the current M&E system of municipalities be modified and upgraded to 
integrate the components and characteristics of EWS in it, so that it can alert 
key players and stakeholders of developing problematic trends in the last 
stage of municipal service delivery processes, i.e., the implementation stage?    
 
1.5 Delimitations and limitations 
Leedy (1997: 59) points out that “the researcher can be easily beguiled by discovering 
interesting information that lies beyond the precincts of the problem being 
investigated.” In order to ensure that the researcher did not fall into this trap a 
framework was set to assist the limitations of the research needed. The focus of this 
research is, therefore, not on the issues and arguments of whether or not there are 
problems in municipalities, or whether the service delivery performance of 
municipalities is low or high. The main area of the study is to explore and understand 
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early warning signs or indicators of problems and factors affecting municipal service 
delivery processes.  
 
The research was limited in three ways. First, it studied the CoJ and three of its 
municipal owned entities (MOEs), rather than municipalities and municipal entities 
around the country. Second, it focused on four basic services, i.e., water, electricity, 
sanitation and waste removal, rather than all municipal services delivered to 
communities. Third, it explored the problems experienced in the last component of the 
service delivery processes, i.e., the implementation stage of delivering services to 
community members, rather than all areas of municipal service delivery processes 
that involve planning, consultation, budgeting, building and maintaining service 
delivery infrastructures, and delivering services to community members. That was an 
advice or recommendation given by CoJ senior officials during the preliminary study 
(interview) conducted at the Office of the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan 
Municipality, at Thuso House, 66 Stiemens Street, Johannesburg, on 6 November 
2013 (See the preliminary interview note at the Appendix 5). 
 
For instance, for City Power, delivering services means providing or supplying 
electricity to residents, maintaining and repairing electricity meters, cable networks, 
replacing or repairing faulty street lights, and auditing meter readings. For 
Johannesburg Water, delivering services means providing or supplying water and 
sanitation services to residents; maintaining or fixing waste water culverts, water 
pipes, water valves and hydrants, and water mains; replacing and fixing water meters, 
boxes, covers and connections and also sewer covers; reading water meters; clearing 
blockages in water pipes; operating and maintaining the sewer network. For Pikitup, 
delivery services means collecting trash; maintaining vehicles; operating and running 
waste treatments; collecting, diverting and recycling refuse, and environmental 
development and education. However, it is pertinent to state that although this study 
focuses on the problems experienced in the delivery stage of services, factors and 
causes of those problems are originated in the early stages of the municipal service 
delivery processes, that include planning (Integrated Development Planning, IDP), 
budgeting, public consultations and participation, human resource management, and 
infrastructure maintenance and development.  
 
  11 
1.6 Significance of the study 
The significance and contribution of a research has three general areas: knowledge in 
the relevant areas, policy considerations, and practitioners (Punch, 2000: 272). The 
study extended the areas of applications of three theories—Ansoff’s theory of weak 
signals, and four roots of service delivery problems of Devarajan and Reinikka (2004), 
and four elements of an EWS (UNISDR) (2005)—to municipal service delivery 
processes.  
 
The theoretical contribution of this research is that it would be hard to apply the Weak 
Signals Theory to an early warning system for a municipal service delivery process 
because of low capacity of municipalities, heavy involvement of political influences in 
municipal processes, and the ten joints (fault-lines) that connect the different sectors 
and groups of municipalities, which make communication process difficult and long. 
However, the rationale of the theory can still be applied. 
 
As an operational contribution, the outcome of this research is a proposed M&E 
system, with a section on EWS. Although it will not be a cure-all for municipal 
problems, it will help the respective municipalities to improve communication, co-
ordination and co-operation both within individual sectors and between the various 
municipal entities and the City of Johannesburg. It will not only make the M&E system 
more streamlined but will improve collective planning as well as making collective 
problem-solving more effective. Furthermore, it will enable municipalities as well as 
national and provincial governments to get a better sense of the planning, 
implementing, communicating, overseeing and monitoring of the municipal service 
delivery process. 
 
Municipalities in South Africa mostly have common elements such as water treatment 
plants, sewage, water reticulation, roads, bridges, traffic light systems electricity sub-
stations, abattoirs, morgues, finance departments, billing systems, town planning, 
having common elements – just the scale changes. Thus, it is reasonable to argue 
that there is lots of knowledge, provided by this study, that could be transferrable into 
a basic common municipal early warning system, and could be installed in every 
municipality by tailoring it to suit the peculiarities of each municipality.  
 
It is important to understand that merely having an M&E system that is integrated with 
an EWS will not solve or help municipalities to address or even prevent problems that 
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are correctly alerted. What is also required is a competent team that diligently 
monitors, and identifies the early warning signals, and then effectively communicates 
the findings to the responsible persons or team to deal with the upcoming problems. 
Finally, the notified departments must develop and implement the response 
capabilities needed to address the problems. As Hodgetts (1979: 101) argues, “no 
plan can be successfully implemented without a competent organisation. There must 
be some process by which the work and the people come together”. Similarly, no 
matter how systematic and efficient the EWS is in the M&E system, it will not be 
useful when the management or the leadership of the organisation is not interested 
and engaged in the system, or not committed to implement or apply the system. 
 
Most importantly, integrating an EWS system into a public sector M&E system paves 
an innovative way of applying an EWS and ‘Weak Signals theory’, which are generally 
used in disaster management (DM) and strategic management (SM), in private sector 
management. Consequently, the study serves as a reference for future research on 
the characteristics of an EWS incorporated into the M&E systems of municipalities as 
an effective tool of the municipal service delivery processes.  
 
1.7 The outline of the thesis 
The thesis has nine chapters. Chapter (1) presents the introduction and background 
information of the study, problem statement, the purpose of the research, research 
question. It also states the delimitation and limitation, as well as the significance of the 
study. Chapter (2) provides the conceptual and theoretical frameworks of the study. 
Chapter (3) reflects a thorough review of the literature on the functions and 
responsibilities of local government, current municipal service delivery performance, 
municipal performance management and the M&E system and legislative and 
regulatory frameworks for them, and municipal service delivery challenges. Chapter 
(4) provides the methodology used in this study as well as the manner in which data 
was organised, categorised and analysed. Chapter (5) serves as a case study, that 
provides background information of three municipal entities and discusses factors 
affecting municipal performance. Chapter (6) provides the M&E system and the EWS 
framework. Chapter (7) presents and discusses the theoretical implications. Chapter 
(8) arrives at answers to the research questions posed in the chapter 1, followed by 
knowledge contributions and recommendations for future research. Chapter (9) 
includes appendixes and references (Figure 1.2). 
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Figure 1.2 Outline of the thesis 
  
1.8 Conclusion 
This chapter provides the general background of the study. It discusses the purpose 
and aim of the study followed by the rationale of the study, and two premises on which 
the research is based. It then states the problem and purpose statement, research 
questions, delimitations and limitations, and significance of the study. The next 
chapter gives the conceptual and theoretical framework of the study.  
  
Chapter 1
Introduction
Chapter 2
Exploring M&E, EWS and 
Weak Signals Theory
Chapter 3
Local Governance, M&E & 
Delivery Challenges
Chapter 4
Methodology
Chapter 5
Service Delivery Chellenges
Chapter 6
M&E and EWS
Chapter 7
Discussion & Theoretical 
Implications
Chapter 8
Answers & Conclusion
Chapter 9
Appendixes & References
Both Ch 2 and Ch 3 present 
literature review. Ch 2 is 
related to concepts and 
theories related to M&E, EWS 
and WST, while Ch 3 to 
service delivery challenges and 
M&E system in South Africa’s 
local government context.
Both Ch 5 and Ch 6 present 
findings of the study.  Ch 5 is 
related to the service delivery 
challenges while the Ch 6 to 
M&E and EWS. 
Literature 
Review
Data 
Presentation, 
or Findings
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Chapter 2 
 
EXPLORING M&E, EWS  
AND WEAK SIGNALS THEORY 
 
 
The chapter serves as a literature review related to M&E, EWS and Weak Signals 
Theory. It explores the concepts and natures of M&E and EWS, introduces a reactive 
problem-solving approach and a proactive one, and discusses the differences 
between an M&E without an EWS and an M&E with an EWS. It also explains why 
M&E theories and the existing management tools are inadequate to provide 
mechanism to monitor and capture early warning signals. They serve as a conceptual 
framework section. The second part of this chapter presents the theoretical framework 
of the study, explaining about the theories that are related to M&E, EWS and root 
causes of municipal service delivery problems. It also states why these theories are 
used and the relationship among them. It introduces the Weak Signals Theory and 
discusses why its approach and method are useful to monitor, capture and use early 
warning signals. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The research problem of this study is the inability of municipal monitoring and 
evaluation (M&E) systems to provide warning information about emerging problems 
and as a result, municipalities lose opportunities to tackle those emerging problems 
when they are still in the beginning stages of their development into fully-fledged, or 
mature (completed) problems.  
 
This Chapter has four main sections. The first is a short section that describes the 
need for a new way of solving municipal problems—a proactive approach, and 
outlines how that approach could be formulated. The second is the conceptual 
framework, which sets the ground on which the concepts and theories used in this 
study are positioned, and describes the conceptual road-map from the current 
approach—reactive one—to the proposed new approach—proactive one. The 
conceptual framework section consists of four sub-sections, namely, first the basis of 
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M&E; second, M&E and EWS information; third, methodology to get the information; 
and fourth, the application of the information. The third section presents the theoretical 
framework. It introduces three theories that are used in this study, why they are 
necessary, and how they are related to one another. And the fourth section describes 
the core concepts and tools that are used in, or are related to the study (Table 2.1). 
 
Table 2.1 The organisation of the chapter 
2.1 
Introduction 
2.2 
Reactive to 
Proactive 
Approach 
2.3 
Four stages 
from M&E to 
EWS 
2.4 
Theoretical 
Framework 
2.5 
Definitions 
of key 
concepts 
2.6 
Conclusion 
Introduction 
about the 
chapter:  
 What this 
chapter is 
about 
 
 What is 
involved in 
the chapter 
 
 How many 
sections 
there are  
and what  
they are 
A short 
section that 
outlines the 
conceptual 
road-map:  
 From a 
reactive 
problem-
solving 
approach to 
a proactive 
one 
 
 And from 
M&E 
without an 
EWS, to a 
new M&E 
system 
(M&E with 
an EWS) 
A conceptual 
journey from 
M&E without 
EWS, to M&E 
with EWS  
 Basis of 
M&E 
 
 M&E 
information  
 
 Methodology 
to collect 
information: 
tools, 
approaches 
and theory 
 
 Application 
of 
information 
Three 
theories used 
in this study, 
why they are 
used, and 
how they are 
related to 
one another:  
 Weak 
Signals 
Theory 
 
 Four 
essential 
elements of 
an EWS 
 
 Four roots 
of service 
delivery 
problems 
Definitions 
of core 
concepts 
and how 
they are 
related to 
one another 
 
Summary of 
the main 
points of the 
chapter and 
conclusion 
 
2.2 Reactive and Proactive Problem Solving Approaches 
Problems and challenges always exist, although their frequency and the severity of 
their impact vary. The municipalities in South Africa are still facing several service 
delivery problems and challenges. Moreover, no matter how advanced and efficient a 
municipal system and its management are, some problems will always exist and will 
have negative effects on municipal system performance.  
 
One of the premises on which the study is constructed is that handling or solving 
emerging (immature) problems is easier and less costly than solving fully-fledged or 
mature ones. For that reason, municipal M&E systems are required by legislation to 
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serve as an early warning system (EWS). Another premise of this study is that the 
current methods of solving municipal problems can be improved through the help of 
an effective M&E system, which can provide early warning information of municipal 
problems.  
 
According to problem management processes, the problem solving approach can be 
divided into two kinds: the current approach (“reactive approach” because it solves 
problems only when they become problems), and the new one (“proactive approach” 
because it solves problems before they become problems, while they are still at an 
immature stage (Zitek, 2015; Summers, 2014; Wilson, 2012) (See Section 2.4 for 
more discussion on proactive and reactive problem solving approaches). 
 
In the same way, M&E can also be divided into two kinds: M&E without an EWS, and 
M&E with an EWS. The following section presents the Conceptual Framework: A 
conceptual and operational journey (or process) from a reactive problem-solving 
approach to a proactive problem-solving one, and from M&E without an EWS to M&E 
with an EWS (Figure 2.1). 
 
Figure 2.1 A Four-step conceptual journey 
 
 
2.3 Four Stages from M&E to EWS 
This section serves as the conceptual framework section, that illustrates the journey 
from the current, conventional way of problem-solving (or reactive approach) to a new 
way of problem-solving (or proactive approach). Moreover, it also, briefly, introduces 
concepts, theories and tools that are related to developing a proactive approach for 
problem-solving, and how they are related to one another and what their roles are 
Are they conceptually related? and 
two levels of questions.
Reactive 
problem-solving
(1) Basis of M&E and 
EWS 
(2) Information: 
Different information 
for different purposes
(3) Methodology to 
collect information: 
Different tools and 
approach
(4) Application of 
information
M&E, 
without an EWS
M&E, 
with an EWS
Proactive 
problem-solving
Journey
A Four-Step 
Journey
Quality of information, the roles of 
ToC and LogFrame, and their 
limitations
Data collection methods of Risk 
Management, Strategic Management, 
and the roles of SWOT and 
Balanced Scorecard
The use of information in diffusing 
or mitigating approaching problems.
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there. This section consists of four sub-sections, which discusses four stages in the 
journey travelled from “M&E without an EWS” to “M&E with an EWS”.  
 
The first sub-section posits a conceptual question related to M&E and EWS; are they 
conceptually related?. The second sub-section explains the importance of information 
to any kind of management, and how different kinds of information are used for 
different types of management, such as Risk Management (RM), Disaster 
Management (DM), Strategic Management (SM), M&E and EWS. It also discusses 
how various M&E information are determined by the purpose, planning and design of 
the M&E. It also presents the roles of and effects of ToC and LogFrame in and on the 
quality and usefulness of M&E information. The third sub-section is about 
methodology: how information is monitored and collected. It describes a number of 
management tools such as SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and 
Threats) analysis, and the Balanced Scorecard approach that provide a means to 
identify and create a list of weaknesses, threats and risks that are required to be 
addressed. After that, it also discusses the limitations of those tools and approaches 
to monitor and capture early warning signals or indicators of any problems and 
introduces a theory and a model that can be applied to overcome their limitations. 
They are Weak Signals Theory and Four Essential Elements of an EWS model. The 
last sub-section discusses the application of information for different purposes and 
ends, which include EWS purposes and objectives (Table 2.2).  
 
Table 2.2 Organisation of Conceptual Framework Section 
2.3.1 
The Basis of M&E 
and EWS 
2.3.2 
Information: Life-
blood of 
Management 
2.3.3 
Methodology: 
Collecting 
information 
2.3.4 
Application  
 What M&E really 
means 
 What EWS really 
means 
 Are M&E and 
EWS 
conceptually 
related? 
 
 
 Information:  
usefulness and 
quality 
 
 The role of Theory 
of Change (ToC)  
 
 The role of Logical 
Framework 
(LogFrame) 
 Management 
tools, approaches 
and  
 
 Four essential 
elements of an 
EWS 
 
 Four roots of 
service delivery 
problems 
 Application of 
information 
 
 
  18 
2.3.1  The Basis and nature of M&E and EWS 
The research problem of this study is that M&E information is not useable or useful to 
foresee emerging problems, so that those problems could not be prevented or 
mitigated while they are still in their early stage of development. In other words, the 
problem is that M&E does not serve as an early warning system (EWS). 
 
The question of whether M&E serves as an EWS has to be answered on two levels: 
the conceptual level and the operational level. The first level is to answer whether 
M&E is conceptually related to an EWS. If M&E is not conceptually related to an EWS, 
two more questions are then entailed, because the legislation requires M&E to serve 
as an EWS. The first new question is to ask how M&E can be modified so that it will 
be able to serve as an EWS. In order to answer that question, the nature and 
characteristics of an EWS are required to be understood, and then compared with the 
nature and characteristics of a conventional M&E system. By any means or any 
answers attained for these questions, the task of this study is to close the conceptual 
gaps that exist between the nature and characteristics of M&E and those of an EWS. 
Closing that gap is called in this study “a conceptual journey from M&E without an 
EWS, to M&E with an EWS. If M&E is conceptually related to an EWS, the journey will 
be short. But if M&E is not conceptually related to an EWS, the journey will be long 
and conceptually tricky. 
 
No matter what answers are obtained for the first level ‘conceptual’ question as well 
as its sub-questions if they are entailed, the second level question is required to be 
asked.  
 
The second question is an operational one. Even if M&E is conceptually related to an 
EWS, M&E still can fail to serve as an EWS because of operational flaws, which might 
be the result of design failures, or implementation failures. That leaves another gap, 
an operational one. Closing that ‘operational’ gap can be termed “an operational 
journey from M&E without an EWS, to M&E with an EWS”. Answering all these 
questions is not required to be done in this chapter, as it is the Conceptual Framework 
Chapter. But they will be answered by this study, and discussed in later chapters 
(Chapter 6 and 7) of this thesis. 
 
Is M&E conceptually related to an EWS?: In order to answer  the question of 
whether M&E is conceptually related to an EWS or whether M&E has an EWS nature, 
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it is necessary to clarify what the concept of an early warning is and what an EWS 
means. The concept of an early warning system (EWS) is not unfamiliar to   us. In our 
daily life, we have been using and benefitting from the use of an EWS, in one way or 
another, without realising that we are using an EWS. One obvious and common 
example is the use of information provided by the weather forecast to plan our day 
ahead.  
 
The concept of an early warning system can be understood in this small analogy 
stated by Strive Masiyiwa (2016): “A farmer looks up to the sky and sees black clouds 
rolling in, and says, ‘There is a storm coming!’.” But an EWS does not stop at noticing 
or capturing these warning signs (rolling black clouds), and knowing or understanding 
what it means (an imminent storm), but it has to undertake the necessary actions to 
deal with the events that will be coming soon.   
 
A key word in an EWS is ‘early’. The meaning of the term ‘early’ in an EWS, can be 
also understood in Masiyiwa’s (2016) explanation. “The sooner you see a storm 
through the signs, the more time you have to react, as long as you are prepared to do 
so. Don’t be a sitting duck waiting to be soaked!” said he.  
 
The term ‘early’ is, however, a subjective word: its meaning depends on the whole 
length or duration of a process (project or programme), and it has different meaning in 
different situations and contexts where it is applied. In some cases, ‘early’ means 
within a few hours while in others, it can be within ‘a few weeks’ or even ‘a few 
months’. Therefore, there are some instances where M&E reports and information 
serve as an early warning system for projects whose life-span (or length or duration) 
is a couple of years or even a decade or two, for example mid-term (medium-term) 
and long-term projects and targets, such as the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) adopted by 189 U.N. member countries and numerous international 
organisations in 2000, targeting to achieve eight goals within 15 years (in 2015) 
(Kusek & Rist, 2004: 3). There are many similar plans and projects that project long-
term goals, for example, the CoJ’s the i-Goli 2002 Plan as well as its Growth and 
Development Strategy 2040 (GDS 2040), and municipal entities’ business plans that 
cover five years such as City Power’s Business Plan (2013 - 2016). 
 
An answer to whether an M&E system serves as an EWS depends on the information 
provided by the M&E system (Reinhnrdt, 1984; Choo, 2009; World Bank, 2000). An 
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M&E system serves as an EWS if it provides early warning information or signals of 
emerging problems and allows modifications to be made to the plan or the programme 
(Görgens & Kusek, 2009; McCoy, Ngari, & Krumpe, 2005).  
 
2.3.2  Information: Life-blood of Management 
Information is the life-blood of management. Without information, any kind of 
management whether it is M&E, or Risk Management (RM), or Strategic Management 
(SM), or Disaster Management (DM) could not be conducted. Different kinds of 
information are necessary and are used in different kinds of management. Information 
needed and used in RM is risk information. Similarly, information required and utilised 
in SM is strategic information. In the same vein, information that is necessary and 
applied in DM is information related to disasters. 
 
The importance of information is more relevant and crucial for M&E. The basic 
foundation and rationalé for the existence of M&E is information, that is credible and 
useful. The success of an M&E system depends on the quality of its information or 
data. Görgens and Kusek (2009: 289) call ‘data’ “[T]he fuel of an M&E system”. Data 
and information collected by an M&E system, in turn, depends on the design of the 
M&E system, its purpose, and questions asked at the design stage (Görgens & 
Kusek, 2009). 
 
M&E is used for a wide range of different purposes. One of the popular and common 
purposes of using M&E is “for checking progress with the implementation of plans”, to 
see (know) “whether we are doing the right things, whether the work  done (activities) 
actually resulted in the intended outputs, outcomes and impacts (or achieved their set 
objectives and goals), and are being effective, efficient and providing value for money, 
and how we can do things better” (DPME, 2014: 2; Loveridge: 2011; Gosling, 2010; 
Perrin, Owen, van den Knapp & Stame, 2008; Woodhill, 2005). It can also be used as 
learning from the experience in order to develop their own capacity and the quality of 
future projects, or works (Loveridge: 2011; Gosling, 2010); for decision-making 
(Gosling, 2010), supporting operational management, supporting strategic 
management, and capacity building (Woodhill, 2005). 
 
Different purposes of an M&E system need different kinds of information: for example, 
to support operational management such as directing, coordinating and controlling of 
human, financial and physical resources, M&E provides the basic management 
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information; to support strategic management, M&E information will be related to set 
and adjust goals, objectives and strategies and to improve quality and performance 
(Woodhill, 2005). M&E that is useful for one purpose may not be usable for another 
purpose. When M&E is designed to use for accountability-control or transparency 
purposes, its information will not be relevant to use for EWS purpose.  
 
Whether an M&E can provide early warning information, in turn, depends on its 
Theory of Change (ToC)—an explanation of the causal links and results chain—and 
Logical Framework (LogFrame)—that identifies not only performance indicators at 
each stage in the results chain, but also risk which might impede the attainment of the 
objectives. Although, like an EWS, the ToC and LogFrame systems have an 
anticipative nature in terms of expecting or anticipating, and establishing certain steps 
of accomplishments and their indicators along the entire process, programme or 
project, it does not always contain the considerations or means to anticipate or 
foresee probable problems or barriers that can be encountered along the process, 
programme or project.  
 
 In the same way that indicators of each step of the accomplishment of a programme 
can be formulated and established, it is also possible and required to anticipate the 
probable problems and barriers, as well as the indicators or signs of their 
development or evolution (or coming). World Bank (2002: 8) states that “[d]uring 
implementation the LogFrame serves as a useful tool to review progress and take 
corrective action”. If M&E applies comprehensive LogFrame and ToC, that identify not 
only performance indicators at each stage in the results chain, but also risks which 
might impede the attainment of the objectives, then their early warning signs will be 
able to serve as an EWS. There will however still be a gap between anticipating and 
capturing early warning signals. Weak Signals Theory (WST) seems to be able to fill 
that gap, i.e., to monitor, and interpret early warning signals (or weak signals). The 
WST is introduced and presented in the Theoretical Framework Section (Sub-Section 
2.4.1). 
 
Moreover, there are two main problems that ToC and LogFrame tend to have. The 
first problem is “theory failure” or “cause-effect identification problem”, i.e., the theory 
or idea or a set of assumptions on which a program or project is based do not work, 
because the cause-effect relationship identified by the theory is flawed or failed to 
identify all factors required for causes. While doing things well and implementing 
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correctly, a programme or project could still fail to produce the expected outcomes or 
the desired results, if underpinning ToC and LogFrame are flawed (Chen, 2005; 
Funnell & Rogers, 2011; Porter, 2012). Another problem is “implementation failure”, 
which is in fact not related to ToC or LogFrame. Implementation failure has happened 
when the programme or project has not been implemented actually or correctly, 
according to the underpinning ToC. which is correctly formulated (Loveridge: 2011; 
Patton, 2008; Rogers, 2008; Woodhill, 2005).  
 
Moreover, ToC and LogFrame approaches do not adequately provide detailed steps 
about the early warning signals of the possible risks, and how to plan or prepare to 
monitor, capture and utilise the signals and knowledge to handle the risks. This is 
where the Weak Signals Theory comes into the system, as it provides the means and 
approaches to catch early warning signs (weak signals) of those theory and 
implementation failures. The Weak Signals Theory is introduced and discussed in the 
Theoretical Framework Section (Sub-section 2.4.1). 
 
2.3.3  Methodology: How to collect Information 
Information necessary for management is collected by various means, depending on 
the different kinds of management and their purposes. Different kinds of management 
use different data-collection methods, to collect different kinds of information. In this 
section, different kinds of management such as Risk Management, Strategic 
Management, and different tools such as SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, 
Opportunities and Threats) analysis, and Balanced Scorecard are introduced, which is 
followed by discussions on how they are similar and different from one another, and 
whether they are related to EWS. 
 
Risk Management: It is obvious to see and understand the close relationship 
between the nature and functions (operations and steps) of an EWS and RM (Niwa, 
1989; Nikander & Eloranta, 2001). RM and an EWS have similar and common 
components to one another. These components are, (1) identification of risks, (2) 
evaluating (or analysing) them, (3) prioritising them, (4) planning to deal with them, (5) 
and taking mitigatory actions. The identification of risk in RM is the same as the 
formulation of possible problems that can occur throughout the processes (or 
programme or project) in an EWS. To see the similarities and relatedness between 
RM and an EWS, the relationship between hazard, risk and problem have to be 
understood. RM defines “a risk” as a future impact of a hazard that is not controlled or 
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mitigated, and if it has not been prevent will create a problem (Figure 2.2). This 
relationship between hazard, risk and problem, stressed by RM, is necessary to 
understand problems, their causes and factors, and solutions, which are useful and 
critical to two essential elements of an EWS, i.e., creating a risk-database and 
developing response capabilities. 
 
Although similar and related to each other, RM is not an EWS because it does not 
have the nature of the concept ‘warning’. RM does not have a stage where it monitors 
the early warning signs of developing risks. It does not look for early warning signals, 
as it only takes the necessary mitigatory actions once risks have been identified, 
analysed, and prioritised, without using monitoring, capturing, using early warning 
signs of those risks. Steps that are taken by an EWS but not by RM include (1) 
identification of early warning signals of risks (emerging problems), (2) monitoring 
them in order to capture them so that their coming (emerging or approaching) is 
apparent, and (3) based on these warning signals and information, taking necessary 
actions, which include communicating, helping decision-making, resource 
mobilisation, and fixing them or correcting their causes.  
 
Figure 2.2 Hazard, risk and problem 
HAZARD  RISK  PROBLEM 
 
A present condition, event, 
object, or circumstance that 
could lead to or contribute to  
an unplanned or undesired 
event such as an accident.  
 
It is a source of danger; 
 
Future impact of a       
hazard that is not   
controlled or eliminated. 
 
It may or may not    
happen, but if it does  
occur it will have an effect. 
 
Future outcome 
of un-prevented 
risks 
Source: FAA, 2009 
 
An interesting question that should be pondered and answered is “why the legislation 
attaches an EWS to M&E rather than to RM”.  By nature, an EWS is more closely 
related to Risk management. However, the reasoning of the legislation for associating 
an EWS with M&E, and demanding (or requiring) that M&E serve as an an EWS could 
be understood as an operational consideration: an EWS requires, among other things, 
constant monitoring, which is one of the primary operations of M&E. Monitoring does 
not have a prominent role in RM. 
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Strategic Management (SM): It uses a method called environmental scanning (both 
external and internal). But unlike M&E, its purpose is to help achieve goals and 
objectives, and to formulate strategies and develop policies and plans to achieve 
those goals and objectives (David, 2005). Although their purposes are different, there 
are some similarities between SM and M&E. One of them is the questions asked by 
SM. Questions—such as whether or not the initiative is really working towards the 
correct objectives; Why failures are occurring, because of the wrong assumptions 
(incorrect theory of action) or due to problems with implementation; How problems 
can be overcome and successes built on—are asked both by SM and M&E (Woodhill, 
2005). 
 
Like RM, but unlike an EWS, SM does not use early warning information. In SM (like 
RM), there is no concept of early warning, and no components or steps of 
identification of early warning signals of strategic barriers (risks, in case of RM) and 
monitoring, capturing, analysing, communicating (dissemination), and utilisation of 
these warning information (signals). Like RM, SM starts dealing with strategic barriers 
immediately once those barriers are identified, analysed and prioritised. 
 
Moreover, there are a couple of management tools that are used, albeit not for early 
warning purposes, to identify and manage future problems or risks, and their causes 
and solutions. Two of them are closely relevant to an EWS. They are SWOT analysis 
and Balance Scorecard. 
 
SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) analysis: It is a 
widely used management planning tool to evaluate factors related to the achievement 
of a project or programme by identifying the internal strengths and weaknesses (i.e., 
within its control) and the external threats and opportunities (i.e., outside its control) 
(Görgens & Kusek, 2009: 133). It also helps to determine obstacles and barriers that 
can exist in the programme or project (which are related to limitations or weaknesses, 
and threats), and devise solutions to overcome them, (which are related to strengths). 
Normally, SWOT analysis is not used in planning for M&E or an EWS. But by 
integrating it into both M&E and an EWS, at the planning stages, both M&E and the 
EWS could become more effective and powerful. 
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Balanced Scorecard:  This is a management tool that can help to achieve strategic 
objectives.  It is a single concise report, with a succinct summary of the most relevant 
information, which managers can use to keep track of their activities and monitor the 
outcomes and consequences of these actions (Shulver & Antarkar, 2001). Kaplan and 
Norton (1992) proposed to include four sections in a balanced scorecard: financial, 
customer, internal business processes, and learning and growth. A small number of 
indicators or measures are identified under each of these sectors, and they are 
required to be modified and added to over time. The basic idea is to provide a set of 
critical indicators that show the health of the organisations strategic performance. 
Since its introduction, it has been modified and improved, to overcome various 
limitations and deficiencies in its structure, and make it more relevant and functional to 
strategic management, to achieve strategic objectives. 
 
Both SWOT analysis and Balanced Scorecard are quite closely related to M&E and 
EWS. Information and data generated and organised by SWOT analysis and 
Balanced Scorecard are useful for the creation and revision of risk or a problem data-
base, creation of a watch-list of prioritised risks or problems to keep one’s eyes on, 
and the building and development of response capabilities. Their approaches and 
methods should be integrated into the methodologies of M&E and EWS. 
 
The role of Weak Signals Theory (WST): These tools and approaches (SWOT, SM,  
RM, Balanced scorecard) do not adequately explain or propose a means to capture 
early warning signs of emerging or approaching problems or risks that are either 
foreseen (therefore anticipated or prepared for)  or un-foreseen. The Weak Signals 
Theory, on the other hand, provides and proposes a means (or mechanisms) to 
monitor, capture and interpret early warning signs (weak signals) of changes, or 
problems (or surprises, or deviations from plans) whether or not they are anticipated 
and prepared for or unforeseen and unprepared. The Weak Signal Theory is 
introduced and discussed in the Theoretical Framework Section (Sub-Section 2.4.1).  
 
2.3.4  Application of information 
An EWS is not merely to provide early warning information, but is also to help in 
applying the information to diffuse or mitigate developing or approaching problems to 
which warning indicators are indicating. Only having warning information, no matter 
how early they have been received, will not prevent problems automatically. Actions 
have to be taken, based on the warning information, to prevent or mitigate those 
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approaching problems, as much as possible. Kaivo-oja (2012) argues that it is not 
enough to detect early warning information (or weak signals) leading to potential 
problems; it is also necessary to act upon them. 
 
One of the problems with M&E is that not all information generated by M&E are not 
used. For example, in South Africa, it has shown that appropriate information are 
generated but they have not been used effectively for performance management 
purposes (DPLG, 2006: 25).  
 
Application of information received is hampered by at least two reasons: lack of will, 
and lack of capacity. The first barrier is the lack of will or interest from leadership, or 
decision-makers, who unfortunately hold, for some reasons (perhaps an effect of 
alienation), ‘I could not bother’ attitude, or ‘everything is just fine’ perspective. It is one 
of the most difficult challenges EWS and M&E officers have to overcome, i.e., to 
convince decision-makers or people who hold power and control resources. The 
second barrier is lack of capacity. Even when a decision is made to deal with or 
mitigate the approaching problems, after reviewing and accepting the importance of 
the early warning signals obtained, and the need to act on them, the response 
capability might not be adequate.  
 
An EWS that provides early warning information to responsible persons or a group or 
a team has done only half of its job. The other half of its job is to have a plan or 
programme in place for  an efficient and effective  method of communication and 
dissemination of the warning information (as warning information become no-early if 
the communication and decision-making processes take too long or get delayed), and 
also for building and developing a response capability (although it is not directly under 
their responsibility and control, an EWS team needs to have a clear plan and 
programme to collaborate with every related team   or group  about response-
capability development). 
 
The journey from M&E without an EWS to M&E with an EWS started with the 
discussion of the conceptual relationship between M&E and EWS, and ended with the 
application of information gathered by M&E, which is EWS information and is usable 
to diffuse or mitigate emerging problems. Theories and EWS methods and tools 
introduced and discussed in this conceptual framework section are discussed more in 
the following an EWS model. 
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2.4 AN EWS MODEL  
In order to understand the functionalities and performance of municipal service 
delivery, and the roles played by M&E systems that are required, by legislation, to 
serve as Early Warning Systems (EWSs), this study applies three main theories: The 
theory of weak signals, four roots of service delivery problems and four essential 
components of an EWS. The Weak Signals Theory argues that it is possible to detect 
or foresee or predict problems or changes or surprises by means of an EWS which 
can indicate that these problems, changes or surprises transmit or hint as to their 
coming, well before their actual arriving. To supplement the Weak Signals theory, two 
complementary theories are applied in this research. The first complementary theory 
is that the four roots of service delivery are related to the root causes of problems in 
the municipal service delivery process. The second complementary theory is four 
essential components of an EWS, used in order to design an EWS.  
 
The Figure (2.3) represents an EWS model. This research was primarily situated in a 
monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework. However, the cornerstone of the 
research problems and questions posed in this study is provided by the Weak Signals 
Theory (WST) by Igor Ansoff, and further supplemented by two operational theories 
that are related to municipal service delivery problems and challenges, and designing 
and building an early warning system. 
 
The municipalities in South Africa are still facing several delivery challenges, such as 
inability to meet the legitimate expectations of the citizens” (Jolobe, 2014; CoGTA, 
2015, 2014; The Presidency, 2011b: 7; Tshandu & Kariuki, 2010: 204), the declining 
trust of citizens toward local government and municipal authorities has been declining 
steadily (CoGTA, 2015; Alexander & Kane-Berman, 2014; Powel, 2009; Idasa, 2010a, 
HSRC, 2009), and widespread service delivery protests around the country (CoGTA, 
2015; Jolobe, 2014; Alexander & Kane-Berman, 2014; Allan & Heese, 2011; World 
Bank, 2011: ix).  
 
According to problem management processes, there are two ways of addressing or 
responding to these challenges: reactive problem solving (or the normal ways of 
response) and the proactive ways of response. Reactive problem approach addresses 
or solves problems when they manifest themselves as problems. Proactive response 
means dealing with nascent problems before they develop into full matured once, by 
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identifying, addressing and solving emerging problems while they are in early stages 
of development (Summers, 2014). Proactive Problem Management does not wait for 
an incident (or series of incidents) to happen in order to react (Zitek, 2015; Wilson, 
2012). In order to apply proactive problem solving methods, information about 
emerging problems or challenges are necessary (i.e., early warning signals).  
 
Figure 2.3 An EWS model  
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The M&E systems of municipalities are required by legislation to serve as an EWS, 
which is a proactive way of responding to the delivery challenges. However, none of 
the current municipal M&E systems are able to serve as an EWS. Since the current 
monitoring system cannot recognise the early warning signs of municipal service 
delivery challenges and problems, this study introduces the WST that provides 
mechanisms to monitor and recognise those early warning signs. In order to apply the 
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WST theory in an EWS system, the four essential elements of an EWS is also used in 
the study.  
 
Again, in order to make a transition from the theory (WSI) to a system (EWS), the 
Decision Support Model of Early Warning (DSMEW) of Nikander (2002) was adopted. 
The relationships between the WST and the EWS, as well as between the DSMEW 
and the four essential elements of an EWS, and also between municipal service 
delivery problems and four roots of service delivery problems are described in Figure 
2.4. 
Figure 2.4 Relationships between theories, model and system 
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2.4.1  Weak Signals Theory (WST) 
The central aspect of this research is related to the concept and theory of Weak 
Signals, which were first conceptualised and discussed by Igor Ansoff first in his 
seminal journal article published in 1975, and then in his book “Strategic 
Management” (1979). Ansoff (1979) argues that any change taking place is preceded 
by some form of “warning”, which the analyst has the role of capturing and making 
good use of. The theory was started and proposed to be used for strategic 
management. At that time, in the 1970s, the world, in terms of politics and Business 
situations, started changing very quickly—Ansoff (1975; 1979) called it “turbulent 
world”—and organisations and companies were not well-prepared for those fast 
changing situations. So it was necessary to find the ways to be able to see the future 
as early as possible so that there would be some time to prepare for the coming 
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problems, challenges, crises or changes. The main point of Ansoff’s theory is that, 
while signals are weak, uncertain and difficult to analyse, it is still possible to take 
some actions to prevent or mitigate problems or crises that the signals indicated about 
their coming. 
 
Criticisms and Supports for the Weak Signals Theory 
Ansoff’s weak signals concept and theory are, at its inception, always a central point 
of debate, because he has not provided any evidence to support and prove his theory 
(Kothari, 2010). There have been a number of criticisms as well as supports from 
researchers and scholars in different fields. The main reasons behind the argument 
are two-fold: first, whether weak signals really exist or they do contain information 
about future events; and, second, even if they present, whether it is possible or 
practical to detect them. Then, the critics are also protesting the application of 
concepts designed for detection and analysis of weak signals. In the same vein, it is 
also argued whether weak signals really are significant or important for organisations, 
in other words, the benefit of observing, detecting and interpreting weak signals out-
power the cost of doing so. 
 
Makridakis and Heáu (1987) hold that weak signals theory is still an academic idea. 
Webb (1987) initially believed that information about future events are impossible to 
obtain and criticised Ansoff’s theory for lacking evidences to substantiate it and 
argues that more studies still have to be done to confirm that concept. The existence 
of weak signals is question by both Webb (1987) and Ashley (1989a). For Ashley 
(1989a), such early warning phenomenon does not exist at all. It is just a hindsight 
bias that makes an illusion that there are warning information about future events. 
Mintzberg (1994a) asks if weak signals are important in strategic planning and 
management. Betts (1982) and Morris (1997), note the effect of the hindsight bias, but 
also ascertain the existence of warning phenomenon. 
 
On the other hand, there are also many studies and researches that support Ansoff’s 
view and idea, adopt and apply weak signals theory and concept in wide range of 
disciplines and organisational contexts, and then, provide methods and processes to 
detect and analyse weak signals. The importance of weak signals theory is 
demonstrated by many studies. Leidecker and Bruno (1987) demonstrate the 
importance of observation weak signals by proving that there are success factors in 
what companies do or conduct. Morris (1997) shows the existence of early warnings 
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for corporate failure. Similarly, Betts (1982) demonstrates the existence of warning 
phenomenon in advance of wars and conflicts, for example German attack to Russia 
in June 1941, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Korean War, and three Arab-
Israeli conflicts. He states, now famously, that “pure bolts from the blue do not 
happen. Sudden attacks occur after prolonged political conflict” (Betts, 1982: 95). In 
the same vein, the work of Pinto and Slevin (1992) on project implementation is 
regarded as a research that supports the existence of weak signals. Out of his doubt 
about the existence of weak signals, Webb (1987) studied, through his doctoral 
research that investigates and forecasts future development in the ophthalmic laser 
environment, and confirmed the existence of weak signals. Nikander (2002) 
demonstrates the presence of weak signals, he terms it as early warnings in typical 
project environment context. In the same way, Weschke (1994) identifies group of 
early warning signs seen in enterprises that are economically risky. 
 
After proving the existence and also the importance of weak signals, many 
researchers have been trying to extend the application of weak signals into different 
fields and organisational settings. Weak signal theory and concept is applied in a 
variety of ways not only in the context of strategic management but also in other 
disciplines like communications research, project management, journalism, 
international security, business economy, international politics and even military 
science (Nikander, 2002; Uskali, 2005; Kothari, 2010).  
 
Hiltunen (2001a; 2006) holds that weak signals are different from wild cards, because 
weak signals are indicators or signs but wild cards are events.  Nikander and Eloranta 
(1997) introduce two categories of weak signals as preliminary signals and early 
warnings. The weak signals application was extended by Uskali (2005) into innovation 
journalism. Schoemaker and Day (2009) also provide different methods to identify and 
interpret weak signals. 
 
Weak signals, early warning signals and strong signals 
According to the WST, the level of information has two extreme stages: strong signals 
and weak signals. Ansoff (1975) made it clear, at the very beginning, to differentiate 
weak signals from strong signals. When a signal is strong, it will not be a warning but 
an indication of a coming problem. In fact, the WST is an attempt to understand 
characteristics of weak signals and, in turn, to monitor and detect them. Ansoff and 
McDonnell (1990: 20-21) argue that strong signals are “sufficiently visible” and 
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“concrete”, and weak signals are “imprecise early indications about impending 
impactful events”.  
 
Normal strategic management or risk management have been using strong signals for 
a long time. The point of departure that the Weak Signals theory introduced is the 
difference between weak signals and strong signals, and how weak signals evolve 
into strong signals. When signals become strong, the ordinary management 
techniques can be applied. Thus, one of the main points of weak signals theory is the 
explanation about the evolution of signals from weak to strong status, and how to 
detect the signals as early as possible while they are transforming themselves into 
strong signals. Ansoff and McDonnell (1990: 20-21) claim that weak signals may 
mature over time and become strong signals. There are five different stages of 
signals: the sense of threat or opportunity is perceived; the source of threat or 
opportunity is known; the shape of threat or opportunity is concrete; the response 
strategies are understood; and the outcome of response is foreseen. 
 
After interpreting, weak signals become early warning signals. Early warning signals 
are, therefore, well-identified and correlated weak signals (Goria, 2013). On the other 
hand, strong signals have much information and, therefore, are easy to detect, 
credible and rational, thus easy to be interpreted and consensus reached. However, 
the limitations of the strong signals are that organisations or teams do not have time 
to prepare and plan for responses. Thus, it can be argued that it is from weak signals 
that organisations could benefit from taking proactive and preventative actions for 
future problems and crises by these signals. 
 
Presence of just signals and receiver of them does not suffice. There must be one 
thing that is essential and indispensable to connect these two points. It could be called 
a light or clear channel. Anything that is blocking or filtering, throughout such a 
connection between signals and signal receiver has to be removed or cleared, in 
order to make weak signal approach or analysis work. One of the major components 
in the discussion provided by the Weak Signals Theory is about these filters, and how 
to pass through them so that weak signals will be received by signal observer(s) and 
receiver(s) and then to take advantage of the information provided by weak signals 
and address or solve the future or embryonic problems, while still in their nascent 
stages, before they actually become a fully developed, or real, problems.  
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Ansoff (1984) states that three levels of filters exist between weak signals and signal 
observer(s)—surveillance filter, mentality filter and power or political filter. In order to 
be able to pass through the surveillance and receive weak signals, observer(s) have 
to know what kinds of information they are monitoring and detecting and what kinds of 
methods or mechanism should be used. At this point, it is necessary to point out that 
the Weak Signals Theory does not apply the risk knowledge database used by the 
early warning system of natural disaster management. The use of risk knowledge 
database could make the monitoring and interpreting the weak signals more efficient. 
 
Information received after passing through the first filter, still has to pass through 
another filter called mentality filter, to make sense of the information and what 
problems and risk this information is revealing. At this stage, information is 
distinguished between weak signals that reveal incoming problems, and noises. After 
signals observer(s) decide that information is important and then pass it to decision-
makers who will decide whether or not to take actions based on information and 
choose suitable response strategies. This stage employed by decision-makers is 
called the power or political filter.  
 
Furthermore, Ansoff (1979) also discusses four kinds of delays that can make the use 
of weak signals theory ineffective. Those delays are (1) identification delay to spot 
early warning signs (weak signals), (2) verification delay to interpret and understand 
the meaning of signals, (3) political delay, i.e., decision-makers feel the recognition of 
the problems (performance deficiencies) revealed by early warning signals (weak 
signal) endanger their position or negatively reflect on their reputation, and (4) cultural 
delay, which is it about an organisational culture that tends to assume that the 
problem would work itself out, and does not have the tendency to take the necessary 
steps and actions. The first two delays are caused by capacity constraints. Ansoff 
(1984) also states that these four delays are caused by three levels of filters exist 
between weak signals and signal observer(s)—surveillance filter, mentality filter and 
power or political filter. 
 
The first delay (identification delay) is caused by, according to Ansoff (1984) 
surveillance filter, or by Choo (2006) knowledge gap. The second delay (verification 
delay) is caused by, according to Ansoff (1984) mentality filter, and by Choo (2006) 
capacity gap (Choo, 2006). These two delays are caused by obstacles to identify the 
weak signals. One of the obstacles is the complexity of issues or problems. In 
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complex situations and problems, causality is less clear and it is not easy to identify 
the inputs (signs) and the outputs (problems). However, municipal service delivery 
processes are similar over the years as well as across municipalities—as they deliver 
similar services and follow similar procedures and processes—and many experiences 
and lessons could be accumulated and learnt from the past problems, mistakes and 
challenges. Another obstacle is the lack of a strong learning and record-keeping 
system in organisation. In the similar past experiences, some early warning signs 
have been noticed and acknowledged, but failure to record them in risk database 
results in the losses of valuable lessons and information of WST, which could be 
otherwise very useful to address or prevent problems, mistakes or challenges. 
 
The third is by political reason, which is caused by power or political filter according to 
Ansoff (1984), or commitment gap, according to Choo (2006). It is a situation that is 
called by Choo (2006: 250) “knowing-doing gap in its action”, and by Nikander (2002: 
122) “a credibility problem” because Nikander (2002) argues that it is the greatest 
difficult stage—of the four stages of the Decision Support Model of Early Warning 
(DSMEW) (see in Chapter 2)—as it is at this stage the observer has “to convince the 
decision-maker of the existence of a problem, its impact on the project, and the 
necessity of responses”.  
 
And the fourth delay is caused by the organisational culture. It is possible to state that 
the local government culture is very young and has to evolve further. Thus it can be 
suggested that the future local government—which is matured and at a more evolved 
culture level—would be able to achieve the ideal form of local government, and then 
also be in a position to use EWS methods outlined by the Weak Signal Theory. 
 
2.4.2  Decision Support Model of Early Warning (DSMEW) 
In 2002, Nikander, who regards weak signals as early warning indicators, proposed a 
model called Decision Support Model of Early Warnings. The Decision Support Model 
of Early Warning (DSMEW) is a tool for anticipating the future aspects of municipal 
service delivery problems. The model provides a base to implement the early 
warnings phenomenon. The model has four concepts: concepts of signals, problems, 
time available, and responses to problems. And there are four steps involved in the 
Model: signals, problems, time and response. The first step of the model is about 
signals and monitoring, i.e., to monitor (or observe), detect and interpret the weak 
signals (or early warning signals of municipal problems. The second step is about 
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understanding the problems revealed by the weak signals, i.e., to discover the 
impending or forthcoming problems based on the interpretation of the signals. The 
third step is about calculating the time available for the responses required by the 
problem. In other words, it is to ask how urgent the situation is. Ansoff (1980) 
classifies the time available into three levels as delayable, postponable or urgent. 
Figure (2.5) describes three different problems (event C, B, and A) and time available 
for the responses for each of them (∆c, ∆b, and ∆a). It also shows the state the 
knowledge from zero knowledge to full knowledge of the weak signals (early 
warnings), and its relationship with time available for the response. 
 
The last step of the model is to identify the responses. According to Nikander (2002: 
121-2), it is the greatest difficult stage as it is at this stage the observer has “to 
convince the decision-maker of the existence of a problem, its impact on the project, 
and the necessity of responses”. Nikander (2002: 122) calls that challenge “a 
credibility problem”. 
Figure 2.5 State of knowledge and time available 
 
Source: Ansoff (1980: 144) 
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2.4.3  Four essential elements of an EWS 
Together with these two theories discussed above, four essential elements of an EWS 
by the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) (2005) 
will also be used to incorporate these four components in a M&E system so that it can 
serve as an EWS. 
 
According to United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) 
(2005), to make an EWS effective and complete, four elements are indispensable. 
They are risk knowledge, monitoring and warning system service, dissemination and 
communication and response capability. This set of four elements is in a logical 
sequence and has direct and strong two-way linkages and interactions with one 
another. Failure in any one of these elements can mean failure of the whole early 
warning system (UN, 2006: v). The existing PM and M&E system of municipalities 
lack all of these essential components of an EWS.  
 
Moreover, in Why Smart Executives Fail, Sydney Finkelstein (2004) argues that a key 
cause of failure of organisations is their inability to act on vital information and states 
four reasons for this failure—first, failure to recognise vital information; second, lack of 
clear communications channels for vital information to move from those who have it to 
those who can act on it; third, lack of motivation for the information holder to move it 
along or for the recipient to act on it even if there is a communications channel, and 
fourth, lack of oversight to ensure that the process is working. Researches on 
municipal M&E systems and service delivery processes (Rabie, 2011; Engela & Ajam, 
2010; CDE, 2007) discover that these factors are indeed undermining the 
performance of municipal service delivery processes. According to Finkelstein (2004), 
it is necessary to design incentives for reporting vital information to responsible 
persons who can perform necessary preventative and corrective measures to prevent 
and solve the future problems. This study examined and investigated to what extent 
the current M&E systems has the characteristics and components of an EWS and 
how these system could be upgraded to be able to function as an EWS. 
 
The purpose of this study is to understand the early warning signs of common 
problems and factors that negatively affect municipal service delivery performance. 
The good news is that the number of common problems and their EWSs are limited 
and can be documented. As Ansoff (1979) argues, any change or deviations from 
plans is preceded by some form of ‘warning’. An example of the detection and 
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utilisation of early warnings was given by Cleland (1994: 462) in his book Project 
Management: Strategic Design and Implementation. He said  
I can walk onto any project site anywhere in the world and within a short 
time tell you if that project is going to be a winner. It’s easy; I just look at 
the people, what they are doing and how they are doing it. If the project 
people look determined, confident, enthusiastic, and busy, it’s a good 
bet that you’ve got a winner team. If people respect each other, help 
each other and things seem to be getting done with a minimum amount 
of confusion, then you can be fairly certain that they have their act 
together and they will pull it off without much strain (Cleland, 1994:  
462). 
 
Similarly, in a study by Nikander (2002: 112), one interviewee states that “[s]omeone 
is always aware of impending or ‘hidden’ problems; nobody just wants to bring them 
out. Nobody seems to want to let the cat out of the bag”. Nikander (2002) argues that 
even when warning information is inexact, some actions can be taken to prevent or 
defuse the budding problems.  
 
In the context of municipal service delivery processes, it is possible to document or 
record common problems and factors that negatively affect municipal service delivery 
performance. Documenting, recording or just listing the past problems, challenges and 
crisis is the basis to build risk knowledge. Any of official documents of municipalities 
and MOEs do not mention about the existence of risk knowledge databases. 
Numerous reports, studies and researches have been carried out on the 
municipalities, factors affecting municipal performance and the problems and 
challenges municipalities have to face constantly. However, an establishment of a 
consolidated and comprehensive database on risk knowledge, in other words frequent 
problems and challenges as well as factors negatively affecting municipal 
performance yet have to be fully implemented.  
 
Additionally, it is important to acknowledge that although the findings of the AG’s 
reports (AG, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2010d, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2012a, 2012b, 
2012c, 2012d, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013d, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2014d) are useful 
and invaluable for municipalities to learn from their past experiences and not to 
commit the same mistakes again in the future, they do not serve as an EWS because 
of several factors. Documents such as the AG’s reports highlight negative factors and 
causes that have already happened. But those reports are only published annually, 
and only focus on a particular institution rather than a sector or a particular unit (The 
Presidency, 2009). Nevertheless, it still needs to be stressed again that the AG’s 
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report is valuable to document problems, causes of problems and factors that affect 
municipal performance negatively. Since municipalities are contextually, 
demographically and geographically different to one another, lists of common 
problems and their early warnings have to be developed for each municipality. 
 
Although an M&E system could be considered as an EWS, not all M&E systems have 
the essential elements of an EWS and therefore neither function nor serve as an 
EWS. The current M&E system of the CoJ, together with municipalities in South 
Africa, does not serve as an EWS. Information and indicators in the current M&E 
systems provided are structurally deficient for decision support other than the most 
primitive form of reporting and control budget variances. Then too, the M&E systems 
do not have the essential components of an EWS.  
 
According to the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction 
(UNISDR) (2005), in order to be effective and complete, an early warning system 
needs to comprise all four interacting elements, namely: risk knowledge, monitoring 
and warning system service, dissemination and communication and response 
capability. This set of four elements is in a logical sequence and has direct and strong 
two-way linkages and interactions with one another. Failure in any one of these 
elements can mean failure of the whole early warning system.  
 
According to UNISDR (2005), past events have to be studied and improvements have 
to be made to the early warning system, major players and stakeholders have to meet 
regularly and consult each other, risk scenarios are constructed and reviewed, 
specific responsibilities are agreed, information has to be disseminated and staff have 
to be trained.  
 
The purpose of this study is to develop a model of an EWS for municipal service 
delivery processes in four key basic service areas. The development of a model of an 
EWS is based on performance measurement principles and on previous researches 
on early warnings and early signals, especially on Ansoff’s seminal work  on “weak 
signals” (1979).  
 
2.4.4  Four roots of service delivery problem 
Devarajan and Reinikka (2004) argue that there are at least four roots of the service 
delivery problem. These are resources misallocation, weak incentive, expenditure 
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‘leakages’, and demand side failure. The service delivery problems occur when either 
one or some or all of these root-causes are embedded in the service delivery 
processes. The first cause is misallocation of resources. It is a budgeting or resources 
allocation problem that occurs when the government spends resources on the ‘wrong’ 
goods or the ‘wrong’ people. Castro-Leal, Dayton, Demery and Mehra (1999) 
discovered that less than 20 per cent of public spending in health and education 
reaches the poorest twenty per cent of population who actually need the benefits, 
while more than 80 per cent of the spending go to the rich and middle-class who do 
not really need the help of government. 
 
The second cause is ‘expenditure leakages’. It happens when the resources allotted 
by the government do not reach frontline service providers. In other word, it means 
the money does not reach its ultimate destination. Reinikka and Svensson (2002) 
gave an example of Uganda where, during 1991 and 1995, only 13 per cent of the 
central government grant (nonwage recurrent expenditure) for primary education 
reached the schools. Reinikka and Svensson (2002) also discovered that the same 
experiences also happened in Ghana and Tanzania too. Expenditure leakages also 
happened in municipalities of South Africa. According to the Auditor General’s 
Consolidated General Report on the Audit Outcomes of Local Government (2016: 17), 
in the 2014-2015 financial year, municipalities incurred unauthorised expenditure of 
R15,32 billion, irregular expenditure of R14,75 billion, and fruitless and wasteful 
expenditure of R1,34 billion. Devarajan and Reinikka (2004) argue that it can be 
solved through a practical and effective expenditure tracking system. Through having 
an effective EWS, these kinds of problems could be detected and corrected in time. 
 
The third cause is called the ‘weak incentive’ problem. It is attributed to the issues of 
accountability and monitoring. When there is no incentive or a weak incentive to the 
service providers especially when they are poorly paid and hardly ever monitored, the 
service delivery will be poor. This problem could be addressed through an effective 
mechanism of monitoring and holding the service providers accountable. The final 
cause is a result of failure of the demand side caused by the community’s 
unawareness of services to which they are entitled. It could be solved through raising 
public awareness and participation. 
 
The framework of four roots of service delivery problem indicates that municipal 
service delivery can be best explained and understood by critically analysing each of 
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these four root causes of service delivery problem. These four root causes guide the 
set of questions to be asked and answered by the semi-structured interviews and site 
observations. 
 
Most of the debates and arguments concerning municipal service delivery 
performance are based on resource constraints. However, since the focus of this 
research is on the effectiveness and accountability dimensions of the municipal 
service delivery process from the point of view of an M&E, the issues on resource-
constraints are not pertinent. Instead, this research will focus more and emphasise the 
EWS characteristics of M&E systems in municipalities. Thus, external constraints, 
which are out of the control of municipalities, go beyond the scope of this study and 
will be discussed at a minimal level.  Most importantly, this section also discusses why 
the AG’s performance audit and reports do not serve as an EWS. The next section 
discusses the four essential components of an Early Warning System (EWS). 
 
2.5  The relationship among the key concepts 
For the sake of clarity and convenience, it is necessary to discuss the relationship 
between and among the key concepts involved in the study. The key concepts of this 
study are “weak signals”, early warning system (EWS), effectiveness, and 
accountability.  
 
2.5.1  Weak Signals 
There are several different definitions of weak signals, for example Ansoff defines 
weak signals as “imprecise early indications about impending impactful events… all 
that is known (of them) is that some threats and opportunities will undoubtedly arise, 
but their shape and nature and source are not yet known” (Ansoff & McDonnell, 1990: 
20; Ansoff, 1984: 22), and signals or the first symptoms of possible change or 
changes (Hiltunen, 2007: 6). Kuusi and Hiltunen (2011: 48) note that it is because “the 
key feature of the weak signal is that it has rival interpretations” (emphasis in the 
original). 
 
Nevertheless, the underlying concept of weak signals or its definition is clear; it is a 
weak, ambiguous, inexact, fuzzy, fragmented, unclear, vague and disputable signal or 
information about future problems, risks or changes. For this research, weak signal is 
defined, pragmatically, as a weak and disputable but useful and important piece of 
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information about possible or impending problems and challenges that occur in 
municipal service delivery processes. 
 
There are primarily three main components that the weak signals theory expound: 
firstly, what is a weak signal, and its importance for organisations; second, how to 
detect, analyse, and understand the signals. In order to be of use the information 
provided by them in preparing and planning to address, handle, mitigate or even 
eliminate the impacts of these problems when they become real problems; and third, 
what considerations and steps are involved in the process of weak signals analysis 
and approach. 
 
2.5.2  Early Warning System (EWS) 
Early warning systems (EWS) have been used, probably since the beginning of 
human culture, intensively in many fields, especially in the field of natural disaster 
management. But there is no universally accepted definition of an early warning 
system (Glantz, 2004). However, Basher (2006: 2170) defines an ‘early warning’ 
system as a “means to the provision of information of an emerging dangerous 
circumstance where that information can enable action in advance to reduce the risks 
involved”. The UN formally defines it as "the provision of timely and effective 
information, through identifying institutions, that allow individuals exposed to a hazard 
to take action to avoid or reduce their risk and prepare for effective response" (ISDR, 
2003). Glantz (2004: 9) defines an EWS more broadly as “a social process for 
generating maximally accurate information about possible future harm and for 
ensuring that this information reaches the people threatened by this harm, as well as 
others disposed to protect them from the harm”.  
  
However, the definition and functions of an EWS integrated into M&E is not the same 
as those of the most common type of EWS usually applied in disaster, risk and 
strategic management. While the EWS in disaster, risk and strategic management is 
to expect, prepare to deal with, and address unexpected circumstances or events, an 
EWS integrated into the M&E system proposed by this research is only to expect, 
prepare to deal with or address, and pre-empt common problems that municipalities 
and municipal entities experience or face or have to deal with in their daily activities of 
delivering services to community members. Accordingly, based on the nature of these 
research questions and objectives, this research simply defines it as a detection 
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process that alerts key players and stakeholders of developing problematic trends that 
can be obviated by taking corrective and preventative interventions. 
 
The rationale behind the necessity and importance of an EWS as a part of a M&E 
system is based on two premises: the first premise is that most of the common 
problems can be documented and the causes and early indicators or information of 
these problems could be figured out or understood, and the second premise is that 
preventive actions could be taken and therefore the consequences or severity of most 
common problems of municipalities could be less than the resulting situations.  
 
A conceptual framework for an EWS is a tool to enable municipal service delivery to 
succeed. By establishing a system for early warnings, the municipal team will be able 
to get signals on emerging problems – including opportunities – and by using these 
signals is able to act upon them to reduce risk or to improve its service delivery 
performance. The development of a conceptual framework for early warnings in the 
municipal service delivery process is based on performance measurement principles 
and on previous work on early warnings and early signals. In short, the basic idea 
behind EWS is that the earlier and more accurately future problems and challenges 
can be predicted, the more likely it is they can be managed, mitigated and prevented 
by taking appropriate actions more effectively. 
 
Although an M&E system could be considered as an EWS, not all M&E systems have 
the essential elements of an EWS and therefore neither function nor serve as an 
EWS. Glantz (2004) states that two groups of people are involved in an EWS. One 
group monitors changes and provides technical information to another group who 
inform, warn or alert society, as is often the case, to warn the government. As 
Hamilton (1999) suggests, predictions will not be useful without translating them into a 
warning and action plan that are understandable for the public—in this case for 
stakeholders and persons responsible for municipal service delivery processes, or if 
these warnings do not reach people who need them timeously.  
 
One of the functions of a systematic EWS is documenting the compliance or non-
compliance with laws, rules, and procedures during the municipal service delivery 
process. The most unnoticed but important and valuable advantage an organisation, 
department, or municipality can attain from a systemic and effective EWS (of M&E 
system) is having deadlines for tasks. Moreover, it can be realised from our daily 
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experiences that, deadlines force people to prioritise and tasks that have deadlines 
usually and generally get done before those that do not. It can also be a great help in 
conducting a comprehensive diagnostic assessment of the functionalities of the 
municipal service delivery process. By these means, it can be an effective tool in 
making the municipal service delivery process efficient in the most cost-effective way.  
 
2.5.3  Effectiveness 
Roger (1990: 15) argues that defining effectiveness as the relationship between 
outputs and outcomes and, more precisely, as the extent to which policy objectives 
are achieved is not a comprehensive definition because focusing primarily on the 
intended effects of a policy will ignore the unintended effects that can be of equal 
importance.  
 
Kernaghan (2010) refers effectiveness to the degree to which a service is achieving 
its intended results. Various policies, frameworks and legislation have been put in 
place by the South African Government to enable effective service delivery to its 
people. In 2003, Khumalo, Ntlokonkulu and Rapoo (2003: 4) estimate the annual 
municipal service backlog of South Africa in 2003 was between R47 and R53 billion 
with an annual service backlog of R10 billion. The reasons for this huge backlog are, 
according to Khumalo, Ntlokonkulu and Rapoo (2003: 4), ineffectiveness of South 
African municipal administrative structures and lack of service orientation. 
 
The focus of this research is effectiveness and accountability. The low quality of 
service delivery, which is a result of skills shortages and resource constraints, 
therefore, are not regarded as a failure of municipality as long as the issue of skills 
shortages and resource constraints are duly noted and communicated to the 
responsible stakeholders such as national and provincial governments, local 
community and local government leadership. In the same vein, there are several 
important, but external factors, i.e., not in the control of municipalities, that hinder the 
performance and quality of municipal service delivery processes, these were 
discussed briefly but in-depth study was not be carried out because these issues are 
irrelevant to the research questions and problems of this study. External factors are 
structural problems, which include poverty, high unemployment, Apartheid legacy, 
unclear roles between government spheres, impact of South African developmental 
model, weak infrastructure (which is also partly because of municipal failure), 
underdeveloped financial markets, ineffective intergovernmental relation, weakness in 
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policy and regulatory framework and ineffective over-sight by national and provincial 
governments.   
 
As the World Bank (2003: 47) emphasises, if service providers (municipalities) are not 
given adequate resources, holding them accountable for poor outcomes is not fair and 
also not enforceable, Resource constraints per se is, therefore, not the focus of this 
study. However, failure to recognise, report and take actions to address these issues 
is within the area of this study, because it is relevant to the function of a PMS. 
Moreover, the M&E mechanisms need to monitor the level of available resources as 
well as the resources necessary to perform tasks according to agreed and approved 
IPD plans. 
 
Furthermore, since this research studies and explores the level of effectiveness of the 
functions of the municipal service delivery process, the focal point of this study is how 
efficiently and effectively the municipality executes it service delivery process; in other 
words, how the municipality uses available resources effectively as well as 
accountably in their service delivery process. Such a position of this research is also 
applicable to other factors, such as skills shortages, unclear delegation or role among 
the municipal officials and staff, and other external factors, that cause the quality of 
municipal service delivery to be weak.  So most of the challenges faced by 
municipalities are therefore not also relevant to this research question.  
 
However, it is important to note that although skills shortages and resource 
constraints are external factors to the municipal responsibility, it is their responsibility 
to utilise the resources effectively and accountably.  It is not a fault of a municipality if 
it cannot deliver services to the local community simply because of the lack of 
resources and skills. However, it will be the fault of the municipality if it does not take 
the necessary steps to consult with higher spheres of government and its local 
community about the constraints. As mentioned before, the ultimate objective of this 
research is to develop and propose a M&E model, which has the components and 
characteristics of an EWS and can therefore serve as an EWS, will assist and 
empower the municipalities to do effectively and accountably what they have to do, 
but not what they have no control over or are unable to do, in other words it means 
letting the municipalities take responsibility for their tasks, i.e., their service delivery 
responsibilities. 
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Grounded in this basic conceptual framework, it could be concluded that there are 
many complaints and criticism about the municipal service delivery process and 
performance is, in fact, not because of municipal failure and this research will, 
therefore, neither explore nor study these factors. Instead the research will study how 
existing M&E mechanisms fail the municipalities leaving them unable to recognise, 
record, inform, alert and seek corrective assistance, guidance and intervention from 
the national and provincial governments. 
 
2.5.4  Accountability 
Various studies (World Bank, 2011: ix; Fiszbein, 2005: 4; Devarajan & Reinikka, 2004: 
7) discovered that there is a positive relationship between enforcing the accountability 
of the service provider and the service delivery quality and performance of the 
municipalities. According to the World Bank (World Bank, 2011: ix), the more local 
community members are empowered to demand or enforce the accountability of 
service providers whether they are municipal or private providers commissioned by 
the municipality, the better the service delivery quality and performance of the 
municipalities. The aim of performance monitoring of municipal services is to oversee 
the implementation or delivery of municipal services as they happen at ground level. 
This is the supervisory or managerial process of monitoring (Singh & Shah, 2003: 3). 
Therefore, to improve quality and coverage of public services, “the key is to enhance 
the power of poor clients in service provision” so that they can hold service providers 
accountable whether they are municipality or municipal entities or private providers 
privatised by municipalities.  
 
Similarity, Fiszbein (2005: 4) argues that there are four situations when services 
typically fail—when governments do not feel the pressure to respond to citizen 
demands; when they are incapable of enforcing basic performance rules on those 
directly responsible for service delivery; and when citizens have no control or choice 
over service providers. Devarajan and Reinikka (2004: 7) discuss the relationship 
between holding service providers accountable, monitoring the delivery of service, 
and the quality of service received by the local community. They argue that the 
service provider does not feel accountable when the delivery of service is poorly 
monitored, if at all. It is because typically, the service provider is an employee of the 
municipality, which sends him or her a pay cheque regardless of whether he or she 
performs his or her functions. Devarajan and Reinikka (2004: 7) state that the 
symptoms of this problem are everywhere.  
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2.6  Conclusion 
This chapter provides the theoretical and conceptual frameworks of the study. Firstly, 
it explains two methods of problem-solving approaches: a reactive approach and a 
proactive approach. M&E with an EWS is presented as a proactive problem-solving 
approach because it provides the means and mechanisms to solve problems while 
they are still in their nascent stages. It then proposes how a proactive problem-solving 
approach can be designed by using a four-step journey. The four-step journey serves 
as a conceptual framework because it clarifies the concepts of M&E and EWS, what 
makes M&E able to serve as an EWS (as required by legislation), how M&E is able to 
provide early warning information of emerging problems. 
 
Then, theories and approaches involved in making M&E able to provide early warning 
information are introduced. The discussions on the similarities and differences are 
made. As a theoretical framework, it introduces three theories and a model (the 
decision support model of early warning), and why they are used in this study are 
explained. It concludes with the definitions of key concepts used in this study. The 
following chapter presents the local government M&E systems and service delivery 
challenges discussed in literature.  
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Chapter 3 
 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT M&E SYSTEM AND 
DELIVERY CHALLENGES 
 
This chapter explores a number of debates and arguments in current literature on 
local government, municipal responsibilities, functions, the level and targets of 
services constitutionally required to be delivered to local communities, and the current 
level and quality of municipal service delivery performance, problems and factors 
affecting municipal service delivery performance, legislative and regulatory framework 
for Performance Management system (PMS), and M&E system. Moreover, this 
section also explains why it is necessary to discuss PMS of municipalities while the 
focus is on M&E system. It also discusses performance auditing and the Auditor 
General’s annual report, which while very valuable, does not serve as an EWS. Both 
this chapter and the previous one (Chapter 2) present literature review. Chapter 2 is 
related to the concepts and the theories, i.e., the general concepts of M&E, EWS and 
theories related to them, while this chapter is related to the context this study 
explores, i.e., about South Africa’s local government M&E system and service delivery 
performance and challenges. 
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
There are five main sections in this chapter. The first section (3.2) discusses the 
functions and responsibilities of local government and municipalities. The second 
section (3.3) provides the current municipal service delivery performance and 
challenges in local government and the City of Johannesburg. The third section (3.4) 
provides the legislative and regulatory framework for the performance management 
and M&E systems of local government, the performance management and M&E 
systems of the CoJ, the weaknesses identified in performance management system in 
local government as well as in the CoJ, and EWS elements that are missing in the 
current municipal PM and M&E systems. The fourth section (3.5) presents the factors 
affecting municipal service and the relationship between the four roots of service 
delivery problems and selected three factors. The last section (3.6) discusses the 
relationship between the selected three factors, the research questions and the early 
warning system (Figure 3.1). 
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Figure 3.1 Outline of the chapter 3: Local government M&E system and 
delivery challenges 
 
 
3.2 Functions and responsibilities of local government  
South Africa is one of the few, if not the only country, among developing countries that 
have taken the bold step to improve the abilities of local government to deliver 
services (DPLG, 2001: 2). Local government in South Africa is an independent sphere 
of government, which has its powers and functions constitutionally enshrined. It is 
neither a third level of government, nor a function of national or provincial government, 
nor subordinate to them. As the closest manifestation of government to the people 
and based at the places where needs are felt, local government is strategically 
located to perform its mandate of providing basic services to the people, as a first step 
towards developing communities in South Africa (Section 152 of the Constitution).  
 
The objects of the South African government are mentioned in the Constitution 
(Section 152) which is to establish a democratic and accountable local government 
system that ensures the provision of services to communities in an accountable and 
sustainable manner thus promoting good governance. The constitution (RSA, 1996: 
Section 151) establishes five objectives of local government such as to be a 
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democratic and accountable local government for local communities, to ensure the 
provision of services in a sustainable manner, to promote social and economic 
development, to promote a safe and healthy environment, and to encourage the 
involvement of communities and community organisations in the matters of local 
government.  
 
The vision for a developmental local government system is outlined by the White 
Paper on Local Government (RSA, 1998a: Section B, part 3). The Constitution (1996) 
and the White Paper for Local government (1998) envisaged an ‘ideal’ local 
government as a developmental one that is “committed to working with citizens and 
groups within the community to find sustainable ways to meet their social, economic 
and material needs and improve the quality of their lives” (RSA, 1998a). According to 
the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (CoGTA, 2009), an 
ideal municipality has eight characteristics; (1) providing democratic and accountable 
government for local communities, (2) being responsive to the needs of the local 
community, (3) ensuring the provision of services to communities in an equitable and 
sustainable manner, (4) promoting social and economic development, (5) promoting a 
safe and healthy environment, (6) encouraging the involvement of communities and 
community organisations in the matters of local government, (7) facilitating a culture of 
public service and accountability amongst its staff, and (8) assigning clear 
responsibilities for the management and co-ordination of these administrative units 
and mechanisms. These characteristics will be used as a benchmark for evaluating 
and assessing the current performance level and quality of municipalities. 
 
Since the municipal service delivery process and its performance level are also the 
parts of this research, it is necessary to look at the major functions and responsibilities 
of local government, which is to deliver basic services to everyone, particularly those 
who currently have little or no access to services. As White Paper on Local 
Government (RSA, 1998a) notes, “good basic services are essential to enable people 
to support family life, find employment, develop their skills or establish their own small 
business”. As the closest government to the people, the primary goal of local 
government functions is therefore to deliver services to communities effectively, so 
that the quality of life of all citizens will be enhanced, many new economic 
opportunities can be created and productive initiatives will be increased, and as a 
result local economic development could be achieved (Maphazi, 2011: Bekink, 2006; 
Roux, 2005).  
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Although the Constitution does not define the word services, municipalities are 
constitutionally compelled to provide sustainable, impartial, equitable services to local 
communities. Similarly, the Municipal Systems Act (2000), which dedicates a chapter 
to municipal services, does not define what these services are that municipalities must 
provide, however it compels municipalities to ensure that all members of the local 
community have access, at least, to the minimum level of basic municipal services. 
However, a list of local government functions is described in Schedules 4B and 5B of 
the Constitution. Similarly, sections 9 and 10 of the Municipal Systems Act (2000) 
cover the allocation of powers and functions to local government. The functions 
include air pollution, building material, child care facilities, electricity and gas 
reticulation, fire-fighting services, local tourism, municipal airports, municipal planning, 
municipal health services, municipal public transport, municipal works, pontoons, 
ferries, jetties, piers and harbours (excluding the regulation of international and 
national shipping, storm water management systems in build-up areas, trading 
regulations, and water and sanitation (limited to potable water supply, domestic waste 
and sewage disposal systems. 
 
However, this research focuses on the four basic services of municipalities, which are 
provided at no charge by the government through municipal entities to ‘indigent’ 
households. Free basic services refer to the minimum amounts of service levels that 
are required in terms of health and environmental considerations. There are four 
services (1) a minimum level of free water to promote healthy living; (2) the provision 
of a basic level of sanitation services; (3) the basic level of electricity/energy to be 
supplied free of charge to support all households; and (4) a minimum energy free 
refuse removal service. Households and peoples, whom I interviewed as a preliminary 
study as a part of the process of developing the problem and context of this research, 
said that they do not understand about the free service levels. They are not sure that 
they get any free electricity because they pay for their usage in total. Moreover, they 
said they pay for their refuse removal. Thus it needs to be explored throughout the 
study. 
  
A policy of free basic services includes providing basic levels of services for free to 
those already having access to services and extending service delivery to those who 
do not have access. According to Carrim (2010: 41), basic service refers to a service 
that is necessary to ensure an acceptable and reasonable quality of life, and, if not 
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provided, would endanger public health or the safety or the environment. Basic 
services include clean water, sanitation and refuse removal, and the delivery of them 
will greatly assist in poverty eradication and community development. The 2000 
Election Manifesto of the ruling African National Congress (ANC) government views 
access to basic services as universal and a constitutional requirement and mandates 
local government to render limited free basic services. For example, basic water as 
6000 litres (6kl) per household per month and basic electricity as 50 kilowatt hours 
(kWh) per household per month to communities who cannot afford to pay for 
municipal services. Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 states that these services can 
be provided by a municipality itself or through other alternative service delivery 
methods in terms of the Local Government and service delivery mechanisms and 
standards should be regularly reviewed with the intention of improving and extending 
them (Tsatsire, Taylor & Raga, 2010: 278). 
 
Concerning the free basic services, two targets were set. The 2014 minimum service 
delivery targets were set by the government, to be in line with the Millennium 
Development Goals. According to the 2014 minimum service delivery targets, by 2014 
all households are expected to have access to at least clean piped water 200 m from 
household; to have access to at least a ventilated pit latrine on site; to have access to 
refuse removal services at least once a week, and to be connected to the national 
electricity grid (SALGA, 2011: 17). The Presidency also set 12 Presidential Outcomes. 
Outcome No. 9 is to have a responsive, accountable, effective and efficient local 
government system. Outcome No. 9 has seven outputs. However, being focusing on 
the basic municipal services, only Output No. 2 is relevant to this research. According 
to Output No. 2 of the Presidential Outcomes, No.9, universal access to water is 
targeted from 92% to 100%, sanitation from 69% to 100%, refuse removal from 64% 
to 75%, and electricity from 81% to 92% by the period ending 2014 (The Presidency, 
2010). 
 
One of the important components of municipalities is municipal owned entities (MOEs) 
established and based on market fundamentals. They are wholly owned by 
municipalities but run as separate companies and have their own PM and M&E 
systems, which are not always in alignment with the PM and M&E systems of their 
municipalities. More importantly, the municipalities do not have legal authority to 
enforce and penalise them when their service delivery performances do not achieve 
the agreed standards and levels.  
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To further complicate the functionalities and performances of municipalities, according 
to Karodia (2010), the principles underlying the process of decentralisation and the 
establishment of commercial entities are conflicting and have a negative impact on the 
performance of municipal service delivery processes. Karodia (2010) argues that the 
efforts of municipalities to fulfil their service delivery targets have been compromised 
by two parallel and contradictory processes of public sector transformation. These two 
processes are decentralisation and establishing commercial utilities. Decentralisation 
of the functions of public sector service delivery into the local government sphere 
suggests state-led participatory development at the local government level. However, 
establishing municipal entities based on market fundamentals advocates an economic 
development that is led by the capitalist class.  
 
The main area of this research is the M&E systems of municipalities, its strengths and 
weaknesses, and its impact on the performance of the municipal basic service 
delivery process. The following section will discuss the current performance level of 
municipal service delivery. 
 
3.3 Current municipal service delivery performance 
Improving municipal service delivery performance remains a key priority for the South 
African government (CoGTA, 2015; PSC, 2010) and over the past fifteen years, local 
government has improved service delivery substantially, at an unprecedented pace, 
however most of the local municipal councils face a widening gap between the 
demand and the supply of services (Makananisa, 2011). As described above, whether 
municipal service delivery performance is low or high, or municipalities are struggling 
with problems and challenges are not the arguments or the focuses of this study. This 
study is grounded in a position that, no matter what the current level of municipal 
performance is, there are still ways or possibilities to improve the performance. 
However, in order to improve the level of performance, it is necessary to understand 
the current performance level.  
 
According to a study conducted by the CoGTA (2015), the performance of 
municipalities can be divided into three groups: the top third that have got the basics 
right and are performing their functions at least adequately; the middle third that are 
fairly functional, and overall performance is average; and the bottom third that are 
dysfunctional (Figure 3.1). According to CoGTA (2015), the level of national average 
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of municipal service delivery in 2015 is 90% for water, 79.5% for sanitation, 80% for 
electricity and 63.8% for refuse removal (Table 3.1). 
 
Figure 3.1: Back-to-Basics Performance of Municipalities per Province 
 
Source: CoGTA, 2015: 10. 
 
However, it is necessary to mention that the current levels of household access to the 
four basic services are in fact not as bad as media and critics are portraying. The 
service levels of the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Council (CoJ), which is the 
unit of analysis of this research, in 2015 were impressively high and much higher than 
the national average CoGTA, 2015 July: 35; CoJ, 2015 (IDP); CoJ, 2016: 39 (SDBIP). 
The current service levels of water, sanitation, electricity and refuse removal of the 
CoJ have already achieved the targeted levels to be met by 2014. In the CoJ 98.5% of 
household have flush toilet connected to sewerage, 96.9% of households have weekly 
refuse removal, 96.8% of households have access to water and 90.8% of household 
have electricity for lighting (See Table 3.1). Moreover, the communities’ satisfaction 
level with municipal service are also very high. According to a survey conducted by 
CoJ, 89% of the respondents said that they were satisfied with water services, 80% 
with sanitation, 84% with energy and 83% with waste removal (CoJ, 2015idp: 155).  
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Table 3.1 Basic services targets and service level of the CoJ (2015) 
Targets and current service 
levels in the City of 
Johannesburg (CoJ) 
Percentage of households that have adequate access 
Water sanitation electricity 
refuse 
removal 
Minimum Standard 2014 
Target (SALGA, 2011) 
100% 100% 100% 100% 
Output No. 2 of Presidential 
Outcomes No. 9 (by the end 
of 2014) 
92% -100% 69% -100% 81% -100% 64% -75% 
Current level of national 
average (2015) (CoGTA, 
2015) 
90% 79.5% 80% 63.8% 
Gauteng (CoGTA, 2015) 96.4% 90.9% 83.8% 89.1% 
CoJ (CoJ, 2015 (IDP); CoJ, 
2016: 39) 
95.8% 98.5% 90.8% 96.9% 
Source: SALGA, 2011; The Presidency, 2010; CoGTA, 2015 July: 35; CoJ, 2015 
(IDP); CoJ, 2016: 39 (SDBIP). 
 
However, the numbers and percentage of service levels do not tell us anything about 
the quality of the services and the satisfaction level of community members. 
Moreover, these levels are an average of all cities and towns that are included into the 
CoJ and there are many cities and towns where the service levels are much lower 
than these averages and their real situations are not reflected in these data.  It should 
be understood that performance of municipal service delivery is not only about the 
numbers of households that have access to the services, but the quality of services 
delivered to the community, the relationships between the staff and officials of 
municipalities and the community members, public participation in the decision 
making processes are also important factors in municipal service delivery.  There is 
also a general consensus that it is the customer or the community members who 
define service quality (Fornell, 1992; Gronroos, 1984; Parasuraman, Zeithaml & Berry, 
1985).  
 
In his book Quality is Free, Philip Crosby (1979) argues that quality is ‘free’ because it 
doesn’t really cost any more to do your best as an individual or as an organisation, 
and then advises organisations to constantly do their best and focus on the needs of 
the customers. It is important to understand that quality is sometime related to and 
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concerned with the attitudes of persons who ‘supply’ delivery and how they 
communicate with customers and community members. From the public’s almost 
every day experiences of dealing or working or communicating with public servants 
such as municipal workers or staff of the Home Affairs Department or nurses from 
public clinics, what most of the public expect is not only services but also to receive 
the values and principles envisioned in the Batho Pele White Paper (RSA, 1997).  
 
Moreover, one of the critical matters is an expectation or performance gap between 
the expectation of community members from the municipalities and the level of 
services actually delivered by the municipalities. The government, through the 
Constitution and three White Papers, i.e, WPTPS (RSA, 1995), Batho Pele White 
Paper (RSA, 1997) and the White Paper on Local Government (RSA, 1998a), has 
effectively raised the expectation levels of community members of the municipal 
service delivery processes, thus the government and municipalities have to make sure 
that services are delivered to the level and qualities of community expectations. 
Otherwise, as Goodman (2000: 6) points out, an expectation or “performance gap will 
sow the seeds of dissatisfaction” and also the continuation of the service delivery 
protests that the country has been experiencing since 2004. Over the past ten years, 
a flood of community service delivery protests has been overwhelming the country 
and the growing dissatisfaction of citizens with local municipalities have increased.  
 
Figure 1: Major service delivery protests, by year (2004 –31st August 
2016) 
 
Source: Municipal IQ, 2016: 1 
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The Economist magazine (2010) states that  in 2009 South Africa lost an estimated 
1.5 million working days to strikes, beaten only by Canada, which lost around 2.2-
million working days to industrial action. It is also necessary to state that service 
delivery protests were not the results of low service delivery performance—there are 
political aspects and grievances of community members related to issues that are not 
directly related to local government’ control or performance, for instance, issues of 
housing delivery, which is the provincial government’s responsibility. That point is 
evident in the numbers of protests by province. According to Municipal IQ (2016), in 
2014 there were 191 service delivery protests and in 2015, 164 protests. Although 
Gauteng province does not have any dysfunctional municipalities, during the 1st 
January and 31st August 2016, 30% of service delivery protests that occur in the 
country occurred in Gauteng (Municipal IQ, 2016; Allan & Heese, 2011) (Figure 3.1). 
 
The Gauteng City Region Observatory’s (GCRO) Quality of Life Survey III, suggests 
that the reason for the Gauteng having almost one third of all service delivery protest 
is that communities are generally satisfied with service, their satisfaction with 
government is low (GCRO, 2014). Furthermore, in its Quality of Life Survey, GCRO 
(2015: 2) points out that “High levels of service satisfaction do not translate into high 
levels of satisfaction with government”. In Gauteng provinces, 59% of residents are 
satisfied with services provided by local government, only 34% are satisfied with the 
performance of local government generally. 
 
It is a generally accepted fact that the level of national aspiration expressed at the 
start of the new nation and the high level of community members expectations 
encouraged by the most progressive Constitution in the world and the principles and 
values embraced in the Batho Pele White Paper (1997) have not been achieved yet, 
as has been confirmed by the ongoing  service delivery protests and pronouncements 
both from government leadership  including the president himself, community 
members and civil society.  
 
In its Back to Basic study, CoGTA (2014) states that necessary resources and 
systems are available in municipalities but what is lacking is the basic mechanisms to 
perform these functions are often not in place. CoGTA (2015) discovers that 
nationally, there are six primary challenges that municipalities are experiencing. They 
are (1) deteriorating infrastructure services in some municipalities as a result of either 
not providing at all or provided but at low quality levels; (2) breakdown of trust in local 
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government by communities because of slow or inadequate responses to 
communities’ concerns and questions related to municipal services; (3) inadequate 
public participation and social distance by councillors; (4) low collection rate of 
revenue; (5) lack of skills of personals and inappropriate appointments and 
replacement; and (6) widespread instances of corruptions.  
 
Figure 3.1: Service delivery protests by province 1st January and 31st 
August 2016 
 
Source: Municipal IQ, 2016: 2 
 
Furthermore, there is a concern for efficiency and effectiveness of municipalities and 
municipal entities too. During the financial year 2014-15, the City lost R10.67m of 
impairment of consumer debtors (which is 68% of total consumer debtors) (AG, 
2015coj: 2; CoJ, 2015: 389). Moreover, in the same financial year, the City lost R2.6b 
because of material electricity losses (which is 29% of total electricity purchased due 
to distribution losses (R8m) and criminal conducts such as theft, bypass of meters, 
illegal de-calibration of meters and damaged meters (R1.8m) (AG, 2015coj: 2; CoJ, 
2015: 389). And during the same financial year (2014-15), 37.8% of Johannesburg’s 
water (229,658 megalitres) is unaccounted for annually, costing the City R1.2b (R0.6b 
for leaks and R0.3b for illegal connections) (Molatlhwa & Smillie, 2015). 
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Moreover, during the same financial year (2014-15), Johannesburg Water lost R3.9b 
because of material impairments caused by debtors, which is 66% of consumer 
debtors (JW, 2015: 99; AG, 2015jw: 14), and Pikitup lost R3.9b because of material 
impairments caused by debtors, which is 66% of consumer debtors (Pikitup, 2015: 
118; AG, 2015p: 1)1 (Table 3.2). The Auditor-General states that these types of 
losses, although not planned, do occur in the normal course of business and 
considerations should be taken when developing the budgets.  
Table 3.2 Material losses incurred and impairment of assets 
(In CoJ, City Power, Johannesburg Water, and Pikitup Johannesburg) 
Auditee 
Material 
losses  
Material 
impairment 
caused by 
debtor  
Reason(s) 
Metropolitan municipalities 
CoJ 
 
R11m Consumer debtors 
Municipal entities 
City Power  R2.6b  
distribution losses, Criminal 
Conduct 
Johannesburg Water R1.2b R3.9b 
Water losses, illegal 
connections, consumer 
debtors  
Pikitup   R3.9b consumer debtors 
Source: AG, 2015coj: 2; CoJ, 2015: 389; Pikitup, 2015: 118; AG, 2015p: 1; JW, 2015: 
99; AG, 2015jw: 14), 
 
3.4 Municipal performance management and M&E systems 
Performance management (PM) is, according to Shafritz and Russell (2000: 273), the 
systematic integration of an organisation’s efforts to achieve its objectives through 
developing work expectations and goals, delivering and receiving performance 
feedback, identifying development needs, and evaluating performance. The primary 
responsible person is an organisational leader. The difference between the PM and 
mere management is its focus and emphasis on systemic integration. Performance 
management has six components, which include the specification of clear and 
                                                 
1
 Please note that these AG figures of material impairments for Joburg Water and Pikitup are 
exactly the same (R3 874 196 000). It is possible that there might be mistakes either from the 
AG or Picktup (it is sure that it is not Joburg Water mistake as it attached the original report of 
AG). In Appendix S, both AG reports are attached. 
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measurable organisational objectives, systematic performance measures and 
indicators, performance appraisal, performance incentives, linkage between resources 
to management or budget cycle, and regular review and assessment (Shafritz & 
Russell, 2000: 273-4). The PM of CoJ encompasses the planning, monitoring, 
measurement and reporting of performance at various levels (CoJ, 2007). According 
to Jonas (2011: 40), a PMS is in fact the M&E tool for the implementation of the 
Integrated Development Plan (IDP). Although the focus area of this research is the 
M&E system of municipalities, without studying the PMS it would not be possible to 
understand the M&E. It is the prime reason for studying the Performance 
management system (PMS). 
 
One of the benefits the PM and M&E systems provides to municipalities is 
improvement of service delivery by means of improving communication, setting 
targets, comparisons, a focus on service and access to a directory of best practices, 
and acquiring abilities to alter services easily to adjust to the current situation as soon 
as the changes occurred (GFOA, 2007: 5). Performance management (PM) is defined 
by the Department of Provincial and Local Government Manual (DPLG, 2003:12) as a 
strategic approach to management, which equips leaders, managers, employees and 
stakeholders at different levels with a set of tools and techniques to regularly plan, 
continuously monitor, periodically measure and review the performance of the 
organisation in terms of indicators and targets for efficiency, effectiveness and impact. 
By these means, a PMS can ensure all leaders, managers and individuals in a 
municipality are held accountable for their actions, which should bring about improved 
service delivery. The 1998 White Paper on Local Government (RSA, 1998a) 
acknowledges that PM is critical in ensuring that development plans are implemented; 
resources are used efficiently and optimally; and ensuring that the desired effect is 
obtained through proper application.   
 
3.4.1  Legislative and regulatory framework for PM and M&E systems 
The PM and M&E at local government sphere is guided and instilled by the 1998 
White Paper on Local Government, the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act, 
1998 (Act 117 of 1998) (hereafter will be referred to as the Municipal Structures Act), 
the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act, 2000 (Act 32 of 2000) (hereafter 
referred to as the Municipal Systems Act, 2000), The Local Government: Municipal 
Planning and Performance Management Regulations, 2001 (hereafter referred to as 
the PM Regulations), and the Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act, 
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2003 (MFMA). The White Paper on Local Government (RSA, 1998: Section B, part 3) 
identifies PM as one of three tools for realising a developmental local government. 
The other two tools are integrated development planning (IDP) and budgeting, and 
partnerships with local citizens and partners. The Municipal Structures Act (Act 117, 
RSA, 1998) aims to institute a PMS in local government that will facilitate access of 
service information to communities and thereby empower them to demand better 
services and thereby cause municipalities to be more accountable (DPLG, 2001:8). 
Section 19 of the Municipal Structures Act stipulates that a municipality must annually 
review its overall performance.  
 
The Municipal Systems Act is the most important and comprehensive legislation for 
local government PM and M&E systems. It not only provides the policy framework for 
the implementation of the PMS, and also provides the most comprehensive national 
framework for M&E in local authorities. It also provides a most wide ranging set of 
guidelines to enable local authorities to establish and implement a PMS that is 
commensurate with its resources, and in line with the priorities, objectives, indicators 
and targets contained in its integrated development plan. It aims to promote a culture 
of PM among its political structures, political office bearers and councillors and in its 
administration, and to administer its affairs in an economical, effective, efficient and 
accountable manner.  
 
The core components of the PMS are outlined in its Section 41. These components 
set appropriate performance indicators to measure performance outcomes and 
impact, specific, measurable targets, regular monitoring of performance, 
measurement and review of performance at least once a year, ways to improve 
performance, and an established process of regular reporting.  Section 5 of the Act 
“requires municipalities to regularly disclose information regarding the affairs of the 
municipality to the public”, while section 11 compels municipalities to monitor “the 
impact and effectiveness of its policies, programmes and plans” (Atkinson & Wellman 
2003: 4). Chapter 6 of the Municipal Systems Act (RSA 2000: Sections 38 and 41) 
requires municipalities to develop a PMS, set targets, monitor and review 
performance based on indicators linked to their IDP, publish an annual report on 
performance for the councillors, staff, the public and other spheres of government, 
incorporate and report on a set of general indicators prescribed nationally by the 
Minister responsible for local government, conduct an internal audit on performance 
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before tabling the report, involve  communities in setting indicators and targets and in 
reviewing municipal objectives, performance, expenditure, budget and timelines.  
 
Most importantly, the Municipal Systems Act compels municipalities to make sure 
their PMS functions as an early warning system of underperformance so that it can be 
addressed through proactive and timely interventions, and also stipulates to include 
requirements for external oversight and actions if found to be non-compliant. The 
2001 PM Regulations provides additional guidelines for the implementation of the 
Municipal Systems Act, 2000. The regulations state that, in developing the PMS, a 
municipality must ensure that the system “complies with all the requirements set out in 
the Act; demonstrates how it is to operate and be managed from the planning stage 
up to the stages of performance review and reporting; clarifies the roles and 
responsibilities of each role-player, including the local community, in the functioning of 
the system; clarifies the processes of implementing the system within the framework 
of the integrated development planning process; determines the frequency of 
reporting and the lines of accountability for performance; relates to the municipality’s 
employee PM processes; and provides for the procedure by which the system is 
linked to the municipality’s integrated development planning (IDP) processes” (RSA 
2000: 8-9). 
 
The Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA) does not refer directly to PMS. 
However, it provides the framework for good financial management practices in local 
authorities. The overall performance of the municipality depends on the financial 
practices and performance of the municipality, especially in terms of ensuring the 
effectiveness, efficiency and economy of all aspects of service delivery and municipal 
management. The MFMA also provides for a number of budgetary requirements for 
linking the budget of the municipality to the IDP (and thereby also to the PMS) as well 
as for assigning responsibility and accountability of financial performance to both 
managers and political representatives. 
 
3.4.2  The PM and M&E systems of the City of Johannesburg 
The City of Johannesburg introduced a Performance Management System (PMS) in 
2003. The PMS has eight objectives: first, to ensure compatibility of the City 
Scorecard or Service Delivery and Budget Implementation Plans (SDBIP) with the 
Integrated Development Plan (IDP). political priorities; second, to develop viable 
programmes to achieve targets and political priorities; third, to establish linkages 
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between planning and budgeting; fourth, design performance measurement systems 
that will improve performance; fifth, to ensure increased accountability throughout all 
sectors of the municipalities; six, to facilitate learning and development of employees; 
seven, to provide political leadership and management with warnings about potential 
problems and  crises; and eight, to instill a performance-oriented culture across the 
City (CoJ, 2009: 6; Municipal Performance Management Framework). The PMS of the 
City of Johannesburg has five phases: (1) Performance planning, (2) performance 
executing; (3) performance reviews and reporting; (4) performance auditing, 
evaluation and moderation phase; and (5) managing the outcomes of the performance 
management process. 
 
3.4.2.1 Performance planning 
In the performance planning phase, supervisors and subordinates consult and identify 
the performance objectives at the individual and organisational levels. In order to 
enhance the performance of the municipality as a whole, it is imperative to have 
consensus between the supervisor and subordinates on the performance objectives. 
 
3.4.2.2 Performance executing 
The performance executing phrase has three steps: Scorecard implementation, 
performance monitoring and coaching. Scorecard implementation and performance 
monitoring take place throughout the cycle and are both linked structurally to groups 
as well as individual performance. Performance coaching occurs throughout the cycle 
but is only related to individual performance. 
 
Scorecard Implementation: The City’s PMS uses the Balanced Scorecard approach 
(CoJ, 2007: 34). The Balanced Scorecard is implemented at four levels: group level 
(city scorecard), sector level, departmental or municipality entity level, and individual 
level. At the group level, the City Scorecard is used. It is called Service Delivery and 
Budget Implementation Plans (SDBIP). It identifies the city-wide performance 
objectives and strategic planning process, based on the Growth and Development 
Strategy and the Integrated Development Plan (IDP). Using the City Scorecard, the 
attainment of the overall objectives is monitored and measured. The responsible 
persons for conducting performance management at the group level (through the City 
Scorecard) are the City Manager, Executive Directors and Managing Directors/Chief 
Executive Officers (CoJ, 2009). 
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Based on the Citywide Scorecard (SDBIP) and the five year IDP, the sector plans, 
objectives and measures are developed by sector leaders and sector members. From 
the sector plans, objectives and measures, the sector scorecards are developed and 
adopted. Developing sector plans require collaboration and cooperation among all key 
stakeholders, so that each sector plan contributes to the implementation of the five 
year IDP articulated annually in the (SDBIP). The Infrastructure and Services Sector 
(ISS) scorecards are developed together by all related municipal entities—
Johannesburg Water, City Power, Pikitup—and the Infrastructure and Services 
Department in order to align the activities of each sector with those of the others. The 
draft of the sector scorecard has to be submitted to the City Manager. After being 
accepted by the City Manager, it goes to the Johannesburg Performance Audit 
Committee (JPAC). The JPAC provides inputs and feedback comments about the 
draft sector score.  After revising according to JPAC comments and inputs, the 
scorecard is submitted to the Mayoral Committee to be accepted. The members of 
Mayoral Committee (as political heads of the sector) are held accountable for sector 
performance and oversee its implementation.  
 
Based on the sector scorecard, specific sector priorities are established and these are 
implemented by the core departments and municipal entities within their areas of 
jurisdiction. These priorities are then transformed into Strategic Performance 
Objectives (SPOs). These objectives (SPOs) are documented by Executive Directors 
and the Managing Directors or Chief Executive Officers of the core departments and 
municipal entities. Based on these SPOs, Functional Performance Objectives (FPOs) 
are developed for all other employees (CoJ, 2009: 19). Derived from FPOs, the 
Individual Scorecards are established for personnel at all levels of the hierarchy 
including the strategic decision-makers of core departments and municipal entities. 
(CoJ, 2009: 19). Monitoring of individual performance is conducted all year around. 
The City Manager is responsible for monitoring the performance of the managers 
directly accountable to her/ him. The Board Chairpersons and relevant MMC is 
responsible for monitoring the performance of the MDs/ CEOs. The Central Strategy 
Unit (CSU) supports the City Manager in the monitoring process, and the Shareholder 
Unit (SHU) supports Board Chairpersons and the relevant Member of the Mayoral 
Committee (MMC) in their monitoring process. 
 
Performance monitoring: Performance monitoring takes place at two levels:  the group 
level and the individual level. Monitoring is conducted against the implementation of 
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the IDP, the City scorecard, the sector scorecards, the departmental or municipal 
entity business plans and individual scorecards. The aim of monitoring is to 
continually track performance and improve performance through feedback and 
capacity development. Data and information are gathered from reports and data and 
information sources related to the implementation of Key Performance Indicators 
(KPIs), strategic performance objectives (SPOs), Functional Performance Objectives 
(FPOs) during the implementation process. There are two kinds of performance 
monitoring: Group performance monitoring and individual performance monitoring. 
 
Group performance monitoring checks the implementation levels of the IDP, SDBIP, 
Sector and the Municipal/Departmental business plan, and sector scorecards. Data 
and information are collected by the various individuals and committees at each level 
of group performance. The SHU (Shareholder Unit), Sector leads, EDs (Executive 
Director) and MDs. Sector members collect information on implementation of the 
scorecard. Then, sector leads prepare, with the support of the various sector 
members, and submit a progress report to the Committee. Sector leads, EDs 
(Executive Director) and MDs collect, generate, analyse, prepare and share 
monitoring information within the sector. The SHU (Shareholder Unit) collects and 
analyses data and information from the municipal entities and departments through 
the sector lead. The Municipal Performance Audit Committee (MPAC) and Section 79 
Committees oversee the monitoring process.  
 
Individual performance is monitored all year round, with an aim to review and provide 
feedback on performance progress, and to identify individual performance 
development needs as well as corrective measures. Monitoring is undertaken against 
the implementation of individual scorecards. With the support of the CSU, the City 
Manager monitors the performance of the managers directly accountable to her/ him. 
With the support of the SHU, the Board Chairpersons and relevant MMC monitor the 
performance of the MDs/ CEOs. The respective EDs and MDs/ CEOs collect and 
analyse performance information and evidence for all levels of performance 
achievements, and then, submit a record of review results, together with evidence of 
performance, to the Performance Audit Committee and the Performance Evaluation 
Panel (PEP) respectively.  
 
Performance monitoring: Performance coaching takes place at an individual level. Its 
aim is to get individual employees to understand how well he or she is doing. 
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Coaching sections are held in October and April. The City Manager is responsible for 
coaching the sector leads and sector members who are directly accountable to him. 
The Board Chairperson is responsible for coaching MDs/ CEOs of municipal entities. 
Line managers are responsible for coaching their subordinates. During the coaching 
process, a review of progress is made against the Key Performance Areas and 
associated KPIs and core competency requirements (CCR) in the employee’s 
performance scorecard; challenges that employees face are identified and a plan of 
action to address them are agreed; training and development needs are identified and 
plans to address these development needs are formulated, and also good 
performances are acknowledged and discussed. 
 
3.4.2.3 Performance reviews and reporting 
The objective of the performance reviews is to establish the extent to which the 
desired outcomes have been achieved, by way of assessing the level of performance 
against scorecards. Performance reviews and reporting take place at the various 
levels such as at the levels of the IDP, City Scorecard, Sector, Business plans and 
individual performance management. At the individual level, it takes place through the 
one on ones. But at the ME (municipal entities) level it takes place, formally, through 
the MMC quarterlies. Performance reviews are not conducted at a Departmental level. 
Group wide performance and the performance of the Core Departments is reviewed 
by the CSU. Performance reviews are undertaken at two levels: at the group level and 
at the individual level. After reviewing the performances, reports are submitted to 
reviewing committees and/or persons who check and analyse the performance results 
against relevant performance information. 
 
Group Performance Review: Group performance review is conducted at the 
overarching levels of the city, the sectors and the various departments and municipal 
entities. It involves reviewing performance reports and documenting evidence to 
establish whether group priorities have been achieved in line with the IDP, SDBIP, 
Sector plans and municipal entity/Departmental business plans. Reviews take place 
bi-annually and quarterly. The JPAC reviews sector performance on a quarterly basis. 
The committee reviews the performance of the sector against the sector scorecard.  
The CSU is responsible for preparing and submitting its own report on the 
performance of the sector including critical challenges and an assessment of how the 
performance management system has been implemented within the sector. The 
JRAS is responsible for auditing sector performance on a quarterly basis and 
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submitting the report to the Committee and the Performance Audit Committee (JPAC). 
The SHU is responsible for providing inputs on the performance of the relevant 
entities that are part of that sector. Sector leads are responsible for consolidating, 
preparing and presenting the performance review report.  
 
Individual Performance Review: Individual performance reviews involve assessing 
individual performance reports and evidence to establish whether individual scorecard 
priorities have been achieved according to the Sector plans and municipal entity or 
Departmental business plans. Responsible persons to review individual performance 
are MDs/CEOs and EDs. Four performance review sessions are conducted: Two 
formal sessions (in January and July) and two informal sessions (in October and 
April). 
 
3.4.2.4 Performance auditing and evaluation 
Performance auditing and performance evaluation are different processes conducted 
by two different committees. Performance auditing conducted by the Performance 
Audit Committee (JPAC) which is comprised of the Executive Mayor and Central 
Strategy Unit (CSU), and performance evaluation is conducted by a Performance 
Evaluation Panel (PEP) which is composed of the City Manager, Board Chairpersons, 
the Chairperson of the Performance Audit Committee, member of the Mayoral 
Committee, and a municipal manager from another municipality. 
 
The functions and responsibilities of the JPAC and PEP are different. The JPAC 
focuses on institutional performance while the PEP on individual performance. The 
JPAC audits the entire performance management system, reviews the performance of 
the City (SDBIP), reviews the performance of sectors, and prepares and submits a 
report to the Performance Evaluation Panel, Mayoral Committee and the Council. The 
PEP evaluates the performance of the City Manager, evaluates the performance of all 
managers directly accountable to the City Manager, evaluates the performance of all 
Managing Directors and Chief Executive Officers of the Municipal Entities, moderates 
the outcomes of individual performance review sessions, recommends individual 
performance rewards in line with the City’s reward framework, and submits 
recommendations to the Mayoral Committee (CoJ, 2009: 40). 
 
Performance appraisals are sent to the Performance Audit Committee. The Audit 
Committee assesses whether or not the PMS is operational, it complies with the 
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Municipal Systems Act of 2000, and its measures are reliable. After auditing and 
evaluation, recommendations are provided. Performance evaluations are conducted 
at the end of the performance cycle. Individual performance is appraised against the 
key performance indicators reflected in the sector scorecards. The performances of 
the City Manager and all managers are evaluated by two panels annually and 
performance scores are submitted to the Mayoral Committee and the Council for 
approval. 
 
3.4.2.5 Managing the outcomes of the performance management process 
The last stage of the PMS is managing performance outcomes, which come in three 
forms: financial or non-financial rewards (to employees who perform well), 
performance development and support; and incapacity procedures (to employees 
whose performances are poor). Performance-related rewards are given to reward the 
good performance of employees. The amount of reward depends on the performance 
of the City as a whole group. Performance bonuses are between 5 per cent to 14 per 
cent (of the all-inclusive remuneration package) for all employees including MDs, 
CEOs and Section 57 employees (CoJ, 2009: 52). 
 
Support and corrective measures are taken to manage the poor performance of 
employees. Systematic remedial or developmental support, adequate guidance and 
assistance are provided to poor performing employees to improve their performance. 
If employees fail to improve their performance after appropriate support has been 
provided, their employment contracts are terminated. 
 
3.4.3  The weaknesses identified in PMS in local government 
Due to these intensive and comprehensive legal directives mentioned in section 3.4.1, 
it should be assumed that the PMS of local government has already been established 
in many municipalities. However, Koelble and Siddle (2013) discovered that there is a 
vast divergence between constitutional and legal mandates and the actual practice of 
municipalities. Only a small fraction of their sample, i.e. only 2 of 37 municipalities, 
came close to actually performing all of the 38 functions required of municipalities in 
the Constitution. Although the Constitution and subsequent legislation provide local 
government with substantial powers and functions, in practice large numbers of 
municipalities in their sample are neither exercising nor performing using these 
powers and functions (Koelble & Siddle, 2013). 
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A survey, which is unrepresentative, conducted by Rabie (2011: 189) at the Institute 
for Municipal Finance Officers (IMFO) 2005 conference revealed that 44 of the 52 
municipalities represented in the survey have a PMS in place that assesses 
performance against the IDP. In most cases (32 of the 52 responses) the PMS is 
based on the balanced scorecard model. Various studies, researches and even 
government leadership  (Rabie, 2011; Phalatse, 2010; Jonas, 2011, Carrim, 2009) 
discovered that the main problems experienced at local government level with the 
PMSs are lack of knowledge, skills and understanding of the system by various role-
players; fear of victimisation leading to lack of buy-in; inappropriate targets and key 
performance indicators; lack of sharing, the administrative burden of managing 
performance information; political interference; lack of linking individual performance 
to organisational performance (and understanding the differences between the two 
systems); lack of incentive in PM and M&E systems; and weak financial management 
and failure to meet reporting deadlines.  
 
It is important to note that ineffective measures will not lead to improvement. 
Moreover, having performance measures and even tracking the measures do not 
mean anything unless management uses them to evaluate performance (Moss, 
2007). As Berry (1991), Johnston (1999) and Moss (2007) conclude, ineffective PM 
and M&E systems would neither improve service delivery performance nor customer 
service quality. The following section will discuss the essential characteristics of an 
EWS that are currently lacking in the PM and M&E systems but need to be integrated 
into them in order for these systems to be able to serve as EWSs and, in turn, to be 
able to alert the responsible stakeholders and persons about the possible problems 
and difficulties in the service delivery processes. 
 
3.4.4  The weaknesses identified in PMS in CoJ 
In his study of the Balanced Scorecard (BS) of the City of Johannesburg during three 
financial years (2011/12, 2012/13, 2013/14), Mbala (2016: 176-7) reveals that the 
Performance Management Policy of the City provides a selection of performance 
measures and targets, but the objectives settings and strategic initiatives were not 
integrated within it. He also states that the implementation of the BSC during these 
three financial years did not comply with the adopted framework. The developed 
scorecard did not have objectives and initiatives. While different components of 
service delivery have measures and targets, they are not in alignment with one 
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another. Moreover, the City set a large number of targets which made it difficult to 
determine the status of the target achievement (Mbala, 2016: 176-7). 
 
One of the findings on the City’s PMS is the lack of involvement of residents and 
communities in formulating and implementing the PMS. Although employees are 
aware of the municipality’s mission statement and its purposes, residents do not know 
them. While the Growth and Development Strategy and the IDP are clearly outlined, 
the daily operations of the municipality are not related to them. Moreover, the strategic 
performance outcomes and KPIs are formulated by the municipality but there is no 
consultation with residents. Employees at the lower levels of management are also 
not involved in the development of KPIs.  
 
It is also revealed that performance objectives are set by managers and subordinates 
together, but both of them are not involved in the evaluation of the municipal 
performance. Furthermore, Radebe (2013: 266) discovers that “the evaluation of the 
municipality’s performance is in fact not carried out”. In addition, it is noted that the 
PMS is only applied to officials in higher levels of the municipality. Training regarding 
the PMS is provided to managers and subordinates. So that they understand the PMS 
and how it functions. But no training is provided on how to conduct performance 
reviews. Moreover, they lack the capacity to work effectively with the Balance 
Scorecard. Consequently, employees at the PMS make inaccurate measurement of 
employees’ performance, and unjustified performance rewards are given to 
employees, mostly to top managers. Because of lack of skills and understanding, 
there is a negative attitude among employees to the Balanced Scorecard in particular 
and the PMS in general. 
 
Radebe (2013: 267) also states that the current IT system and infrastructure used in 
the CoJ for the PMS is not easy for employees. He observes that most of the time 
computers as well as the network are not functional. Moreover, employees do not 
have the skills to capture key performance indicators. For employees, it is “a daunting 
task to acquire data in order to calculate key performance indicators” (Radebe, 2013: 
267). These situations further reinforce the negative attitude of employees on the 
implementation of the PMS. Another weakness Radebe (2013) finds in the CoJ’s PMS 
is poor coordination and lack of alignment among sectors and departments in creating 
KPIs, thus creating “silos” in the municipality. The very same key performance areas 
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are sometime out of tune with the municipality’s Growth and Development Strategy, 
IDP and overall municipality objectives.  
 
Furthermore, when KPIs are developed, the municipality does not pay due 
consideration of available resources. KPIs are sometime pitched at a high level that is 
beyond employees’ ability. In addition, the PMS has no relationship or association 
with the provision of service delivery such as the removal of garbage, fixing of 
potholes, maintenance of street lights, maintenance of lawns, sidewalks and parks, 
and maintenance of the sewage system. Another limitation in the CoJ’s PMS is its 
lack of communication about performance results with communities who are affected 
by the PMS. Radebe (2013) also observes that the CoJ’s PMS is not performance-
oriented and the performance culture seems to be lacking in the implementation of 
PMS. 
 
3.4.5  Elements of EWS lacking in the current PM and M&E Systems 
The primary question of this research is to what extent the current PM and M&E 
systems of municipalities have the characteristics and components of an EWS. 
Basher (2006: 2170) argues that to be effective and complete, an early warning 
system needs to comprise all four interacting elements, namely: (1) risk knowledge, 
(2) monitoring and warning system service, (3) dissemination and communication and 
(4) response capability (Basher, 2006: 2168). Failure in any one of these elements 
can mean failure of the whole early warning system (UN, 2006: v). Based on 
researches and literature, the following sections discuss the weaknesses found in 
current municipal PM and M&E systems. Although there are several important 
weaknesses in the current PM and M&E systems of local government, only three 
weaknesses that are directly related to the components of an EWS. 
 
3.4.2.1  Lack of ‘risk knowledge’ database 
Risk knowledge or simply a list or a record of problems and challenges that 
municipalities face and address in their service delivery processes is an integral part 
of any EWS. According to UNISDR (2005), past events have to be studied and 
improvements have to be made to the EWS. Municipalities have not developed a list 
of their municipal service delivery problems and challenges. Even the government 
(RSA, 2010) admits that it has not done sufficient work on developing detailed 
indicators and targets for service delivery quality. Performance targets and key 
performance indicators (KPI) of current M&E systems of municipalities are 
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inappropriate and data verification issues can still be problematic. Engela and Ajam 
(2010: 18) state that systems of data verification and auditing of nonfinancial 
performance information need to be put in place. Where information systems are in 
place, the emphasis often tends to be on data collection rather than analysis. 
 
Even when information and data are collected, it is often riddled with technical errors, 
including poorly formulated or defined indicators; non-agreement between the 
indicator’s unit of measurement and the unit of measurement of the target; and over-
focus on inputs and outputs, with few process and almost no outcome indicators 
(Rabie, 2011). Furthermore, often the same information and data are recorded or 
documented in different versions, and baseline data of departments are also different 
from one another. Often, there are no central data repositories within departments. 
Different programme areas frequently are not even aware of what data are available 
within the department itself (Engela & Ajam, 2010). 
 
3.5.2.2  Lack of systematic warning mechanism and information 
sharing 
Basher (2006) argues that although collecting, monitoring and detecting are critical 
parts of an EWS, it is in the communication and preparedness elements where 
failures of an EWS typically resulted. According to UNISDR (2005), major players and 
stakeholders have to meet regularly and consult, risk scenarios are constructed and 
reviewed, specific responsibilities are agreed, information has to be disseminated and 
staff have to be trained. In the similar vein, Hamilton (1999) warns that getting warning 
information or predictions alone are not useful unless they are translated into action 
plans, which the municipalities communicate   to the public and also that the public 
understands them. 
 
All Municipalities generally have monitoring systems, but information collected by 
M&E systems are not completed. More importantly, there is no a systematic warning 
mechanism in the M&E systems.  In addition, municipalities as well as individual 
departments do not share their information. According to Engela and Ajam (2010: 25), 
“civil servants are uneasy about sharing data not only between departments but even 
between programme areas within the same department. In many instances, 
custodians of data guard their information and, in some instances, the ‘culture’ has 
become so entrenched that governmental departments are forced to buy data that 
should be readily available from a sister department.  
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3.5.2.3  Weak response capability 
Response capability is part of the competence and capability of municipalities. 
Response capability means mastering addressing and solving problems and 
challenges that municipalities regularly or frequently encounter in their service delivery 
processes. In order to be able to solve these problems and challenges, municipalities 
have to record, document and understand all common problems and challenges they 
experienced in the past, i.e, establishing risk knowledge. Before developing response 
capability, risk knowledge or a database of common problems and challenges has to 
be constructed. Response capability is not the same as general skills and capacity to 
perform and implement municipal tasks. It is a special kind of knowledge and capacity 
to solve the problems and challenges of municipal service delivery processes. As 
discussed above, municipalities are still struggling with capacity and skill shortage 
issues. Without sufficient capability to address or solve problems, just knowing early 
warning signs will not be useful. 
 
3.5 Factors affecting municipal service delivery performance 
Literature on local government and municipal service delivery performance discuss 
various kinds of problems. These problems are at macro level and generally are the 
underlying causes of day to day practical problems that municipal service delivery 
teams face and have to overcome. On the other hand, this study tries to explore and 
understand problems that are at micro level and that staff and technicians of 
municipalities and municipal owned entities (MOE) face and have to address during 
the delivery of services to community members. Common problems and difficulties 
that employees and staff of MOEs face and have to overcome during their work are 
different from the problems and issues discussed in literature, academic journal 
articles and researches. However, in order to understand these small scale problems, 
it is necessary to explore the macro-level problems discussed in the literature and 
researches. 
 
The problems with municipal service delivery are multifaceted and interrelated. 
Although some factors and problems are within the control of municipalities, there are 
still many factors that are external (CoGTA, 2015, 2014 & 2009; Carrim, 2009; 
Stanton, 2009). This research does not explore or examine external factors, but 
investigates and discusses internal factors and problems.  
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According to Devarajan and Reinikka (2004), as discussed in section 2.4.4, there are 
at least four roots of the service delivery problem: resource misallocation, weak 
incentive, expenditure leakages, and demand side failure. Based on these “four roots 
of service delivery problems”, this study selected three factors—resource constraints, 
poor public participation and non-compliance with rules and regulations—as the most 
responsible for the poor municipal service delivery performance.  
 
The reason for selecting these factors out of four root causes is because root causes 
are in fact results of these selected three factors. For example, resource misallocation 
is a result of these selected three factors—resource constraints as a form of skills 
shortage, poor public participation. Similarly, weak incentives and expenditure 
leakages happen because of non-compliance with rules and regulation. Expenditure 
leakages mean municipal expenditures and costs are spent fruitlessly and wastefully. 
Such unauthorised, irregular and fruitless and wasteful expenditure can be 
understood as a result of non-compliance with rules and regulations, which is 
reinforced by a lack of consequences for transgression although the Municipal 
Finance Management Act (MFMA) degrees that these transgressions must be 
investigated. AG (2016) reports that 45% of municipalities (in 2015-16; which is 47% 
in 2013-14) had not investigated these transgressions. Demand side failure is related 
to poor public participation. In the following sections on these three factors, their 
relationships are elaborated (Table 3.3). 
Table 3.3 Relationship between four roots of service delivery problem and 
selected three factors  
Four roots of service delivery 
problem (Devarajan & Reinikka 
2004) 
Selected three factors  
resource misallocation 
 resource constraints as a form of skills shortage 
 poor public participation (in planning)  
weak incentive 
 non-compliance with rules and regulations (weak 
accountability) 
expenditure leakages 
 non-compliance with rules and regulations (weak 
accountability) 
demand side failure  poor public participation  
 
3.5.1  Resource constraints 
Resource is a collective word that encompasses financial sources, capacity and skills. 
Among these, it is capacity constraint that most negatively affects municipal service 
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delivery. In order to delivery in the most competent, efficient and effective, as well as 
accountable manner, municipalities need the right staff with the right skills. 
Competence and capacity are fundamental requisites for effective service delivery by 
any organisation to perform its assigned functions. For municipalities, capacity and 
competence mean having the ability to interpret policies and legislation, to develop 
credible IDP (integrated development planning), to run and control mechanisms for 
revenue and debt collection, to manage finances, to mobilise and plan resources, to 
implement and manage service delivery processes, and to engage with and 
communicate with communities (Makananisa, 2011; Nkoana, 2007).  
 
Skills-shortage is a high profile issue and a much debated matter. It is not a new 
problem. In his 2006 State of the Nation address, Former President, Thabo Mbeki 
(2006), stressed the fact that skills shortage was amongst the most critical issues 
facing South Africa and required urgent attention. Over ten years later, although a 
series of programmes had been implemented, the problem of skills shortage had not 
been improved.  
 
In 2007, the South African Institution of Civil Engineering (SAICE) conducted a skills 
survey of all 283 municipalities and found that there were 83 municipalities that had 
no civil engineers, technologists or technicians, another 48 municipalities employed 
only one civil technician. In municipalities with civil engineering staff, 35% of 
professional positions were vacant. The SAICE study cited several reasons for this 
shortfall, including high vacancy rates, which were often attributed to budget 
constraints, “the inefficient deployment” of civil engineers and “the use of unqualified 
and inexperienced personnel in positions requiring technical ability” (SAICE, 2011: 
11). According to Stats SA report (2016), the highest municipal vacancy rates were 
recorded in the areas of environmental protection (23%), electricity (20%), road 
transport (18%), and wastewater management (16%). In Gauteng local government, 
the Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) of 20% of municipalities and 42% of municipal 
entities did not have the necessary skills; and in 70 % of municipalities and 17% of 
municipal entities, officials in key positions did not have the minimum competencies 
and skills.  
 
The skills shortage issue is just one critical facet of the capacity constraint issue, so is 
financial constraints. Besides the skills shortage, several studies (AG, 2016; CoGTA, 
2014; Makananisa, 2011) discovered that there was also a mismatch between 
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incumbents’ posts, job descriptions and the required qualifications of municipal staff 
and employees. On the other hand, skilled personnel still might lack resources or 
drive or motivation or the correct attitude to perform their tasks and responsibilities 
effectively. Moreover, there was also a discussion on the issue of councillors’ lack of 
understanding of their roles and responsibilities and municipalities’ lack of clear norms 
and standards to guide the appointment of staff (AG, 2016; Makanasia 2011; 
Opperman, 2007; Hicks, 2006). According to 2014 CoGTA presentation at the 
Parliamentary Monitoring Group (PMG) on 16 July 2014, municipalities lack various 
management skills, that include contract and project management skills, financial 
management skills, supply chain management skills and infrastructure asset 
management skills (PMG, 2014; Atkinson, 2004). As a result, there is often no 
alignment between projects run by sector departments and municipalities, and project 
implementations are delayed (PMG, 2014).  
 
Atkinson (2004) argues that municipal managers do not manage, for four reasons. 
First reason is that managers lack management skills and do not know how to 
management. Many senior officials, municipal managers and councils also do not 
know how to evaluate staff performance. Second reason is that they lack experience 
in project or programme management and therefore have to rely on consultants. Third 
reason is that they do not need to manage, either because councillors manage their 
departments on their behalf, or because the trade unions have become the de facto 
manager, or because they do not care, or because they are spending all their time 
assisting under-skilled subordinates. Fourth reason is lack of consequences for poor 
or non-existent management. Managers do not have to manage and nothing bad will 
happen whether they do or they don’t.  
 
What is worth noting here is Elcock’s (1994) discussion, who states that people 
become councillors by winning an election and the attainment of office may or may 
not be related to their abilities as policy-makers or managers. One explanation for 
skills shortage is neo-patrimonial politics in the ruling party, ANC, whereby unqualified 
supporters of the ruling party are appointed to positions within councils (Lodge, 2014; 
Beresford, 2016). Similarly, the Centre for Development and Enterprise (CDE) (2007: 
55) argues that one of the causes of skills shortage is of bad appointments 
compounded by “incompetent human resources administration, breakdown of political 
leadership, political favouritism, nepotism, and misapplied racial transformation”. 
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Concerning financial constraints, Nkwinika (2010) describes two sources of municipal 
financial constraints—weak tax-base and municipal weak ability to collect revenue. 
Municipalities could not raise revenue because of the lack of a sufficient tax base in 
their municipalities. However, even when tax-bases exist, municipalities lack the 
ability to collect revenue. The local government financial regime is collectively still 
fragile though many key elements of local revenue systems are already in place. 
Although some municipalities already have sustainable local sources of revenue, 
some municipalities have a non-existent, or very small, tax base (Nkwinika, 2010).  
 
Secondly, local governance as a whole is struggling to raise enough finance to deliver 
on its mandates. Pycroft (2000) and Stanton (2009) note that serious financial 
constraint on municipalities is attributed to the non-payment by community members 
for the municipal services they use. Pycroft (2000) continues that it is also a result of 
the failure of municipalities to implement appropriate cost-recovery techniques, to 
render monthly accounts in the cases of municipalities with inexperienced staff, and to 
pursue defaulters although there is adequate legal machinery for cost recovery that 
includes legal termination of services such as water and electricity. 
 
Just a few municipalities are able to raise enough revenue to fund their budgets while 
the majority have to depend on inter-governmental grants. Again there are two 
interlinked factors for the municipalities’ inability to raise enough revenue. The first 
factor is the weak billing and collection systems in municipalities and wasteful 
expenditures. Stanton (2009) and Koelble and Siddle (2013) discovered that the 
majority of the 37 municipalities they examined failed to take appropriate steps to 
collect debts or avoid wasteful expenditures. Wasteful expenditure is a kind of 
‘expenditure leakage’. It means the financial resources are not efficiently utilised and 
therefore frontline service providers, where resources are needed, do not receive the 
resources. Koelble and Siddle (2013) estimate that the avoidable wasteful 
expenditures amounted to R27 billion.  
 
According to the Auditor General’s Consolidated General Report on the Audit 
Outcomes of Local Government (2016: 17), in the 2014-2015 financial year, 
municipalities incurred unauthorised expenditure of R15,32 billion, irregular 
expenditure of R14,75 billion, and fruitless and wasteful expenditure of R1,34 billion. It 
is rational to argue that if these wasteful expenditures could be eliminated and local 
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government were able to collect the debts they own, they argue that municipalities 
would be able to finance their activities properly.  
 
Furthermore, while financial constraint is widely attributed to the poor performance of 
municipal service delivery, there are several studies (Elcock, 1994; Mcloughlin & 
Batley, 2012; Devarajan & Reinikka, 2004; World Bank, 2011; Koelble & Siddle, 2013; 
CoGTA, 2009) all of which argue that financial constraint is not the main factor 
responsible for the poor municipal service delivery performance.  
 
While financial constraints are regarded as a factor for weak municipal service 
delivery and for failure to eradicate infrastructure backlogs on water, sanitation and 
roads services, a CoGTA study (2009) points out cases of under-spending, a degree 
of wastage, inappropriate usage of funds, and poor oversight. In his annual report to 
Parliament tabled on 3 August 2012, the director-general of the department of 
CoGTA, Elroy Africa (interviewed by Hartley, 2012), states that R8,7b was allocated to 
local government for infrastructure grants projects, and was transferred to the 
municipalities concerned. But 4% of all municipalities failed to spend any of their 
infrastructure grants at all, while 15% spent less than half of those allocations, thus 
R2,163b was left unspent. According to AG MFMA 2014/15 Report, in 2014/15 
financial year, municipalities did not spend R2b (12%) of municipal infrastructure 
grant. According to Muthotho Sigidi, Deputy Director General of CoGTA, in 2010/11, 
every year there is an increase of R2 billion in the Municipal Infrastructure Grant, but 
municipalities do not have enough capacity to utilise that amount of money.  
 
Moreover, as of 31 March 2014, aggregate municipal consumer debt was R93.4b 
(households owe R57.5b, commercial or business owe R19.3b and other debtors owe 
R12.5b). It is because municipalities were not able to collect them. Moreover, 
outstanding debt over 90 days owed to municipalities were R73.6b, and outstanding 
debt under 30 days were R12.4b. Gauteng municipalities alone have R40.9b 
outstanding debt over 90 days (PMG, 2014). 
 
The Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) (2008) stated that municipal 
borrowing is far lower than its capacity to borrow, partly because of a non-borrowing 
policy by some municipalities such as Mangaung, and of over-caution by the big 
municipalities such as Tshwane when it comes to borrowing. The National Treasury 
and the Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC) have discussed that municipal under-
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spending can be attributed to a lack of proper project planning, ineffective project 
management, a lack of capacity to manage the Municipal Infrastructure Grant 
Programme (MIG) funds and the late approval of projects and budgets by council 
officials. All of this is negatively affecting municipal service delivery (Josie, 2008).  
 
In fact, according to the World Bank (2011: 14-15) “fiscal resources have not been the 
binding constraint to improved service coverage and quality”. It continues that in terms 
of the financial resources municipalities have South Africa is in an enviable position 
because of the fiscal space and resources created and targeted to the poor. The 
World Bank (2011) therefore argues that the challenge is to ensure that public 
transfers result in better outcomes.  
 
On the other hand, an organisation or a department might have more than enough 
financial resources at its disposal, it still might have a capacity constraint and lack of 
effective and systematic planning (CoGTA, 2009; Jackson & Hlahla, 1991). CoGTA 
(2009) states that although some municipalities keep considerable investment 
amounts, there are still huge service delivery backlogs. Jackson and Hlahla (1991) 
identify the relationship between financial constraints and the issues of lack of skills. 
They argue that, while there is a need to put money into municipal development 
programmes, there is a lack of capacity to match the skills required to manage the 
funds. This position is supported by Liebig et al (2008), who stated that lack of 
capacity is mainly due to a severe scarcity of well-educated financial managers and 
engineers, which could be an effect of low level of pay scale levels in the civil service 
compared to those of private sector. 
 
It is interesting to note that the skills shortage issue has a negative impact on the 
community participation. Piper and Chanza (2006) note that ward committee 
members lack training in municipal processes, the technical details of budgetary, IDP 
and performance management processes and skills and support are also needed in 
order for members to engage with the community. Hicks (2006) also points out that 
municipal officials are often unprepared to engage with ward committees and are 
unreceptive to participation. 
 
Additionally, there are underlying but under-discussed factors behind the skills-
shortage issue. These are under-utilisation of the skilled labour resources because of 
the affirmative action (AA) policy and a rigid labour market environment. Some studies 
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(Jeffery,2015; Turton, 2015; Chipkin, 2011; Solidarity Research Institute, 2011; 
Joubert & Calldo, 2008) blame the effects of affirmative action for the shortage of 
skills and incompetency of public servants. However, in my view the true culprit is not 
affirmative action per se, which is in fact a necessary approach to empower and 
integrate historically disadvantaged groups (HDGs) or individuals (HDIs) into the 
mainstream workforces, but implementing and using it as an excuse for guise for 
nepotism and cronyism. What affirmation action means is when two candidates are 
equally qualified for a single position, a person who is from HDGs will be appointed for 
that position. Moreover, providing educational and training opportunities for HDGs or 
HDIs is a critical part of a policy, planning and implementation of affirmation action.  
 
Similarly, while studies (CoGTA, 2009; Cameron, 2012) discussed cadre deployment, 
gatekeeper politics and neo-patrimonial politics in the ruling party, ANC, whereby 
unqualified supporters of the ruling party are appointed to positions within councils 
(Beresford, 2015; Ndletyana, 2015; Marchant, 2015; Lodge, 2014; Ndletyana, 
Makhalemele & Mathekga, 2013) as underlying factors affecting not only the 
performance of municipalities but also the working relationship between the political 
components and the administration parts of municipalities. It is important to realise 
that cadre deployment is not only common to South Africa’s democracy, but also 
practised in most of the old democracies of the world. And cadre deployment per se is 
not a threat to performance as long as the cadres deployed are capable and 
competent (Twala, 2014; Ndletyana, Makhalemele & Mathekga, 2013; De Waal 
2012). For example, cadre deployment has been used effectively in China (Lu, 2014; 
Rolandsen, 2012) and Singapore (Lee, 2000). It should be argued that comparing SA 
to Singapore is like “comparing apples with pears”, but it is not the case. At the early 
beginning of Singapore’s development process, its situation was not so different to 
that of SA. At that time, Singapore was also rife with corruption, and inefficient and 
ineffective public service. The ways taxies in Singapore drove and disregarded the 
traffic rules at that time, in the 1950s and 1960s, were almost like those of Joburg 
taxis. Lee (2000), who is the first Prime Minister of Singapore and who transformed 
Singapore from Third World status into Frist World also talked about how his 
government transformed Singapore Taxi industries. 
 
What causes the shortage of skills and lack of competency and professionalism in the 
public service is more concerned with nepotism and cronyism as well as the lack of 
strict human resource management systems that can hold personnel appointing 
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procedures accountable and make any appointment strictly merit-based (Jolobe, 
2014; CDE, 2007). In the words of the Centre for Development and Enterprise (CDE) 
(2007: 55) skills shortage are results “of incompetent human resources administration, 
political favouritism, nepotism, and misapplied racial transformation”. 
 
It is however critical to heed the argument of Mcloughlin and Batley (2012) who argue 
that “resources alone do not determine outcomes on the ground”. It is politics that 
determines service delivery performance. Similarly, Elcock (1994: 146) also argues 
that “the quality of service may be improved within a static or declining budget by 
providing more cost-effective services or by developing better relationships with 
clients”. Furthermore, Devarajan and Reinikka (2004) also argue that even if 
governments provide enough resources, the service delivery performance still could 
be of low quality and poor if either of these resources are used for the wrong purpose 
or if service providers such as municipalities do not have the incentive to deliver 
services to communities.  
 
3.5.2  Community participation 
The second root of service delivery problems is “demand-side failure”, which is 
caused by the community’s unawareness of services that they are entitled to. 
However, for this research the meaning of “demand-side failure” is wider than a lack 
of community’ awareness of service they are entitled to as stated by Devarajan and 
Reinikka (2004).  Since Involvement  in the governance process is a legislative 
imperative of citizens (Moodley, 2007), “demand-side failure” also means a 
community’s unawareness of their responsibility as well as their duty to participate, 
engage and work with municipalities in creating development plans (Integrated 
Development Plan, IDP), prioritising the community’s needs, preparing and 
implementing municipal policies and processes, finding solutions and addressing 
problems and challenges encountered among the municipal service delivery 
processes, and to hold municipalities as well as municipal entities accountable by 
demanding answers to their questions and communicating with them about all 
municipal matters and issues. 
 
The Municipal Systems Act (2000) requires municipalities to work together with all 
stakeholders, such as community members, to develop the IDP and a PMS that is 
suitable for their own circumstances. Moreover, the Department of Planning and Local 
Government (DPLG) (2001) also states that all stakeholders have different roles in 
  81 
developing, implementing and using the PMS. In the same vein, the Monitoring and 
Evaluation Framework of the City of Johannesburg (CoJ) acknowledges and 
motivates the necessity and importance of public participation by not only stating it as 
“a cornerstone of local government practice” but also stresses the necessity of 
creating opportunities for the community to be involved in municipal processes of 
planning and delivering services (CoJ, 2012: 67). However, public participation 
remains as one of the greatest challenges to local government. 
 
Since running local government is a joint process it is the responsibility of both 
municipalities and communities, there are two sides in the issue of poor community 
participation in local government in South Africa. However, several studies 
(Mashamaite & Madzivhandila, 2014; Buccus, 2011; Benit-Gbaffou, 2006; Ababio, 
2004; Cameron, 2012) state that communities are also a part of the problem with 
public participation. Mashamaite and Madzivhandila (2014) argue that community 
members don’t understand or know their role and responsibility to participate in local 
government affairs, and the roles of municipalities.  
 
Therefore, communities are not capable of being involved and participating (Ababio, 
2004). Moreover, according to Cameron (2002) people are not interested in politics, 
not necessarily because of barriers imposed by government or politicians, but rather 
because of their lack of interest. In the 2014 elections, millions of eligible South 
Africans did not even bother to register as voters (McKinley, 2014), and only 57 per 
cent of the eligible voting-age population turned out (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2014).  
 
One of the reasons why community members do not participate in the activities and 
programmes of municipalities is the places where municipal activities and 
programmes are held are often far from the community members’ homes, thus the 
community members cannot afford to pay for transport to go there. Another reason is 
the language used in local government rules and regulations and an IDP that is 
complicated and difficult for community members to understand (Mashamaite & 
Madzivhandila, 2014). Moreover, they also feel that their views and voices are not 
taken into consideration by municipalities, and their development priorities are not 
reflected in municipal IDPs and their inputs at IDP forums are not adequately 
integrated into the IDPs (Buccus, 2011: 12). Williams (2006: 197) state that citizens 
become merely "endorsees of predefined planning programmes". The result is a 
breakdown of trust in local government and councillors by communities and so-called 
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service delivery protests (CoGTA, 2014). Therefore, community members feel that 
there is no point for them in wasting their time attending these meetings (Benit-
Gbaffou, 2006 & 2008; Buccus, 2011; Makananisa, 2011; Netswera, 2008). 
 
The reason for the low level of public interest and participation in municipal affairs is 
according to Buccus (2011) that community members feel powerless and frustrated 
when they attempt to interact with their councillors because the councillors as well as 
municipal authorities are not responsive to their concerns and demands. Moreover, 
Benit-Gbaffou (2006) observes that formal communication channels between 
communities and municipalities generally are not working. That is why communities 
choose marching and protests to make their voices and concerns heard (Benit-
Gbaffou, 2006). Because people are not participating in municipal activities, for Hicks 
(2006), community participation in municipal processes is often merely elite 
participation. People who participate in municipal decision-making are the ones 
connected to non-governmental organisations and other organised civil society and 
interest groups that have access to the necessary resources. 
 
At the same time, municipalities are responsible for the poor public participation. In 
fact, the majority of factors causing community participation in local government to be 
problematic are from the side of the municipalities. Municipal management such as 
politicians and officials see the legislative obligation to consult or inform the 
community as well as to follow and practise PM and M&E systems as something they 
are forced to do rather than something that will benefit them. For Benit-Gbaffou (2015, 
2012 & 2006), one of the primary reasons for poor public participation in local 
government is dysfunctional local democracy institutions and ward committee 
structures. She explains that there are two reasons for this dysfunction:  first, the 
limited power of councillors and ward committees; and second, councillors and ward 
committee members do not have to be accountable or answerable to their voters and 
communities (they are instead accountable to their party). And there is no interest for 
councillors to bring issues from the bottom-up, especially when they are challenging 
policies adopted by the municipal or national government (Benit-Gbaffou, 2012). 
Benit-Gbaffou (2012, 2008, 2006) and Piper (2009) argue that ward committees 
appear to be a failure in enabling participation. In the words of Piper (2009: 20) ward 
committees seem to be “talk shops” with little authority and power for real influence.  
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There are several explanations for the ineffectiveness of municipal ward committee 
structures in encouraging and strengthening public participation in municipal affairs 
and activities. According to Buccus (2011) and Benit-Gbaffou (2012), it is because 
ward committees lack real capacity or power and therefore they can neither fully 
present community needs and inputs at municipal development planning processes 
nor engage meaningfully with communities and civil society in this regard. For Benit-
Gbaffou (2015, 2012, 2008, 2006), it is because councillors’ power is limited (due to 
the strong centralisation of governance processes) and they are not empowered 
enough to do their jobs, which are demanding, and come with huge responsibilities as 
the agents of service delivery, the communication channels, and mediators between 
the council and residents. For Mohamed (2006), it is because ward committees are 
often under-resourced and lack administrative and logistical support. For Hicks 
(2006), it is because ward committees lack political leadership and their 
communication is ineffective.  
 
But in the view of Nyalunga (2006), one of the reasons for the ineffectiveness of ward 
committees is that they have no formal powers to force council to do anything. For 
Piper and Chanza (2006), it is because ward committee members lack training in 
municipal processes and the technical details of budgetary, IDP and performance 
management processes. Skills and support are needed in order for members to 
engage with the community, but ward committee members lack skills and there is not 
sufficient support and empowerment provided to them (Piper & Chanza, 2006), and in 
turn, municipal officials are often unprepared to engage with ward committees (Hicks, 
2006). The Good Governance Learning Network (GGLN) makes another interesting 
point. It points out that ward committees are formed with traditionally voice-less and 
disadvantaged people, and that leads people who are more economically well off or 
powerful not to take the ward committee system seriously (GGLN, 2008). Another 
reason discussed by Putu (2006) is a lack of participation by professionals on a 
voluntary basis, from them ward committees could learn and strengthen their capacity.  
 
Several studies also observe the poor working relationships between councillors and 
ward committee members, as well as ward committees and communities. The Good 
Governance Learning Network (GGLN) (2008) observes that according to the 
Municipal Systems Act (32 of 2000, section 42) and Municipal Structures Act (117 of 
2000, chapter 4), ward committees are the main forums for involving the public in the 
Performance Management Systems of municipalities. But councillors and municipal 
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officials are resistant to being assessed by word committees and they tend to be 
hostile to them. And ward committee members do not have any power to hold non-
compliant councillors and officials accountable, due to a fact that the existence of 
ward committees depends on the performance of ward councillors, the political will of 
the party and the support of the municipality (Piper & Deacon, 2009). In addition, 
sometimes councillors and ward committees are competing with one another (Piper, 
2009) and many ward committee members aspire to become councillors themselves 
(Hicks, 2006).  
 
Similarly, the interaction between ward committees and communities are also marked 
by uncertainty, and in severe cases, are chaotic (Hicks, 2006). Municipalities are also 
not willing to involve stakeholders in the process of developing an M&E system, and 
the IDP. Furthermore, ward committees do not encourage citizens to participate and 
represent stakeholders in municipal affairs (Hemson, 2007). And councillors and 
municipal officials do not hold meetings in their wards to give service delivery reports 
to their ward committees because of their fears of or reluctance to answer questions 
asked by community members. They are also scared of reporting back or holding 
consultation meetings which become forums for complaints and protests about 
problems or against non-delivery (Makanasia, 2011). On the other hand, Arends 
(2011) provides another reason for the reluctance of political leadership to make 
adequate funding available for public participation. It is a lack of resources and there 
is a huge infrastructural backlog, among other things. 
 
These factors are endogenous as they are related to people who belong to 
municipalities. Beside these factors, there are also exogenous factors that affect the 
level of public participation in local government. These factors are related to the policy 
and structure of local government, and the domination and centralisation of the ruling 
party in decision-making processes in municipalities. Schmidt (2007) argues that the 
problems with local government originated in the White Paper on Local Government 
(WPLG), which is in Schmidt’s view overly optimistic and ambitious in expecting and 
positioning municipalities as the driving agents of economic and social development, 
effective service delivery agencies, and facilitators of local level democracy. He further 
argues that besides its one-size-fits-all approach to municipal government it is neither 
sustainable nor realistic. Demarcating wards according to geography is also pointed 
out by Nyalunga (2006), Buccus, Hemson, Hicks and Piper (2007) as problematic 
because it might prevent relevant civil society organisations from participating in 
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municipal forums as they are not situated in particular areas. A plethora of local 
government laws and regulations is pointed out by Steytler (2008) as another 
exogenous factor that strangulates municipalities. 
 
The domination and centralisation of the ruling party (ANC) in the functions and 
decision-making of municipalities are also described as factors that affect, negatively, 
the performances of councillors and ward committees. There are many power 
struggles and lots of party politics in ward committees. And ward committees are often 
seen as a section of a party branch to be used as a means to advance a party agenda 
(Piper & Deacon, 2006). Such an environment creates conflict among councillors as 
well as ward committee members. Locally-grounded leaders are overtaken and 
disregarded by party candidates who are more powerful in the party (Benit-Gbaffou, 
2012). Such politicisation or interference from the party in ward committees decrease 
the committee’s representativeness and meaningful engagement of communities 
(Piper & Deacon, 2008; Gervais-Lambony, 2006). Moreover, it also undermines 
efforts to advance the interest of communities over party interests (Piper & Deacon, 
2008).  
 
Nationally, public participation at local government level is generally very poor. 
However, CoGTA (2015) states that public participation processes in Gauteng 
municipalities are general functioning well. But there is one problem with them: not all 
municipalities in Gauteng carry out annual community satisfaction surveys. But the 
Gauteng City Region Observatory (GCRO) conducts Quality of Life Surveys every 
year. 
 
It is important to note that engaging and communicating with community members is 
in fact not only for the benefit of communities but also for the benefit and advantage of 
municipalities because they can receive public cooperation, engagement and local 
knowledge contributions to solve municipal problems. In addition, public participation 
in planning, resource allocation, problem-solving and in the decision-making process, 
in fact, helps to relieve the burden on municipalities of addressing the problems 
caused by resource constraints such as financial inadequacy and skills shortage. 
 
Additionally, the interaction between the voting public, elected politicians, bureaucracy 
and political and action committees can help to bring about solutions to some of the 
problems of municipalities regarding service delivery (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962). 
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Furthermore, maximum community participation by all role players allows for large 
numbers of actors to have a voice on service delivery issues and encourages them to 
seek help on issues that are beyond their capacities and controls. Buccus, Hemson, 
Hicks and Piper (2007) argue that by including community members in the decision-
making process, public protests can be reduced as the developmental agenda of 
municipalities would be driven and accepted by communities. Moreover, through 
community participation, development plans and services become more relevant to 
local needs and conditions (Buccus, Hemson, Hicks & Piper, 2007). Poor or a lack of 
community participation on the other hand leads to making development plans and 
providing services that are not relevant to local needs and conditions. It is important to 
understand that resource misallocation, one root cause of service delivery problems 
(Devarajan & Reinikka (2004) is a result of poor public participation in planning and 
decision-making processes of municipalities. 
 
Understanding factors affecting the quality and level of community participation in 
municipalities is necessary in order to strengthen and improve the public’s 
participation in the system of local government. These factors also need to be 
explored and understood because their early warning signs have to be extracted    in 
preparation for solutions and developing response capabilities have to be based on 
the knowledge and understanding of these factors. 
 
3.5.3  Non-compliance with rules and regulations 
The third root of service delivery problems is “weak incentive”, which is attributed to 
the issues of accountability and monitoring. Having no consequence for non-
compliance with rules and regulations means there is neither incentive nor 
disincentive to follow the rules or to abide by regulations. Based on intensive literature 
review, document study and the preliminary interview, this research would like to 
suggest—albeit temporarily until the study is completed, the data collected and all the 
information analysed completely—among all the factors and problems that affect 
municipal service delivery performance, this factor, non-compliance with legislation, or 
a lack of accountability, or a tolerance for continued poor performance, could be the 
root cause of all problems and inefficiencies in municipalities.  
 
Koelble and Siddle (2013) discovered that there is a vast difference between 
constitutional and legal mandates and the actual practices of municipalities. Only a 
small fraction of their sample, i.e. only 2 of 37 municipalities, came close to actually 
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performing all of the 38 functions required of municipalities in the Constitution. 
Although the Constitution and subsequent legislation provided local government with 
substantial powers and functions, in practice large numbers of municipalities in their 
sample are neither exercising nor performing these powers and functions (Koelble & 
Siddle, 2013). As Josie (2008) also indicates, the ways municipalities execute budgets 
often does not comply with financial management and reporting practices.  
 
In his 2014/15 MFMA report, the AG raises three concerns: a lack of consequences 
for poor performance and transgressions; lack of response to AG recommendations; 
and levels of vacancies and instability in the key positions of municipalities. The first 
concern raised by the AG is the lack of response of municipalities to his 
recommendations. According to the AG’s MFMA report for 2014/15, both municipal 
management and political leadership, as well as oversight groups such as municipal 
public accounts committees (MPACs) and portfolio committees are not taking the 
AG’s recommendations or directives seriously, and sufficient effort was not made to 
establish basic internal controls and management disciplines at municipal level (AG, 
2016).  
 
The second concern of the AG is a lack of consequences for poor performance and 
transgressions and its negative effects on the compliance of municipalities and 
municipal entities with laws and regulations. The MFMA requires municipalities to 
investigate and take action against poor performance and transgressions such as the 
high levels of non-compliance, poor audit outcomes, SCM transgressions and 
unauthorised, irregular as well as fruitless and wasteful expenditure. The Auditor-
General, in an interviewed by Thepa (2013), states that "it is elementary knowledge, 
that there is a lack of a culture of respecting the rule of law or of compliance to the 
rule of law in most government departments". The AG MFMA report for 2014/15, 
states that, during the 2014/15 financial year, councils at 45% of municipalities had 
not investigated these transgressions happened in their municipalities, even though 
the AG informed municipalities and indicated possible fraud or improper conduct in 
the SCM processes in their municipalities for investigation. And the cases continue to 
increase (AG, 2016). 
 
In terms of capacity and skill, the AG’s report (2012) indicates that in about two-thirds 
of municipalities, key officials do not meet the minimum required qualifications as 
envisaged in the Municipal Systems Act, 2000. Similarly, after pointing out “a direct 
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correlation between stability in the key positions of municipalities, such as municipal 
manager, chief financial officer and head of SCM unit, and the financial and 
performance management of municipalities as well as audit outcomes”, the AG MFMA 
report on 2014/15 financial year also revealed that at the end of 2014-15 financial 
year, vacancies in chief financial officer positions were at 20%, and vacancies in 
municipal manager positions at 17% (AG, 2016: 18). 
 
In 2007, the CoJ decided to implement the performance scorecard method for all 
permanent employees as part of linking performance and reward. The permanent 
employees resisted its introduction because they felt that they were now policed and 
thought it would not add value to performance—annual salary increases and 13th 
salary cheque each year are guaranteed irrespective of their performance (Phalatse, 
2010). It was confirmed by public servants whom I interviewed. All of them said the 
performance management system and the employee performance scorecard system 
are "useless" and do not help to improve their performance.  
 
Moreover, having performance measures and even tracking the measures do not 
mean anything if management does not use them to evaluate performance (Moss, 
2007). As Berry (1991), Johnston (1999) and Moss (2007) conclude, ineffective PM 
and M&E systems would neither improve service delivery performance nor customer 
service quality. It is important to note that ineffective measures will not lead to 
improvement. The World Bank (2003) rightly argues, when there are no incentives or 
weak incentives applied to the service providers, the quality of service delivery will be 
poor. Without effective control and enforcement mechanisms, and merely having 
performance agreements and M&E systems will not improve the service delivery 
performance of municipalities. Thus, one of the essential functions of a systematic 
EWS is documenting compliance or non-compliance with laws, rules, and procedures 
during the municipal service delivery process. 
 
There are several other factors that are not discussed here. Some of these factors 
include the effect of decentralisation (Koelble & Siddle, 2013; Cameron, 2012; 
Karodia, 2010; Wittenberg, 2003), priorities of the South African public sector reform 
model and the South African developmental model (World Bank, 2011), the plethora 
of national and provincial laws that strangulate municipalities and preventing it from 
executing its constitutional, developmental mandate (Steytler, 2008), weak co-
ordination among government spheres as well as among municipalities themselves, 
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weak leadership (Sejeng, 2013; CoGTA, 2009), huge service delivery backlogs, 
leadership and governance failures, corruption and fraud, poor financial management, 
cadre deployment without adequate assessment of skills (CoGTA, 2009), undue 
political interference in management decisions (Deloitte, 2012), the rise of gatekeeper 
politics (Beresford, 2016) and the lack of an effective political opposition that monitors 
and checks the performance of the ruling party. The reason for not discussing these 
factors is not because they are less important, but because this research focuses on 
the factors that are within the control of municipalities and are directly related to the 
four roots of service delivery problems.   
 
3.6 Three factors, research questions and EWS 
Based on four roots of service delivery problems of Devarajan and Reinikka (2004), 
three main factors are selected. The study of these factors are necessary not only to 
understand them but also to explore their early warning signals. The third research 
question of this study is related to the M&E system that can serve as an EWS (i.e., 
providing early warning signals of developing problematic trends in municipal service 
delivery processes. There are two kinds of factors that are responsible for municipal 
problems and challenges: underlying factors (or root causes) and immediate factors 
(or particular causes). Immediate causes are the direct, obvious cause of particular 
problems, and root causes are the events or condition that cause or allowed the 
immediate cause to develop. While immediate factors are directly related to a 
particular problems or crises, root causes or underlying factors are related to different 
problems or crises.  
 
Signs of resource constraints such as financial shortages or problems and skills 
shortages could be easily detected. Indicators that show early signals are overrun 
budgets, unspent budgets, cash shortages, overrun costs, late or even non-
submission of financial reports, lack of equipment or skilled workers, numbers of 
unfilled vacancies. At the same time, Nikander (2002) states that resource constraints 
or skills shortage is also an early warning of future problems. The early warning signs 
of low public participation are also simple and easy to detect. Indicators that signal low 
public participation are low attendance numbers at meetings, frequency of meetings 
and low response at the call centres. Similarly, compliance indicators could also be 
established and used to identify persons and groups that do not comply with rules, 
regulations and guidelines. Moreover, the numbers and frequency of complaints and 
cases that are settled can also be used as compliance indicators.  
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As stated above, problems and challenges faced by municipal entities (MOEs) in their 
day-to-day service delivery are different from the above mentioned factors and 
problems. Problems and challenges which are encountered and have to be overcome 
by staff, employees and technicians of MOEs are the micro-level, day-to-day 
problems. The problems and challenges faced by City Power (CP) include a lack of 
equipment and tools; losses of cable and electricity (The total estimated cost of 
electricity losses in 2013 is R1.4bn while the CP has already paid Eskom for this 
electricity consumption (Styan, 2013); loss of working hours because of strikes; 
insufficient technicians who can maintain and run electricity sub-stations, which is also 
a result of worker strikes, unfilled vacancies and overall skill shortage; inability to 
collect debts (which have mounted to R4.9bn in the City Power debtors’ book (Styan, 
2013); difficulty in accessing consumers electricity meters to read electricity usage, 
which in turn resulted in massive incorrect billing issues.  
 
Problems faced by the Johannesburg Water entity include lack of relevant skill-sets 
applicable to improperly trained technicians; insufficient tools, equipment and 
vehicles; water loss due to water theft and water pipe leakages and bursts (Over 31% 
of water in Johannesburg is unaccounted for; meaning a third of Johannesburg’s 
water is either lost due to burst pipes or just not paid for (Bittkau, 2013); inability to 
collect debt; water pipe blockages because of sand and refuse infiltration or tree roots; 
sewer blockages—Johannesburg experiences approximately 3500 sewer blockages 
monthly (JW, 2013), inability to compile information about water pipe leakages and 
pipe bursts. 
 
Problems faced by the Pikitup entity involve loss of working hours because of strikes; 
lack of skills and properly trained technicians; insufficient tools, equipment and 
vehicles; severe cash flow problem—the Annual Report of Pikitup (2012) indicated 
that at the end of 2011-12 financial year, Pikitup had an accumulated deficit of R363 
million (due to the inability of council to collect its debts and the poor implementation 
of new billing systems), preventing or arresting illegal dumping (the removal of illegal 
dumping costs Pikitup in Johannesburg of R58 million per annum). However, Pikitup 
does not have legal authority to arrest illegal dumpers. It has to inform and work with 
the police. However, available literature, academic journal articles and researches 
hardly describe or discuss these micro-level problems and issues. 
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It is, however, reasonable to assume that these micro-level day-to-day problems are 
outcomes or results of macro-level problems and factors that are discussed in detail in 
Section 3.5.1, 3.5.2, and 3.5.3. There are chains of linkages among these micro-level 
and macro-level problems. Understanding the linkages and interconnections between 
these problems is essential to deduce or reveal early warning signs at both Micro and 
Macro level.  
 
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter provides the local government M&E systems and service delivery 
challenges. It presents the functions and responsibilities of local government and the 
current municipal service delivery performance, followed by the presentation of 
legislative and regulative framework for municipal performance management and 
M&E systems. Then, it discusses the factors affecting municipal service delivery 
performance. In the following chapter, the research methodology of this study is 
presented. 
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Chapter 4 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter presents the methodology used in this report. The chapter discusses the 
research approach, and research methods and evaluation of the chosen 
methodology. It describes the method of data collection and data analysis. In addition, 
issues around reliability and validity of the data and findings of the study, and ethical 
considerations are also discussed. 
 
4.1  Introduction 
To answer the main question raised in this research, this research is conducted in a 
qualitative manner, with the objective of obtaining qualitative information that provides 
insight into the extent the current M&E systems possess the characteristics and 
components of an EWS and the ways to incorporate an EWS into these systems to be 
able to function and serve as an EWS. The aims of this study were twofold: to 
investigate to what extent the current M&E system of the CoJ has the characteristics 
and components of an EWS, and then to propose an M&E system that has the 
characteristics and components of an EWS and therefore could provide early warning 
signs and signals on possible problems and crises in service delivery processes.  
 
This study investigated the reasons for the absence of EWS components and 
characteristics in municipal M&E systems, which are by legislation required to function 
and serve as an EWS. Information this study searches for and collects were problems 
and challenges that frequently occur during the implementation stage of municipal 
service delivery processes, and signs or indicators that signals or informs the 
approach of these problems.  
 
The researcher chose the qualitative method because the study seeks to interpret 
human actions, institutions, events, and customs in order to construct or portray in 
sufficient depth and detail. According to Robson (1993: 307) quantitative research 
deals with data that is expressed in numbers, while qualitative research is an 
approach in the human sciences which relies on a deductive model of explanation and 
deals with data that is in words and non-numerical form (Ary, Jacobs & Razavieh 
1990: 445). Schurink (2005) emphasises that qualitative research regards reality as 
subjective and that observations are determined by information richness, setting, and 
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types of observation. Data are presented in the form of words, quotations from 
transcripts and documents, while quantitative research regards reality as objective, 
and observations are systematically undertaken in a standardised manner. This 
approach was appropriate to this empirical research undertaken from an explicit 
performance improvement perspective, with a focus on the better management of the 
municipal service delivery processes.  
 
The qualitative approach used in this research allowed for flexibility and spontaneity 
with the participant as well as adaptation of the questions required to obtain in-depth 
information. Open-ended questions were used, so that the participants could respond 
in their own words, elaborately and in greater detail than is typically the case with 
quantitative methods. Qualitative data, as Punch (2000) states, are most of the time 
words, which are collected by interviewing, observing and reading documents. 
According to Strauss and Corbit (1990: 17-27), qualitative research findings are not 
based on “statistical procedures or other means of quantification”. This research 
applied all three major components of qualitative research methods: data collection, 
review of written and verbal reports, and analytic or interpretive procedures (Strauss & 
Corbit, 1990).  
 
The collection of the empirical data was based on the theoretical framework which 
focuses on the four roots of service delivery problems, which are resources 
misallocation, weak incentive, expenditure ‘leakages’, and demand side failure. These 
are used as a theoretical framework (Singh & Shan, 2003: 2) (see Section 2.4.4). The 
information this study collects was based upon common problems and challenges 
which occurred during the municipal service delivery processes, “signs, signals or 
indicators” that precede and indicate the approach of these problems, available 
methods to detect these problems in advance, preventative actions taken by 
municipalities to solve them, to alert and communicate about potential problems to 
responsible persons and stakeholders, and how capacity needed to pre-empt 
emerging problems could be built. 
 
As a primary means, this research used a qualitative approach because “qualitative 
research provides a means through which a researcher can judge the effectiveness of 
particular policies or practices” (Neuman, 2003). Since M&E system of a municipality 
and its application in the implementation stage of municipal service delivery processes 
are a complex phenomenon, and the purpose of this study was to describe and 
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understand the nature and process of the municipal M&E systems in the municipal 
service delivery processes, their functionalities, the challenges and problems they are 
facing in their service delivery processes, and the M&E system that they are currently 
applying for the delivery processes, reasons of poor service delivery, and the effects 
and contribution of the EWS on  service delivery.  From the participants’ point of the 
researcher, it was the most suitable to use a qualitative approach (Leedy & Ormrod, 
2005: 94).  
 
4.2  Case study methodology 
This study has adopted a case study approach. Case study refers to an event, an 
entity, an individual or even a unit of analysis. It is an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context using multiple 
sources of evidence (Yin, 1989). For Anderson (1993), case studies are concerned 
with how and why things happen and investigate contextual realities and the 
difference between what was planned and what actually occurred. It also enables the 
researchers to understand the complex real-life activities in which multiple sources of 
evidence are used. The use of case study was therefore the most suitable for my 
research as the objective of this study is to explore the current M&E system of 
municipalities and how municipalities applied it during their service delivery 
processes. 
 
Case study is a method of enquiry designed to bring out the details of information 
from the viewpoint of the participant through the use of multiple sources of data to 
increase reliability (Tellis, 1997: 44). According to Bogdan and Biklen (1998), this 
inquiry is defined in terms of participant observational case study wherein interviews 
and documents become the major source of focus. This study used a single case 
study methodology. At the beginning stage of this study, it was proposed (in the 
research proposal) and planned to do three case studies on three regions of the CoJ, 
which has in total seven regions. These three regions are: Region B that includes the 
whole of the former Region 4, excluding Ward 70 (such as Florida), including Wards 
90, 102 & 104 (such as Rosebank, Bryanston, Randburg); Region D that includes 
Soweto only; and Region E that includes Wards 73, 74, 91, 103 and 106 (such as 
Parkwood, Highlands North, Alexandra, Wynberg, Morningside, Douglasdale). 
However, during the data-collection periods, it was discovered that there are no 
enough separate data and information from region to region and thus it was unable to 
do three case studies. As a result, this study presents a single case study that cover 
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problems, challenges, factors and causes of them, as well as early warning indicators 
and signals of them experienced in all seven regions of CoJ.  
 
The main reason for choosing case study research is because it, as Yin (1984: 23) 
states, “excels at bringing us to an understanding of a complex issue or object and 
can extend experience or add strength to what is already known through previous 
research”.  
 
“A case study is an in-depth study of one individual, a group of individuals or an 
institution. Case studies provide significant amounts of descriptive information, and 
they can also provide some explanatory information about why, as well as what” 
(Brink, 1996: 116). Moreover, case studies emphasise detailed contextual analysis of 
a limited number of events or conditions and their relationships. According to Yin 
(2003: 97), the major strength of a case study data collection is the prospect to 
employ many diverse sources of evidence. The use of varied sources of data in this 
study will make the findings or conclusion more realistic and if plausible, precise. The 
research will collect the information and data on the municipal M&E systems and 
service delivery processes of the CoJ from three different sources, namely from the 
government departments, municipal management and staff, from the community 
members and the consumers that the municipalities are providing the services to,  civil 
society, NGOs (Non-Governmental Organisations) and CBOs (community-based 
organisations), and from the intellectual and educational organisations such as 
research institutes and universities. 
 
The purpose of this research was to explore and investigate the effectiveness of 
municipal M&E systems in the service delivery processes of the municipality, to 
examine the common problems and challenges experienced during the service 
delivery processes, and early warning signs or indicators of these problems. The aims 
were twofold: to investigate to what extent the current M&E system of the CoJ has the 
characteristics and components of an EWS, and then to propose an M&E system that 
serves as an EWS and can be used by the municipalities on a weekly basis to 
continuously monitor and evaluate service delivery performance. Therefore, a case 
study research strategy was best suited to this aim. 
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4.3  Unit of analysis 
The unit of analysis refers to ‘the level of aggregation of the data collected during the 
subsequent data analysis stage’ (Cavana, Delahaye & Sekaran, 2001: 119). Guided 
by the research problem and the time and resource constraints, this research selects 
all regions of the CoJ which has in total seven regions.  
 
There are two areas of study field that this research explored and studied: the first is 
the detailed steps and processes of the M&E systems and their roles in and impacts 
on the implementation stage of municipal service delivery processes, and the second 
field is the problems and challenges that are regularly and recurrently experienced in 
the municipal four basic service delivery processes, and ways to foresee and avert 
those problems and challenges. Three theories, i.e., four roots of the service delivery 
problems, theory of weak signal, and four essential components of an EWS, 
discussed in section 2.4.3 (of Chapter 2), the theoretical framework section, are used.   
 
4.4  Data collection strategies 
Creswell (1998) states that qualitative researchers generally rely on four basic types 
of data sources: interviews, observations, documents and audio-visual materials. By 
its nature, a case study draws on a number of methods in gathering data, namely 
observations, interviews and informal conversations, and artifacts. One reason for 
using multiple methods of data collection was to increase the ‘trustworthiness’ of the 
findings. From a theoretical and methodological perspective, the study sought the 
kinds of data that would answer the research questions (Patton, 2001). The main 
purpose of this research is to integrate the EWS components into the current M&E 
system, so that it can be used to continuously monitor and evaluate the health of local 
government. To answer pertinent questions, interviews, observations, or written 
accounts were used to collect and analyse data (Brink, 1996: 116).  
 
Concerning the nature of primary-data, this research holds that it is not the data-
collection method that dictates the status of primary-data but the originality and first-
handedness of the content of the data and information that make them primary-data. 
Data is still primary even if the researcher does not collect it by himself or herself, as 
long as they contain originality and first-handedness in them. Data and information 
such as video and audio-recording (or even the transcripts) of interviews, which might 
have been conducted by other researchers or even journalists, can still be regarded 
as primary-data, although these were not collected by the researcher. Premised on 
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this position, this research collected recorded documentaries such as public hearings, 
meetings and discussions recorded and archived by the Parliamentary Monitoring 
Group (PMG). This study’s emphasis was on the triangulation method of data 
collection by employing various methods and tapping various sources for data. The 
accuracy of these data was verified during interviews with the participants as well as 
by site observation. The data management plan is stated and detailed in Appendix E 
(Figure 4.1). 
Figure 4.1 Data collection and source of data 
 
 
4.4.1  Semi-structured and in-depth interviews  
Almost all of similar studies and research (Nikander, 2002; Havenga, 2002; Netswera, 
2005; Bekink, 2006; Bonga, 2007; Nkoana, 2007; Stanton, 2009; Karodia, 2010; 
Makwarela, 2010; Phalatse, 2010; Makananisa, 2011; Johan, 2013) used interview as 
a primary mean for data collection. This study used the semi-structured and the in-
depth interview techniques in order to elicit a vivid picture of the contributors’ 
perspective on the thesis topic. The in-depth interview is an effective qualitative 
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method for encouraging experts or normal interviewees to share their opinions and 
experience (Soy, 1996).  
 
Twenty six persons from four different groups—public servants and municipal officials 
and staff; Civil Societies; Community members; and researchers and academics—
were interviewed. Two interviews (with a director from DPME, and a director from 
DBSA) were conducted as a preliminary study in 2011. Again, four interviews with 
senior officials from the CoJ were conducted as a preliminary study on the 6st of 
November, 2013. The positions, ranks and groups of interviewees and the dates of 
interviews are described in the following table (Table 4.1 and Table 4.2).  
Table 4.1 Numbers of interviewees and their positions or ranks 
Descriptions: Positions, ranks, and groups Numbers  
Councillors (1 former councillor, and 4 current councillors) 5 
Senior officials from the Gauteng provincial government 2 
Senior officials from CoJ 6 
Senior official from municipal entities 1 
Director from DPME 1 
Director from DBSA 1 
Director from CoGTA 1 
Community members 5 
Consultant 1 
Researcher 1 
Academic 1 
M&E practitioners 1 
Total numbers of interviewees 26 
 
Table 4.2 Dates of interviews 
Numbers, description Interview Date 
5 Councillors  
C1, 31 July 2014 
C2, 26 August 2014 
C3, 23 Jan 2015 
C4, 19 Feb 2015 
C5, 25 March 2015 
2 Senior Officials from the Gauteng provincial government  
SOG1, 18 Feb 2014 
SOG2, 12 March 2014 
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6 Senior Officials from the City of Johannesburg (CoJ) 
SOCoJ1, 6 Nov 2013 
SOCoJ2, 6 Nov 2013 
SOCoJ3, 6 Nov 2013 
SOCoJ4, 6 Nov 2013 
SOCoJ5, 4 March 2014 
SOCoJ6, 9 April 2014 
1 Senior Officials from Municipal Entity (JW) SOME1, 13 Nov 2015 
1 Director from DPME DDPME, 19 July 2011 
1 Director from DBSA DDBSA,  6 July 2011 
1 Director from CoGTA  DCogta, 21 Aug 2014 
5 Community Members  
CM1, 19 March 2014 
CM2, 11 April 2014 
CM3, 17 June 2014 
CM4, 20 Sep 2014 
CM5, 6 Feb 2015 
1 Consultant Con, 28 Jan 2014 
1 Researcher R, 1 May 2014 
1 Academic A, 8 August 2014  
1 M&E practitioners M&EP, 22 April 2014 
26 persons in total  
 
The actual numbers of people who were interviewed for this study are more than 26 
people as listed in this thesis. Apart from the listed 26 people whom I interviewed 
properly, there are several people (more than 10) such as conference and workshop 
attendants who  were from, or  associated  with, municipalities whether councillors or 
municipal officials or staff;  community  members and residents (as  all of us fall in that 
category), municipal staff such as Joburg Water technicians  who fix water pumps and 
pipes, and Pikitup workers who weekly (unless they are on strike) come to our  homes 
to pick up our rubbish. But the conversations with them were ad hoc and not planned 
systematically, as well as their unwillingness to allow me to audiotape, or to reveal 
their identities, hence, they are not included in this study as proper interviewees. 
 
This researcher was aware that the lack or limitation of knowledge, or awareness, of 
respondents could also cause them to provide wrong information, involuntarily. For 
example, in a preliminary interview with four persons from the CoJ conducted on the 
6th of November, 2013, as a part of the process of developing the problem and 
context, one respondent stated that the CoJ is the “major’ shareholder in municipal 
entities such as City Power, Joburg Water and Pikitup. But in fact the CoJ is the “sole” 
shareholder of them. That experience of involuntary error made by the respondent is 
in line with the caution pointed out by Chadwick, Bahr and Albrecht (1984) to take into 
consideration when collecting data through interviews.  
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In order to overcome such kinds of errors or incorrect or misleading information 
provided by respondents, involuntarily or voluntarily, two focus-group discussions 
(FGD) on 23 June 2014 and on 24 November 2014, document study, and site 
observation were also applied in this study. Furthermore, the selection of interview 
respondents was also made from different sectors and groups such as from 
opposition parties, civil society, labour unions, academics and journalists. At the same 
time, the study keeps in mind the possibility that the respondents might be, in one way 
or another, biased in their view because of their political orientation or career situation.  
Figure 4.2 Informal chatting with Pikitup employees 
 
Note: Photo taken on 4 February 2014, on Kelvin Road, Morningside, Sandton. 
 
As Bogdan and Biklen (1998: 35) state, “qualitative researchers are interested in how 
people act and think in their own settings; they attempt to ‘blend into the woodwork’, 
or to act so the activities that occur in their presence do not differ significantly from 
those that occur in their absence”. The interviews therefore were conducted in the 
research setting where participants felt comfortable. The warning of Bogdan and 
Biklen (1998: 35) as “[i]f you treat people as ‘research subjects,’ they will act like 
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research subjects, which are different from how they usually act” was heeded 
throughout the data-collection processes. When communicating and interacting with 
the interviewees, special caution was taken not to treat the participants any differently 
from their normal day-to-day interaction. The interviews were based on open-ended 
questions as the objective is to obtain “fuller development of information”. According 
to Weiss (1995), in-depth interviews provide detailed, thorough and diverse 
information and are therefore appropriate for the complex nature of issues that need 
to be covered for an understanding of the process of policy formulation, 
implementation and regulation. 
 
Based on the central  question of this research: to what extent  does the current M&E 
system have the components and characteristics of an EWS, what are the common 
problems and challenges in municipal service delivery processes, what are the early 
warning signals of these problems, and how can the existing M&E mechanism  be 
integrated with an EWSs components so that it can serve as an EWS, the data 
gathering process was guided by the following four key focus areas: Main problems 
and challenges that hinder the Implementation stage of municipal service delivery 
process; the underlying situation and root causes of these problems; signals or 
warning indicators of these problems; and a mechanism to detect these signals or 
warning indicators. (See Appendix C, for a list of the questions asked.) 
 
As mentioned above, the research data was collected by using semi-structured as 
well as in-depth interviews from the three different groups, in order to reinforce the 
validity and reliability of the data and information provided by respondents. The first 
group for the interview are the key informants who are within the municipality and 
municipal entities. These key informants are senior managers, directors, and 
municipal employees involved in the implementation of the service delivery processes. 
The second group is external academics, researchers from the universities and the 
third group is persons from the trades and worker unions and civil society. The 
interviews were recorded on condition that participants give permission to do so. 
Where permission was not granted, notes were taken to ensure that the views of the 
participants will be represented accurately. Recording is valuable and useful to check 
the accuracy in the wording of statements from notes, particularly when there is a 
need to quote respondents. 
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Besides face to face interviews, e-mail and telephone interviews were also conducted 
in order to be able to interview persons who are not available for face to face 
interviews or who live far away from the researcher. These e-mail and telephone 
interviews enabled the researcher to follow up the previous face to face interviews or 
to clarify answers from the respondents.  
 
Different data collection methods were used in the study. The four methods stated 
here are the main methods. Several other methods were also applied, to supplement 
to these four methods. But those small methods were conducted in an ad hoc fashion, 
and either unstructured or unsystematic as they were not planned. For example, I 
have attended and participated several workshops, dialogues, meetings, group-
discussion where political leaders (such as the President, Ministers and senior 
government officials, at the Presidential Local Government Summit, attended on 18 
September 2014, at Galaha, Midrand, Gauteng), municipal officials, staff and workers, 
as well as councillors and community members (at Resident Association Meetings 
attended on 19 February 2014 at Region C Ward Governance Boardroom, 100 
Christiaan de Wet street, Randburg, Johannesburg), and collected and noted data 
and information from their discussions and debates. Moreover, social discourse such 
as on-line discussions groups (such as LinkedIn, Facebook, Twitter, Quora) and 
complaint-website for various government departments and organization, (State-
Owned Enterprises) SOEs, as well as private companies, for example 
http://hellopeter.com were used to collect data for this study. 
 
4.4.2  Non-participant direct naturalistic observation 
Observation means watching a phenomenon as it occurs in nature with regard to the 
cause and effect relationship. To conduct an observation the researcher went to 
places where the event was taking place and recorded the findings as accurately as 
possible. Leedy and Ormrod (2001: 158) state that “the primary advantage of 
conducting observations is flexibility. The researcher can easily shift focus as new 
data comes to light”. Moreover, the biggest advantage of the naturalistic method of 
research is that researchers view participants in their natural environments. Leedy 
and Ormrod (2001: 196) argue that when prepared well and structured carefully, an 
observation can reveal the richness and complexity of a phenomenon under study. 
However, they also state that there is a major disadvantage too: by being there as an 
observer, “the researcher may alter what people say and do and how significant 
events unfold”.  
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In a non-participant direct observation, unlike in interviewing, the observer did not 
actively query the respondent. The observer tried as much as possible to be like an 
eavesdropper who attempts to observe people without interacting with the research 
subject, in this study of municipal management and staff, without their knowledge that 
they are being observed. Four observational visits were made: first, to the City of 
Johannesburg office at Thuso House, 66 Stiemens Street, Johannesburg on 6 
November 2013; second, to the City of Johannesburg Environmental Management 
Department and the Infrastructure and Services Department (EISD) office at Traduna 
House, 118 Jorissen Street, Johannesburg on 13 August 2014; third, to the Pikitup 
Head Office, Corner of Bertha and Juta Streets Braamfontein, Johannesburg, on 13 
November 2014; fourth, to the Council Chambers, Ground Floor, Council Chamber 
Wing, Metro Civic Centre, 158 Loveday Street Braamfontein, Johannseburg, on 26 
February 2015 (Figure 4.3).  
Figure 4.3 Councillor Meeting  
At the CoJ Councillor Chamber on 26 February 2015 
 
 
The Pikitup’s Chief Operation Officer (COO) agreed on 13 November 2014 to allow 
the researcher to go with Pikitup refuse collecting truck for a week. However, although 
repeatedly requested for about a year, the arrangement was never actualised. 
However, the researchers meet with several Pikitup staff from refuse collection truck 
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and observed their functions and activities. Information acquired in the observation 
include the nature and functionalities of municipal M&E systems and service delivery 
challenges, interactions among officials and staffs, the organisation of the offices, and 
work-loads and staff levels of various offices, and staff work ethics and motivation 
levels. 
 
4.4.3  Customer service call  
The Qualities or otherwise of municipal services are best defined by the views of 
customers. Apart from interviewing community members and community-based 
organisations on the matters of municipal service qualities, to get the real experiences 
of customers or community members who use municipal services, 15 systematic 
telephone calls were made to municipal customer services, as well as to municipal 
spokespersons and information officers, and their responses and the way they 
communicated were studied. It was necessary to conduct it in the way these are some 
of Johannesburg citizen’s biggest complaints when discussing municipal service 
delivery quality and performance. Most of the respondents complained about waiting 
time to get through to the call-centres and being cut off and having calls dropped 
during their calls to the municipal call centres.  
 
4.4.4  Documentary study  
To compensate for the limitations of interview and observation methods, documentary 
sources were used as an important supplement. Documentary evidence provided a 
method of cross-validating information gathered from interviews and observation as 
sometimes what people say is different from what people do (Noor, 2008: 1603). This 
study perused and analyse official and unofficial documents, and records pertaining to 
the municipal service delivery processes.  
 
Documents provided additional specific detail to back up information from other 
sources. The use of documents enabled this researcher to gain an in-depth 
understanding of the functions and challenges of municipalities during their service 
delivery processes, and the M&E process. Moreover, a review of documents also 
enabled this study not only to look for facts, but also to read between the lines and 
pursue corroborative evidence elsewhere. This research studied documents like 
municipal reports such as annual, mid-year and quarterly reports, government 
legislation, as well as official reports and files (unsolicited documents) as primary 
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data, as well as media and press statements, interviews and relevant news, 
consumers’ complaints and comments  as secondary data.  
 
To supplement the data gleaned from the interviews and site observations, primary 
and secondary documentary and archival data sources were also drawn on. 
Furthermore, the international literature and research studies on local government and 
the municipality, other countries’ case studies were also consulted. One of the 
important uses of documents is that of corroboration of evidence on or against what is 
in question (Tellis, 1997: 51). Media reports on service delivery and press statements 
were scrutinised to provide an understanding of the various viewpoints of participants. 
Policy documents, the constitution, pieces of legislation and other related government 
documents were used to broaden the conceptualisation of issues on service delivery 
challenges.  
 
The documents utilised in this study were all three White Papers (RSA, 1995, 1997, 
1998a); the Municipal Structures Act (RSA, 1998b); the Municipal Systems Act (RSA, 
2000); Intergovernmental Relations, and the Ten-Year Review of the State of Local 
Government in South Africa; Blue Drop Score and Green Drop Score on the 
performance and impacts of municipalities; the Auditor-General’s annual reports and 
general reports on the audit outcomes of the Gauteng Local Government; the 
Treasury Department’s annual reports; Statistics South Africa’s reports; and official 
reports, handbooks, manuals and documents published by the CoJ such as the PM 
Policy & Procedure Document (2001), Establishment of Performance Management 
Panel Briefing Document (2003), Reflection on a Solid Foundation 2005: Building 
Developmental Local Government 2000-2006 Report (2006), Employee PM 
Handbook and Training Manual (2006), PMS Audit of Municipal-owned entities 
(2007), and Customer Satisfaction Survey (2009) (Table 4.3).  
 
The research also made use of audio and video recording material such as records of 
the Parliamentary Monitoring Group’s discussions, hearings and question and answer 
sections, audio and video interviews of mayors and municipal managers, and the 
M&E mechanisms applied in the functionalities of the municipal service delivery 
process.  
 
Among those four data collection methods, the experience of this study revealed that 
document study is the most effective method to study and collect municipal service 
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delivery problems, challenges and difficulties and their causes and possible early 
warning signs. This realisation about the effectiveness of document study also 
suggests that the sources of early warning signs or weak signals are already in 
documents related to local government or municipalities, such as annual reports, 
business plans, AG reports, research studies, articles and media publications. 
 
4.4.5  Focus-group discussions (FGD) 
In order to compensate the limitation of interviews and insufficient site-observation 
that the City of Johannesburg and three municipal entities did not allow to be 
conducted although many repeated requested were made and verbally agreed but 
never officially granted permission to do, two focus groups, with municipal staff, 
employees and councillors, who were attending the post-graduate diploma course at 
the Wits School of Governance (WSG) on 23 June 2014 and 24 November 2014, 
were later applied as a data collection method supplementing to interview, site 
observation, document study. In a focus group, there were 23 participants in the first 
focus-group discussion (on 23 June 2014) and 18 participants in the second focus 
group discussion (on 24 November 2014). Among the participants, only five in the first 
discussion, and six in the second discussion were from the CoJ, and municipal 
entities. 
Table 4.3 Documents perused and studied thoroughly 
No. Documents Sources 
Information and 
data that are 
looking for 
Note 
1. Legislations, Laws, 
and Acts, such as 
the Constitution, 
White Papers, 
MSA, MFMA, IDP, 
Improvement Plan 
(GDIP), etc. 
Government, 
Local 
Government, 
municipalities 
Legal Framework; 
Roles, Functions and 
Responsibility of 
Local government; 
Vision and targets, 
outcomes 
Vision and target 
output and 
outcome; functions, 
responsibility, and 
requirements of 
municipalities 
2. Annual, Mid-year 
and Quarterly 
Reports, Business 
Plans, Statistical 
Publication 
Government, 
Local 
Government, 
AG, Stats SA, 
Municipal 
entities, SALGA, 
etc 
Statistics; 
Performance 
situation and level; 
barriers and 
challenges; 
accomplishment and 
development. 
PM and M&E 
process and steps, 
Performance level,  
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3. Surveys such as 
Customer 
Satisfaction survey, 
Blue Drop Score, 
Green Drop Score 
Local 
Government, 
Water Dialogues 
South Africa 
(WDSA) 
Public views on 
output and outcomes 
of municipal service 
delivery performance 
Output and 
outcomes, public 
perception and 
view 
4. Media coverage 
such as newspaper 
articles 
Media Popular perceptions 
and views, news 
coverage, debates 
on municipal service 
delivery performance 
and situation.  
Public views and 
perceptions; 
performance and 
situation of 
municipal 
   
 
4.5  Data analysis strategies 
Data analysis is, according to Marshall and Rossman (1989), a practice of 
categorising the collected data into a format that has order, structure and meaning.  
and they aver that qualitative data analysis is a search for general statements about 
relationships among categories of data. All data generated and collected during each 
of the interviews, non-participant direct observation and documentary study are 
compared and categorised along the themes of the research questions, such as the 
nature of municipal M&E systems, the nature and steps of the municipal service 
delivery process; problems and challenges during service delivery processes, and 
early warning signals of them.  
 
Case study data analysis generally involves an iterative, spiralling, or cyclical process 
that moves from more general to more specific observations (Creswell, 1998; Palys, 
1997; Silverman, 2000). Data analysis began informally during interviews or 
observation and continued after the data collection process and audio recording of 
interviews were studied. When written records of collected data, coding were 
conducted and salient points or structures were identified. Themes and categories of 
each municipal entity (ME) are common to all.  For applying case study approach or 
methodology, generalisations were made because each case has its particular 
context and conditions that create its own kinds of problems and early signals as well 
as the causes of these problems. 
 
4.5.1  Root cause analysis (RCA) 
In order to understand common municipal service delivery problems, their causes and 
the interrelationship amongst these problems, Root Cause Analysis (RCA) is used. 
RCA is an analytic process to discover what happened, why it happened and how it 
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can be prevented. Unlike the traditional process of investigation that focuses on 
finding out who made the mistake, RCA rather focuses on why the mistake was made. 
Its objective is to discover solutions and to improve the processes or systems 
(Staugaitis, 2002). There are four major steps in RCA: data collection, causal factor 
charting, root cause identification, and recommendation generation and 
implementation (Rooney & Heuvel, 2004). However, this study needed to take one 
more step—identifying early warning signals or indicators of root causes. It was 
because awareness of root causes is an important step necessary to be able to 
identify the early warning signals of approaching problems.  
 
4.5.2  Thematic analysis and factor categorisation  
Together with RCA, Thematic analysis was applied to analysis the collected data. 
Thematic analysis is “a method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns 
(themes) within data. It minimally organizes and describes your data set in (rich) 
detail” (Braun & Clarke, 2006: 79). Boyatzis (1998) characterises it as a tool to use 
cross different methods--rather than a specific method by itself. For Holloway and 
Todres (2003: 347), it means identifying “thematizing meanings”. It is a process for 
encoding qualitative information which requires both implicit and explicit codes that 
may be “a list of themes; a complex model with themes, indicators, and qualifications 
that are causally related; or something in between these two forms” (Boyatzis, 1998: 
vi-vii; Guest, MacQueen & Namey, 2012).  
 
Based on the themes revealed by the thematic analysis, factor categorisation was 
applied to group factors responsible behind municipal challenges and problems. 
Those factors or causes are divided into three main groups: supply-side, demand-side 
and exogenous. Municipal affairs and business are joint-efforts of municipalities, 
together with municipal entities, and communities, which is how the two sides as 
supply-side and demand-side arise. Supply side is related to municipalities and 
municipal entities, which are responsible for supply services, and demand-side is 
about behaviours and activities of communities and customers, i.e., their participation 
and cooperation, or lack of them.  
 
Supply-side factors and causes are further divided into four categories: planning, 
inputs, processes, and outputs, using the system theory with one added category, 
planning. Planning category has four sub-categories (leadership, governance, IDP, 
public participation), inputs category has five sub-categories (Human capital, finances, 
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infrastructure, machines and tools, and information), process category has four sub-
categories (administration, supervision, monitoring, and coordination and 
communication), and outputs category has four sub-categories (customer care, 
electricity, water and sanitation, and refuse removal) (Figure 4.4). 
Figure 4.4 Supply-side factors and causes 
 
Governance 
Leadership 
& Planning 
 Inputs  Processes  Outputs 
 
  
 Leadership 
 Governance 
 IDP 
 Public participation 
 
 
 Human capital 
 Finances 
 Infrastructure 
 Equipment 
 Systems  
 Information 
 
 Administration & 
management 
 Supervision 
 Monitoring 
 Procurement 
(SCM) 
 Coordination & 
Communication 
 
 Customer 
service 
 Electricity 
 Water & 
sanitation 
 Refuse 
removal 
 
 
4.6  Reliability and validity 
Issues of reliability and validity in qualitative research have long been debated 
amongst researchers. Although regarded as an important issue in qualitative data 
collection, reliability is usually not seen as problematic by qualitative researchers who 
use a naturalist approach and seek to understand phenomena and events in context-
specific settings like a “real world setting” as Patton (2001: 39) calls it where 
researchers do not try to manipulate or control the phenomenon of interest. 
Qualitative researchers such as Chadwick, Bahr and Albrecht (1984) argue that 
several artists could paint a given mountain in different styles and using different 
techniques but still get an accurate representation. In the same vein, qualitative 
researchers could describe a given group or a given event or phenomenon differently, 
but without being biased or inaccurate. 
 
In their seminal work, Guba and Lincoln (1981; 1982) substituted reliability and validity 
with the concept of “trustworthiness,” which is comprised of four aspects: credibility, 
transferability, dependability and conformability. To ensure the study is trustworthy or 
reliable or valid, Patton (2001) advocates the use of triangulation by combining 
methods of data collection, collecting data from different sources, and applying more 
than one theory to frame and guide the research. It is supported by Johnson (1997: 
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284) who states that “engaging methods, such as observation, interviews and 
recordings will lead to a more valid, reliable and diverse construction of realities”. 
 
On the other hand, according to this definition of reliability defined by Joppe (2000: 1) 
as the extent to which results are consistent over time and an accurate representation 
of the total population under study, a research instrument can be considered to be 
reliable, if the results of a study can be reproduced under a similar methodology. 
Similarly, Babbie (1989: 121) refers reliability to the likelihood that a given 
measurement procedure will yield the same description of a given phenomenon if that 
measurement is repeated. However, for qualitative researches the primary research 
instrument is the researchers themselves (Golafshani, 2003) and there are not many 
measurement instruments involved in the research process, especially when thematic 
analysis is used to analyse the data (Guest, MacQueen & Namey, 2012).  
 
For this research, the research problems were not revealed directly from interview 
questions or document studies or site-observations. It was the researcher who looked 
for and revealed answers for his research questions by making sense of the data and 
information provided and collected through various data collection methods, and 
finding the missing links or connecting invisible dots among the data and information.  
 
Accordingly, this study carefully selected the right people who have knowledge within 
relevant areas. Moreover, a number of strategies such as using the triangulation 
method in terms of data-collection, different theoretical approaches, and data-analysis 
were employed to ensure, or at least promote, trustworthy or reliable or valid 
procedures during data collection, data verification and the reporting process. (The 
following session discusses the triangulation method applied in this research in more 
detail.) Besides the use of triangulation, integrity was maintained by using different 
sources of data, transcription or notes of the interviews and discussion were sent to 
relevant respondents, in order to enable the respondents to read and revise or add 
material if they want to. It enabled interviewees to give more information, or verify, or 
clarify what they have answered or discussed. But no interviewees added or changed 
the transcripts that were sent to them. 
 
4.7  Triangulated research strategy 
Triangulation is typically used as a strategy for improving the validity and reliability of 
research (Golafshani, 2003).  There is a general consensus among researchers that 
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using multiple sources of data collection is likely to increase the reliability of the 
observation of a research project (Mouton & Marais, 1991; Yin, 1984). It was Denzin 
(1978) who coined the term triangulation to refer to the application of multiple methods 
of data collection. This study used three sources of data, they are document study, 
interview and site-observation, which ensured the accuracy and validity of the data 
and information by means of cross-checking varying perspectives or information 
provided by respondents observed during the site-observations and studied from 
documents and secondary data (Wolcott, 1988).  
 
Interviewees were from the government and municipalities; civil society and Non- 
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) such as resident associations; from  
international academic and from their studies and research on the best practices and 
lessons of experience on municipal service delivery functionalities and processes  as 
well as monitoring and evaluating the processes which are going to be studied.  
 
The purpose of studying and collecting data and information from three different 
sources was to obtain the different views, concerns, understanding and 
recommendations from these sources. The views, experiences and understanding of 
the senior officials from municipality and municipal entities are not the same as those 
of officials from provincial and national governments. Similarly, the views, 
experiences, concerns and expectations of community members on service delivery 
performance were different from those of municipal management and staff. Therefore 
it was invaluable and interesting to hear all voices and views from these different 
stakeholders. 
 
The reason for studying material from international academic and financial institutions 
was to become informed on international best practice experiences on reforming their 
public sectors and improving the performance of municipal service delivery processes. 
It helped to learn what kinds of M&E systems and early warning tools they use in 
order to improve municipal performance. The international experience was discussed 
in detail in the literature review section of the dissertation of this research. 
 
4.8  Ethical considerations 
This research required the participation of human respondents such as municipal 
managers, workers, staff, academics, members of civil societies and community 
members. Thus, ethical issues were taken into consideration and addressed. The 
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ethical considerations were to ensure the participant’s privacy and safety. The most 
important issues taken into consideration were the issues of consent and the 
confidentiality of the participants and their data.   
 
In order to secure the consent of the selected participants, the researcher explained 
all important details of this study that include the aims and purpose of this research. It 
helped the participants to understand the importance of their role in the research. All 
participants were fully informed and all important details of this study which includes 
the aims and purpose of this research, and the research questions and underlying 
premises which frame the study were explained, so that all participants understood 
the importance of their answers and participation in the research. The participants 
were not coerced to participate in the research. Furthermore, the respondents were 
advised that they could withdraw from the study any time they wish even during the 
process. But all participants were happy and supportive as they also wanted to know 
the answers that this research was trying to discover. All participants said they would 
like to get the thesis when it is completed. 
 
As Merriam (1998) points out, ethical considerations within qualitative research 
require two most important matters: confidentiality and anonymity. Moreover, Leedy 
and Ormond (2005) identifies the four key critical ethical issues in research as 
protecting the participants from harm, acquiring informed consent, ensuring their right 
to privacy and establishing honesty with professional colleagues. A written 
memorandum that ensures the participants’ safety and confidentiality were given to all 
interviewees. The culture of the respondents was respected and considered at all 
times. Moreover the trust between researcher and respondents was highly valued.  
 
In order to ensure the safety, confidentiality and anonymity of the participants, their 
names and personal information were not disclosed in the research. Instead, code 
numbers were applied to refer to individual respondents whenever direct quotations 
need to be included. Furthermore, only relevant details that are necessary to answer 
the research questions were included in the thesis. In coding the name, the following 
system of code formulation was devised and applied: 
 
C refers to councillor 
SO refers to senior official 
SOG refers to senior official from the Gauteng provincial government 
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SOCoJ  refers to senior official from the City of Johannesburg (CoJ) 
SOME refers to senior official from municipal entity 
D  refers to Director 
DDPME  refers to director from DPME 
DDBSA  refers to director from DBSA 
DCogta refers to director from CoGTA 
CM  refers to community member 
R  refers to researcher 
M&EP  refers to M&E practitioners 
 
The Code numbers referred to the interviewees is described in the following table 
(Table 4.4). (See Appendix E: Data Management for more detail about confidentiality 
and anonymity). 
 
Table 4.4 Numbers of Interviewees and Codes Referred to Them 
No. Descriptions: Positions, ranks, and groups Codes 
5 Councillors (1 former councillor, and 4 current councillors) Cou1—Cou5  
2 Senior officials from the Gauteng provincial government SOG1—SOG2  
6 Senior officials from CoJ SOCoJ1—SOCoJ6 
1 Senior official from municipal entities SOME1 
1 Director from DPME DDPME 
1 Director from DBSA DDBSA 
1 Director from CoGTA DCogta 
5 Community members CM1 – CM5 
1 Consultant Con1 
1 Researcher R 
1 Academic A 
1 M&E practitioners M&EP 
Total numbers of interviewees  26 
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4.9  Conclusion 
The chapter presented the research strategy that was employed to extrapolate and 
analyse data relating to the municipal service delivery problems, factors and causes 
behind them, and the municipal M&E systems. It also discussed the research 
approach, research methods, and rationale and evaluation of the chosen 
methodology, together with the method of data collection and data analysis. This 
chapter explains some limitations of interviews and how they are overcome by using 
document study and analysis as a supplementation of data collection.  
 
In this chapter, an argument related to “primary data” was made, i.e., the essence of 
“primary data” is more about the nature of data, than the collection methods of it. 
Primary data does not necessarily have to be collected by researchers themselves, 
and as long as data are not processed—they are still in their raw forms—data could 
be regarded as “primary”. Another important point made in this chapter is a new way 
of factor categorisation, as there has been no uniform categorisation or classification 
of factors related to municipal service delivery challenges. Different studies use 
different categories and groupings of factors. The factor categorisation devised and 
used in this study and in this thesis is based on steps in M&E processes, so they 
those factors could be better monitored and checked through M&E. 
 
Moreover, it discussed the strategies take to ensure the reliability and validity of the 
data and findings of the study, through triangulation research, and ethical 
considerations and cares taken to ensure the participant’s privacy and safety. The 
next chapter presents the service delivery challenges of the CoJ and three municipal 
entities, and their causes and factors discovered from interviews, focus-group 
discussions (FGD) and document study.  
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Chapter 5 
SERVICE DELIVERY CHALLENGES 
 
 
This chapter presents the findings on service delivery challenges faced by the City of 
Johannesburg and its three municipal entities. First, it presents the background 
information on the formation of the City of Johannesburg (CoJ) as a single-tier 
metropolitan system and iGoli 2002 Plan. Second, it introduces three municipal 
entities that deliver four basic services. Third, it discusses the simple model of local 
government system. Fourth, it explains the business model of municipal entities and 
their current performance levels. Fifth, it discusses two primary problems in municipal 
service delivery. Sixth, factors affecting the municipal service delivery performances of 
municipal entities are presented and a model of categorising these factors is 
proposed. After that, four important issues discovered by this study are highlighted. 
Finally, the relationship between these factors and early warning signals are 
discussed.  
 
Both this chapter and the next one (Chapter 6) present the findings revealed by this 
study. This chapter is related to the service delivery challenges while the next chapter 
(Chapter 6) is related to the Monitoring and Evaluation system and Early Warning 
System. Although not directly related to the main research question of this study, 
which is M&E and EWS, this chapter is important because understanding municipal 
service delivery challenges and problems, and factors behind them are necessary to 
understand, monitor, interpret and use early warning signals of those factors and 
challenges in order to build a risk or problem database—one of four essential 
elements of an EWS, and to develop response capabilities—another essential 
element of an EWS.  
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter has two main parts. The first part is a brief introduction to three municipal 
entities (MEs)—City Power (CP), Johannesburg Water (JW), and Pikitup—and the 
role the City of Johannesburg (CoJ) plays in the delivery of services from these 
entities. The second part is the categorisation of problems the MEs face during 
service delivery processes, and the factors and causes behind those problems.   
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The study is not about whether or not the Municipality and Municipal Entities are 
performing. It is rather about improving their functionalities, productivity and 
performance by addressing nascent problems before they have matured into full 
problems, with the help of an EWS. In order to use an EWS, problems and their 
factors and causes need to be known, so that their early warning signals can be 
understood and recorded. This chapter therefore discusses the various problems the 
Municipality and Municipal Entities experience, and the factors and causes of those 
problems. It is not to show that the problems are found there. The problems have 
been experienced and it is possible they will happen again. Discussing them is key to 
both understanding them and their early warning signals. 
 
To know what problems they experience, their role, functionalities, and mandates or 
objectives need to be known. The following section therefore, first presents a brief 
introduction of the three municipal entities, their mandates and functions. Second, the 
problems, factors and causes of these problems are presented. And then finally, the 
various early warning signals are discussed.  
 
5.2 iGoli 2002 Plan and the formation of a single-tier metropolitan system  
Before 1993, there were 13 separate local government administrations in 
Johannesburg. These 13 administrations were divided along racial lines. Between 
1993 and 1995, they were merged into five councils which were divided into two tiers. 
The top tier was the Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council 
(GJTMC) and the lower tiers were four independent metropolitan local councils 
(MLCs). After the 1995 municipal elections, the Greater Johannesburg Transitional 
Metropolitan Council (GJTMC) was transformed into the Greater Johannesburg Metro 
Council (GJMC). In 1997 the GJMC experienced a financial problem. It owed R300 
million to Eskom by July 1997 but had no reserves. The MLCs were also unable to 
transfer revenue to the GJMC (Van Rooyen, De Wet, Marais, Korth, Thaba & Mchunu, 
2009). It should be noted that at that time, many of the old municipalities called 
Transitional Local Councils (TLCs) were bankrupt (Atkinson, 2004). 
 
The problem was exacerbated further by the 85 per cent reduction in the central-local 
government operating grant system between 1991 and 1999 (Bond, 2007), and the 
withholding of rates and taxes (of approximately R220 million) by the Sandton 
ratepayers Federation and Liberty Life dating from 1996 because of their unhappiness 
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with the distributive policies of the GJMC (Lipietz 2008; Wafer et al, 2008). While 
these were the immediate factors of the financial crisis, there were other underlying 
causes in the context. These were fragmentation and inadequate coordination, 
aggressive and over-ambitious spending, low revenue collection and no provision for 
bad debts (Allan, Gotz & Joseph, 2001). 
 
In order to solve those crises, the iGoli 2002 plan was revealed in 1999. It was a 
three-year strategic plan emphasising the structural transformation of the city. Its aims 
were to reduce fragmentation, eliminate duplication, improve accountability, focus on 
human development and provide performance incentives, so that services were 
delivered in a cost-effective way. Moreover, it also tried to restore the city’s financial 
health and sustainability. The rationale behind the iGoli 2002 plan was that the City 
would work better by combining new political structures, a core administration, 
regional administrations, utilities, agencies and corporatised entities (CoJ, 2002). An 
important component of the Igoli 2002 plan was creating a single-tier metropolitan 
system, called the City of Johannesburg (CoJ 2002). When the iGoli 2002 plan was 
made public in 1999, there was a severe negative reaction from trade unions and a 
number of civil society organisations. Even within the ANC and the city’s 
administration there was some resistance. SAMWU lead a protest in 1999 of about 
20,000 workers, and was party to the formation of the Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF) 
(Allan, Gotz & Joseph, 2001; van Rooyen, Thaba, Mchunu & Korth, 2009). 
 
Despite protestations, in December 2000 the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan 
Municipality was established as a single municipality by uniting and combining the 
Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council and its substructures—the Northern, 
Eastern, Western, Southern Metropolitan Local Councils, and portions of Midrand and 
Modderfontein (CoJ, 2002). The new political governance arrangement was 
comprised of an executive mayor, a core administration, 11 decentralised 
administrative regions, 217 councillors (109 ward councillors and 108 party 
representative councillors), utilities (JW, City Power, and Pikitup), agencies (like the 
Johannesburg Road Agency and City Parks), and corporatised entities (like Metrobus, 
the Johannesburg Zoo, the Civic Theatre, and the Johannesburg Fresh Produce 
Market) (CoJ 2002). This study uses three municipal entities (or utilities) as case-
studies. 
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5.3 Municipal entities  
The City of Johannesburg (CoJ) Metropolitan Municipality provides basic services to 
approximately 1.4 million households for consumption by over 4.4 million citizens 
(approximately 8% of the total national population) through an employee base of over 
25,000 employees (CoJ, 2014a, 2015).  However, the CoJ does not deliver municipal 
services by itself, it does so through state-owned companies (SOCs), which are also 
called municipal entities (ME), or utilities (CoJ, 2001). Electricity is delivered by City 
Power. Water and sanitation are by Johannesburg Water. And refuse removal 
services are by Pikitup.  
 
5.3.1 Electricity: City Power 
City Power Johannesburg (SOC) Ltd (City Power) distributes electricity for the City of 
Johannesburg. It was established in 2000 as an independent municipal entity that is 
wholly owned by the City of Johannesburg. At the time of the MEs inception, in 2001, 
Johannesburg was the only municipality in the country that generated electricity 
through its own power stations. Some of these stations were later sold to private 
sector operators (CoJ, 2001: 96). City Power consists of six independent transmission 
systems (sited in Johannesburg, Randburg, Roodepoort, Sandton, Midrand and 
Johannesburg South), with a few minor independent load points (in Alexandra, 
Dainfern, Lenasia, Modderfontein and Vlakfontein), 243 power transformers are 
installed in the network, and there are 264 substations (CP, 2014b: 103). 
 
The mandate of City Power from its sole shareholder, the CoJ, is to buy from two 
main suppliers of electricity—Eskom at 80% and Kelvin Power at 20%—and sell 
electricity to the citizens of Johannesburg (CP, 2014b). It should be noted that City 
Power is not the sole provider of electricity services for the City: Eskom services some 
areas in Johannesburg, predominantly Soweto and Sandton (CP, 2013a). The core 
function of City Power is to provide network services to all its customers within its 
geographical area, that includes the purchasing, distribution and sale of electricity, 
constructing networks, connecting customers, repair and maintenance of networks, 
and installation and maintenance of public lighting (CP, 2014b). Moreover, it is a 
responsibility of City Power to educate customers about the safe use of electricity, the 
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impact of cable and electricity theft and the importance of account payments (CP, 
2014a). 
 
The City Council (CoJ) regulates City Power’s financial issues such as tariffs and 
capital expenditure, human resource issues, such as skills development, delivery 
targets, maintenance of assets and addressing assets, and standards of customer 
care, by means of a Service Delivery Agreement (CP, 2014b; CoJ, 2013a). Its 
performance is overseen and monitored by the Environment and Infrastructure 
Services Department (EISD) of the City of Johannesburg (CP, 2014b). While meter 
reading is done by City Power, the billing and collection of customer debt is done by 
the Revenue and Customer Relations Management Department (R&CRM) at the City 
of Johannesburg, and in cooperation with City Power (CP, 2013a: 10). At the end of 
June 2014, according to City Power customer invoices, it had over 410,000 
conventional customers; ranging from domestic to commercial and industrial 
properties. These are customers that City Power billed or invoiced. There are many 
more active accounts of City Power that are not billed or invoiced (CP, 2014a).  
 
On 13 May 2015, the Managing Director (MD) of City Power, Sicelo Goodwill Xulu, 
won the African Utility Executive of the Year Award at the African Utility Week Industry 
Awards for innovative and smart initiatives (i.e., the rollout of smart meters and solar 
geysers across Johannesburg and the introduction of smart technologies such as 
ripple control, load limiting and time of use) introduced and implemented by City 
Power that significantly improved billing accuracy, enhanced revenue generation for 
municipalities and contributed markedly to managing electricity usage and reducing 
pressure on the national grid (Bundock, 2015). 
 
5.3.2 Water and sanitation: Johannesburg Water 
Johannesburg Water SOC Ltd (JW) was incorporated on the 21 November 2000 and 
commenced business on 1 January 2001. It is wholly owned by the City of 
Johannesburg. Its mandate is to provide water and sanitation services to the citizens 
residing in all areas of Johannesburg, from Orange Farm in the South to Midrand in 
the North, Roodepoort in the West and Alexandra in the East, serving an estimated 
consumer base of about 4,4 million people—approximately, living in approximately 1.4 
million households (JW, 2014a: 52-3; JW, 2013a: 5).  
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With its approximately 2,500 employees, it reticulates water to consumers through a 
water network of 12,581 kilometres of water pipes, 88 water reservoirs and 28 water 
towers. An average of 1.6 billion litres of water complying with acceptable drinking 
water standards—SANS (South African National Standards) 241—are distributed to 
the households within the city on a daily basis (JW, 2014a: 52-3). It manages 
wastewater through an 11,000 km wastewater network, and sewage through a total 
network of 11,786 kilometres of sewer pipes which is treated at six Waste Water 
Treatment Plants situated around the city. The amount of water it buys from Rand 
Water is over 1.5 billion litres per day, and the amount of sewage it treats is on 
average 1 billion litres per day. To ensure the quality of the water supplied, daily 
sampling and testing of water is carried out at the four accredited water laboratories 
which accounts for over 500 samples per month (JW, 2014a: 52-3). 
 
Water is supplied to informal settlements through stand-pipes, connections to 
individual properties and water tanks. Sanitation services are also provided in the form 
of portable Ventilated Improved Pit (VIP) toilets, chemical toilets or pit latrines. During 
the 2013/14 FY, over 50,000 VIP toilets were desludged, 4,300 chemical toilets were 
provided and serviced on average twice a week and 100 million litres of water was 
transported to stationary tanks in the informal settlements. It is important to be aware 
that generally, these communities (informal settlements) do not pay for these services, 
which are in any case far from adequate to meet the growing demand (JW, 2014a: 52-
3; CoJ, 2001). 
 
It is Johannesburg Water’s responsibility to manage 100 per cent of meter reading 
and billing data for the customers as well as to manage contractors that read the 
water meters. However, all accounts are managed by the CoJ, through Program 
Phakama.  As with City Power, the billing and collection of customer debt is done by 
the Revenue and Customer Relations Management Department (R&CRM) of the City 
of Johannesburg (JW, 2013a: 43, 73). 
 
In 2013, Johannesburg Water was recognised as the top performing company and 
best performing company in the sector from a list of 3700 private and public sector 
companies; as well as being the one of the best companies to work for in 2012/13 FY 
(JW, 2013a: 15) 
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5.3.3 Refuse removal: Pikitup 
Pikitup Johannesburg (Pty) Limited was established in 2001 as an independent 
municipal entity, wholly owned by the City of Johannesburg. Its primary mandate is to 
provide sustainable integrated waste management services to all residential, formal 
and informal areas, and businesses of the City of Johannesburg, ensuring the overall 
cleanliness of the City’s streets and open spaces and certain public areas, and 
preserving an attractive and hygienic environment for residents and visitors (CoJ, 
2014a: 32).  
 
There are two categories of services Pikitup provides: council services and 
commercial services, which is to improve its financial position (Pikitup, 2014a: 47). As 
council services, mandated by the City of Johannesburg, it collects and disposes of 
domestic waste, cleans streets, flushes lanes, cleans areas, manages litter bins, 
collects illegally dumped waste, collects and disposes of animal carcasses found in a 
public place and operates garden sites. As commercial services, it competes with 
other private waste management companies and provides bulk collection services, 
collection and disposal of hazardous waste, composting, recycling services, and 
services for special events and the operation of landfill sites (Pikitup, 2013a: 7). It 
manages and maintains 11 depots, 42 garden sites, one compost plant and four 
operational landfill sites. Its customer base has 741,455 domestic customers, 9,658 
Business Round Collected Refuse (RCR) customers, 1,666 bulk service customers, 
752 dailies, 522 institutions and several compost customers (Pikitup, 2013a: 7) 
 
Although it is not required by the mandate to clean public sector hostels, public sector 
housing estates as well as informal trading areas and taxi ranks, it performs those 
activities at cost (Pikitup, 2013a: 6). It provides a wide range of waste management 
services to approximately 4.4 million people. It collects and disposes of approximately 
1.2 million tons of waste annually (Pikitup, 2013a: 6). 
 
After briefly introducing three municipal entities that provide four basic services of 
electricity, water, sanitation and refuse removal, their mandates and functions, the 
following section will provide two basic models related to the local government system 
and business of municipal entities. This is because understanding these two basic 
models is necessary to explore and see municipal problems and the factors behind 
these problems. 
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5.4 The system of local government 
The municipality structure is composed of two sectors: political and administrative. 
Political sectors are structured with a mayoral committee and councillors, while the 
administrative sector is headed by a municipal manager and run by municipal 
employees and staff, in some instances with the help of consultants. The principle 
function of local government is to provide services to communities. As stated above, 
municipalities do not deliver municipal services by themselves, instead, services are 
delivered by municipal entities.  
 
In the local government model, all decisions and planning are required to be 
conducted together by the municipality and the communities. The Municipal Systems 
Act (RSA, 2000) makes it obligatory for the public to participate in the affairs of the 
municipalities. It is the responsibility of municipalities to deliver services based on the 
needs and requirements of the communities. In order to know and understand the 
needs of the communities, ward committees are established with councillors and ward 
committee members elected by the communities to act as their representatives and 
present their needs and requirements to the municipal council. Section 152 of the 
constitution (RSA, 1996), clearly states that local government has an obligation to 
consult with communities, and for community participation to be part of the decision-
making processes. Councillors are elected to represent and serve the community in 
realising people’s constitutional rights to basic services (Figure 5.1). 
 
5.5  Business model of municipal entities 
Its business model of municipal entities is simple: buying bulk services at low prices 
and selling them to communities at a higher price. Municipal entities work as 
middlemen and thus their business model is simple, buying goods (electricity and 
water) from producers (Eskom, Kelvin and Rand Water) and selling them to residents 
and communities. Pikitup is different from CP and JW, as it does not have to purchase 
services from service providers. Its expenses are mainly operational costs that consist 
of labour, logistics and material costs. This is a simplified model. In reality, their 
operations and functions are not that simple. For example, some municipal entities 
such as Pikitup deliver services, and moreover, all municipal entities have to deliver 
goods and services for free to certain sectors of communities and residents. 
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In the case of electricity service delivery, of City Power, bulk electricity is bought from 
Eskom and Kelvin and sold to residents or households, businesses and other 
customers that include government departments, schools and hospitals. City Power 
purchases 12.6 million MWh (Megawatt Hours) of electricity at c66.39 per kWh 
(Kilowatt Hours), and sells 8.9 million MWh (Megawatt Hours) of electricity to its 
customers. Bulk purchase of electricity was R8.4 bn for 2013-2014 FY (CP, 2014c: 
48). The revenue from electricity sales was R12.4 bn according to City Power’s 
Financial Statement (CP, 2014c: 45), and R12,6 bn according to City Power’s Annual 
Report (CP, 2014a: 9). 
 
In the case of water service delivery, of Johannesburg Water, water is delivered to 
residents or houses or businesses at R12/1,000 litres by Johannesburg Water as a 
Municipal Entity. Every day, Johannesburg Water buys an average of 1.6 billion litres  
of water from Rand Water at R5/1,000 litres and sells or distributes to the households 
within the city on a daily basis (JW, 2014a: 52-3). Rand Water buys water from the 
Vaal Dam at a lower price (R2/1,000 litres). But it is important to note that in these  
buying and selling cycles there are other costs or expenses involved, for example 
infrastructure maintenance, labour costs, water losses, bad debts, non-payments, and 
free distribution of water to indigent people.  
 
Figure 5.1 Local government model 
  
 
Source: My own conceptualisation   
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In the case of refuse removal, of Pikitup, the business cycle is a little bit different for 
two reasons: first, it is in a service business; and is non-profit. But the basis of its 
business is similar: there is a circular flow of income (revenue, property rates, or 
service charges) and expenses (costs for input materials, operations and labour). 
 
Because of being natural monopolies, there is almost no way to incur financial loss in 
these simple businesses when procedures are followed correctly. But problems began 
when municipalities could not properly collect revenues for municipal services from its 
customers, i.e., communities, and in turn the expenses quickly exceeded the 
revenues. The well-known infamous example of this is the CoJ’s bankruptcy  around 
1997 when the City was unable to pay Eskom some R300 million for bulk supply of 
electricity (CoJ, 2001). But it is important to understand that it was before municipal 
entities were established. In fact, municipal entities were established because of that 
financial crisis of the Coj.  
 
There are several factors responsible for not being able to collect enough revenues to 
cover all expenses. One of them is the failure to collect all due revenue. Others are 
non-payment by the communities, and inefficiency either stemming from poor financial 
management, poor supervision or monitoring. However, City Power and 
Johannesburg Water are performing well in terms of their financial situation and 
service coverage. 
 
Figure 5.2 Supply chain in water delivery 
 
Source: My own conceptualisation 
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5.4.1 Performances of municipal entities 
Data from document study, such as Annual Reports, Business Plans and Financial 
Statements of CoJ, City Power, Johannesburg Water, and Pikitup pointed out that 
municipal entities are doing well in terms of finances and service delivery coverage, 
although there are some inefficiencies and material losses in their operations. The 
biggest challenges the municipality and the municipalities have are poor customer 
service and relationship. The service coverage for four basic services are more than 
90 per cent in 2013. Revenue collection rate (Revenue received versus billed) is 92 
per cent in 2013, and 93.7 per cent in 2014 (CoJ, 2014a: 73) (Table 5.1).  
Table 5.1 Service coverage 
Revenue collection rate 2012/13 2013/14 
access to electricity 90.8%  
access to sanitation 98.5%  
access to refuse collection  96.9%  
revenue collection rate (vs billed) 92% 93.7% 
Source: CoJ (2013a: 14; 2014a: 158);  
 
City Power has been making a net profit and a surplus. Since 2012, it has been 
making profit of more than R 1 billion. The payment level is more than 90 per cent. 
The problem areas are meter reading level (66 per cent in 2014) and electricity losses 
about 30 per cent in 2014 (Table 5.2). One problem that can be easily noticed from 
the following table is data credibility. There are several pairs of figures stated for the 
same indicators. Sources of those figures are stated in the note.  
Table 5.2 Performance indicators of City Power, 2010-2014 
 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 
Net profit  R859m R1.4b R1.3b R1.3b 
Surplus (after tax expense) R859m R1.2b R1.4b R1.2b 
Payment levels  86.27% 92.37%  94.77% 100.32% 
Customer satisfaction 65% 65% 50.6% 66.2% 
Meter reading - 98% 78.05% 66.6% 
Total losses 19.29% 19.31% 25.59% 30.7% 
 Technical losses 9% 9% 9% Nil 
 Non-technical losses 10.29% 10.31% 16.59% Nil  
Source: CP (2014a: 17, 19, 41, 64; 2014f: 17; 2013a: 5, 10, 12; 2012a: 22, 34, 36, 44, 
46, 74; 2011i: 44) 
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Note: The latest figures are used in the above table. When the years of the reports 
are the same, for example, the City Power 2014 Annual Report and the City Power 
Updated Business Plan 2014 – 2016, and they stated different figures for the same 
indicator, the figure of the Annual Report was used. There are various versions of 
figures and statistics stated in official reports of City Power. For example: The surplus 
after tax expense of City Power for 2011/12 FY was stated as R1.4 billion in its 2012 
annual report (CP, 2012a: 34), and as R1.2 billion in its 2014 annual report (CP, 
2014a: 17).  
Similarly, the rate of customer satisfaction was stated as 50.6 per cent in the City 
Power 2014 Annual Report (CP, 2014a: 19), and as 56.6 per cent in the City Power 
Updated Business Plan 2014 – 2016 (CP, 2014f: 17).  
Another case is the amount of power losses. The amount of power losses for 2011/12 
FY was stated as 17.21 per cent in the City Power 2012 Annual Report (CP, 2012a: 
22), and as 19.31 per cent in the City Power 2013 Annual Report (CP, 2013a: 10). For 
2012/13 FY, it was stated as 30.13 per cent in the City Power 2013 Annual Report 
(CP, 2013a: 5), and as 25.59 per cent in the same report at page number 17 (CP, 
2013a: 17) and its Updated Business Plan 2014 – 2016 (CP, 2014f: 17). For 2013/14 
FY, it was stated as 30.7 per cent in the City Power 2014 Annual Report (CP, 2014a: 
19), and as 30.9 per cent in its Updated Business Plan 2014 – 2016 (CP, 2014f: 17).  
Different figures were also noted for non-technical losses. For 2011/12 FY, it was 
stated as 8.21 per cent in the City Power 2012 Annual Report (CP, 2012a: 22), and as 
10.31 per cent in the City Power 2013 Annual Report (CP, 2013a: 10) (See Table 
5.3).  
Table 5.3 Different versions of figures (statistics) in City Power reports 
 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 
Surplus 
(after tax 
expense) 
R1.4b (CP, 2012a: 34) 
R1.2b (CP, 2014a: 17) 
  
Customer 
satisfaction 
 
50.6% (CP, 2014a: 19) 
56.6% (CP, 2014f: 17) 
 
Total 
losses 
17.21% (CP, 2012a: 22) 
19.31% (CP, 2013a: 10) 
30.13% (CP, 2013a: 5) 
25.59% (CP, 2013a: 10; 
2014f: 17) 
30.7% (CP, 2014a: 19) 
30.9% (CP, 2014f: 17) 
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 Non-
technical 
losses 
8.21% (CP, 2012a: 22) 
10.31% (CP, 2013a: 10) 
  
Source: CP (2014a: 17, 19; 2014f: 17; 2013a: 5, 10; 2012a: 22, 34). 
 
 
Like City Power, Johannesburg Water has been making a net profit (R 535 million in 
2014) and a surplus (R 1.7 billion in 2013). Meter reading level was 87.23 per cent in 
2014. Customer satisfaction level was 68 per cent in 2014. Revenue collection ratio is 
78.7 per cent in 2013. One problem for Johannesburg Water is water losses 
(unaccounted for water): 35.7 per cent in 2014. The payment level for water was not 
found. 
Table 5.4 Performance indicators of Johannesburg Water, 2010-2014 
 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 
Net profit / loss R380 m R585 m R812 m R535m 
Surplus/deficit R786 m R1b R1,7b  
Unaccounted for water (UFW) 39% 30.3% 28.9% 35.7% 
   UFW metered areas 22.01% 27.56%   
   UFW un-metered areas 83.82% 37.96%    
   Physical losses   13.7%  
   Commercial losses   15.19%  
Customer satisfaction  62%  68% 
Meter reading   New 87.23% 
Revenue collection ratio   78.7%  
Debt provision   R909.8m  
Water bursts restored within 48 
hours 
86.49% 88.79% 88.67% 79.85% 
sewer blockages cleared with 24 
hours of notification 
90.89% 94.11% 96.39% 94.49% 
no of water pipe’s burst per 
100km  
277.62 301.42 298.22 247.23 
no of sewer blockages per 100km  356.30 384.30 418.60 428.07 
Annual company performance   92.91%  
Source: JW (2014a: 24, 60, 62; 2014b; 2013a: 8, 15, 54; 2012a: 15, 18, 19, 20, 21). 
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It should be noted here that various versions of figures and statistics were stated in 
official reports of Johannesburg Water. For example: The net profit of Johannesburg 
Water was stated as R580 million in its 2012 annual report (JW, 2012a:15), and as 
R585 million in its 2013 annual report (JW, 2013a: 8 & 15). Similarly, the rate of sewer 
blockages cleared with 24 hours of notification was stated as 96.06 per cent in the JW 
2013 Annual Report (JW, 2013a: 8), and as 96.39 per cent in the JW 2014 Annual 
Report (JW, 2014a: 60). Another case is the number of water pipe’s burst per 100km. 
It was stated as 299 in the JW 2013 Annual Report (JW, 2013a: 8), and as 298.22 in 
the JW 2014 Annual Report (JW, 2014a: 60). In the above table (Table 5.3), the latest 
figures are stated. 
 
Water Losses: Real’, ‘physical’ or ‘technical’ losses include leaks from reticulation 
systems (especially service connections), leaks from transmission or distribution 
mains, and overflow and leaks from storage and balance tanks. Such leaks are often 
the result of poor workmanship, the use of poor materials, and the lack of 
maintenance (WSP–SA, 2009). ‘Apparent’ or ‘commercial’ losses include water stolen 
through illegal connections; water stolen for resale; water consumption undercounted 
by inaccurate meters; and water sales that cannot be invoiced because meter 
numbers cannot be accurately correlated with customer names and addresses  
(WSP–SA, 2009). 
 
Unlike City Power and Johannesburg Water, Pikitup has been struggling, financially. It 
has been in deficit until 2014. But its revenue collection rate is now over 90 per cent in 
2014.  
Table 5.5 Performance indicators of Pikitup, 2012-2014 
 2012/13 2013/14 
Surplus/deficit, before taxation  (R44.89m) R59.3m 
Queries resolved within 7 days 43% 67% 
Revenue collection ratio (of Pikitup’s commercial 
customers: Revenue received versus billed) 
79% 91% 
Outstanding debtors order than 120 days for 
commercial customers 
78.6% 70% 
Cleanliness Level  
(based on CoJ standards as described in GDARD Gauteng Waste Collection) 
   Inner city (level) 4 2 
   Outer city (level) 2 & 3 3 
   Hostels (level) 2 3 
Source: Pikitup (2014a: 64-67, 97). 
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Moreover, the eight-year history of audit outcomes and Auditor General’s opinions 
shows the gradual operational performance improvement of the municipality and 
municipal entities (Table 5.5). However, it does not mean that the municipality and 
municipal entities are perfect. There are still many areas that need to be improved and 
effectiveness and productivity can still be improved. It is also wise to keep in mind that 
the municipality and municipal entities are not there only to deliver services. Besides 
delivering services, there are several responsibilities and roles they have to discharge 
and these areas still have to be improved. In the following section, two primary 
problems are stated. 
Table 5.6 Eight-year history audit outcomes of CoJ, CP, JW and Pikitup 
Years CoJ City Power Joburg Water Pikitup 
2013-14 Unqualified 
Unqualified 
audit with 
matter of 
emphasis and 
other matters  
Unqualified  
2012-13 Unqualified Unqualified Unqualified 
Unqualified Audit 
with matters of 
emphasis 
2011-12 Qualified Qualified Qualified 
unqualified audit 
opinion, with 
findings 
2010-11 Qualified Unqualified Qualified 
Financially 
unqualified with 
findings 
2009-10 Qualified Qualified Qualified 
Financially 
unqualified with 
findings 
2008-09 
Financially 
unqualified with 
no findings 
Financially 
unqualified with 
findings 
Financially 
unqualified with 
findings 
Financially 
unqualified with 
findings 
2007-08 
New 
consolidation 
Financially 
unqualified with 
findings 
Financially 
unqualified with 
findings 
Financially 
unqualified with 
findings 
2006-07 
New 
consolidation 
New municipal 
entity 
New municipal 
entity 
New municipal 
entity 
Source: AG (2012: 88-89); CoJ (2013a); Pikitup (2014a); CP (2014a; 2011b: 21); JW 
(2013a; 2014a) 
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5.6 Two primary problems of municipality and municipal entities 
The objectives and functions of municipalities, through municipal entities, are 
straightforward: to provide municipal services to communities efficiently and 
economically (RSA, 2006). This study identified two main problems in municipal 
service delivery: first, perception and expectation gaps, which is related to efficiency 
matters; and second, personality of municipality and municipal entities that 
communities found unpleasant. 
5.6.1 Perception and expectation gaps 
The first main problem experienced by municipal entities is communities’ or residents’ 
expectation gaps, whether perceived or actual, either on quality or quantity of 
municipal services. The expectation gaps occur when residents’ or communities’ 
perceptions of municipal services fail to match their expectations of it. The four gaps 
explanation of Pycraft et al (2000) is useful in trying to understand the expectation 
gaps between communities’ perceptions of municipal service and their expectations of 
it. The four gaps are: first, the communities’ specification – municipal entities’ 
specification gap; second, the concept – specification gap; third, the quality 
specification – actual quality gap; and fourth, the actual quality – communicated image 
gap (Figure 5.3).  
 
The first is the specification gap between municipalities or municipal entities and 
communities. These two have different specifications for the same service. In other 
words, it is a result of a mismatch between municipal entities’ own internal quality 
specifications and the specifications expected by communities. For example 
communities and municipal entities have different specifications about municipal 
service. It is a result of poor communication between municipal entities (or 
municipality) and communities.  
 
The second is the concept-specification gap. It is a mismatch between the product or 
service concept and the way the municipal entities specified the quality of service 
internally. For example, the government has a concept of a democratic, participatory, 
efficient and responsive local government system, but the specifications of 
municipalities and municipal entities about that concept do not match with the actual 
concept of the government. It is because developing specifications for a particular 
concept is difficult. Another example is that, the government—whether it is national, 
provincial or local—has a grand concept (or vision) of municipal service quality and 
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performance, but that grand concept (or vision) cannot be realised or achieved with 
the available resources and capacity municipal entities have. It is simply that the 
concept is unattainable at least with current capacity. 
 
Figure 5.3 Perception and expectation gaps 
 
Source: Pycraft et al (2000: 615). 
 
The third gap is a mismatch between the actual quality of services and the internal 
quality specifications. It can be simply understood as an outcome of the inadequate 
capacity and capability of an organisation (municipalities or municipal entities) to 
produce the intended or set specifications. For example, a municipality or municipal 
entities have set certain specifications of their service, but the actual quality of service 
does not meet the specifications. The fourth one is a gap between the actual quality 
and the communicated image. It is a result of a communications or marketing failure. 
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For example, it is a mismatch between what politicians promise to deliver and what 
the municipality or municipal entities actually deliver.  
 
5.6.2 Personality of municipalities 
Another problem with municipalities, in the view of the public and communities, is the 
personality of the municipality. The public and communities find that municipalities 
have poor personality manifested in poor communication, unresponsiveness, and in 
lack of courtesy.  
 
Municipalities are not only service delivery agents but are the basis for democracy 
and serve as a voice of their constituencies at higher levels of government, i.e., 
provincial and national government levels (CCRC, 2009). The Constitution (1996: 
Section 152) sets five objections of local government, and states that a municipality 
must strive, within its financial and administrative capacity, to achieve those five 
objects. They are: first, to provide democratic and accountable government for local 
communities; second, to ensure the provision of services to communities in a 
sustainable manner; third, to promote social and economic development; forth, to 
promote a safe and healthy environment; and fifth, to encourage the involvement of 
communities and community organisations in the matters of local government.  
 
According to the Constitution (1996: Section 153), municipalities also have 
developmental duties to promote the social and economic development of the 
community. As developmental duties of municipalities, the Constitution (1996: Section 
153) states two requirements for municipalities that are related to the structure and 
management of the administration, budgeting and planning processes: first, the basic 
needs of the community have to be given priority, and second, the social and 
economic development of the community have to be promoted. Thus, the public 
relation and customer services and cares are important components of municipal 
businesses. However, the customers and the public find the public relation and 
customer services poor and low quality.  The poor customer service is the root cause 
of customers’ anger, frustration. One respondent stated about the contacts of the CoJ 
and MEs that do not work, as follows 
And there are contact numbers that don’t work, so it’s very very hard to 
know what the right contact number is. You can get many of those 
contact numbers, but there is in fact no body answers, but just the 
machine does (Interview: M&EP, 22 April 2014).  
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One community member shared her disappointed experience with Johannesburg 
Water when she tried to contact them for the pipe bust. She said 
But last year (2013) in January, it will be about 18 months ago, I nearly 
went nearly mad, because a (water) main pipe burst and it spilled 
water for five days after water was rushing out into the gutter, I don’t 
know how many time I have people from that house telephoned it was 
in January, there must be an emergency service when they finally 
came it turned out to be quite quick and easy thing to fix  (Interview: 
M&EP, 22 April 2014). 
 
The views on the root causes of municipal challenges and problems are differed 
among senior officials and managements of municipalities and municipal entities, and 
the communities and the public, including the low level employees and staff of 
municipalities. The top levels and managements of municipalities argue that the root 
of municipal challenges and problem is the resource constraint. They said people do 
not pay for service, and demands for municipal services are ever growing because of 
continuous migrations. But people, communities, including lower level employees and 
workers of municipalities believe that the root of municipal problems the 
managements and leaderships of municipalities and the government. The public and 
community members think that those high senior officials (including politicians and 
councillors) in municipalities and MEs are not working for the interest of people, and 
are not treating the communities and the public well. The public feel that they do not 
have a role to play in decision-making, budgeting and distribution, allocation of 
budgets, want a role in monitoring and evaluation. For them, the problems of 
municipalities and municipal entities are more about the personalities of the 
municipalities, that do not treat the general public and the communities members, 
including customers, with respect and courtesy as prescribed by the Batho Pele 
Principles (RSA, 1997; Interview: C2, 26 August 2014; C4, 19 February 2015; SOG1, 
18 February 2015; Con, 28 January 2014; CM3, 17 June 2014; CM4, 20 September 
2014). 
 
5.7 Factors affecting the performances of MEs  
Factors affecting the performances of municipalities and municipal entities were 
collected through studying documents, conducting interviews and focus-group 
discussions, and reviewing literature. 
 
Official documents of municipal entities, such as annual reports, business plans and 
Auditor General Reports on each of them, as well as the CoJ’s annual reports reveal 
wide disparities of factors affecting their performances. Official documents of City 
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Power revealed 108 factors (Appendix 12). Official documents of Johannesburg Water 
mentioned 37 factors (Appendix 13). And official documents of Pikitup stated 79 
factors (Appendix 14). Similarly, the interviews and focus-group discussions identified 
178 factors (Appendix 10), while the literature review exposed 141 factors (Appendix 
11). Many of these factors however overlap one another (Table 5.7). 
 
Table 5.7 Factors affecting the performances of MEs 
 
City 
Power 
Joburg 
Water 
Pikitup Interviews 
Literature 
review 
Factors 108  37  79  178  141  
 
 
5.8 Categorisation of factors 
To analyse these factors, their categorisation is necessary. Since their inception, local 
government and municipalities have been studied widely. There is however no 
uniform categorisation of factors affecting municipal service delivery performance, and 
they are categorised in various ways.  For example, in its Municipal Assessment Tool 
(MAT), the Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation, which was 
changed it in 2014 into the Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation 
(DPME, 2012) used six categories: Planning, Human Resources, Financial, Service 
Delivery, Community Engagement, and Governance. On the other hand, in its Local 
Government Turnaround Strategy (LGTAS), the Department of Cooperative 
Governance and Traditional Affairs (CoGTA), which was changed it in 2014 into “The 
Department of Cooperative Government's (DCoG) used six themes, such as service 
delivery, spatial conditions, governance, financial management, Local Economic 
Development (LED), and labour relations (CoGTA, 2009). 
 
In this study, factors are divided into three main groups: exogenous, supply-side and 
demand-side factors. Exogenous factors are related to issues which are out of the 
control of municipalities, such as political, socio-economic situations that affect the 
performance of municipalities. Examples of exogenous factors include 
intergovernmental relations, regulatory complexity and burden, poverty, inequality, 
and unemployment. As core functions municipalities are providing municipal services 
to communities, two sides are involved in the municipal business cycle, providing 
services (supply) and receiving services (demand). These two sides are named here 
as supply-side and demand-side factors. Supply-side is related to municipalities and 
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municipal entities, which are responsible for supply services, and demand-side is 
about the behaviour and activities of communities and customers, i.e., their 
participation and cooperation, or lack of the same (Table 5.8 & Figure 5.4). 
 
Table 5.8 Exogenous, supply-side, and demand-side factors 
 
City 
Power 
Joburg 
Water 
Pikitup Interviews 
Literature 
review 
Exogenous 7 7 8 17 12 
Supply-side 97 27 64 152 123 
Demand-side 4 2 7 6 6 
Total factors 108  37  79  178  141  
 
Figure 5.4 Factors triangle 
Exogenous 
factors
Performance of 
municipalities
Supply-side 
factors
Demand-side 
factors
 
 
5.8.1 Supply-side factors 
Supply-side factors are further divided into four categories: planning, inputs, 
processes, and outputs, using the logic model commonly used in M&E with one added 
category, planning. Planning category has four sub-categories (leadership, 
governance, IDP, public participation), inputs category has five sub-categories 
(human capital, finances, infrastructure, machines and tools, and information), 
process category has four sub-categories (administration, supervision, monitoring, 
and coordination and communication), and outputs category has four sub-categories 
(customer care, electricity, water and sanitation, and refuse removal) (Figure 5.5). 
 
Planning factors are related to setting plans, prioritising and budgeting. Factors 
related to public participation are included in the planning, as the local government 
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system is a joint-enterprise where municipalities and communities are required to 
work together starting from planning through to monitoring and evaluation.  
 
Governmental and leadership factors are also included in the planning because they 
play critical roles in planning and public participation, and the success of the whole 
planning operation as well as the process of public participation depends on the 
performance of governance and the leadership of municipalities. There are seven 
main characteristics of good governance: (1) accountable, (2) transparent, (3) 
following the rule of law, (4) responsive, (5) equitable and inclusive, (6) effective and 
efficient, and (7) participatory. Two of them are inclusive and participatory, which are 
two essential elements of IDP planning required by legislation.  
Figure 5.5 Supply-side factors  
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Four hundred and forty six supply-side factors are discovered from interviews, focus 
group discussions, document studies, and literature review. Ninety seven factors are 
noted from the official documents from City Power such as its annual reports and 
business plans. In the same way, 27 factors from the official documents of 
Johannesburg Water; 64 factors from Pikitup’s. Similarly, 155 factors are from the 
interviews and the focus group discussions; and 123 factors from the literature review 
(Table 5.9). The details of those factors are described in Appendix J, K, L, M & N. 
 
Table 5.9 Supply-side factors  
 City Power 
Joburg 
Water 
Pikitup 
Interviews 
& FGD 
Literature 
review 
Planning 46 2 2 60 33 
Inputs 24 15 21 36 48 
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Processes 24 4 29 42 37 
Outputs 32 6 12 17 5 
Total 97 27 64 155 123 
 
 
5.9 Selected issues highlighted by interview respondents 
The following section presents the four main issues discussed and highlighted by the 
interview respondents. These four issues are public participation, accountability, 
leadership, factors around skills shortage, fragmentation and silo-mentality. Issues 
around monitoring (and M&E) are presented in the next chapter (Chapter 6: M&E and 
EWS). 
 
5.9.1 Public participation and IDP 
Integrated Development Planning (IDP) is at the heart of the local government 
formation and system. It is the most important step from which all functions and 
processes of municipalities originated. IDP processes and approaches were 
developed from international experiences, for example, India, Pakistan and Ghana 
show that the more the public participate in the process, the more effective and 
successful IDP turns out to be and the less the public participate in the process, the 
more weak and useless IDP ends up (Stewart, 1995). The IDP process of the City 
used to be based on genuine public participatory in the early years of the new 
democratic system. One respondent shared his experience as a councillor and how 
they formulated the IDP, in a genuine public participatory way, in which the priorities 
of the community and budget allocations were discussed with and decided together 
with communities. He stated as follows: 
So if it goes back to genuine public participation. At that time the RDP 
(Redistribution and Development Programme), people-driven, people-
centred development which meant you consult the people before you 
decide what to do, including local projects so we decide what is the priority 
of this community, is it a clinic or fixing a library or a road? You know, out 
of 20 things, you choose five priorities. So you do, based on budget. 
(Interview: C2, 26 August 2014).  
 
 
At the beginning, the first five years of new democratic government system, public 
participation in local government level was working. One councillor shared his 
experience in public participation in the IDP process. He stated,  
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when we started as councillors just all sort of participation, not 
participation as given in an idea, not even working, so when we started 
the government has a system by councillors like me have to call 
meetings in a kind of Brazilian people budget. So we call. [You invite 
people.] Yeah!, and they tell us their priorities, and then you tell them 
look, obviously they have so much money, so out of these money, how 
would you want it to be used and of course, you have to choose your 
priorities and people came up with the priorities for example in Soweto, 
there in Soweto all roads are tarred because when we started everything 
we were said “tar the roads”, you know, we can wait, but we just don’t 
want to walk in the dust as you know people wear nice shoes and they 
want to walk nice (laugh). So that was done. So but that process was 
stop (Interview: C2, 26 August 2014). 
 
Unfortunately, it is no longer done in that way: the IDP and the public participation 
processes become just a formality or ritual. Community meetings are used just to 
conform with legislative requirement—just to be able to tick the boxes of compliance—
rather than to listen to the views, concerns and requirements of communities and 
integrate (that) community feedback and requirements into the IDP (Interviews: C2, 26 
August 2014; C4, 19 Feb 2015; CM5, 6 Feb 2015; M&EP, 22 April 2014). 
But obviously, if the participation is going to be genuine so you can’t just 
decide on a budget allocation for you as Area A when there are 20 other 
areas. There must be a forum where all the areas come together, look at 
the cake, you know, to cut a cake (Interview: C2, 26 August 2014).  
 
IDP and public participation are related and one cannot separate it with another. 
Without meaningful public participation, the IDP does not have its true essence and 
meaning. It is because the fundamental idea of local government rests on the 
inclusion of communities in all municipal affairs as local government is regarded as a 
joint-business where communities or the public are the most important stakeholder. 
The Constitution and legislation related to local government and municipalities state, 
repeatedly and over-lappingly, that municipalities have to involve the public and the 
communities in all stages of their affairs and business.   
 
Section 152 of the Constitution (Act 108 of 1996) outlines five objectives of local 
government. The fifth one is “encourage the involvement of communities and 
community organisations in the matters of local government”. The other four 
objectives are: a) provide democratic and accountable government for local 
communities; b) ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable 
manner; c) promote social and economic development; d) promote a safe and healthy 
environment. Similarly, Section 19 of the Municipal Structures Act requires all 
municipal councils to conduct annual reviews on the needs of the community; its 
  139 
priorities to meet those needs; the processes for involving the community; its 
organisational and delivery mechanisms for meeting the needs of the community; and 
its overall performance in achieving the objectives. It also further states that municipal 
councils must develop mechanisms to consult the community and community 
organisations in performing its functions and exercising its powers. Moreover, in 
Chapter 4, Section 16, of the Local Government Municipal System Act (Act 23 of 
2000) (LGMSA) there is a section titled ‘the development of a culture of community 
participation’. According to the LGMSA, a municipality has to develop a culture of 
municipal governance that complements formal representative government with a 
system of participatory governance. 
 
In terms of the LGMSA (Chapter 6), it is not only in planning and the formulation of an 
IDP that the community and public participate, but also in the establishment, 
implementation and review of the performance management system, which includes 
monitoring and reviewing of municipal performances. Furthermore, according to 
Chapter 8 of the LGMSA, communities are entitled and required by the LGMSA to be 
actively involved in the preparation of the budget and strategic decisions related to the 
municipal service delivery provisions. In addition, the LGMSA states that in order to be 
able to actively participate in municipal affairs and business, the capacities of 
communities have to be built and it is the responsibility of municipalities in that 
community to develop capacity-building processes.  
 
However, public participation is one of the most serious problems the municipalities 
are facing and, the main complaint made by communities is the “anti-democratic or 
anti-participatory tradition” of IDP processes, which include lack of involvement of the 
whole community in IDP meetings; people or communities are invited to IDP meetings 
and processes; even if people are invited and included in the meetings, they are not 
all allowed to talk and discuss things in an IDP meeting, where the City presents their 
plans, most of them are incomprehensible or too complex for community members  
(Interview: M&EP, 22 April 2014); the City’s unresponsiveness for example when 
communities submit their IDP but do not get replies from the City, and the 
community’s feedback is not included in the IDP; lack of briefing and reporting from 
City to communities about projects and programmes in their communities; 
unresponsiveness to councillors about their communities’ information, projects and 
programmes (Interview: M&EP, 22 April 2014; C3, 23 January 2015). 
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These wards form the basic units for participatory and democratic local government. 
Ward committees are established for each ward in all provinces except the Western 
Cape. Ward councillors chair these committees and ought to rely on them for support 
in ensuring that the issues and needs of residents are well represented in the 
municipal councils. Each ward committee consists of the elected ward councillor and 
10 additional members nominated from the community. It is more than 40,000 people 
involved in ward committees around the greater metropolitan municipality, to promote 
community representation and participation (CoGTA, 2009b). Besides promoting 
community representation and participation, the ward councillors are required to serve 
as a link between the ward community and the rest of government to the extent to 
which there is proper consultation with local communities with respect to the planning 
and implementation of provincial and national programmes impacting on the ward. 
However in practice sector departments hardly ever consult or involve ward 
councillors in plans and projects (CoGTA, 2009b). 
 
However, the problem with community participation starts from those ward 
committees. One respondent discussed the problems related to forming ward 
committees, as follows: 
The problem starts here. These ward committee members, they are not 
from the sectors. They are not from the sectors they represent. You are 
representing for sport, but you are not a sporting coach, not from any 
sports team, you don’t play football, you don’t play soccer, you don’t 
play anything. So you are not representing the sport. Some of them they 
come from political parties and they are now competing with councillors. 
They are not advising the councillor. They are now competing with the 
councillor. They see themselves as better than the councillor. That is 
how they are supposed to work but currently they are not working 
because meetings are not taking place. Those meetings are supposed 
to empower councillors when they go the Council (Interview: C4, 19 
February 2015).  
 
That statement is in line with the findings of CoGTA’s (2009b) the State of the Local 
Government Report that stated “with respect to functionality, some assessment 
reports cited claim that many Ward Councillors do not even attend Ward Committee 
meetings, and poorly resourced Ward Committees are failing to comply with 
expectations. Further, Ward Committee issues often do not find their way into, or are 
not prioritised in Council meetings, and thus fail to become reflected in the IDPs of 
municipalities and project implementation for basic services can be non-consultative, 
biased or ad-hoc” (CoGTA, 2009b: 15). That point was supported by one respondent, 
a ward councillor, who stated that she always submits the IDP Submission for her 
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ward, but the IDP of the Municipality (CoJ) does not take account of her ward IDP 
submission and does not include issues and plans made in her ward IDP (Interview: 
C3, 23 January 2015). A very similar discussion was also reported by another 
respondent, a representative for civil society and an M&E practitioner (Interview: 
M&EP, 22 April 2014):  
 
One of the important components in local government communication is to have 
contact with the communities. The establishment and existence of ward committees is 
intended to have and use the lines of communication. Public participation cannot be 
achieved without communication (Bonga, 2007). One of the most common and 
frequent complaints communities express is the lack of communication from the 
municipality. Communities feel that the municipality as well as councillors are not 
responsive to their concerns, needs and wishes (Atkinson, 2007). From the document 
studies and interviews, it repeatedly appeared that the communication and 
engagement of the municipality with the community is weak and clearly insufficient. 
The community are not happy with the way the municipality engages and 
communicates with them especially about the conditions of delivery services. 
These are things that cause of anger. Recently the government now got 
something for the community based planning and they are piloting it and 
it involves the ward councillors and the ward committee but instead of 
involving the whole community they will actually involve representatives 
of different sectors, whether youth or women, they gather in the meeting 
and they will come up with projects. So it is not the best, but even so 
those projects are sometime finished and written up and given to the IDP 
office. When the IDP is finally drafted people come to those meetings 
and see those projects are not there (Interview: M&EP, 22 April 2014).  
 
Projects proposed and presented by the community are not in the final draft of the 
DIP, it is supported by another councillor who also submits their IDP and when the 
City finalises the DIP, their projects are not included in it (Interview: C3, 23 January 
2015). 
 
For example, when water outage happens, the complaint of the community is not 
about the water outage, but about the lack of reporting or communication either by 
Johannesburg Water or the Municipality (CoJ) (Interview: CM 2, 11 April 2014; M&EP, 
22 April 2014). 
 
One respondent shared his experience related to public participation in municipal 
planning. He said the municipality promised to start some projects for the community, 
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but eight months passed and nothing had happened. The community did not get any 
feedback from the municipality. People want to hear what is happening to those 
projects. And he suggests a proper participation system and model for it.  
It should be designed and should be a clear manual form and that 
participation should find ways of involving the whole range of community 
and their priorities and those priorities should be taken up to be included 
in the Integrated Development Plan (Interview: M&EP, 22 April 2014). 
 
Another problem is the holding of ward committee meetings only with people who are 
close to ward councillors, rather than all community members who are willing and 
available to attend and participate there. One respondent stated that: 
The ward councillor means to be elected by the constitutional basis to be 
accountable but also the ward councillors sometime hold meetings with 
representatives and invite people to closer to the ward councillors both in 
terms of patronage closer and also in terms of political party they belong 
to, and other people don’t get invitations. So, again you can see that the 
democratic system at that level is not being run very well (Interview: 
M&EP, 22 April 2014).  
 
That point was supported by another respondent who was a councillor. He said: 
The public participation mechanism is not working well now. We have 
IDP. They invite people, but I think, how can I say? It is too much of 
about the ritual, or compliance. There are more inputs from 
administrators than from communities (Interview: C2, 26 August 2014). 
 
Irresponsiveness is another personality of the municipality that make communities 
angry and frustrated. The people and the public are named by the constitution and 
legislation as the owners and the major stakeholders of municipalities. But the City is, 
in many communities and public, neither cooperating nor communicating with 
communities. One respondent stated their frustration caused by the City’s 
irresponsiveness as follows: 
In many cases, they send the community development workers to take 
messages and they themselves come back without the replies (Interview: 
M&EP, 22 April 2014). 
 
Public participation is an essential part of the local government system. It is more 
necessary when there is resource constraint. One councillor stated it in an illustrative 
way, as follows: 
As a councillor, I said, no, comrades I think when they are lacking money 
all the more reason to consult. You know what I mean. When you and I 
have R10, we can buy beer but we only have R10. You must decide, 
Comrades what will we buy. Yes, we have to consult. So, yeah!, yeah!, 
okay we will buy bread. Okay. It is not that what happened, obviously 
(Interview: C2, 26 August 2014). 
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Because of these kinds of personalities and their behaviour, municipalities and  local 
government as a whole are regarded by communities and the public as dis-functional  
non-performing, under-performing, irresponsible, irresponsive, rude, and uncaring. 
5.9.2 Accountability: Governance and internal Control 
An interesting and important finding revealed by this study is about the cause of weak 
or lack of accountability. For the people to hold, employees and management 
accountable is difficult, but three respondents pointed out that the lack of 
accountability in an institution is also good for people who want or take advantage of 
that situation, i.e., unaccountable state or condition, as they can easily engage in 
corruption or unlawful activities. One respondent said that “The reason why they are 
not accountable is that they set up a structure, procedure and system which  prevents 
them from being accountable” (Interview: C2, 26 August 2014). A similar view was 
expressed by a former senior manager of the CoJ (Interview: SOG1, 18 February 
2015).  
 
This point was supported by another respondent who is in a management position in 
local government. That discussion was made at the Presidential Local Government 
Summit held in Midrand, Johannesburg, on 18 September 2014. When one of his 
employees was not performing his tasks and responsibilities, he wanted to take 
disciplinary action against that employee but he could not do so without the 
agreement of his senior, a political one, and the problem is that his senior appointed 
that employee, and also connected with him politically, and, so, he did not want to 
take a disciplinary action. 
 
One respondent said that lack of accountability is prevalent across the whole country. 
He lamented as follows:  
It (lack of accountability) is a deep thing. We don’t call people to 
account easily as a country. It is a very strong thing about talking about 
corruption, and strong thing about you would have another chance. And 
you have another chance, you still don’t succeed and you get yet 
another chance (Interview: SOG1, 18 February 2015). 
 
He then discuss about various factors and why taking disciplinary action is not 
conducted:  
It (accountability) is weak. It is one thing we don’t hold people 
accountable. It is because for some reasons HR department, 
everywhere, all hopeless. So there, to discipline someone on 
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performance, you have to get all paper work ordered. You agreed this is 
your targets, you fail to achieve the targets. I gave you a chance to 
improve, you failed to improve. You get a document all of that. And you 
can demote the person or whatever, dismiss or something. But you 
have to run all through. And you have to have an hearing and 
everything. That’s too much work, well. And Human resource 
department all has to keep these information. And they don’t. So, 
whenever there is a serious problem, you can start launching a case, 
and it falls apart, so the manager doesn’t bother, why? Because he 
knows he gonna will fail. And then, it’s very hard (Interview: SOG1, 18 
February 2015). 
 
 
Another dimension of the lack of, or weak, accountability issue is related to several 
other issues such as the strong politicised nature of an institution, weak governance, 
and weak enforcement in the forms of weak internal controls and supervision, lack of 
interest of the leadership and management in taking disciplinary action against people 
who transgress.  
 
Weak accountability is also at the root of poor performance of service providers and 
consultants, who are selected and given municipal contracts and projects. One 
respondent discussed how contracts are given: 
Also sometime, things are contracted out because you’re going to get 
bribes for that. You got the people inside and hard to manage the people 
inside. If I outsource things I will get money in my pocket, and even if 
performance is not going to be improved (Interview: SOG1, 18 February 
2015). 
 
With proper accountability and a good governance system, such practices would not 
happen and would not be tolerated if they did.  
 
Accountability is indispensable for any organisation, or department, or even a 
government. Without a functioning accountability system, all legislation and 
regulations would not have any effect. Weak accountability and lack of consequences 
for non-performance or poor performance are among the most critical challenges the 
municipalities have. One respondent, who is a community organiser as well as an 
M&E practitioner, stated as follows: 
In South Africa one of the problems at the moment is the political 
leadership, political office bearers and their powers, in relation to the 
power the administration is not clearly defined. The roles are not clearly 
defined. For example, the political players can have a big say who is the 
point in position in filling the way down in the administration. It is a big 
problem. And without being that fixed, you are not going to have the 
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responsible local government that is accountable (Interview: M&EP, 22 
April 2014). 
 
However, there is a little good news about these issues. A respondent, who is a high 
level officer from SALGA (the South African Local Government Association), stated in 
a focus group discussion that the issue of lack of consequences for wrong-doers or 
non-performance has been addressed seriously since 2014 and there have been 
several disciplinary cases that have been actioned (FGD, 23 June 2014). 
 
One respondent linked the issue of lack of accountability and community non-payment 
for services. 
Accountability for service delivery is stronger when you use money 
collected from local population who will be holding you accountable on 
how you used with their money. But you don’t have to face it when you 
use grants from the National Treasury. Strong local accountability can 
only have when you have revenues from local population (FGD, 24 
November 2014). 
 
5.9.3 Leadership and political will 
A respondent who participated in a focus group discussion remarked that “South 
Africa is rich not only in terms of resources but also legislation and policies but it lack 
political will” (FGD, 24 November 2014). “Running a municipality is a real job”, as one 
participant in a focus-group discussion said (FGD, 24 November 2014). 
 
One of the common discussions about sources of municipal problems is weak (or 
bad) leadership. One respondent stated leaderships are not interested in delivery 
services. 
They are not there to delivery services. They are there to get rich. To me, 
what has been happening is especially since 2008 there is a way of this 
stuff. Basically people are joining council for only one reason and that is 
a self-enrichment kind of reason. That is generalisation. There are 
obviously some people are not like that. But there are massive in real like 
that (Interview: SOG1, 18 February 2015). 
 
The competency and understanding of leadership is important. It was widely accepted 
that most of the municipal problems originated from poor governance and weak 
leadership. It might be argued that there is a direct relationship between the 
performance or competency of leadership and the performance of an organisation or 
department. One respondent who held a senior position in the CoJ for about eight 
years, stated as follows: 
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Politicians need to know and understand their work. It has to start with 
the head. Since 2011, the financial situation of Joburg improved. It was 
started with having a politician who is also an accountant as the head of 
finance department. He can manage both sides of the department: 
political and administrative sides. Generally, politicians need to be told 
the importance of accounting (Interview: SOG1, 18 February 2015). 
 
Lack of understanding about finance is one of the weaknesses most politicians have. 
Out of ignorance, politicians tend to make planning with unrealistic projects and 
targets. He then shared his experience of making planning with politicians. He stated: 
 
IDP is from politicians, and are sometimes very ambitious (I said wow, 
how are you going to finance these projects), at the end of IDP 
document, there are list of projects saying subjected to available fund. 
But national treasury does not allow projects without fund. They change 
their budget at every council meeting. Plan and budgets have to take 
account of the past executions and implementations. Sometime they 
don’t and their plan and budgets becomes very unrealistic (Interview: 
SOG1, 18 February 2015). 
 
5.9.4 Dimensions of skills shortage problem 
Skills shortage is one of the paramount challenges not only local government has to 
face but also all departments in provincial and national governments as well as the 
private sector have to address and overcome. Moreover, it is not just a problem South 
Africa alone is struggling with, but all Southern African countries and the whole world 
has to deal with it (for example see The Hays Global Skills Index 2012; Kigotho, 
2014). 
Figure 5.6 Eight dimensions of skills shortages 
 
Ineffective higher education, and  
in-house training, mentorship, skills 
development, and succession plans 
High vacancy rate, partly related to 
labour regulations, e.g, Affirmative 
Action, and BEE (Black Economic 
Empowerment) 
  1 2    
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3 
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Weak administration 
and Internal controls  7 4 
Workers low morale, poor 
attitude, and productivity 
  6 5   
Tensions between management 
and labour (strikes) 
Ill-treatment of workers (they feel), 
and wage gap 
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Eight dimensions of skills shortage issues were revealed from this study through 
interviews, focus-group discussions and document study. These dimensions are: first, 
lack of performance of higher education as a whole country, and in-house trainings, 
mentorship, and skills development of municipalities, as well as lack of succession 
plans for technical and skilled posts (Interview: C4, 19 February 2015; FGD, 24 
November 2014); second, high vacancy rates, which is regarded as related to the 
labour regulations such as Affirmative Action and BEE (Black Economic 
Empowerment) (CP, 2014b; Interview: C3, 23 January 2015); third, non- recognition 
of existing skills in the workforce (Interview: C4, 19 February 2015); forth, workers 
low morale and productivity, probably an outcome  of non-recognition of workers’ 
knowledge, experience, skills and value or usefulness, especially of lower level 
workers who do not have formal education (Interview: C2, 26 August 2014; SOCoJ6, 
9 April 2014); fifth, workers’ feeling and perception that they are ill-treated, which is 
reinforced by a wide wage gap between the wages and allowances of top level 
management and those of middle level and lower level workers (SAMWU, 2015; 
Interview: C2, 26 August 2014); sixth, the tensions between management and labour, 
which cause incidences of strikes and labour protests (Interview: C2, 26 August 2014; 
SOME1, 13 November 2014); seventh, weak administration and internal controls that 
cause inefficiency and poor productivity of workers (Interview: SOG1, 18 February 
2015; C4, 19 February 2015); and eighth, flaws in selections and appointments, that 
appoint unqualified or inappropriate workers and employees (FGD, 24 November 
2014; Interview: C4 February 2015). 
 
The skills shortage issue of municipalities in South Africa can be understood as an 
outcome or result of the poor performance and qualities of South African higher 
education and training (Breier & Erasmus, 2009; Kigotho, 2014; Mateus, Allen-Ile & 
Iwu, 2014; Selisho, 2015). According to the Global Competitiveness Index of the 
World Economic Forum’s 2014/2015 report, in higher education and training, South 
Africa ranked last in the quality of mathematics and science education. It was at 140 
out of 144 countries studied and listed in the Index, for the quality of its education 
system. Furthermore, as a result of it, in terms of labour market efficiency, South 
Africa ranked last in co-operation in labour-employer relations and 143 out of 144 for 
hiring and firing practices. But it is necessary to state that South Africa did very well in 
some areas such as the strength of auditing and reporting standards, and financial 
markets development: it ranked number one for the strength of auditing and reporting 
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standards. In financial markets development, it came first in the regulation of the 
securities exchange (World Economic Forum, 2015). 
 
Another factor responsible for the skills shortage in municipalities is inadequate 
training or mentorship programmes within municipalities or municipal entities. One 
respondent in a focus group discussion, a senior manager at the CoJ, said “We never 
train our staff. We don’t train them enough” (FGD, 24 November 2014). 
 
Skills shortage is also cited as a cause of high vacancy rates in many government 
departments and utilities, such as City Power and Johannesburg Water. City Power 
has a vacancy rate of 58.1 per cent (as of 15 May 2014). It establishes 3,868 
positions but has only filled 1,624. The rest, 2.244 positions are still vacant (CP, 
2014b: 36). Moreover, the City Power Business Plan for 2014-2016 states that 
technical training has been left in the hands of the private sector for a long time. 
Municipalities do not perform training to suit their particular needs. All training facilities 
have not been utilised optimally. Structured, detailed and forward focussed training is 
very limited at this stage (CP, 2014B: 38). As a result of this high vacancy rate, 
capacity is constrained (insufficient) and service delivery is affected adversely. 
Joubert (2009) remarks that no matter how perfectly formulated policies are, with such 
high vacancy rates currently experienced in many government departments, it is 
impossible to implement those excellent policies. 
 
Another issue related to human capital or human resource of municipalities is the low 
morale of municipal staff and employees. From interviews, the discovery of feelings—
or perhaps just perceptions—of municipal staff and employees about the treatment 
they receive from the City Council as their employer and the municipal leadership and 
management was revealed. One respondent, a senior manager at the City, said that 
they are not treated well and the skills and expertise they have learnt they are not able 
to use in their employment (Interview: SOCoJ6, 9 April 2014).  Another respondent, 
who was a councillor, elaborated on how municipal staff and employees especially 
who are at the front-line, and at the lower level. 
They are at the front line, meeting with community. They are quite key. 
But in terms of salary structure, in terms of benefits, they are dead 
bottom. They are looked down upon. They are humiliated. In the views of 
the City and the management of the municipality, they are nothing… 
They are the most important, because they are dealing with communities 
like customers and patients. ..They [the City, the leadership and the 
management] don’t want to integrate or recognise people, well, but 
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offend them like as a low rank, so it is not good, you know… the salary 
they are getting is the lowest so they are offended at the bottom 
(Interview: C2, 26 August 2014).  
 
In his view, resource constraint is not a reason for paying low salary to municipal 
workers at the lower levels. He continued:  
They have not because of resource constraint, because they are taking 
a lot of money at the top. But they don’t want to pay to them [municipal 
staff at lowest levels who are doing the most essential and difficult works 
of providing services to communities (Interview: C2, 26 August 2014). 
 
The salary gap among top employees or bosses of municipalities and common and 
ordinary municipal staff is wide. The South African Municipal Workers’ Union 
(SAMWU) has been trying to negotiate to pay municipal employees and staff the 
minimum salary of R4,000, while the pay of municipal managers has to be capped 
because of growing to the point that is higher than the salary of the President 
(SAMWU, 2015). 
 
One respondent, a former senior manager in the finance department of the CoJ, also 
talked about the ill-treatment municipal workers received from the City. He said, quite 
succinctly that, 
It is tough place to work, Joburg Municipality, is very hard. It doesn’t treat 
staff well. Almost all organisations don’t. And why that is, I don’t know 
(Interview: SOG1, 18 February 2015).  
 
Not only municipal workers feel they are not treated well by the leadership and 
management of the CoJ, as well as Municipal Entities, but also even councillors feel 
that they are not treated well by the Council neither. The perceptions and feelings of 
the general public and community members, as well as customers of municipal 
services are perceived in the same way as municipal workers and marginalised 
councillors. 
 
Employment of unqualified people can lower workers morale and work ethics, 
because when they have to work together with unqualified persons, they have to do 
more work because of that unqualified co-worker (Mathis, K. 2004: 12). The situation 
becomes worse if that unqualified person is appointed as a leader. One respondent 
related about a municipal worker who resigned because the municipality appointed an 
unqualified person above him (as his senior, while that person does not understand 
the work) (Interview: CM4, 20 September 2014). 
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Many respondents suggested that it is more about attitude than skills. One 
respondent, who is a researcher as well as an active politician, raised an interesting 
question, relating to the issue of skills shortage: He asked “What kinds of skills do 
they need to read meters correctly and accurately?” (Interview: R, 1 May 2014). 
According to him, he said, it is more about attitude, workmanship, internal control and 
supervision, rather than skills shortage.  
 
Another respondent also made the same point. He said  
This is a ‘Cultural’ problem and a Training Problem….the culture is often 
one of – Take the shortest/cheapest route – that one can get away with 
when ‘delivering’ a job/contract. Or, do the least amount of work that one 
can get away with. There is little culture of Pride in ones work in SA. 
There is little culture of ‘Excellence’ in ones work. Compare our ‘work’ 
culture with the Japanese work Culture (Interview: CM3, 17 June 2014). 
 
The same point was also made by Gumede (2015) at a conversation entitled 
“Lessons in China’s reform of its state-owned enterprises”, at Wits School of 
Governance, on 19 August 2015, Wednesday. He asked “what kind of skills set is 
necessary?” He holds that it is more about attitude and a culture of trying to do well in 
one’s work and taking pride in getting work done well. He also gave examples of 
Japanese and Korean workers who take pride in their performance. 
 
One respondent, who is municipal senior staff, and participated in a focus-group 
discussion, ardently said that “there is no skills shortage. Most of us are highly 
educated” (FGD, 23 June 2014). It is true because she herself, together with several 
her colleagues from the municipality, is currently completing her post-graduate 
degrees at the Wits School of Governance and Wits Business School. According to 
her, the problems of the municipality related to skills shortage issues is about the lack 
of understanding and experience of councillors and political appointees who are 
elected or appointed based on political reasons rather than their competencies and 
qualification. That point was made, albeit quite obscurely, by Elcock (1994)—his 
observation or remark was stated in Chapter 3. That point was also supported by 
another respondent, a councillor, who stated: 
As politicians, you can take anybody else. Consider you are a MMC 
(Member of the Mayoral Committee) or minister of something you don’t 
have that experiences. You have never been in police, and you are the 
minister of police. You are managing police who have been trained and 
are doing all those things. What happens to you? You are relying on all 
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information given by management to assist you (Interview: C4, 19 
February 2015). 
 
One participant in the focus-group discussion stated that “the role of politicians is to 
represent the interests of the people; it's clear that they're not necessarily qualified to 
run the day-to-day operations in a city like Joburg” (FGD, 23 June 2014). 
 
Another interesting phenomenon stated by one respondent is the exploitative move 
taken by some municipal senior technicians and staff who had long working 
experiences in the City and accumulated much specialised knowledge of municipal 
infrastructure designs and design, and a wide range of connections or networking 
through working life in the municipality (Interview: C2, 26 August 2014; C4, 19 
February 2014). Working and performing municipal functionalities and operations 
requires more than educational training or qualifications. One respondent said “You 
can’t bring bright boys and girls and expect them to do good work. It needs working 
experience and institutional memory to perform properly in municipal work and 
projects. He continued that another related issue is about non-recognition of existing 
skills in the municipalities and not recognising employees and workers who have 
extensive knowledge and experience, but lack the formal educational qualification. 
The municipality not only does not recognise their value but also does not treat them 
well as valuable employees (Interview: C2, 26 August 2014; SOG1, 18 February 
2014; SOCoJ6, 9 April 2014). 
 
Non-recognition of existing skills, other respondents also point out about it, in the 
focus-group discussion, in an interview with a deputy director, and a councillor, with 
an ex-employee who resigned because a person was appointed above him as his 
supervisor but who does not have any skills and does not know about the job 
(Interview: SOCoJ6, 9 April 2014; SOG1, 18 February 2014; C2, 26 August 2014; 
CM4, 20 September 2014). The respondent said  
They [municipal management and leadership] only know that engineers 
have skills, but workers also know and have skills too. Engineers only 
know which workers he has to ask. Hey Harry, where did you put the 
valve? This is it here, sir. Workers are the real staff who do the jobs. We 
short change ourselves by not recognising the skills and knowledge of 
workers. And then we treat them as people who don’t know anything. 
And also when we pay them little money, treat them badly, they lost 
morale, and also withhold their information (Interview: C2, 26 August 
2014). 
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The necessary skills, knowledge and experience necessary to run and maintain all the 
municipal systems and processes could not be attained within a few years. It takes 
many years of working experience.  One respondent stated that “it is not that there are 
no skills but people with skills exploit the system to get more money” (Interview: C2, 
26 August 2014). Those municipal employees with years of working experience and 
extensive knowledge about municipal working systems, infrastructure designs and 
plans retired, knowing that new employees and staff could not work without their 
knowledge and skills, so that the City has no other way but to hire them as 
consultants at higher fees. The respondent elaborated as follow  
… so engineers would rather work for companies providing services to 
the government, like work for the government, because they gonna 
make more money. Many public servants they resigned and they run 
and set up as consultants. And they sell their services back at a higher 
premium. That happened. Accounts, engineers, land surveyors. So they 
are able to be within the system. Okay, with government, it still has 
counted a lot. So let’s say, water engineer, who has been working for the 
council for 20 years. So that guy, he knows where valves are, he knows 
what are the problem pipes, the institutional knowledge and memory. So 
even when he resigned, or retired, they (the City) still need his 
knowledge. So he will resign, knowing that they would hire him as a 
consultant. There are a lot of that happening. They know the system how 
to earn more money (Interview: C2, 26 August 2014).  
 
 
According to Auditor General’s report on local government (MFMA 2014/2015), 
nationally 68 per cent of the municipalities used consultancy services to prepare 
financial statements and underlying records. Consultancy costs just for financial 
reporting services was R892 million in 2014-15 (AG, 2016). The City of Johannesburg 
spent more than R4b on consultants each year. In the 2014-15 financial year, it was 
R4.36bn (Dlamini, 2015), which is over 50 per cent of the total employee costs 
including councillor remuneration (R8.56b) in the same financial year (CoJ, 2016: 
195).  
 
Moreover, what is interesting is that the CoJ does not write its Integrated Annual 
Report itself, although it has 28,248 employees across the various sections (CoJ, 
2016: 187). On 1 July 2014, the City of Johannesburg requested a quotation for 
Research and Compilation of its Integrated Annual Report for 2013/14 (CoJ, 2014b; 
See Appendix T). One of the concerns related to the quality of work provided by 
consultants is an ethical issue. The Centre for Public Participation had discovered that 
five IDPs in different municipalities in KwaZulu Natal were identical (Pienaar & 
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Geldenbloem, 2013). In his MFMA 2014-15 Report, the Auditor General (2016: 27) 
observes that the over-reliance on consultants is a warning signal of a lack of capacity 
and skills in municipalities. 
 
 
Flawed selection and appointments not only performance and productivity problems, 
as those employees are not qualified to do their jobs, but this also affects the other 
workers morale, as people appointed above them do not know what they are doing, 
although those persons are their supervisors or team leaders. 
I know one young man who worked at Johannesburg municipality he is 
a water engineer and he became so frustrated because somebody was 
appointed above him somebody who knew nothing about water 
engineering I think he kept staying there for a couple of years. Then 
and he could not take it anymore he started working at a restaurant 
(Interview: CM4, 20 September 2014).  
 
What another respondent, a lecturer who has been studying and researching 
municipalities for many years, said is more disturbing. He said “They are deliberately 
making things difficult. They only have people who don’t question: I found it very 
distracting” (FDG, 24 November 2014). 
 
A participant from a focus-group discussion, who is municipal staff, also made a 
similar point, but it was about councillors who have no knowledge or understanding 
about what the municipality is doing. She said it is not that there are no skills in 
municipalities. Municipal employees are educated and qualified. But the real problem 
is about councillors’ lack of understanding and knowledge, and lack of institutional 
memory. It was exacerbated by high turnover rates of councillors. According to her, 
the turnover rate of councillors is about 70%. More than two thirds of councillors are 
new-comers (FDG, 23 June 2014).  
 
5.10 From factors to early warning signals 
After understanding the problems and factors that negatively affect the performance of 
municipal service delivery processes, it is essential to assimilate their early warning 
signs, which are the lifeblood of an EWS. Too often, municipalities and MOEs 
experience problems that could be prevented or addressed at an early stage of the 
problem’s development. But managers and responsible persons and stakeholders 
failed to see early signs of these problems because they have not learnt to spot the 
early warning signs of problems and therefore were not prepared or ill-equipped when 
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trouble arose. The obvious signs of municipal problems and troubles are rarely the 
root causes. Skills shortages or the lack of tools or resources, or tensions in workforce 
relationships, for example, are not the problem. They are just the result of other 
problems. 
 
Failure to recognise deteriorating characteristics, or even taking too long to 
understand or take note of early warning signs of incoming problems and troubles 
causes municipalities, MOEs and all stake-holders involved unnecessary costs and 
expenses. Solving or addressing problems that are at their beginning stage is easier 
and less costly to solve.  By recognising some early warning signs of problems and 
troubles on the horizon, the municipality and MOEs can pre-empt or eliminate them, 
or at least, reduce the intensity of those problems and challenges. 
 
Problems and factors are sometime interrelated and some problems are also early 
warning signals of other problems. Problems and challenges that individual 
municipalities have to face, address and solve, occur repeatedly and are quite similar 
from one municipality to another. Although there are contextual differences, the 
functions and processes of municipalities as well as the services that municipalities 
provide to their community members are largely the same. In the same vein, the 
services a municipality provides to its community members are not changed from one 
year to another. The discussions on early warning signals and the integration of early 
warning system into an M&E framework are presented in the Chapter 6. 
 
5.11 Conclusion 
This chapter presented a brief introduction of three municipal entities and their 
mandates and functions. The system of local government and business model of 
municipal entities were also discussed. The categorisation of factors revealed from 
data was described and selected issues highlighted by interview respondents were 
presented. The rational for exploring those factors is to determine whether there are 
early warning signs indicating that some problems are developing. Those factors have 
to be understood because the focus of this study is an EWS (Early Warning System) 
in the Municipal M&E system. The findings of this study revealed two primary 
problems of the municipal service delivery processes: first, there are quality gaps 
between the communities’ and public’s expectations of municipal services and the 
actual quantities and qualities of services provided by the municipality and its 
contractors. A new way of factor categorisation was devised and used in this study 
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and thesis, as there has been no uniform categorisation or classification of factors 
related to municipal service delivery challenges—different studies use different 
categories and groupings of factors.  
 
There are two main points this chapter highlights: first, municipal challenges are more 
related to the psychological aspect of municipal service delivery processes, rather 
than the quantities or levels of municipal services—which are adequate compared to 
internal standards. Second, the new way of factor categorisation which is based on 
steps in M&E processes, so those factors could be better monitored and checked 
through M&E. In the next chapter, the municipal M&E system will be presented and 
will describe to what extent the M&E system serves as an EWS. 
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Chapter 6 
M&E and EARLY WARNING SYSTEM 
 
 
This chapter presents the findings on the current Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) 
system and practices of the City of Johannesburg (CoJ) and its three municipal 
entities (MEs). There are two chapters in this thesis that discuss about M&E and Early 
Warning System (EWS). They are Chapter 2 and this chapter (Chapter 6). The 
difference between these two chapters is that chapter 2 serves as a literature review 
related to M&E and EWS (i.e., presenting information, discussions, data and figures 
came from literature), and this chapter is findings of this study related to the current 
M&E system of the CoJ and its three MEs (i.e., presenting data and information 
revealed by this study through interviews, focus group discussion and document 
analysis, and data-analysis.  
 
In the same vein, this thesis has two chapters that present the findings: this chapter 
and the previous one (Chapter 5). Again, the difference between these two chapters is 
that chapter 5 presents the findings on municipal service delivery challenges, and this 
chapter discusses the findings on municipal M&E and EWS. This chapter also 
suggests how an EWS should be integrated into an M&E framework, and proposes a 
sample EWS framework that can be incorporated into the current municipal M&E 
framework.  
 
6.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the municipal M&E system and to examine 
the extent to which the current M&E system of the City of Johannesburg contains the 
characteristics and components of an EWS. This chapter introduces the municipal 
M&E system and discusses the EWS components the current municipal M&E system 
has. It also answers the conceptual question posted in the Chapter 2: Are M&E and 
EWS conceptually related? Based on two definitions of an EWS, it distinguishes two 
kinds of EWS: Gross and specific EWS. The existence of early warning signals—
weak signals, as argued by the Weak Signals Theory—is proved by providing three 
examples of water outage problem, billing problem, and skills shortage problem. The 
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main section of this chapter is about the discussion on the integration of an EWS into 
an M&E system, which is the follow-up discussion started in the Chapter 2 (Section 
2.3 Four Stages from M&E to EWS). It also proposes the sample EWS framework to 
be incorporated into the current M&E framework in order to enable the M&E system to 
serve as an EWS.  
 
6.2 Municipal M&E system 
The CoJ and all municipal entities have established quite sophisticated M&E 
frameworks and systems (CoJ, 2009; 2012). One respondent who was involved, as a 
senior official, in the development of a sophisticated CoJ’s performance management 
system stated that 
Performance monitoring, ten years ago, they had, because we 
developed a quite elaborated system. Every manager has a personal 
score-card on their contract, they have to deliver X, Y, Z things and 
therefore there are systems to collect those information. And every year 
their performance targets are set. In 2002, it was a quite well-developed 
system (Interview: SOG1, 18 February 2015). 
 
However, another respondent, who is also a senior manager, saw things differently. 
But what she is saying is about conducting or carrying out M&E, rather than about 
having an M&E system and framework. 
We don’t really do Monitoring and Evaluation. It should be that we do 
monitoring and evaluation. But we don’t have the proper system in place 
for that. There should be overall, overarching monitoring and evaluation 
services across the City that includes all the utilities. There should be but 
it isn’t such as a department (Interview: SOCoJ6, 9 April 2014).  
 
She further stated about self-monitoring and evaluating as follow 
Now, the Catch 22 is that each department or each MOU is doing their 
own monitoring and evaluation. How do you monitor and evaluate 
yourself? So, it’s for me is a big question mark (Interview: SOCoJ6, 9 
April 2014). 
 
The issue of self M&E was also stated by two councillors (Interviews: C2, 26 August 
2014; C4, 19 February 2015), a deputy director from CoJ (Interview: DCoGTA, 21 
August 2014), and a community organiser and M&E practitioner (Interview: M&EP, 22 
April 2014). 
 
Lack of information was stated by many respondents, councillors, municipal staff and 
CoGTA director (Interview: C3, 23 January 2014; C4, 19 February 2015, C2, 26 
August 2014; SOCoJ6, 9 April 2014; AG, 2011a). One councillor stated that there is 
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no information and she requested the City, repeatedly, for financial and demographic 
information related to her ward, but the City never responded. In her view, she said, it 
is not because the City does not want to share this information and statistics with her, 
as she as a councillor is entitled to get such information, she said it is because the 
City does not have those data and information, as they are not collecting the right 
information, and what is worse is that, she said they also do not have a reliable 
system—a Central Registry—to document and store information that they collect 
(Interview: C3, 23 January 2015). 
 
A director from CoGTA talked about weekly reports submitted by community 
development workers (CDW). Those reports contain early warning signals about 
community unhappiness, and raise the alarm and request permission to resolve the 
problems before the situation becomes exacerbated and protests ensue. There are 
many instances that CDWs requested the City and Cogta to take some actions such 
as coming and meeting with communities, in order to defuse tensions.  But generally 
the City ignores those requests. He said: 
We have community development workers, they generate weekly reports. 
They are early. But the system is manually designed and has no accuracy 
and could not able to predict. .. We are not using those information 
effectively. Most of the time, those reports are ignored. We can use those 
CDW weekly reports and information they provide, intelligently (Interview: 
DCogta, 21 August 2014).  
 
In its Back to Basic study, CoGTA (2015: 27) also acknowledges that the situation 
with the CDW Programme is not a positive one, the relationships between the CDWs 
and some Ward Councillors are, in most instance, unhealthy because of personal 
issues among them, and as a result the communication and coordination, and 
feedback mechanism between CDWs and ward councillors are poor, and lack 
transparency and trust among them. Moreover, it also notes that the role of the CDW 
programme is not clear.  
 
One respondent from the CoGTA who oversees CDW workers, and receives and 
analyses, as well as coordinates with the City Council, stated that if sufficient 
responses were taken, most of the situations could be resolved, and most violent 
protests could be avoided (Interview: DCogta, 21 August 2014). 
 
A director from CoGTA also complained about how Gauteng uses a manual system to 
collect information. As it is manual, it is costly and difficult to capture into the systems, 
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and tends to cause mistakes and inaccuracy (Interview: DCogta, 21 August 2014). 
Another respondent, a councillor, also pointed to a similar thing. She said that when 
City Power staff come to her ward to read meters, they come with a piece of paper. It 
is the same when Johannesburg Water staff came to read water meters. They don’t 
even have a proper template. She asked about the template in one Council Meeting 
and did not get any answers. Furthermore, she mentioned about the loss of six years 
data while transferring data from the old computer system to the new one (Interview: 
C3, 23 January 2015).  
 
In terms of M&E process, one respondent, who was a councillor, shared his 
experience of compiling and conducting M&E and preparing M&E report. He said 
It is more political. There are a lot of weight put on some special 
departments that bringing on more revenue. At the end of the year 
(Financial year) we sit down and to get budget reports done, to do 
planning for the next year. Councillors are supposed to get comments 
and feedback from communities and report back. But the process 
becomes bureaucratised. Instead, administrators do them, but even they 
outsource to external persons, consultants. I think that is the problem. I 
think the better system would be using two systems, where people 
involved. Everybody should be involved and be continuous, and should 
be corrective (Interview: C2, 26 August 2014). 
 
A question about the integrity of data and figures in official reports and business plans 
is raised repeatedly by the Auditor General annual reports to the Gauteng Provincial 
Legislature and the CoJ on City Power’s Report on the Financial Statements (AG, 
2010b, 2010c, 2011b, 2011c, 2012b, 2012c, 2013b, 2013c, 2014b, 2014c). 
 
Another weakness observed by reviewing and studying official documents of the 
municipality and municipal entities is the quality of reports and documents. It is 
discovered that there is no uniform reporting template. Annual reports and business 
plans use different structures and format both among entities and among reports of 
the same entities. This makes it difficult to find important figures and numbers. A 
uniform format (or template) is necessary to monitor and check critical figures and 
numbers. The issue of lack of uniform template was mentioned by a councillor. She 
said she even created one and gave to the City Management and the Mayoral 
Committee. But her initiative and valuable assistance were neither accepted warmly, 
nor used. The reason for that is, in her view, probably the animosity between her party 
(the DA) and the ruling party (the ANC).  
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Because of a lack of uniform reporting template for all departments and MOEs, figures 
for profits and losses are described in different sections. Sometimes, figures for 
customer satisfaction levels, employee satisfaction levels, meter-reading levels are 
lacking in some reports. For example, in the annual report of Johannesburg Water for 
the 2012/13 financial year, there are no figures for customer satisfaction levels, or 
meter reading levels, although it was stated that meter reading contractors are 
managed by Johannesburg Water (JW, 2013a). But in its 2011/12 Annual Report (JW, 
2012a: 20), the customer satisfaction level was stated. 
 
One of the glaring shortcomings related to reports and documents is that some annual 
reports do not have page numbers, for example In the 2012/13 Annual Report of 
Pikitup (2013a), not all pages have page numbers—only the first 21 pages have page 
numbers. Moreover, the page numbers of the table of contents do not correspondent 
to the actual page numbers of the titles of sections and subsections. These things 
seem trivial and unimportant but they are really serious red flags about sloppiness or 
lack of professionalism, or lack of control and monitoring. 
 
All interviews, focus-group discussions and document studies pointed out that an 
M&E system exists and there are also M&E activities taking place. But it is clear that 
the public and the communities do not have a role in M&E processes (Interview: C2, 
26 August 2014; C3, 23 January 205; C4, 19 February 2015; M&EP, 22 April 2014). 
One important finding is conspicuously lacking, information about the EWSs activities 
and practices. No evidence is found that the municipal M&E system serves as an 
EWS as required by legislation—Municipal Systems Act (2000), Municipal Planning 
and PM Regulations (2001), Municipal Systems Amendment Bill (2003), White Paper 
on Local Government (1998). 
6.2.1 EWS components in M&E system 
There are some mechanisms in the form of reporting that function like an EWS. For 
example, all departments in the national and provincial governments have to prepare 
and submit an EWS report. It is an expenditure control mechanism. Every quarter 
government department submit a report to the National Treasury, with monthly reports 
up to the end of that quarter. The relevant budget allocations (or budget) of 
departments are requisitioned from the National Treasury on a monthly basis in 
advance as the National Treasury is, required by the Banks Act, No. 94 of 1990, to 
keep those moneys at the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) and earns interest at 
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the normal applicable rates applied within the SARB. The reports of the 3rd Quarter 
table adjustment estimations indicate the additional funds provided for each 
department (Mabala, 2006). An example of a standard early warning report is shown 
in Figure 6.1. The report shows the budgeted amount or expected expenditure for the 
department for the 2004/05 financial year that is expected to be spent within the said 
financial year, i.e. R3.87 billion. 
 
Although it is called “Early Warning System Report”, what it provides are no more than 
financial amounts of budgets and actual expenditures, and thus the report enables the 
National Treasury and respective government departments to monitor, on a monthly 
basis, actual expenditure levels of departments, and whether or not the particular 
departments can spend their allocated funds, and also to see the deviations between 
those budgets and the actual expenditures.  
 
Another objective of the EWS report is to control and monitor the amount of money 
the National Treasury draws and avails to government departments monthly. This is 
because drawing more than what government departments can spend reduces the 
amounts of interest the National Treasury earns from the Reserve Bank where those 
funds are deposited. On the other hand, when the amount of funds the National 
Treasury draws and avails to government departments is less than the amount 
government departments can spent, the National Treasury has to draw more funds 
from the Reserve Bank and other commercial banks, that costs the National Treasury 
as it has to pay penalties (Mabala, 2006).  
 
The City of Johannesburg also implemented a deviation framework that complied with 
SCM legislation to curb the unjustifiable use of deviations. The appropriate use of the 
deviation framework should serve as an early warning signal (AG, 2012: 63). 
 
In interviews, councillors, municipal officials and senior managers as well as directors 
and officials from Cogta stated that many early warning indicators exist and they know 
them. A director from Cogta gave an example from monthly and some emergency 
reports (messages) submitted by Community Development Workers. Those CDW 
reports include many warning signals and information about community unhappiness 
and frustration on the unresponsiveness of the municipality, which could cause 
protests. In those reports many requests were made to come and meet with 
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community members (Interviews: DCogta, 21 August 201; C3, 23 January 2015; C4, 
19 Feb 2015; Gauteng CDWP, 2014).  
 
The warning signals include cash flow levels, vacancy rates, overrun costs, missed 
deadlines, the skills shortage and insufficient skilled workers, engineers, technicians, 
aging and deteriorating infrastructure such as water pipes, pumps, at pumping 
stations, insufficient tools and mechanics and vehicles, scarcity of land fill for waste 
removals. 
 
An important fact is that these early warning signals do not come from M&E reports or 
channels, but rather from working experiences and personal knowledge about how 
the system works. And those signals and knowledge are fragmented across different 
sectors and reports. There is no consolidated risk knowledge data-base. A director at 
CoGTA stated about the lack of a system to collect and store (documents) data and 
information, that information and indicators, including early warning signs, are in 
various reports, for example CDW monthly reports (CDW, 2014). But the problem is 
that those data and information are recorded either manually, or in a non-uniform 
format, so that those data and information are difficult to use (Interviews: DCogta, 21 
August 201; Gauteng CDWP, 2014). 
 
Respondents all stated that they feel powerless about the impending or future 
problems those signals and indicators are warning of, as there are not sufficient 
capacities and resources to take corrective and preventative action to prevent these 
impending problems and challenges. One municipal official mentioned the lack of 
budget to address emerging problems that they knew of through early warning 
indicators. She said the budget is only to be used to address and solve problems, but 
not to address emerging ones that have not developed into full-blown problems (FGD, 
24 November 2014; Interviews: DCogta, 21 August 201; C3, 23 January 2015; C4, 19 
Feb 2015; Gauteng CDWP, 2014). 
 
Furthermore, there is no formal mechanism or process to utilise the early warning 
information effectively and no budget is allocated for that purpose. In all interviews 
with councillors, municipal officials and senior managers, no indication was made that 
these early warning signs are systematically monitored, combined, collected, 
communicated and discussed, with an aim to utilise them to prevent forthcoming 
problems and challenges (FGD: 24 November 2014).  
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Figure 6.1 Early warning system report 
ACTUAL AND PROJECTED EXPENDITURE: 2004/2005 FINANCIAL YEAR 
Vote 34: Department of Water Affairs and Forestry 
 April May June July August Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb March 
Total 
expenditure 
end of Oct 
2004  
Projected 
expenditure 
from Nov to 31 
March 2005  
Total expected 
expenditure 
Original 
budget 
Adjustment 
budget 
Adjusted 
Variance 
between 
available 
funds 
Programmes             expenditure expenditure Expected Budget Budget Budget  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
 R’000 R’000 R’000 R’000 R’000 R’000 R’000 R’000 R’000 R’000 R’000 R’000 R’000 R’000 R’000 R’000 R’000 R’000 R’000 
Administration 14,873 20,205 16,211 27,503 26,925 29,421 47,817 23,060 26,978 27,579 29,651 31,118 182,955 138,386 321,341 252,762 29,279 282,041 (39,300) 
Water resource 
(P&R) 
13,012 16,895 26,574 19,412 19,053 18,718 21,515 38,015 41,705 49,631 50,959 106,295 135,179 286,605 421,784 340,954 80,830 421,784 0 
Water resource 
(Operation 
43,713 48,061 170,868 105,541 78,132 48,585 116,548 (7,246) 104,388 109,855 109,520 241,307 611,358 557,824 1,169,182 1,024,801 144,381 1,169,182 0 
Water service 
(P&R) 
6,524 2,854 2,968 3,253 1,478 3,052 1,429 5,436 5,361 7,851 11,388 8,817 21,558 38,853 60,411 60,411 0 60,411 0 
Water services 
(Operations) 
12,706 69,947 242,136 99,869 87,696 28,109 182,317 119,559 110,008 114,345 134,650 245,343 722,780 723,905 1,446,685 1,273,361 173,324 1,446,685 0 
Forestry (P&R) 638 844 1,227 1,021 1,021 1,989 1,286 2,522 2,273 2,424 2,143 2,612 8,233 11,974 20,207 20,207 0 20,207 0 
Forestry 
(Operation) 
23,066 26,345 65,204 28,120 28,104 34,740 37,116 35,821 29,868 32,392 31,575 32,451 260,695 162,107 422,802 329,648 93,154 422,802 0 
Theft and losses 0 42 6 328 18 114 50      558 0 558 0 0  (558) 
Unallocated 
trading account 
596 521 612 263 384 51 107      2,534 0 2,534 0 0  (2,534) 
TOTAL 
EXPENDITURE 
115,128 185,714 525,806 285,220 261,018 164,779 408,185 217,167 320,581 344,077 369,886 667,943 1,945,850 1,919,654 3,865,504 3,302,144 520,968 3,823,112 (42,392) 
Land and subsoil 
assets 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Theft and losses 0 42 6 328 18 114 50      558 0 558  0 0 (558) 
Unallocated 
trading account 
596 512 612 263 384 51 107      2,534 0 2,534   0 (2,534) 
TOTAL 
EXPENDITURE 
115,128 185,714 525,806 285,220 261,018 164,779 408,185 217,167 320,581 344,077 369,886 667,943 1,945,850 1,919,654 3,865,504 3,302,144 520,968 3,823,112 (42,392) 
Source: DWAF (2006: 102). 
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M&E identifies the state of progress or delay and information provided by M&E reports 
do contain early warning signals or indicators of any problems that may occur 
(Görgens & Kusek, 2009). The M&E system provides early warning signals but not an 
early warning ‘system’. The key two words here are ‘signals’ and ‘system’. But 
providing or having early warning signals or indicators is only one of four components 
in an early warning system (ISDR, 2003; Basher, 2006). Noticing and understanding 
early warning signals is only a small part of an EWS. One of the four essential 
components of an EWS is having a risk database. Without a systematic risk database, 
monitoring and interpreting those signals cannot be conducted effectively. 
 
6.2.2 Definition of an EWS: Narrow and broad 
This study found that the reason for the lack of components of an EWS in the 
municipal M&E system is the different interpretation of an early warning system 
(EWS). It is noted that two kinds of definitions of an EWS are used in different fields. 
M&E and Performance Management use a narrowed definition of an EWS and 
Disaster Management, Strategic Management and Risk Management use a wide and 
broader definition of an EWS (UNISDR, 2005, Woodhill, 2005; Basher, 2006).  
 
One of the major differences between the narrow definition and the broad definition of 
EWS is the area the EWS system covers. The narrowly defined EWS covers the area 
before problems appear, i.e., monitoring and identifying them, while the broadly 
defined EWS covers the area both before problems appear—a part of both strategic 
and risk management—and after they happen—a part of crisis management (Gilad, 
2004). Moreover, it not only develops a risk and problem knowledge database and a 
short, prioritised risk list to focus on that particular period, but also develops and 
prepares for response capability to effectively address incoming problems. 
 
The M&E framework of the CoJ (2012: 6) states that “while also serving as an early 
warning system, notifying leaders and managers of potential risks that may threaten 
achievement of the IDP” (p. 6). It can be understood that an early warning system 
refereed by the CoJ in its M&E framework (2012) has a narrow definition that is 
different from that of early warning systems used in disaster management, which have 
a wider definition and thus more components involved in the system. 
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Moreover, the monitoring process undertaken by a proper early warning system is 
different from the monitoring process taken by an M&E system. In the monitoring 
process, an early warning system uses a more focused method of anticipating and 
then closely monitoring processes or projects by using established (or prepared) risk 
knowledge data-base. On the other hand, an M&E system does not use this kind of 
data-base.  
 
Furthermore, warning signals provided by a conventional M&E system could not be 
regarded as early signals as the nature of the timing and frequency of the current 
M&E system in its reporting to the responsible stakeholder is not in a position to 
provide those warning signals to the responsible persons or sector in a timely manner 
in order that the responsible persons or sector could take the necessary preventive or 
corrective steps and actions before the impending problems perhaps mature into a 
fully-fledged crisis. Even if a M&E system can provide warning signals early enough to 
take the necessary corrective or preventative actions, it could not be regarded as an 
EWS as providing early warning signals is just one of the four essential elements of a 
proper early warning system (EWS).   
 
The M&E systems currently used by municipalities do provide early warning signals or 
indicators. It is, however, necessary to integrate all four essential elements of an EWS 
into the M&E system, and reporting and communication have to be frequent, so that 
the responsible persons or sectors are informed or alerted about impending problems 
and challenges. 
 
The main differences between the narrow definition of an EWS and that of the broad 
definition of an EWS are their purposes and aims, their scope (or territories) and their 
functions (or activities and responsibilities). In the narrow definition of an EWS, the 
purpose and aim is to monitor and communicate the warnings as early as possible to 
responsible persons or departments (or sectors). An early warning system (EWS) with 
a narrow definition does not necessarily use a risk knowledge database. Although it 
does warn and inform responsible persons or the management about the warning 
information, it is not its task to prepare an early warning report that discusses the 
impact of the possible problems, or suggest solutions and required resources. 
Moreover, it does not have to play any role in the preparation and planning for 
corrective or pre-emptive actions. 
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On the other hand, according to the broad definition of an EWS, the system comprises 
all four inter-related elements of an early warning system, i.e., risk knowledge, 
monitoring and warning system service, dissemination and communication, and 
response capability (de León, Bogardi, Dannenmann & Basher, 2006; Basher, 2006; 
UN, 2006). The purpose and aim of the team is not only to provide warning 
information about possible or emerging problems, but it also is actively involved in all 
activities and processes of preventing and mitigating approaching problems (UNISDR, 
2006). 
 
The team prepares a risk knowledge database, prepares a list of early warning signals 
(of selected problems and risks for a particular period), monitors these signals, warns 
about the possible or emerging problems, disseminates and communicates to all 
parties involved not only the warning information, but also the possible impacts of 
approaching problems, solutions, required resources and steps for corrective or 
preventive actions. Moreover, the team is also involved in developing response 
capability, together with related groups and persons. The length and depth of the 
reports of an EWS team are therefore different: reports of an “narrow” EWS team are 
concise while those of a “broad” EWS team are comprehensive. 
 
6.2.3  Two kinds of EWS: Gross and specific EWS 
Because of two different definitions of an EWS, there are also two kinds of EWS 
which have emerged. They could be understood as a Gross EWS and a Specific 
EWS. A conventional M&E system can serve as a gross EWS, as M&E reports and 
briefings can describe the number and intensity of deviations from plans and in turn 
predict, rightly, that the objectives or goals of programmes, projects or work would not 
be achieved.  A classic example of such predictions and warnings are the reports on 
the MDG (Millennium Development Goals). For example see, MDG No. 4, Reduce 
child mortality: the target set for South Africa of 20 deaths per thousand live births or 
lower by 2015 compares adversely with the current level of 104. But MDG No.2, 
Achieve universal primary education was achieved 98% by 2009 up from 96% in 
2002. Again MDG No. 5, Improve maternal health target (of 38 maternal deaths per 
100,000 live births) would not met, as it was at 140 in 2013. MDG No. 6, Combat 
HIV/AIDS (Human Immunodeficiency Virus / Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome), 
malaria and other diseases, as well as MDG No. 7, Ensure environmental 
sustainability, would not met (RSA, 2013; UNDP-SA, 2012). 
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One example is a possibility of achieving a target set by City Power in terms of 
reducing electricity losses. City Power targeted to reduce electricity losses to 10 per 
cent by December 2015 (CP, 2014a: 15 & 28; CP, 2014b: 17) and to 2 per cent by 
December 2016 (Molatlhwa, 2015). The electricity losses were 30.7% in 2013/14 
financial year (CP, 2014a: 28; CP, 2014b: 17).  By looking at data stated quarterly, at 
mid-year or in the annual reports, It is easy to expect that those targets are difficult to 
achieve as the electricity lost  was 30.7 per cent in 2013/14 FY (CP, 2014a: 19). 
 
Another example is a target set by Pikitup to achieve 70 per cent participation in the 
‘Separation at source’ programme by the end of 2015-16 FY (Pikitup, 2013a, the 
report does not have page numbers. It is approximately at page no. 61, Table 3-5: 
SDBIP (Service Delivery and Budget Implementation Plan) Performance Indicators - 
2012/13). Data provided in reports reveal that that target could not be achieved, as 
there was a 17 per cent participation rate at the end of 2012-13 financial year. This is 
an average participation rate when all participating depots are considered. There is 
27% participation rate in the Waterval depot area and less in other areas. The Orange 
Farm depot only started implementation of Separation at Source in the third quarter 
and thus the initial rate is low, but is expected to increase as the community becomes 
more aware of the programme (Pikitup, 2013a. The report does not have page 
numbers. It is approximately at page no. 41, under the Section 1: Key Achievements 
of Chapter Three: Service Delivery Performance). It should be noted that 58 per cent 
participation was achieve in 2011/12 FY (Pikitup, 2014a). 
 
However, knowing for a fact that a project or programme or goal would not be 
achieved is not helpful unless there is enough time left to take the necessary 
corrective actions or steps, there is also analysis and discussion about factors or 
causes for non-achievement of the programmes, projects and goals and 
recommendations are made to correct them or address them.  
6.2.4 Existence of early warning signs in municipal problems 
The study revealed that municipal service delivery problems such as the billing issue, 
skills shortage and water outage have factors and causes that precede them. This 
section discusses three municipal problems, explores the factors and causes behind 
them, and the chain of process. The aim in discussion of those factors and causes is 
to prove that problems do not happen out of blue, and there are warning indicators 
(weak signals) or events (wild cards) preceding them before the problem becomes 
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apparent, an argument made by the Weak Signal Theory (Ansoff, 1975, 1979).  
Moreover, the purpose of exploring these factors and causes that create municipal 
problems is to better understand the factors and causes, so that a correct diagnosis of 
the problem could be arrived at and necessary corrective actions can be taken. The 
data, information and knowledge form part of a risk data-base, and have to be 
assimilated in developing a response capability, one of four essential components of 
an EWS. A long list of early warning signals and indicators of particular factors or 
stages is presented in Appendix 10). 
Example 1: Water outage: Factors and causes 
In the case of water outages, there are at least two immediate causes that create 
water-outage: first, reservoir does not have enough water to deliver; and second, 
pipes burst so that water—although delivered from the reservoir—does not reach the 
residents or households, or customers. These two immediate causes of water-outage 
have again several factors and causes. For example, the reason for not having 
enough water in the reservoir might be that the pumping station does not work either 
because the power supply to the transformer failed, or because of power outage, 
caused by Eskom, or because of technical glitch at the transformer or pumping 
station, or through cable theft. These causes and factors can be understood as an 
outcome of aging infrastructure. Causes of aging infrastructure are important to 
understand as that is one of the critical common problems all municipalities are facing. 
The issue of aging infrastructure is different from the issue of infrastructure backlog or 
lack of infrastructure. More factors and causes involved in the water-outage scenario 
are described in Figure 6.2: Factors and causes leading to water outage.  
 
It is necessary to stress here that water-outage, especially unplanned or uninformed 
outages, causes inconvenience and difficulties to the public, communities and 
customers such as businesses, companies and even government departments, which 
include hospitals and schools where water is essential for their functionalities. 
However, what causes communities and customer’s anger and frustration is poor 
communication and lack of engagement from the municipalities and the water utility, 
i.e., Johannesburg Water (Interview: CM4, 20 September 2014; C3, 23 January 2015; 
M&EP, 22 April 2014).  
 
Most of the time, when Johannesburg Water is aware of some problems—for 
example, the low level of water in a reservoir or the breakdown of a transformer or 
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pumps, or a pipe burst, precedent factors and causes described in Figure 5.3—that 
will result in water-outage, no communication or announcement is made to inform 
affected communities. Even when the utility is not able to inform and warn the 
communities and customers about water-outage on time, they should have informed 
the public and communicated the reasons of the water-outage and the expected 
duration.   
Figure 6.2 Water Outage: Factors and causes  
 
Data reveals that the communication, information-sharing and engagement of the 
municipality and the water utility, Johannesburg Water, is poor and, in the view of 
communities and consumers, unacceptable. Respondents stated that there is no clear 
communication channel or contact number and people do not know which one they 
have to contact or make enquiries of, the City (the municipality), or the water utility 
(JW). Many times, there were complaints that the City and JW—were telling 
communities and consumers, simultaneously, that the problem was not their fault, but 
the fault of the other party. Furthermore, customer service is most of the time, 
unhelpful, as it often does not know or have relevant information about the causes of 
water outages, or how long it will take to effect repairs (Interview: CM4, 20 September 
2014; C3, 23 January 2015).   
 
The indicators to monitor the water outage problem include water level in reservoir; 
number of communication or announcement to customer, number of water outage; 
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number of pipe burst in a month; duration of water outage (hours); number of 
incidents of transformer or pumps break down (in a month), frequency of conducting 
maintenance of infrastructure; quality and quantity of required equipment and tools; 
number of vacancies (Table 6.1). 
Table 6.1 Sample of indicators to monitor water outage 
 Indicators Target Actual 
1 Water level in reservoir    
2 Number of communication or announcement to customer   
3 Number of water outage incidents   
4 Number of pipe burst in a month   
5 Duration of water outage (hours)   
6 
Number of incidents of transformer or pumps break down (in a 
month) 
  
7 Frequency of conducting maintenance of infrastructure   
8 Quality and quantity of required equipment and tools   
9 Number of vacancies   
 
There are three salient points in the example of water outage and factors and causes 
behind it. First, there are precedent factors and causes leading to water outage. 
Second, what public, communities and customers find unpalatable and unacceptable 
is not about water outage per se, but more about the lack of communication, 
information-sharing and engagement either from the municipality or the water utility 
(Johannesburg Water.) Third, those precedent factors and causes leading to water 
outage, and information about them, would not be found in M&E reports. Thus, in 
order to have an early warning system, in the cause of water-outage, daily monitoring 
of those precedent factors and causes and communication when there is something 
wrong with them, is necessary, and an EWS and process for those daily monitoring 
and communication has to be in place. (Table 6.2) 
Table 6.2 Three points in the example of water outage 
1 
There are precedent factors and causes leading to water outage. Those factors 
and causes serve as early warning signals or indicators of impending water outage. 
2 
It is not about water outage per se, but more about the lack of communication, 
information-sharing and lack of engagement that make communities, households 
and customers unhappy, frustrated and angry. 
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3 
Those precedent factors and causes leading to water outage (early warning 
signals) could neither be discovered by M&E activities, nor be found in M&E 
reports. Daily monitoring of those precedent factors and causes and 
communication when something is wrong with them, is necessary to have an 
effective and helpful EWS. 
 
Example 2: Billing problem: Factors and causes  
Billing problem is one of the well-known challenges the municipality has been 
experiencing. The municipality has been struggling to fix it since about five years ago 
(about 2009). Until now (in the middle of 2015) it still has not been completely solved. 
There are some cases still reported where residents still receive inaccurate or 
incorrect bills for their municipal services, for example, complaints at Hello Peter 
website, where complaints are posted by municipal service customers and rate 
payers. Even in the November of 2015, complaints related to billing issue are still 
posted by Johannesburg residents. 
 
There are a range of causes involved in the chain process of the billing problem. The 
immediate cause is a lack of accurate, correct and current information that is a result 
of either a system failure, or data-collection failure, i.e., lack of actual meter reading—
which was acknowledged and noted by City Power in its 2014-2019 Business Plan 
(CP, 2014b: 80-81), as well as weak data-capturing and documentation. The reasons 
for system failure might involve a lack of resources in terms of capacities such as 
skilled technicians, equipment and machines such as computers and software; or 
poor maintenance of them if necessary machines and equipment are in place; or just 
poor workmanship if all necessary resources are provided. According to the Auditor 
General report (AG, 2011a), noted the failure of financial officials and managers both 
of CoJ and its entities to align the source data and billing data when recording 
revenue and debtors.  
 
System failure is related to poor performance of service providers, as the city does 
outsource that technical service. One respondents of this study stated that  
A major component of this problem, was the purchase (at great 
expense) of a new computer system and data base. The migration of 
the data from the ‘old’ system to the ‘new’ system, where many 
consumer account files were lost. Also, I was also told that the Tender 
was awarded on a ‘cadre’ basis to a company that had no experience 
in this area. And who ‘outsourced it to another company also without 
the relevant experience. The whole matter was a travesty, and has 
cost the CoJ Billions (Interview: C3, 23 January 2015). 
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The reason behind the poor performance of service provider can be understood from 
the perspective that the service provider is unqualified for that task, but was awarded 
the contract (or tender) because of a flawed tender process. In turn, it can be thought 
that the tender process is flawed either because of, first, lack of skills that cannot 
correctly conduct the tender process or cannot evaluate correctly competing 
candidates for the tender; or second, poor decision making in terms of awarding the 
contract; or third, corruption, even if the necessary skills are there to conduct the 
tender process properly and can also make the right decision.  
 
These factors and causes can be regarded as a result of weak internal control and 
supervision. Auditor General’s report the Gauteng Provincial Legislature on the CoJ 
for the year ended 30 June 2011 stated that “Monitoring controls to ensure adherence 
to the internal politics, and procedures for the correct recording of revenue and 
consumer debtors were not sufficient” (AG, 2011a: 13). Moreover, in the same report, 
AG noted that “[i]n certain instances, the accounting officers of the municipality and its 
entities did not exercise oversight responsibility regarding financial and performance 
reporting and compliance with MFMA and SCM regulations” (AG, 2011a: 13). 
 
The next step is to explore why skills are inadequate, decisions are poor, and 
corruption exists. The skills become a shortage when supervision and internal controls 
are weak so that there is no awareness or identification about the situation of skills 
shortage. Poor decision making is related either to the skills shortage or weak 
management that does not hold people accountable when they make poor decisions, 
or that does not prevent corruption.  Weak supervision and internal controls can in 
turn be attributed to weak governance, which is also responsible for a weak 
accountability system. Weak governance can be understood as a result of weak 
leadership who does not have enough political will to make the system work so (See 
Figure 6.3). The indicators to monitor the billing problem include number of meters 
read in a month; rate of billing (CoJ); numbers of bills with mistakes; number of 
customer complaints lodged in a day (or a week); number of customer complaints 
resolved in a day (or a week); numbers of system failure in a month; rate of revenue 
collection; amount of revenue collected; amount of debt owed by consumers (Table 
6.3). 
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Table 6.3 Sample of indicators to monitor the billing problem 
 Indicators Target Actual 
1 number of meters read in a month   
2 rate of billing (CoJ)   
3 Numbers of bills with mistakes   
4 number of customer complaints lodged in a day (or a week)   
5 Number of customer complaints resolved in a day (or a week)   
6 numbers of system failure in a month   
7 Rate of revenue collection   
8 Amount of revenue collected   
9 Amount of debt owed by consumers   
Figure 6.3 Billing problem: Factors and causes 
 
Example 3: Skills shortage: Factors and causes  
In the case of a skills shortage problem, there are three immediate causes that create 
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skills shortage is discussed in length in Chapter 5: Factor Categorisation. This section 
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and skills supplied by education system); inability to attract qualified personnel  
(because of attraction from other sectors, such as private sector, or other regions or 
cities); brain-drain (owing to high turn-over rate, or employees are demoralised; weak 
human resource system (which selects and appoints wrong people,  while there are 
qualified people  to be selected and appointed); or effects or misuse of labour 
legislation such as Affirmative Action (qualified and skilled people cannot be employed 
because they are not eligible according to law, while people eligible by law are not 
skilful, or suitable for  positions).  
 
Figure 6.4  Skills shortage: Factors and causes 
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The second immediate cause (ineffective training or mentorships) might be an 
outcome of misaligned training. The third immediate cause (mismatched or 
misallocated skills) is a management and planning problem (Figure 6.4).  
 
Table 6.4 Sample of indicators to monitor the level of skills shortage 
 Indicators Target Actual 
1 number of consultants hired   
2 number of employee over 50   
3 number of employee trained   
4 number of professionally registered engineers and technologists   
5 number of temporary staff employed   
6 number of training provided to employees   
7 number of trainings completed   
8 number of trainings not completed   
9 number of trainings provided to employees   
10 number of vacancies   
 
6.2.5 Early warning signals revealed by the study 
The weak signals theory has been tested and applied in different fields and 
organisational settings. However, it has neither tried in the performance management, 
M&E fields, nor the local government and municipal contexts. One of the main 
arguments claimed by the weak signals theory is the existence of weak signals (or 
early warning signals) of problems, changes or deviations. The research reveals 373 
early warning signals, categorised into six main categories and 25 sub-categories 
(Table 6.6). The details of those early warning signs and their categorisations are 
described in Appendix O. 
 
Although this study and data revealed here are not exhausted to be readily applied in 
the municipal EWS risk database, they do provide a starting point in designing and 
developing a risk database, which can be supplemented and updated gradually and 
incrementally by the municipal EWS team. Similarly, the root cause analysis (RCA) 
carried out by this study on three municipal service delivery problems (i.e., water 
outage, billing problem and skills shortage in Section 6.2.4) is intended to serve as a 
sample one that could be used as a starting point. The RCA is a study that has to be 
conducted by municipal officials and staff on each municipal problem.  
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The data-categorisation proposed by this study (in Section 5.7), which is different from 
the categorisation used by CoGTA, the National Treasury, Auditor General, DPME 
and other individual studies, is based on the order of M&E steps and process, i.e., 
planning, inputs, processes and outputs (in Section 5.7), and thus helps the 
monitoring team to develop indicators to be monitored in each M&E stages. 
 
This study shows that phenomena corresponding to Ansoff’s theory of weak signals, 
i.e., early warnings, can apparently be detected in municipal service delivery 
processes (see Section 6.2.4). And the time available highlighted by Ansoff also 
appears to exist. At the same time, this study also establishes that barriers to 
detecting and capturing weak signals (i.e., early warnings) discussed by Ansoff are 
essential knowledge that deserve special considerations and preparation in planning 
and implementing an EWS in municipal phenomenon (See Section 2.5.1). Moreover, 
the decision support model proposed by Nikander (2002) based on Ansoff’s theory 
appears to be applicable to EWS for the municipal service delivery process too (see 
Section 2.4.2). 
6.3  Integration of an EWS into an M&E framework 
Early warning systems must be an integral part of all levels of the Municipal M&E 
system, strategic and risk management, as well as in policies such as M&E policy, 
planning (IDP) and budgets. An EWS is to be consolidated into existing information 
and processes conducted by the current M&E system and processes (CoJ, 2012). It 
thus does not start the monitoring and data collection process from scratch. Data-
collection is primarily done by the M&E (See responsible persons for monitoring and 
reporting in Performance Management Framework of the CoJ, in Section 3.4.1 of this 
thesis), but more frequently, will be based on a list of problems and factors or causes 
that is prepared from a wider and more comprehensive risk-data base.  
6.3.1 EWS process 
There are four steps in an EWS process: monitoring, analysing information, warning 
and communicating (or reporting), and building response capability. The first three 
tasks are the responsibilities of an EWS team. And development of response 
capability is the responsibility of all units, sectors and departments of the municipality 
and municipal entities (CoJ, 2012 & 2009). 
 
There are three primary tasks of the EWS team: first, to ensure the required data and 
information is attained; second, to analyse these based on a pre-determined list of 
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problems and factors or causes, i.e., just to see the deviations from plans, and to note 
significant changes or delays in the processes; and third, to prepare and distribute 
reports to all stakeholders and people involved in the processes.  
 
The EWS team does not collect data, instead it gathers, compiles data—through 
documents and reports—fed (or submitted) by the M&E data-collection team and all 
sectorial teams and departments of the municipalities (See CoJ’s PMS and M&E 
Framework). The EWS team is responsible for categorising, documenting and storing 
them systematically so that they can be easily accessible when necessary, and 
communicates and distributes them to all responsible persons. 
 
The life-blood of an EWS is information collected through monitoring and from 
institutional experiences and memories (Nikander, 2002; UNISDR, 2005; Basher, 
2006). Another crucial aspect of an EWS is time. Receiving information and 
communication has to always be on a timely basis, as their usefulness and value 
depend on their immediacy in order to undertake the necessary preparation, planning 
and actions (UNISDR, 2004). 
Figure 6.5  EWS processes 
 
Based on de León, Bogardi, Dannenmann & Basher, 2006: 23. 
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6.3.2 Developing risk data-base 
The first essential element of an EWS is a risk data-base (Basher, 2006; UNISDR, 
2005). In order to build a risk data-base, all municipal problems, challenges and 
factors causing those problems have to be collected and documented. The first step 
to building a risk data-base is just sampling and documenting all problems and 
challenges, as well as crises experienced during the past several years: the more the 
list is comprehensive covering as many years as possible, the more useful and 
valuable the data-base will be (de León, Bogardi, Dannenmann & Basher, 2006). 
They can be grouped or categorised into Key Performance Areas (KPAs), commonly 
used in M&E. 
 
Experiences such as good practices, and lessons of monitoring, detecting and 
interpreting warning signals, and solutions for various problems should be 
documented and transformed into training materials to support training workshops for 
technical development projects to enhance preparedness and to develop the 
response capability of the Municipality and municipal entities. As discussed in Chapter 
3, the City’s current performance management system has already established a 
systematic performance coaching system and arrangement (CoJ, 2009), from which 
necessary information and data for the establishment and maintenance of risk data-
base can be obtained. 
 
Developing a risk data-base is an on-going process: continuous revision and addition 
are needed. Moreover, besides comprehensiveness of the data-base, the efficiency 
and ease of search and retrieval of information is also an important characteristic of a 
good risk data-base (UNISDR, 2005). In the data-base, it is necessary to record the 
nature of problems, difficulties and challenges, together with their causes, and 
solutions and if possible, also the persons or teams who handled or solved these 
problems, and the resources and know-how necessary to solve them. Based on 
various official documents, reports and studies, together with data collected through 
interviews, focus-group studies and observation, this study compiled the lists of 
municipal problems, the factors and causes, as well as early warning signals (Table 
6.5). 
 
Problems list (a short and prioritised list) has to be prepared, based on the targets and 
objectives for that particular period, for example a one-month, or three-month period. 
Not all risks documented in the risk database will be relevant all time. The highest 
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possible risks have to be calculated, discussed and prioritised for the short term, for 
example six months, or three months. A number of layers could also be set for 
different priorities, 1st priority, 2nd priority, and 3rd priority, depending on the possibility 
of things happening in that particular period. Moreover, prioritised risk will be varied 
for different periods of time as well as for different municipalities depending on their 
particular contexts and time. The prioritised risks or challenges (or concerns) are 
stated, for every year, in the Auditor General Report, IDP (CoJ), and Annual Reports 
of the City (CoJ) and Municipal Entities (City Power, Johannesburg Water and 
Pickup).  
Table 6.5 Factors, causes and problems revealed by this study 
Factors, 
causes and 
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Categories Sub-categories 
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Exogenous   17 12 7 8 8 
Supply-side 
Planning 
Leadership 11 6 0 0 0 
Governance 13 10 4 1 1 
IDP 6 14 10 1 1 
Public Participation 29 3 2 0 0 
Inputs 
Human Resources (or 
human capital) 
22 18 6 5 6 
Finances 4 2 1 2 1 
Infrastructure 3 3 5 5 4 
Equipment 0 7 5 3 7 
Information 5 11 4 0 2 
Systems 1 7 3 0 1 
Processes 
Administration and 
management 
23 6 13 3 14 
Supervision 1 4 0 0 3 
Monitoring 7 3 6 0 7 
Supply Chain Management 
(Procurement) 
5 3 2 0 2 
Coordination and 
communication 
6 21 4 1 3 
Operation 0 0 0 0 0 
  180 
other 0 0 0 0 0 
Outputs 
CoJ and MoEs 8 0 0 0 0 
Customer service, CoJ 0 1 10 1 4 
Electricity 0 1 17 0 0 
Water & sanitation 5 1 0 5 0 
Refuse removal 1 1 0 0 8 
Revenue service, CoJ 1 1 5 0 0 
Demand-
side 
  6 6 4 2 12 
Total   174 141 108 37 84 
See Appendix J, L, M, N for the comprehensive list of factors, causes and problems. 
 
Table 6.6 Early warning signs revealed by this study 
Factors Categories Sub-categories No 
Exogenous   3 
Supply-
side 
Planning 
Leadership 7 
Governance 29 
IDP 17 
Public Participation 13 
Inputs 
Human Resources (or human capital) 48 
Finances 40 
Infrastructure 16 
Equipment 18 
Information 15 
Systems 3 
Processes 
Administration and management 13 
Supervision 1 
Monitoring 7 
Supply Chain Management 
(Procurement) 
12 
Coordination and communication 18 
Operation 3 
other 22 
Outputs 
CoJ and MoEs 2 
Customer service, CoJ 40 
Electricity 16 
Water & sanitation 24 
Refuse removal 3 
Revenue service, CoJ 2 
Demand-
side 
  1 
Total   373 
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See Appendix O for the comprehensive list of early warning signals 
6.3.3 Data-collection and reporting 
The EWS team does not need to collect data itself, rather it asks for the required data 
and information from the M&E team. The current Performance Management System 
of the City of Johannesburg outlines, in detail, the responsible persons and reporting 
schedules as well as persons to oversee the PMS (See section of CoJ PMS and M&E 
in Chapter 3) (CoJ, 2009, 2012). The responsibilities of the EWS team is to document 
and organise them for EWS purpose, such as monitoring trends and reporting and 
communicating their findings. 
 
Two full-time employees are necessary for the data collection task, and who will be 
the sole responsible persons for data-collection and documentation. Their primary 
task is to collect information and data, record or document the collected information 
and data, check and verify the correctness, accuracy, and completeness from 
different sources (that feed information to the PM and M&E teams), and prepare, 
write, distribute weekly situation reports. They would be occasionally required to brief 
and explain the reports and analysis, whenever necessary to responsible managers, 
supervisors or technicians. The daily task of the data-collectors is to contact, talk, 
communicate—by phone or through email—different managers and supervisors (as 
well as foremen) daily, based on the templates of data-collection, with an aim to have 
all necessary information and data for the weekly reports on different sectors and 
departments. The creation (establishment) of data-collection templates or formats is to 
be based on main risk-database and prioritised and selected list of problems and 
challenges prepared monthly or quarterly. 
 
A number of important indicators are recommended to be included in every report, 
such as all quarterly, bi-annual, and annual reports and business plans. It should also 
be in the weekly and monthly reports. Indicators will be various in different types of 
reports, but all reports have a page with selected important indicators. A sample of a 
summary page is provided below (Table 6.7). Risk levels are divided into five levels: 
very high, high, moderate, low and no risk. It can be expressed by number—4 for very 
high, 3 for high, 2 for moderate, 1 for low, and 0 for no-risk. Or it can also be 
expressed by colour—Red for very high, Orange for high, Yellow for moderate, Light 
Green for low, and White for no-risk (Table 6.3).  
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All sectoral teams or departments of municipalities and municipal entities would be 
required to submit and provide their performance data and information whenever 
requested from the EWS team—a privilege or power delegated to the EWS team that 
has to be endowed by the EWS and M&E policies and regulations of the municipality 
(and local government). 
6.3.4 Resources required for an EWS 
The EWS team needs at least two full time staff and two part-time staff—seconded 
from the M&E team. It should be noted that this EWS team is responsible only for the 
delivery of four basic services: Electricity, Water, Sanitation and Refuse Removal.  
This is just a proposed number and could be varied based on the size of a 
municipality and resources available. It is, however, imperative to understand that two 
sufficiently trained and skilled, motivated and hard-working (diligent) staff is far better 
and effective, or productive than a team of 10 people who are unmotivated, poorly 
trained and thus do not have the necessary skills. It is therefore advisable to start with 
just two staff carefully selected, appropriately trained and adequately resourced.  
 
Skills that EWS staff or technicians are required to have are sound technical, 
analytical skills to be able to interpret and analyse data and information; 
communication and writing skills to communicate succinctly, and efficiently and timely 
distribution of early warning messages to decision-makers and responsible sectors, 
teams, or persons to take corrective and preventative action. 
 
Table 6.7  Risk levels, code number and colours 
Risk level Code Number Colour Colour in words 
Very high 4  Red 
High 3  Orange 
Moderate 2  Yellow 
Low 1  Green 
No-risk 0  White 
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Table 6.8  An example of one-page summary of KPI 
 Indicators 
Base-
line 
Target Actual 
Risk 
levels 
 
Service delivery coverage for each services 
(%) 
    
Financial Situation     
 Profits (Losses) (Rand)     
 Surplus (deficits) (Rand)     
 Cash flow position (Rand)     
 Debt to Revenue ratio (%)     
 Debt provision (Rand)     
Operational Performance     
 Meter reading level (%)     
 Revenue collection ratio (%)     
 RCR completion times and rate     
 No. of targets set (for a quarter, or a year)     
 No. of targets achieved, in a month     
Operational Effectiveness     
 no of water pipes burst per 100km     
 no of sewer blockages per 100km     
 Total losses / Unaccounted for water (%)     
 Technical losses (power) (%)     
 Non-technical losses (power) (%)     
 No. of Power outages (HV and MV)     
 Amount of illegal dumping (million tons)     
 
sewer blockages cleared with 24 hours of 
notification 
    
 no of water pipes burst per 100km      
 no of sewer blockages per 100km      
Customer service     
 Customer satisfaction level (%)      
 
Calls answered in 30 seconds / total calls 
received (%) 
    
 
Customer complaints/queries resolved / total 
queries received, within 7 days (%) 
    
 
Average time taken to resolve queries that 
referred 
    
 Query resolved within 7 days (%)      
Faults restoration     
   Within 1.5 hours (%)     
   Within 3.5 hours (%)     
   Within 7.5 hours (%)     
   Within 24 hours (%)     
 Water bursts restored within 48 hours (%)     
Capacity and Resources     
 Vacancy rate     
 No. of Vehicle breakdowns, in a week     
 Fleet availability (%), Pikitup     
 No. of strikes, in a month     
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There is no set formula for determining the budget for an EWS. Moreover, during 
initial planning, it can be difficult to determine this until a pilot project has been carried 
out. A general rule of thumb should be that the EWS budget should not be so small as 
to compromise the accuracy of information and credibility of predictions and warnings. 
Since most of the data and information are collected by an M&E teams, which budget 
is by an industrial standard, allocated between 3 and 10 per cent of a 
project/programme’s budget (IFRC, 2011; Frankel & Gage, 2007). Approximately 25 
per cent of an M&E budget should be allocated for an EWS (or between 0.75 and 4 
per cent of each project or programme’s budget). The budget for EWS are to cover all 
expenses and costs for capacity building/training, office equipment and supplies, 
travel and lodging, computer hardware and software, an information management 
system, transportation and vehicle maintenance, and printing and publishing of 
documents. This is however just a proposed percentage and needs to be deliberated 
and decided by practitioners, managements and leaderships to be appropriate for 
their particular contexts and resources available. 
6.3.5 Four operational components of an EWS 
There are four operational components of early warning systems (Basher, 2006). 
(1) Observation, detection, monitoring, analysis, forecasting and 
development of warning messages or reports; 
(2) Assessing potential risks and integrating risk information into warning 
messages or reports; 
(3) Dissemination of timely, reliable and understandable warning messages 
to responsible units or sectors; 
(4) Development of response capability, through the performance coaching 
provided by the City Manager to the sector leads and sector members 
who are directly accountable to him, by the Board Chairpersons to MDs/ 
CEOs of municipal entities, and by line managers to their subordinates 
(See responsible persons for performance coaching in CoJ, 2012). The 
tasks of the EWS team includes planning, preparedness and training 
programmes focused on formulating and mastering effective responses 
to problems. 
6.3.6 Sources of data and information 
Sources of data and information are the M&E team, departments or sectors. They 
might be quarterly, mid-year and annual reports, business plans, CDW reports, 
meeting records and minutes, media, Auditor-General reports, PMG meeting, briefing, 
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question and answer records and minutes, statistical reports (See CoJ’s Performance 
Management Framework, 2012). 
6.3.7 EWS framework (proposed by this study) 
In order to serve as an EWS, the current M&E framework has to integrate an EWS 
framework. In this section, an EWS framework will be proposed. The framework is 
designed in order to help municipalities to detect, take corrective actions against, 
prevent and contain the upcoming municipal service.  
 
This framework is a sample and it is recommended that municipalities establish their 
own framework based on this sample. The framework is recommended to be inserted 
between Sub-section 7.1 Requirements for implementation, at page number 71, and 
Sub-section 7.2 Concluding comments at page number 72 and that concluding 
comments sub-section will become sub-section 7.3 as the proposed model of the 
EWS framework would be Sub-section 7.2 (CoJ, 2012).  
 
1. Purpose 
The purpose of this framework is to provide an Institutional Framework for the 
developing, preparing and implementing of an Early Warning System in the CoJ 
Group. 
 
2. Objectives 
a) To ensure that the CoJ has an Early Warning System. 
b) To ensure that possible future problems would be spotted by monitoring 
continuously and systematically. 
c) To ensure that the necessary resources, staff and skills are allocated and 
planned for in order that the EWS be effective and efficient and operated.  
d) To contribute to the reduction of factors, difficulties and challenges that 
hamper the effectiveness of service delivery processes. 
 
3. The scope of application 
The Scope of the EWS framework is for the entire CoJ Group consisting of: 
 City of Johannesburg Core Administration; and 
 City of Johannesburg Municipal Entities. 
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The Core Business Units shall implement the Framework and Municipal Entities are 
expected to follow a similar approach. MEs should customise or align their systems 
with the Framework without downgrading the set Guidelines and Standards. 
 
4. Definitions 
An EWS is defined as a detection and communication process that alerts key players 
and stakeholders of developing problematic trends that can be obviated by taking 
corrective and preventative interventions.  
5. Aim of an EWS 
The aim of an EWS is to provide warning information about emerging problems to 
leadership, management, decision-makers, all responsible persons, so that they take 
preventive actions. 
6. Responsibilities of key actors 
An EWS policy (and framework) is required to define the roles and responsibilities of 
various authorities and stakeholders, explicitly. The major roles and responsibilities of 
different stakeholders for the contingency plan can be as follows: 
 
Table 6.9  Responsibilities of key actors 
Key Actors Task Responsibility 
EWS Observer Monitoring and 
observation 
 Gather and store information from 
sectoral teams and groups 
monitoring,  
 When necessary, contact and 
collect data and information from 
sectoral teams or groups when 
they do not provide enough 
information or data 
 observe early warning signals from 
relevant data and information, by 
using prepared check list (or risk 
knowledge data-base) 
 provide early warning signals to 
data analysts 
EWS Management Conduct management, 
supervision, internal 
 Provide leadership 
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Team control, and oversight of 
the whole system 
 Establish objectives and visions for 
the team 
 Establish an accountability and 
performance management system 
 Establish communication channel 
and report structure 
 Provide management and 
supervision for the EWS team  
 Ensure necessary resources are 
available to the team. 
 Conduct M&E 
Data analysts  Analyse and interpret 
early warning signals 
and forecast emerging 
problems and their 
impacts, study past 
experiences, and 
conduct record keeping 
documentation, 
preparing report 
 Analyse early warning signals and 
indicators provided by EWS 
observers, based on the 
knowledge of past records and 
experiences, using root cause 
analysis and steps of weak signal 
theory  
 Prepare early warning reports  
 Send EW reports to 
communicators 
Communicators  Communication and 
dissemination 
 Communicate, contact to 
responsible teams or group as per 
agreed communication channel 
 Make sure that messages (reports) 
are delivered to and received by 
responsible team or person 
Sectoral team or 
groups 
Response, search and 
study solutions, 
documenting and 
reporting response 
activities and 
experiences back to the 
EWS team 
 Regularly collect and provide 
necessary data and information to 
EWS observers 
 Prepare and build response 
capability 
 Take necessary corrective or 
preventative actions or steps when 
early warning signs occur 
Entire EWS team Development of risk 
knowledge data-base, 
compilations of lessons, 
experiences and best 
practices 
 Prepare risk data-base 
 Conduct documentation and 
record keeping 
 Compile and study best practices 
and lessons 
 Disseminate best practices 
 Provide training on EWS 
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7. Objectives of an EWS 
An EWS has six main objectives. 
(1) To assist Managers, Supervisors and Employees to identify the emerging 
problems and challenges. 
(2) To provide a structured framework for developing and implementing an EWS 
(3) Assist the M&E Functions to develop a consolidated risk data-base, early 
warning signals of common problems and challenges, and solutions to those 
problems and challenges; to monitor, interpret, understand and communicate 
the early warning signals and the possible problems and challenges to 
responsible persons and decision-makers; and to develop necessary response 
capabilities to solve those problems and challenges. 
(4) To help employees to be aware of common problems and challenges and their 
early warning signals and solutions to them. 
(5) To increase employees’ awareness and understanding about the common 
problems and challenges faced during the municipal service delivery 
processes. 
(6) To create a culture of pro-activeness and learning in the organisation 
(7) To reduce the number of problems facing the municipality and municipal 
entities. 
6.4 Benefits of having an EWS for the municipality 
Implementing an EWS creates more work and responsibility for municipal leadership, 
management and staff. Since the EWS systematically records lists of tasks, 
responsible persons for these tasks, and their performance levels in implementing 
them, the accountability and performance management system will be strengthened. 
This is not good news for anybody who tends to shy away from work or 
responsibilities and they will try to block such a system from functioning because 
when they fail to undertake their tasks, their failures and negligence will be recorded 
and they will be more easily held accountable. In fact, those are the people who must 
be closely monitored and supervised with the help of an EWS. Ansoff (1984) 
discussed in the abstract about them as officials (decision-makers) who may feel that 
hightened recognition of the problems (performance deficiencies) revealed by early 
warning signals (weak signal) may endanger their position or negatively reflect on 
their reputation. 
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On the other hand, there are certainly many people in municipalities who really love 
their jobs, genuinely want to perform their tasks and responsibility well and want to 
deliver quality service to communities as much as they can because they really care 
for their people and are passionate to serve their communities and society. For them, 
an EWS enables them to perform well, to serve well and to deliver well. Moreover, an 
effective EWS enables municipal leadership and managers to monitor their service 
delivery processes systematically, to handle service delivery problems and challenges 
in a proactive way, and to manage their staff better and hold their officials and staff 
more accountable. 
 
It is a proven fact that effective early warning systems have substantially reduced 
problem-solving costs and the number of problems experienced (Rogers & Tsirkunov, 
2011; Teisberg & Weiher, 2009; UNISDR, 2006). Since an EWS provides information 
on possible problems and emerging crises (such as service delivery protests, skills 
shortage or financial problems), the municipality can address and mitigate emerging 
problems while they are in their beginning stages and therefore more easily tackled 
and handled. Almost all recurring problems could be prevented (or at least reduced) in  
number because through the EWS these problems and their causes are learnt and 
understood and response capabilities are prepared to prevent them. Consequently, a 
properly set up and applied EWS leads to increased efficiency, higher productivity and 
performance.  
 
It should be noted that increased efficiency and higher performance helps 
municipalities to get funds for their development and infrastructure projects from 
international donors such as the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), 
and the German donor agency Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW), as donors tend 
to provide aid to municipalities that have a reputation for being well-organised and 
able to deliver on their obligations. International donors are willing and happy to 
provide aid and funds when they know a city can fulfil its commitments (Cameron, 
2012). Most importantly, having an M&E system that serves as an EWS, the 
municipality becomes compliant with the legislative requirement of having an M&E 
system that serves as an EWS. 
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6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has two main parts. The first part discussed the findings related to 
municipal M&E system and practices, and to what extent the M&E system has the 
components of EWS. The second part discussed how to integrate an EWS system 
into the existing M&E framework, and then presented a sample of an EWS framework. 
The benefits of having an EWS for the municipality was also stated in the end. 
Development and sustainability of an EWS requires political commitment and 
dedicated investments. Implementation of an EWS requires a clear concept of 
operations and standard operating procedures, enabling effective coordination among 
agencies across the components of the early warning systems. The concept of an 
EWS is very new to the municipal management domain and there is no previous 
utilisation of an EWS in municipal service delivery processes. Thus, the proposed 
model of an EWS for municipalities is at the beginning stage of its evolution into 
municipal management territory. 
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Chapter 7 
DISCUSSION AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATION 
 
 
This chapter presents the discussion on findings stated in the preceding chapters. 
There are three main sections in this chapter: First, it discusses the nature and 
characteristics of municipal service delivery problem and challenges and provides a 
new explanation about their causes and factors behind them. Second, it explains how 
the method and approach of Weak Signals Theory can be integrated into M&E and 
EWS fields, as well as in the local government context. Third, it introduces the 
extended territory of M&E by incorporating the components and characteristics of an 
EWS.  
 
7.1 Introduction 
First, it discusses the nature of municipal service delivery problems and challenges, 
argues that the municipal problems are more related to participatory and 
communicative matters, and suggests that the mild state of alienation is responsible 
for these psychological or mental natures of municipalities and their staff and 
employees—that factor is not covered by the four roots of service delivery problems. 
Second, it explains how Weak Signals Theory can be integrated into EWS framework. 
It also suggests that the two theories used in this study—four roots of service delivery 
problem theory and four essential elements of an EWS—are complimentary to the 
Weak Signals Theory. Finally, it introduces the new type of M&E—a proactive M&E 
(pM&E), or M&E that serves as an EWS (eM&E). Furthermore, it argues that the M&E 
concept and framework need to be re-designed to encompass and build-in the 
concept of EWS.   
 
7.2 Municipal Problems: More about public participation and customer 
services  
Data pointed out that most of the municipal problems are not about quantity and 
quality of municipal services (although there are some serious shortcomings in 
efficiency and productivity that still can be improved), but more about public 
participation in the municipal service delivery processes and customer services. The 
responsibilities of local government and municipalities are not only to provide 
services, but also involve communities in all major steps of municipal functionalities 
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and operation. What communities expect from municipalities is not only about the 
quality and quantity of services but how those services are provided and how 
municipalities conduct their affairs and functions. Most of the complaints from 
communities are not about the level of services municipalities provide, which are 
impressive especially in capacitated metropolitan municipalities. 
 
One respondent said: 
What we want is to have a say. It is not about how many houses we 
want, but we want to have a voice on how houses are distributed. We 
want some controls over the allocation of budgets. We want a role in 
monitoring and evaluation… If government pulls down itself to the level 
of people, things will be better (Interview: C2, 26 August 2014).  
 
The main problems communities have with municipalities are about how municipalities 
relate to them, for example, how municipalities communicate and engage with 
communities, how responsive municipalities are toward communities’ questions, how 
democratic and transparent municipalities conduct their affairs. One respondent, a 
councillor, stated that 
What people often want is honesty, they want to hear something like 
we would have these problems, we are falling behind, that is what will 
happen in the future (Interview: M&EP, 22 April 2014). 
 
The weak public participation processes and practices of municipalities result in bad 
feelings and perceptions in the public and communities that they have no say in the 
municipal functions and processes, especially in planning. The communities and 
public find personalities of municipality and municipal entities as uncaring, non-
participatory, uncooperative and undemocratic. 
 
Communities feel that they are alienated from their roles and right to be able to 
participate and be involved in planning such as IDP processes and monitoring 
functions. Data both from interviews and document studies pointed out that what   
makes the public and communities unhappy, angry and frustrated is more about the 
failure or weaknesses of municipalities to involve them in municipal affairs and 
business, such as planning, budgeting, implementation and monitoring—as stated 
above, people feel, rightly, that municipalities are  unresponsive, inaccessible and 
non-cooperative, and the communication, reporting and cooperation from 
municipalities are not good enough—and that customer relations and services are 
poor and inefficient.   
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Municipal problems and the factors and causes behind them have been well studied, 
discussed and understood. This study revealed two major municipal problems: first, 
the perception and expectation gap related to municipal service delivery performance, 
and second, inadequate public participation related to municipal service delivery 
processes. The findings indicated that the communities’ complaints and 
dissatisfactions are not because of poor service delivery performance. This study 
discovered that except in informal areas, service delivery performance of the CoJ and 
its municipal entities are acceptable and people are generally happy with the service 
levels they received from the municipality. It is necessary to point out that municipal 
entities do not receive service fees in informal areas. Besides a fact that informal 
areas are growing steadily, basically, services are delivered there for free. There is 
moreover infrastructure backlog issue which makes delivery of service by municipal 
entities difficult. 
 
That finding was supported by a survey conducted with over 25,000 people to gauge 
satisfaction levels with governance, by the Gauteng City-Region Observatory 
(GCRO)—a collaborated afford among partnership between the University of 
Johannesburg, the University of the Witwatersrand, the Gauteng government, and the 
SA Local Government Association, in which at least 60 respondents per ward were 
sampled in each metropolitan municipality and 30 per ward in local municipalities—
revealed that in general communities satisfaction with municipal services is high 
(Table 7.1). 
 
Table 7.1: Respondents’ Satisfaction with Municipal Services 
Respondents’ satisfaction with 
Satisfied or very 
satisfied 
Dissatisfied or 
very dissatisfied 
Neither 
Water (%) 85 (S 77 + VS 8) 11 (D 7 + VD 4) 4 
Sanitation (%) 80 (S 72 + VS 8) 17 (D 11 + VD 6) 4 
Waste removal (%) 83 (S 76 + VS 7) 13 (D 9 + VD 4) 5 
Energy (%) 79 (S 73 + VS 6) 16 (D 11 + VD 5) 5 
Municipal billing (%) 50 (S 46 + VS 4) 23 (D 17 + VD 6) 28 
Cost of municipal services (%) 52 (S 48 + VS 4) 21 (D 16 + VD 5) 26 
Source: GCRO (2014: 14 -19). 
Note: S= Satisfied; VS = Very Satisfied; D = Dissatisfied; VD = Very Dissatisfied  
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Figure 7.1: Respondents’ satisfaction with municipal services 
 
Source: GCRO, 2014:14 -19. 
7.2.1 Three root causes of municipal problems 
Out of many factors revealed by data, this study identified three factors as root causes 
of those factors. They are (1) weak internal control, (2) lack of, or poor, enforcement, 
and (3) poor public participation.  
 
Weak internal control: There are many employees who are self-motivated and 
dutiful, there are also many employees who need constant control and supervision 
from management or supervisors to get their work done properly, effectively and 
efficiently. Poor productivity, ineffectiveness, poor workmanship and poor attitude from 
many workers to their responsibility to do the best job they can, and finally poor work 
morale are regarded by the researcher as outcomes of weak internal control, which is 
also a cause of weak accountability systems. 
 
Poor enforcement system: These two factors are complimentary to each other. The 
lack of one will make the other incomplete. It is possible that an accountability system 
can be weak or non-functional although there is strong internal control unless a proper 
enforcement system exists. It is like having an effective police force that arrests law-
breakers, but without a proper judicial system that sentences the criminals or wrong 
doers. The researcher has a personal experience about the effects of weak judicial 
system on the prevention of crimes. While attending court as a witness, I had a couple 
of informal interviews with two police officers, who arrested two robbers who mugged 
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me in August 2014 and we—the police officers and I— were required to attend court 
and testify there. The police officers told me that they arrested people, rightfully, 
according to their responsibilities and duties, but many of those arrested people were 
released within a few months, through various corrupt means, or internal connections 
they secured usually by bribery. 
 
The theory of four roots of service delivery problems, by Devarajan and Reinikka 
(2004), makes the same point but it uses “weak incentive”, meaning that service 
providers and politicians, i.e., the municipality and the council, do not have the proper 
incentive to deliver services. It is a different way of stating that there is no one to 
check and hold them accountable. In the other words, there is neither internal control 
(checking them), nor enforcement system (holding them accountable) so that they do 
not feel that they have to deliver. It is another supporting statement for an argument, 
the researcher made above, about employees and staff who require the theory X 
management.  
 
Weak internal control and poor enforcement are also root causes of skills shortage. It 
is because selection and appointment processes conducted by the HR department 
need to be constantly controlled and thoroughly monitored so that it takes all the 
required steps according to legislation in terms of the selection and appointment of 
employees and staff. The internal control and monitoring, as well as holding 
accountable, of an HR department can prevent the hiring or appointing of unqualified 
staff or employees. Moreover, good internal control can also provide the management 
with essential information on available and scarce skills, so that necessary steps can 
be taken to fill vacancies, provide training and mentorship, or improve skills 
development programmes proactively. In the same vein, good internal control can 
also provide the infrastructure and equipment that is available and needed. Lack of 
systematic, regular and enforced internal control and supervision is observed and 
even admitted by government departments and entities CP, 2014e) as one of the 
biggest factors that creates lack of productivity and inefficiency as well as poor 
workmanship. 
 
Poor leadership and weak governance are not included in these three root causes.  
This is because effective accountability systems can turn both a poor leadership into a 
good one, and a week government into a strong one. The root cause of poor 
leadership and weak governance is a weak accountability system, which is a result of 
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poor internal control that does not hold people accountable. Both good leadership and 
strong governance do happen without constant monitoring under the watchful eyes of 
big brother. However, it is unhelpful, or even harmful, to regard, or believe, that both 
all leadership and all governance are naturally and essentially good and strong 
governance do happen without constant monitoring under watchful eyes of the big 
brother. That point was also made by a respondent who is a councillor. She related it 
to the public sector transformation of UK under the Blair Administration, by 
acknowledging the untenability of the assumption that public servants serve for the 
interest of the public (Interview: C3, 23 January 2015).  
 
It is therefore the view of the researcher that the true problem is a weak accountability 
system rather than poor leadership or weak governance—these two are in fact 
regarded as an outcome of the former. (See for detailed and comprehensive 
discussion of Constitutionalism, which holds that leaderships and governments need 
to be checked and controlled by the Constitution, as power corrupts people (Wormuth, 
1949).  
 
The weak accountability system is viewed and discussed widely by many (AG, 2011; 
NT, 2011, 2010; Cogta, 2009; DPME, 2011; Salga, 2011b, 2010) as one of the root 
causes of municipal service delivery problems. While the weak accountability system 
is indeed a cause of municipal problems, it is not a root cause. Instead it itself is also 
an outcome of other causes. It is a view of the researcher that the weak accountability 
system is an outcome of two root causes. They are weak internal controls and poor 
enforcement systems. These two factors are in fact essential parts of an 
accountability system. 
 
Poor Public Participation: Another root cause identified by this study is poor public 
participation or community involvement and engagement in municipal processes. The 
local government system is established as a joint-business or a joint-responsibility of 
municipalities and their community members (or constituencies). All problems, 
strengths, weaknesses, and limitations are required to be shared, communicated, 
discussed, addressed, and solved. All decision-making, planning, objectives and goal 
prioritising, and budgeting are meant to be made together too.  
 
There are many programmes and projects that could not be successfully or effectively 
implemented without adequate community cooperation and participation, for example 
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Separate @ Source campaign of Pikitup, and the Demand-Management Programme 
(DMP) of City Power and Johannesburg Water. Similarly, there are many strategies to 
address or prevent problems, especially related to the demand-side, such as non-
payment problems; cable, water and electricity thefts; illegal connections of water or 
electricity; illegal dumping. Those strategies could not be effective without community 
cooperation and support. Because of poor public participation, municipalities and all 
municipal entities and utilities have been losing many kinds of opportunities and 
resources that can be attainted from communities. 
 
There are a number of instances where community members can help and assist the 
municipality and municipal entities. One example of public cooperation, to make 
meter-reading corrected, was described by one interviewee, community member. He 
said, “I wait until 6, every month. If they don’t come and read the meter, I read and 
phone them. I have the phone number. I also check the meter by myself” (Interview: 
CM3, 17 June 2014). 
 
Another example is the technical assistance of a community member, an electrical 
engineer, who offered City Power that he could restore power in Parkmore after a long 
power cut in May 2015. The problem was that parts of Parkmore Extension 1 lost 
electricity as they were scheduled for load shedding. Residents assumed that the 
power would come back at 6:30 but did not. Residents informed City Power and a 
technician team was sent out but they failed to fix the problem, as they could not find 
out what the problem was (first they thought it was caused by cable theft). Then, Mr 
Moore stepped in and helped supervise the technicians as they reinstalled all the 
fuses to the main switch, then tested each section and the power was back on 
(Zwane, 2015). 
 
One respondent, a resident, also shared her experience relating to the assistance 
community members can give by being vigilant, observing their surroundings and 
providing critical information. She said  
In this street, this last January (2014) we saw people going down from 
the pavement into the bottom and turned out that somebody had come 
five o’clock in the morning, wearing blue overalls, they took out the 
man-hole cover and they went down. Somebody, the guard, said “Hello, 
what are you doing?” They said “we are sub-contractor to the 
municipality to fix something, five in the morning.” Somebody else came 
and tried to photograph the vehicle. But it turned out two hundred 
meters of electric cable has been stolen. Two hundred meters of cable 
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and it took the City Power nearly two days to fix (Interview: CM4, 20 
September 2014). 
 
7.2.2 Relationship of three root causes, data and theory 
This study explored factors related to and responsible for municipal service delivery 
performance. Factors or causes revealed by data are categorised into three main 
groups: Exogenous, supply-side, and demand-side (Chapter 5). Supply-side factors 
are further divided into four groups: Planning, inputs, processes and outputs. In this 
section, the relationships between these three root causes and the theory of four roots 
of service delivery problems are presented. Moreover, where three root causes are 
situated in data-categories is also presented (Table 7.1).  
 
Table 7:1 Relationship of three root causes, data and theory 
Root causes and 
factors 
Weak internal 
control 
Lack of, or poor, 
enforcement 
Poor public 
participation 
Data  
categorisation 
Processes 
Governance 
Leadership 
Processes 
Governance 
Leadership 
Planning 
Inputs 
Processes 
Theory: Four 
Roots of Service 
Delivery Problem 
Resource 
misallocation 
Expenditure 
leakage 
Weak incentive 
Weak incentive Resource 
misallocation  
Demand-side 
failure 
 
 
Weak internal control: Weak internal control belongs to the groups of processes of, 
governance and leadership (in the data category). It is also related to monitoring. 
Internal control is an essential mechanism for achieving the upmost effectiveness and 
productivity of a work force. If the level and quality of internal control is weak then 
either governance is weak or leadership is poor.  
 
The first three causes of the theory of the four roots of service delivery problems are 
(1) resource misallocation, (2) expenditure leakage, and (3) weak incentive. These 
three causes happen when internal control is weak due to either weak governance or 
poor leadership, or both. When resources are misallocated, they become less-useful 
or underutilised. Examples of resource misallocation include the appointment of 
unqualified persons and awarding contracts to service providers who are not capable 
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to deliver services. These events happen when internal control, through supervision 
and monitoring, is lacking or ineffective. 
 
Expenditure is leaked when financial management is lacking or weak, which is also a 
kind of weak control or lack of internal control. Expenditure leakage happens in 
various forms. One example is the procurement of or purchasing materials, 
equipment, tools, vehicles or computers at high prices either because of corruption 
(collaboration) or lack of understanding of market (related to skills shortage, and 
appointments of unqualified persons). One respondent, a senior manager at the 
Provincial Government, shared this, one department bought 400 computers at prices 
that were three time higher than actual prices (Interview: SOG2, 12 March 2014). 
Another respondent, a former senior manager at the finance department of the CoJ, 
said, “You don’t care if computer system falls down, what you actually care about is 
buying the system that you can get a cut” (Interview: SOG1 18 February 2015). These 
things can only happen when there is no internal control. 
 
Lack of or weak internal control creates weak incentives for service providers, 
municipal employees, staff, management, even politicians and councillors to perform 
their responsible tasks and duties because it does not matter whether or not they 
work, perform or deliver. The theory of four roots of service delivery problems argues 
that when service providers are poorly monitored, they do not deliver properly. 
 
Lack of, or poor, enforcement: Enforcement is a necessary and critical component 
of an accountability system. It is related to internal control. But it can also exist when 
there is proper internal control. Without enforcement, people do not have the incentive 
to comply with or abided by the rules and regulations. When rules and regulations are 
not applied, or even enforced, but punishments are not severe enough, people tend to 
disregard or ignore the rules and regulations. Expected Utility Maximisation theory 
maintains that people comply with the rules and regulations only at the level of their 
expected utility in the case of non-compliance weighed against the probability of 
detection. When there is no chance, or a low probability of detection, or the 
punishment is not severe enough, he or she will not be bothered to comply with the 
rules and regulations. Then, there will be no benefits or advantage, just a greater 
burden that these rules and regulations will have on society or an organisation 
(Becker, 1968). That point was in fact already made almost three centuries ago, by 
John Locke (1694) in his masterpiece Second Treaties of Government. 
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When the performance of service providers as well as municipal staff, management 
and politicians is not properly monitored and there are no consequences for non-
performers or people who don’t deliver, there will be no incentive to carry out their 
responsibilities and task. Thus, it can be argued that weak incentive is an outcome of 
lack of accountability and internal control.  
 
Poor public participation: The four roots of service delivery problem do not explain 
the causes of poor public participation. There is an implication in the theory that the 
politicians (the municipality) and the service providers do not have any incentive to 
include communities or the public in their processes such as planning, budgeting, 
projects and goals prioritisation, implementation and monitoring and evaluation. 
Another explanation alluded to by the theory is that demand-side failure is responsible 
for poor public participation. Demand-side failure refers to a lack of understanding or 
interest in communities in the processes of governments, and public services. It is 
stated that there are many instances within international experience that communities 
or the public, especially poor people, do not know what services they are entitled to 
and who in government and the service providers they can hold accountable. The 
theory also relates resource misallocation to poor public participation.  
 
7.2.3 Four roots of service delivery problems in the context of the CoJ 
The theory of four roots of service delivery problems is used in this study as one 
theoretical framework (Sub-section 2.4.1, in Chapter 2). The four roots according to 
the theory are resource misallocation, expenditure leakage, weak incentive, and 
demand-side failure (Figure 7.1). Exploring factors affecting municipal service delivery 
problems was guided by the four roots causes of the theory. This study found that the 
four root causes of the theory are relevant in the context of the City of Johannesburg.  
Figure 7:1  Four roots of service delivery problems 
Resource 
misallocation  
Expenditure 
leakage  
Weak 
incentive  
Demand-side 
failure 
 
Resource constraint is not a real problem as without resources no one can deliver. 
When municipalities do not have resources for certain mandates, it is not their 
problem as they do not have resources. One participant in a focus-group discussion 
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affirmed that “we no longer have issue of unfunded mandate. Mandates are now 
budgeted” (FGD, 24 November 2014). 
 
However, the problem is more about the lack of consultation and engagement with 
communities as well as other levels of governance about resource constraints. 
However, respondents stated that resource constraint is not a problem for the city of 
Johannesburg. One respondent, a former senior financial manager at the CoJ firmly 
stated that 
I think it is a cheap answer to say there are no resources. They would 
often say that, municipalities. But they are getting far more resources in 
real terms, far more money is going to them than 10 years ago. We are 
just going up and up and up every year, in real terms not talking about 
inflation. Meanwhile, performance seems to be getting worse (Interview: 
SOG1, 18 February 2015). 
 
That statement is in line with an argument of the World Bank (2011: 14-15) that states 
that “fiscal resources have not been the binding constraint to improved service 
coverage and quality”. It continues that in terms of the financial resources 
municipalities have South Africa is in an enviable position because of the fiscal space 
and resources created and targeted to the poor. According to the World Bank (2011), 
the real challenge is to ensure that public transfers result in better outcomes. 
 
The resource constraint experienced by municipalities does not stem from the 
limitation or constraint of input resources, but rather from the inefficiency and 
weaknesses of the billing, low and insufficient revenue collection systems (Heyns, 
2011; Nkwinika, 2010)—City Power 2014-2019 Business Plan also stated that “77,000 
customers found not to be billed on electricity” and “there are 172,000 properties that 
are not on the billing system” (CP, 2014B: 82)—and non-economy which are in turn 
results of skills shortages, lack of proper supervision, control and monitoring and weak 
or insufficient public participation in the municipal planning, decision-making and 
implementation (National Treasure, 2011). 
 
In its report entitled “State of Local Government in South Africa: Overview Report on 
National State of Local Government Assessments”, CoGTA (2009: 40) states that 
“With some justification, many municipalities complain that there are insufficient funds 
to eradicate infrastructure backlogs on water, sanitation and roads services, resulting 
in incomplete infrastructure projects. However, individual assessments have also 
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demonstrated examples of under-spending, a degree of wastage, inappropriate usage 
of funds, and poor oversight” (p. 40). 
 
Furthermore, the lack of resources and money is also an outcome of a weak revenue 
collection process and non-payment by communities for municipal services. The weak 
revenue collection can be regarded again as a result of skills shortage, weak 
management and administrative process, in other words, a limited accountability 
system where there are no consequences for poor performers or non-compliant 
employees. That weak accountability system further causes public distrust toward 
municipalities.  
 
Resource misallocation is related to allocation and expenditures in infrastructure 
maintenance and development, as well as skills development and staff training.  It is 
also related to the appointment of unqualified or unsuitable employees as well as 
expensive consultants. Corruption can be understood as a kind of resource 
misallocation as resources are used for the right purposes but also gains for certain 
persons or groups. 
 
Expenditure leakage is related to inefficient and uneconomical spending of finances, 
which involves incidences of unauthorised or wasteful expenditure;  costs caused by 
poor workmanship and low productivity, for example the use of inferior materials that 
require to be renew frequently; costs for court cases and for the necessity to hire extra 
staff because of labour strikes, for example  the Pikitup experience; and granting 
contracts that are not -delivered, contracts that  neither deliver or decompensate. It 
can be argued that expenditure leakage, as well as skill shortages, is a result of lack 
of control, supervision and monitoring, accountability.  
 
Matters regarding power (electricity) and water losses are common and recurrent 
findings of Auditor General annual reports to the Gauteng Provincial Legislature and 
the CoJ on City Power’s Report on the Financial Statements (AG, 2010b, 2010c, 
2011b, 2011c, 2012b, 2012c, 2013b, 2013c, 2014b, 2014c). For example, Auditor 
General (2014c, 2013c) noted that Johannesburg Water lost 35.7 per cent of the 
water it purchased (equivalent to R1.2 billion) in 2013/14, and 28.9 per cent 
(equivalent to R820 million) in 2012/13. Similarly, City Power lost 28 per cent of the 
electricity it purchased (equivalent to R2.3 billion) in 2013/14, and 26 per cent 
(equivalent to R2.1 billion) in 2012/13 (AG, 2014b; 2013b).  
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Weak incentive is relevant to the experience of South African local government. All 
respondents pointed out the weak accountability in all spheres, where non-
performers, weak performers, and transgressors get away without any disciplinary 
action or punishment taken against them.  
 
Demand-side failure: Demand-side failure is highly relevant to the findings of this 
study. But in this study, a new interpretation of the origin of demand-side failure was 
revealed as an effect of the mild alienation the society is experiencing.  
 
As discussed above, the theory of four root causes of service delivery problems do 
not cover all factors and causes behind municipal problems in the CoJ. There are 
some problems and factors that could not be explained by any of these four causes, 
satisfactorily.  
 
Table 7:2  Four roots of service delivery problems, and causes and factors 
Four roots of 
service delivery 
problems 
Causes and factors identified 
from interviews and document studies 
Resource 
misallocation 
 Cadre deployment 
 Appointment of unqualified staff or employees 
Expenditure leakage 
 Corruption is a biggest source of expenditure leakages 
 Wasteful expenditure 
 Poor revenue collection 
Lack of incentive 
 Lack of consequences which can be understood as a 
result of poor accountability system, weak governance 
and regulatory system 
 Poor workmanship 
 Poor monitoring and evaluation system 
 Poor public participation, which can be regarded as a 
result of no incentive to make it happen, and public 
(communities), at least in their perception that, do not 
have any incentive to participate. Similarly, 
municipalities do not see a need to be compliant with 
that requirement as there is no consequence for non-
compliance with it.  
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Demand-side failure 
 High expectations from communities, which is a result 
of poor public participation and municipalities’ 
weakness (or failure) to include communities in 
planning, decision-making, budgeting, prioritising, 
implementation, and M&E  
 No-payment 
 Lack of participation in municipal affairs 
 Lack of understanding of communities about the roles in 
municipal affairs, which can be argued that it is a failure 
or unwillingness (or reluctance) of municipalities to help 
communities understand their roles 
Factors and causes 
that cannot be 
included in the four 
roots of service 
delivery 
 Legislative burden 
 Poor working relationship between and among different 
sectors, departments, communities, and civil society,  
which is argued by this study, as a result of the mild 
state of alienation 
 Skills and capacity shortage 
 Poor customer service 
 Weak public participation 
 
7.2.4 A mild state of alienation 
The findings of this study suggest that the four roots of service delivery problems, 
while covering most aspects and dimensions of municipal service delivery problems of 
the CoJ and its three municipal entities, does not cover all factors and causes 
observed in this study. Although problems such as poor revenue collection, billing 
problems, power and water outages stem from capacity constraints and skills 
shortages, high vacancy rate, insufficient infrastructure and associated constraints. 
Other problems such as non-payment, electricity and water theft, illegal connections 
and illegal dumping can be understood as outcomes of the high levels of poverty and 
the unemployment rate.  
 
However, some operational and coordination problems, such as fragmentation in 
planning and documentation, silo-mentality in individual citizens and employees, and 
poor social cohesion that is manifested in relationships, communication and social 
problems such as poor customer care, poor working relationships between different  
sectors of municipalities, and municipalities and communities, weak public 
participation are not related to capacity constraints, or skills shortages, or financial 
constraints. It does not need special skills, or capacity or any financial resources to 
have smooth and pleasant working relationships between different sectors or levels of 
municipalities, i.e., between the political sector and administrative sector, or 
municipalities and communities, or even between councillors of different parties.  
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Furthermore, problems such as planning failures, weak governance performance, 
weak political will of leadership, weak participatory practices and processes (i.e., poor 
public participation), and the poor relationships amongst different sectors or 
departments, which reinforces (and is also  caused  at the same time) the silo 
mentality in employees and staff, and the phenomenon of fragmentation in operations 
as well as in the collection, documentation, management and utilisation of information 
and data documentation can be understood as being rooted in or stemming  from 
mental and psychological factors not covered by the four roots of service delivery 
problem as argued by Devarajan and Reinikka (2004). 
 
These reasons as well as the in-depth discussions with interview respondents and the 
in-depth analysis of their discussions led this study to suggest that these 
psychological and personality problems may have originated from the mild state of 
political alienation that individuals, across society and the country have been 
experiencing over the past few years. In the following sections, definitions and 
symptoms of alienation will be presented, followed by five symptoms observed in 
municipal sphere. 
 
7.2.5 Definition and symptoms of alienation 
Although alienation has been studied widely, there is no clear definition provided by 
these studies (Scheff, 2008) and it is defined by theorists and sociological researchers 
in many different ways (Seeman 1975). For Karl Marx (1963), Blauner (1964) and 
Hodson (1996), alienation means self-estrangement and the lack of self-realisation at 
work. Scheff (2008) argues that alienation is measured across a spectrum and is at 
the opposite end to solidarity. It is the isolation of individuals from a community. 
Schwartz (1973) refers to it as a complex of isolation, despair and powerlessness 
within the public that they feel that politicians do not care about them and politicians 
are not trustworthy. Wood (2014: 3) defines political alienation as “a generalised 
feeling of distance from the central political institutions, leaders, and political values of 
society”. Although there is no clear and agreed definition of alienation, the symptoms 
or signs of alienation have been established.  
 
Signs or indications of alienation include psychological and behaviour traits. Some of 
these  indications include poor or lack of communication (such as poor public relations 
or public participation) (Mandle, 1970), low social cohesion and social capital, weak 
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social solidarity, the loss of connection to society and shared values, feelings of being 
ill-treated or exploited, increased corruption and crime (Durkheim, 1951), conflict of 
norms, normlessness (Seeman, 1959), distrust amongst one another, feeling that they 
are separated from  society, self-interest becomes more importance than concern for 
the social group, workers’ estranged relationship with their work and their co-workers 
(Marx, 1963), disenchantment and disillusion, loss of human aspects in work 
relationship and mindlessly obeying the rules (iron cage),  lack of cordiality and 
courtesy (such as poor customer relationship) (Weber, 1958). 
 
7.2.6 Symptoms appeared in municipal sphere  
There are at least five symptoms of alienation that have been observed within the 
municipal sphere: (1) poor communication; (2) disconnection, low social cohesion or 
weak solidarity; (3) distrust toward politicians and municipal authorise; (4) reduced 
political participation and elevated frequency of protests: and (5) lack of cordiality and 
courtesy of municipal staff in dealing with communities and municipal service 
customers. 
 
Poor communication: Mandle (1970) holds that poor or lack of communication 
among stakeholders (in local government and municipality contexts, communities, 
residents, councillors, ward committee members are included in the categories of 
municipal stakeholders), is a sign of alienation. He explained that poor or lack of 
communication among stakeholders is a result of abandoning or un-using the capacity 
to communicate, which he called “alienation of the capacity to communicate”. He 
argues that when it happens, it is a sign that that society has descended into a state 
of alienation. 
 
The widely acknowledged and discussed phenomenon or experience of weak public 
and community participation in municipal processes and functionalities can be 
attributed to poor or a lack of communication among stakeholders. Interviewees 
stated that poor communication not only happened between the municipalities and 
their constituents (or communities), but also between the City Council and councillors 
(Interview: C3, 23 Jan 2015), and even between councillors and their own ward 
committee members (Interview: C4, 19 Feb 2015).  
 
One councillor also shared her frustration at the lack of communication and 
cooperation, and irresponsiveness from the City Council in relation to her inquiries 
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and requests to obtain statistics and data related to her ward. But she stated that in 
her view, it is not because the City Council does not want to share the data and 
information with her, but that the council itself does not have those data and 
information. But she explained that even if the City Council does not have the data 
and information she asked for, she at least should be given the reason for not being 
able to provide the information and data (Interview: C3, 23 Jan 2015).  
 
 
 
The lack of communication is also evident in the high profile billing crisis. One 
councillor argues that at the heart of the billing crisis is poor or lack of communication 
both between municipal staff, who register and print invoices, and their supervisors, 
and also between municipal employees (responsible person such as manager) and 
residents who are owing the City unreasonably high amounts. He stated as follows:  
If I am an employee of the City of Johannesburg, I am printing a bill 
that says you are owing the City R100,000. I am printing it at a printer, I 
see it and print it. As the person who prints it, I must firstly ask myself 
“is this really?” Is this household big enough to spend R100,000 a 
month? That is the first question that you must ask. ... I must go back 
and see how much they pay three months back. And I will ask myself 
why this bill is so huge. Even before printing it, it means I must find you 
or I must call you, say put a caller note, “come here”, let’s discuss 
about the bill before printing it. … But if it is someone else who care 
enough, who has called you and let you know and say we see 
something very very much worse in terms of your bill. You were billed 
R2,000 last month, but this month said R20,000, what is it you’re using 
in your house? As a person who is sitting behind the desk and a 
computer, I must be able to ask this question. But in the City, people 
just print. And that causes the whole chaos (Interview: C4, 19 Feb 
2015). 
 
Another interviewee, a researcher, also stated how the councillors and mayor are not 
in constant communication with communities and that is one of the answers why there 
are service delivery protests. He stated as follows: 
Because of councillors, the Mayor are not in constant communication 
with people to understand what are the challenges and problems 
facing the people and their not responding and unresolving [sic] that 
particular problems and challenges (Interview: R, 1 May 2014). 
 
Another evidence of that is the Bureaucratisation of the M&E process, as well as 
others like public and stakeholder consultation and participation as stated by one 
respondent, an ex-councillor, as follow: 
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At the end of the year (Financial year) we sit down and to get budget 
reports done, to do planning for the next year. Councillors are supposed 
to get comments and feedback from communities and report back. But 
the process becomes bureaucratised. Instead, administrators do them, 
but even they outsource to external persons, consultants. I think that is 
the problem. I think the better system would be using two systems, 
where people involved. Everybody should be involved and be 
continuous, and should be corrective (Interview: C2, 26 August 2014). 
 
That is a kind of Weberian Alienation, caused by bureaucratisation (or rationalisation) 
(Seeman, 1959). 
 
Disconnection, low social cohesion or weak solidarity: It can also be maintained 
that the frequent labour unrest as a result of poor working relationship between labour 
and management experienced repeatedly by Pikitup is also a sign of worker alienation 
with their employers. The unhappiness and frustration of the people and workers (the 
grassroots) who are feeling excluded or marginalised from the democracy, their 
distrust in the political leadership of the country, and the disconnection from their 
leaders is also noted and commented on by Jay Naidoo, the founding General 
Secretary of COSATU (Congress of South African Trade Unions), and former Minister 
in the Mandela Government, who stated that: 
Most are alienated from their leaders, whom they see as disconnected 
from their day-to-day challenges. They have begun to lose trust in our 
democracy… There is growing foment in our land. The people in our 
townships, rural areas and squatter camps are bitter that democracy has 
not delivered the fruits that they see a tiny elite enjoying (Naidoo, 2014: 
para 10 & para 16).  
 
Moreover, there is an evidence of low social cohesion or weak social solidarity among 
general public. The Quality of Life (QoL) Survey conducted by the Gauteng City-
Region Observatory (GCRO)—conducted with a partnership between the University of 
the Witwatersrand, University of Johannesburg, the Gauteng Provincial Government 
and the South African Local Government Association (SALGA), which was probably 
the largest ever survey of social attitudes in Gauteng, with a sample of 27,493 
respondents, and is accurate to ward level—revealed that racial attitudes of people in 
Gauteng is hardening. It stated that 73 per cent of black respondents and 44 per cent 
of white respondents in Gauteng say 'blacks and whites will never trust each other'.  
 
  209 
Table 7:3  Respondents’ trust in other people 
Johannesburg 
Most can be 
trusted 
You need to 
be very 
careful 
Don’t know 
Respondents’ trust in other 
people in their communities (%) 
78 17 5 
Source: GCRO (2014: 72). 
 
Table 7:4  Respondents’ beliefs on trust between blacks and whites 
Respondents’ 
satisfaction with 
Disagree or strongly 
disagree 
Agree or strongly 
agree 
Neither 
Respondents who believe 
that blacks and whites will 
never trust each other (%) 
24 (D 20 + SD 4) 65 (A 49 + SA 16) 11 
Source: GCRO (2014: 80). 
Note: D = Disagree; SD = Strongly Disagree; A = Agree; SA = Strongly Agree  
 
Table 7:5  Respondents’ beliefs that no-one cares about them 
Respondents’ 
satisfaction with 
Disagree or strongly 
disagree 
Agree or strongly 
agree 
Neither 
Respondents who believe 
that no-one cares about 
people like them (%) 
50 (D 39 + SD 11) 39 (A 32 + SA 7) 11 
Source: GCRO (2014: 80). 
Note: D = Disagree; SD = Strongly Disagree; A = Agree; SA = Strongly Agree  
 
Distrust toward politicians and municipal authorities: As stated in chapter 1, the 
trust of citizens toward local government and municipal authorities has been declining 
steadily (Powel, 2009). And local government has become the least trusted of all 
public institutions in the country since 2000 (CoGTA, 2015; Alexander & Kane-
Berman, 2014; Powel, 2009; Idasa, 2010a, HSRC, 2009). At the same time, 
procurement and decision making within local government is highly susceptible to 
corruption (Marchant, 2015; Jolobe, 2014; Corruption Watch, 2014a; Ndletyana, 
Makhalemele & Mathekga, 2013; Putu, 2006). Durkheim (1951) argues that corruption 
is a result of anomies such as low social cohesion and social capital, weak social 
solidarity, the loss of connection to society and shared values. Anomy is a term 
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Durkhein (1951) uses as another form of alienation. Similarly, Seeman (1959) states 
that corruption is a symptom of conflict of norms or normlessness, which is one of 
Seeman’s five dimensions of alienation (they are powerlessness, social isolation, self-
estrangement, normlessness, and meaninglessness).  
 
Reduced political participation and increased frequency of protest: Social 
scientists (Lipset & Raab, 1978; Seeman, 1975; Geyer, 1996; Geyer & Heinz, 1992) 
have been concerned that alienation might reduce political participation through 
institutional channels such as voting, and might lead to nonconventional activity like 
protest movements and collective violence. Denters and Geurts (1993: 460-1) discuss 
two modes of political alienation: powerlessness and meaninglessness. Political 
powerlessness means that people’s trust in the responsiveness of the local system 
has collapsed. Political meaninglessness means that their actions or inputs into the 
political system (through participating in elections or decision-making processes) does 
not have any impact on political outcomes. The political system is deemed 
unresponsive to the demands of common people and therefore they do not have any 
incentive to participate in political processes (Campbell, Converse, Miller & Stokes, 
1960). Booysen (2007), Atkinson, (2007) and Benit-Gbaffou (2006) argue that 
communities choose marching and protest because the formal channels of 
engagement and communication between the communities and municipalities is 
generally not working. 
 
The Institute of Race Relations (IRR) (2015) argues that there is a clear sign of 
alienation of South Africa’s young people—the first Post-Apartheid Generation or Born 
Frees—from the democratic political system. McKinley (2014) also points out that a 
growing portion of the adult (voting age) population has become alienated from the 
political system. And studies (McKinley, 2014; Schulz-Herzenberg, 2014) show that 
an increasing number of eligible South African voters did not even bother to register 
as voters. There is also a suggestion that there is a link between protests (both 
service-delivery protests and students’ Rhodes Must Fall protests) and alienation 
(Ismail, 2015). He observes that a sense of alienation is shared by both white and 
black students together.  
 
Lack of cordiality and courtesy of municipal staff: Both Marx (1963) and Weber 
(1930) discuss the loss of human aspects in work relationship and mindlessly obeying 
the rules (iron cage) as symptoms of alienation and link it to the lack of cordiality and 
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courtesy of workers or staff. As stated in Section 5.5.2 and 5.8.1, the public and 
communities have been frustrated with the poor personalities of municipalities 
manifested in poor communication, unresponsiveness, and in lack of courtesy.  
 
7.2.7 Fragmentation, silo mentality and alienation 
Fragmentation and silo mentality are discussed as causes of municipal inefficiency 
and low productivity. One respondent, a senior official who worked at the CoJ for over 
eight years, said, 
Fragmentation, all over, all over. And that’s hard to overcome. And you 
have to be tight, tight group of senior level people as well, and then you 
have to carry it down so people are interacting all the way down. Quite 
often, they don’t want to care about anything else. I got my job 
(Interview: SOG1, 18 February 2015). 
 
Auditor General (AG, 2011a) repeatedly noted the failures of the municipality and 
municipal entities to reconcile data regularly and stated it as a source of financial mis-
statement. Another problem related to fragmentation is silo the mentality of individual 
employee, sector, or department. Two respondents discussed the problem of silo-
mentality. One said that “silo-mentality, yes, exactly like that. Department to 
department, they don’t talk” (Interview: SOG1, 18 February 2015).   
 
A respondent, a consultant who worked for the CoJ for over eight years, also stated 
about the lack of integration among planning, management and M&E, as follows,  
The other problem with local government is that they don’t have a 
planning and management in an integrated manner. Even though they 
have IDPs, the actual business planning, the management, and 
monitoring and evaluation of them are not happened across the 
department, and across the M&E of municipal owned entities (Interview: 
Con, 28 January 2015). 
 
The Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME), which is now 
named the Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation, states that “weak 
coordination of departments and agencies impacting on local government is 
aggravated by the lack of a spatial or area-based focus and fragmented, weak and/or 
unreliable data” (DPME, 2012: 2). Moreover, both its report entitled “Municipal 
Assessment Tool (MAT) and Summary Outcomes Report” (DPME, 2013) and the 
presentation and briefing by Hassen Mohamed, Deputy Director-General of the DPME 
(he is also MAT Outcome Facilitator and Project Manager) of the Department of 
Performance Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME) to the Standing Committee on 
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Appropriations of the Parliamentary Monitoring Group (PMG) on 10 September 2013 
observed, acknowledged, presented and discussed the nature or characteristics of 
various initiatives, interventions and assistance  provided (by national and provincial 
governments) to the local government level is ad hoc , crisis-driven and fragmented 
(PMG, 2013). The “ad hoc” nature, and the lack of a structured and coherent 
approach to municipal development capacity initiatives were also noted by the 
Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME: 2012: 1). 
 
The lack of an “integrated minimum floor of norms and standards of 
performance for the efficient and effective functioning of local government 
(administratively, politically and in terms of service delivery)”, and the lack of a 
“consistent and integrated set of key performance data on municipalities that brings 
together various pieces of information to form an integrated and holistic picture of the 
municipality” were observed and stated in its Municipal Assessment Tool Guideline of 
the Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME: 2012: 2) 
(Emphasis in the original).  
 
It is possible to suggest that fragmentation is an outcome of silo-mentality, and silo-
mentality, in turn, an effect of the state of alienation—a psychological state which 
occurs in individuals, society, among different races (whites, coloured, Indians, blacks, 
etc), or between different classes (the rich and the poor), or between different levels of 
employees (management and workers). Silo-mentality can occur in individuals (in 
mind-set, and attitude) or in groups (practices and behaviours). Fragmentation occurs 
in functionalities, operations, association and relationships (Figure 7.2).  
 
Figure 7.2 Alienation, silo-mentality, and fragmentation 
Alienation  Silo-mentality  Fragmentation 
 
Among different 
races and 
classes, and 
between 
management 
and employees 
  
Mind-set and 
attitudes of 
municipal 
workers and 
employees’ 
  
In municipal 
functionalities 
and operations 
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7.2.8 Effects of alienation on municipal service delivery 
The data reveal that the state of alienation has negative effects on five areas of 
municipal service delivery functions. Low public participation is regarded by this study 
as a result of alienation. Low public participation in turn creates poor planning that is 
manifested in deviations between budgeting and actual revenues, expenditures, 
targets and actual achievements. Moreover, because of poor public participation, the 
municipal plans (DIPs) do not reflect communities’ needs and concerns. Alienation 
also has negative effects on revenue collections and payment. Revenue collection is 
low either because staff’s productivity is low or customers and communities do not 
pay or delay to pay, both of which can be regarded as an effect of alienation. 
Information and communication are also affected by alienation owing to fragmentation 
and silo-mentality. Alienation affects skills and production by means of reducing 
workers’ morale and productivity, causing workers’ poor attitude, and withholding of 
their skills and expertise. Workmanship and work ethics are also affected too. The 
most affected area would be customer service. As an effect of alienation, customer 
service staff become rude and unhelpful, and process and system lack order (Figure 
7.3).  
 
Figure 7.3 Consequences of alienation 
Information and 
Communication 
 Fragmentation in 
information collection, 
gathering, documentation 
and storage 
 Information shortage, 
duplication, fragmentation 
 Information withholding both 
by municipalities and 
communities 
 Lack or poor flow of 
information, ineffectively or 
untimely, between workers 
and managements, as well 
as between municipalities 
and communities 
Skills and Production 
 Workers’ poor attitude 
 Staff’s low morale and productivity 
 Workers’ withholding their skills and expertise, (as well 
as information) 
 Silo-mentality 
 Poor workmanship and work ethics 
Consequences 
of Alienation 
Revenues and Payments 
 Low revenue collection because 
of staff’s poor productivity and 
inefficiency. 
 Low revenue, because of no or 
late payments from customers 
and communities 
Customer Service 
 Rude and unhelp staff 
 Lack of clear process that customers and 
communities can place their complaints 
Planning (DIP) and Public Participation 
 Poor planning, deviations between 
budgeting and actual revenues, 
expenditures, targets and actual 
achievements 
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and questions 
 Poor customer care and services: long 
queue, disorganised structure, 
information lost 
 Low public participation 
 Planning does not reflect communities’ 
needs and concerns 
 
7.2.9 Causes of alienation 
Exploring the sources or causes of alienation is not a part of this study. But it can be 
argued that a number of social factors, especially the emergence of new wealth, 
conspicuous consumption, and widening inequality, persistent poverty, and high levels 
of unemployment, as well as the prevalent influence of consumerism, are responsible 
for the development of alienation.  
 
Instead of uniting all the different classes and races, the social, economic and political 
situation and development of South Africa has been making the divisions more visible 
and widened. There is some mobility of people from one class to another. But those 
who ascend to a higher level of social class do not help or assist their fellow people 
who are stuck at the poorer level. Although the new political system liberates the 
whole population from the Apartheid system, the economic situation of most African 
people has not been acceptably improved. The aspirations, visions and hopes 
inspired at the beginning of the new democratic era, reinforced and fuelled by the 
ambitious, over-promised, constitution and promises made by governments, turned 
out, in the perception and minds of the general population (citizens) to be an illusion.  
 
Moreover, the general public feel that they are separated from the wealth of their 
country and also from the fruits of their liberation, the political changes, and 
governmental transformations. This has made people frustrated, hopeless and angry. 
This  unhappiness, hopelessness, frustration, resentment,  bitterness and anger  felt 
by the general public, especially by the poor,  is further  exacerbated by the high 
levels of inequality, the clearly visible and increasingly widening-gap between the rich, 
including the new political elite rapidly financially empowered by the new democratic 
system (Langa & von Holdt, 2012) and the poor whose life conditions and living 
standards have not been improved  after over 20 years of political redress and 
changes, and the conspicuously wide salary-gap between municipal management (or 
bosses or chiefs) and general staff—while municipal managers get about R3.5 million 
a year, as a salary and  various allowances, the majority of municipal staff receive 
about R60,000 a year (SAMWU, 2015; de Lange, 2012)—resulting in the beginning of 
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alienation. One interviewee, a former ANC councillor who was a well-known and well-
respected struggle veteran, also discussed about class formation and how political 
leaders and office holders are seen by the general public and workers as in another 
class and they feel alienated and even betrayed. 
Because the government itself is also at the side of accumulation, class 
formation, so the president himself is at this class. He is integrated into 
that system of accumulation. So you find that like our deputy president, 
now Ramaphosa, is the miner, he is a mine-owner, he is a billionaire 
and he is very rich (Interview: C2, 26 August 2014). 
 
Furthermore, the emerging stage of alienation has been fuelled by the public 
awareness of the waste of public money by reckless spending, on lavish hotel stays, 
imported luxury vehicles and multimillion rand parties, lubricated by Johnny Walker 
Blue, home alterations conspicuously pursued by politicians, government officials, 
municipal managers, leaders, and councillors (Interview: M&EP, 22 April 2014). One 
interviewee shared an experienced which happened in his community as follows: 
They (community members) know that there are projects that have been 
approved may not come from them but the projects in their areas and 
they see that that project is taking very long time to be delivered. … 
Grievance is that there are projects we don’t understand why a year 
passed but nothing has happened. But we see you who suddenly driving 
a kind of car or making an improvement in your house that we know you 
can’t afford from your salary. And then they see the councillor driving a 
very nice car all of a sudden buy very expensive car the really the top 
earners in our society are driving.  And one or two people may be linked 
to who won the tender driving those cars. Those things make the 
community very angry when people flush their wealth while in fact there 
is no delivery to the community. So what the community then assume or 
conclude is that somebody is stealing the money that was meant for the 
project. They got an impression. So that is the impression, so it doesn’t 
really matter whether it is true or not. But the community sees those and 
they say it is a corruption and they are becoming angry at corruption 
(Interview: M&EP, 22 April 2014). 
 
That similar phenomena and events have happened and are experienced all over the 
country are widely stated and discussed (Langa & von Holdt, 2012). In its report 
entitled “The State of Local Governance from a Citizen Perspective”, Institute for 
Democracy in Africa (Idasa) stated most people were not happy with their councillors: 
“66% of the respondents think that government staff and councillors benefit privately 
in a dishonest manner from resources intended for service delivery” (Idasa, 2011: 47). 
 
These events and situations lead to low social cohesion and also cause people to 
chase and try to attain, personal wealth and status through deviant behaviour, for 
example through corruption and political connections (nepotism) (Langa & von Holdt, 
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2012), which Durkheim (1951) calls “anomie” as one dimension of the state of 
alienation. One respondent, who was in the Anti-apartheid struggle and well-
respected former ANC member and councillor, stated how people’s attitude and mind-
set toward money and wealth have been changed. He said 
So there is a tendency in the state also to be part of class-formation, so 
people coming in, many of them are not inspired by service to the 
people. Even they might have been former guerrilla comrades but they 
are more of “I must make it” like I need a good job, money so you see 
this is the problem (Interview: C2, 26 August 2014). 
 
7.3 Integration of Weak Signals Theory into EWS framework 
Weak Signal concept is originated in the strategic management and other researchers 
have been trying to use it in different disciplines. However, Nikander (2002) has 
successfully adapted and applied the concept and theory of weak signals in the field 
of project management. The application of weak signals theory applied by both Ansoff 
(1975, 1979), for strategic management, and Nikander (2002), for project 
management, share common characteristics in their use of weak signals. Both of 
them use weak signals to look for warning information about future events, and both 
include the need to anticipate the future. On the other hand, there are differences in 
terms of operational practices.  
 
In strategic management, weak signals are monitored and observed in an external 
operating environment of a company or an organisation while in project management, 
in the internal and external environment of project. Weak signals theory is used in 
strategic management to detect early warnings of unexpected strategic surprises, 
while in project management, for unpredictable small changes and events. In strategic 
management weak signals analysis is used for continuous activities over several 
years, while in project management for the short implementation time of projects and 
for unrepeated once-off events. 
 
Nikander (2002) notes that it is hard to apply Ansoff’s theory in project work because 
of differences in the scale of work load. But he asserts that the rationale of the theory 
is applicable to project work environment. Since the WST is applicable in project 
management, it can be argued that it is also possible to use the WST in process 
management. Moreover, Kaivo-oja (2012) argues that weak signals theory and 
concept are applicable in all kinds of different organisations, categorised by IBM’s 
Cynefin Research Centre. The Cynefin domains classify organisations into five 
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domains based on their inherent uncertainty—obvious (known), complicated 
(knowable), complex, chaotic and transitional domain. Municipalities, which are the 
unit of analysis of this research, belong to obvious or known domain, where cause 
and effect relations exist and will be repeated. Municipalities belong to the first domain 
called obvious (known) where cause and effect relations are repeatable, perceivable 
and therefore predictable. 
 
The important difference between the application of WST in municipal M&E and in 
other fields such as strategic, disaster, business, financial management, international 
politics and future study is that while for municipal M&E, the method is largely based 
on past experiences i.e., risk database, the common problems and challenges, their 
causes, early warning signals and solutions. All of them were learnt and recorded 
from the past experiences. For other fields, the method is based exclusively on past 
experiences and is more and more increasingly inadequate and needs to be able to 
“sense discontinuities” as changes in these fields are happening faster and more 
unpredictably than in the field of municipal sector.  
 
An attempt to incorporate the Weak Signals theory into the M&E system is based on a 
belief that the Weak Signals theory is also applicable in the an EWS framework, by 
making necessary adaptation and adjustment. Furthermore, it is found that integrating 
the Weak Signals theory and concept into the EWS framework will improve the 
effectiveness of M&E system. At the same time, it will extend the application of the 
Weak Signal theory into a new discipline and a new organisational setting and 
working environment. 
 
In addition, this study found that the WST is applicable in the EWS system, 
incorporated into municipal M&E system, because of four reasons; first, the WST 
articulates and argues, and  then is also proved by studies (Hiltunen, 2008; Miller and 
Ward, 2003; Webb, 1987; Nikander, 2002), that there are weak signals (early warning 
signs) about incoming problems or challenges; second, the theory provides 
systematic and practical steps on how to monitor and capture the weak signals (early 
warning indicators). Most of these steps are in line with steps outlined and proposed 
by UNISDR (2005) to design an EWS system; third, since the inception of weak signal 
concept by Ansoff in, the WST has evolved and applied by different disciplines 
including strategic management, international security, international politics, business 
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economy, financial study, military science, communication research, journalism and 
even public sector management, for example public banking institutions.  
 
Fourthly, the unpredictable nature and characteristics of problems and challenges as 
well as changes experienced by municipalities are not the same as those experienced 
by organisations and institutions such as military, intelligent agencies, financial 
institutions such as banks and investment agencies, private sector project 
management. There are still some elements that are similar those organisations and 
fields, such as the possibility to develop risk data based on experiences and common 
problems and challenges, to monitor, spot or detect early warning signals or 
indicators, or weak signals; to study, understand and establish the relationships or 
connections or networks of problem causes, problems, early warnings and responses. 
 
It is, however, important to acknowledge that the nature of problems, challenges, 
changes, risks or surprises of municipal service delivery problems are not as 
turbulent, surprising or unforeseeable as those of other organisations and institutions 
mentioned above. But it makes the monitoring, detecting and interpreting weak 
signals or early warning signals easier and more effective in developing response 
capabilities and strategies.  
 
It can also be argued that unpredictable events are unpredictable because we do not 
understand how chains of events are caused by various factors to become one big 
event that is suddenly and unexpectedly happening. This point is supported by Betts 
(1982) who demonstrates the existence of warning phenomenon in German attack to 
Russia in June 1941, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Korean War, and 
three Arab-Israeli conflicts, and Robinson (2012) in his study of weak signals in 
American history. Once we understand underlying factors and the relationships 
between different, invisibly connected, causes that drive the chains of events and 
eventually create a big event, and we can see or are aware of the development or 
evolution of each and every step, factor and cause, it is possible to anticipate that 
event well before it materialises and becomes visible. In Chapter 5 of this thesis, the 
chain of events that escalate into three municipal problems of water outage, billing 
issue, and skills shortage are presented. The long lists of early warning signs or 
indicators of those individual events or factors are presented in Appendix J, K, L, M, N 
& O. 
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The weak signals theory is regarded as a useful theory for early warning system 
because it provides a means to see, understand and use early warnings of emerging 
problems and challenges in order to be proactively capable to prepare and plan, in 
advance, to address, overcome or mitigate, as much as possible, the effects of 
problems and challenges. 
 
Furthermore, this study would like to argue that there is no real difference between 
organisations where risks and changes are quick and dynamic, or turbulent in a word 
of Ansoff (1978), and organisation where risks and problems are predictable and 
business and working environments are relatively stable, by applying weak signals 
concept and theory in attempts to anticipating, forecasting, detecting, and taking 
advantage of early warning indicators of possible problems and challenges. Although 
WST was intended to apply to organisations in turbulent environments, it is still 
applicable in organisations that are stable and their problems and risks are less 
unpredictable. In fact, it can be argued that the predictable and stable nature of these 
organisations and their problems give extra advantages in using the theory, having an 
advantage of more accurate predictions of incoming problems and therefore able to 
provide relatively correct warnings and effective response strategies. 
 
Although municipalities have the simple organisational structure and nature in terms 
of the complexity of their problems and challenges, the current capacity and 
management level of municipalities are hardly enough to effectively apply Weak 
Signals analysis and approach in their M&E system. However, there is still a great 
potential for municipalities that have enough resources in terms of financial, human 
and management quality, to be able to adopt the weak signals analysis and approach 
in their M&E systems, and can become effective and productive by anticipating, 
addressing, controlling and solving most of their problems and challenges, with the 
help of EWS that is integrated into the M&E system. 
 
7.3.1 Early warning phenomenon in a municipal service delivery environment 
The nature of the early warnings phenomenon, factors relating to the phenomenon, 
and its relation to municipal service delivery processes is illustrated in Figure 7.4. In 
the figure, municipal service delivery process is depicted as a chronological flow of 
events. There are two phases in the phenomenon and several factors occur in it. The 
first phase is an observation and communicational phase. An observer will note the 
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flow of events, receive, interpret and communicate messages. Municipal service 
delivery processes have a chronological flow of steps and events, from which an 
observer obtains information and communication. To obtain the desired information, 
various methods are used. Observers, then, interpret the information. The second 
phase is a phase of analysing the information obtained and making decisions to take 
actions. That phase involves a decision-maker or decision-makers. Based on 
information and data provided by an observer or observers, he or she or they make 
decisions about planning, organising, mobilising resources in order to take pre-
emptive actions concerning the upcoming problems and challenges. In the, time factor 
is an important concept in the early warning phenomenon in a municipal service 
delivery process environment. It is the amount of time available between the moment 
observer notices and catch signals and the moment potential problems became actual 
ones. Capturing, interpreting, communicating and preparation and planning necessary 
actions or responses have to be taken place during that time frame. (Figure 7.4).  
 
Ansoff’s theory of weak signals has, primarily, three important parts—sources of 
signals, decision-making process, and time available to defuse incipient problems and 
issues. According to Ansoff (1984), there are three sources of weak signals or early 
warning indicators, which could be collected and utilised. These sources are 
environmental, internal and performance trends. These three sources are applicable 
to the context of municipal service delivery process.  
Figure 7.4 An early warning phenomenon in a municipal service 
delivery process environment 
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Source: Adapted from Nikander & Eloranta (2001: 389). 
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The intervention or corrective actions that the responsible persons or department can 
devise or implement will depend on the levels of potential impacts implied from and 
calculated based on these signals: Impacts of the future problems (which could be 
minor or major) and strength of signals (which can be strong or weak). Based on this 
information and decision, different actions and matter of urgency are calculated. When 
issues are delayable, monitoring will be continued. When issues are postponable, 
necessary actions and steps will be included in next planning cycle. However, when 
issues are urgent and strength of signals about the issues is strong, quick pre-emptive 
or preventive actions need to be taken. But if strength of signals about issues is weak, 
but issues are urgent, based on the time availability and severity of the impacts, a 
gradual commitment is needed to take actions in near future (Figure 7.5).  
Figure 7.5 Warning signals strategic issue management decision 
 
Source: Adapted from Ansoff, 1984: 366. 
 
Between the time when early warning signals or indicators are detected and the time 
when the full impacts of the relevant problems occur, there are four sub-periods—
times for decision, for planning and negotiation, for mobilisation and preparation for 
implementation, and for undertaking the corrective actions (Nikander, 2002: 86) 
(Figure 7.6). 
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Figure 7.6 The sub-periods of time available between early 
warning and full impact of problems 
 
 
 
 
Source: Nikander, 2002: 86. 
 
7.3.2 Integration of two supplemented theories into the WTS 
In order to design an M&E system that serve as an EWS, the weak signals theory 
alone was not sufficient. Moreover, in its nature, the WST is conceptual, and the 
research problems, i.e, early warning characteristics of an M&E system, are, in 
nature, operational. To supplement the Weak Signal Theory, as stated above, two 
complementary theories are used in this research—Four roots of service delivery 
problem that was expounded by Devarajan and Reinikka (2004) and later adopted 
and used by the World Bank to study public sector service delivery problems; and 
“four essential elements of EWS” discussed by Basher (2006: 2170) and later adopted 
and practised by the United Nations (UN) in its disaster management. Integrating 
these two operational theories into a conceptual theory strengthen and expend the 
practical and operational dimension of the WST.  
 
7.3.3 Contributions to the remedies on the WST’s limitations  
The key term in the theory is “weak”. But Ansoff himself and researchers who studied 
and discussed about the theory do not discuss about the term “weak”. It is a weak 
term—difficult to define and measure. However, it should be understood that the 
definition and meaning of “weak” depends on the context where it is applied. 
 
Another key term in the theory is “signal”. Ansoff did not define “signal” clearly about 
signal. Coffman (1997) filled this gap by discussing three kinds of signals—signals 
that are beyond our perception; signals that are within our perception and we 
recognise them easily; and signals that are within our perception but which we do not 
recognise because of our failure, negligence or incapability to be aware of them. 
Weak signals theory is about trying to receive and use the third kind of signals that we 
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miss or fail to receive, not because they are out of our perception but because of our 
inability to detect or receive them.  
 
So far, interpreting weak signals is still a subjective activity. The theory, initiated by 
Ansoff and improved and expanded by many researchers later, has not provided a 
methodology to make interpreting weak signals less subjective, and more objective 
and therefore less debatable regarding the interpretation of the signals and also 
determining response strategies. One of the main reasons for the subjectivity of weak 
signal interpretation is the nature of risk, changes, surprise or future problems and 
challenges that are generally unpredictable and capricious. Another reason is the 
nature of signal evolution into strong, clear and concrete information about future risks 
or problems. According to Ansoff (1975; 1979) and later a number of researchers 
(Ansoff & McDonnell, 1990; Ansoff, 1984; Hiltunen, 2006, 2007, 2008a, 2008b; Kuusi 
& Hiltunen 2011; Nikander, 2002; Uskali, 2005; Kothari, 2010), there are five steps 
where weak signals evolve into strong signals. There is also a trade-off between the 
amounts or length of time available and level of certainty the signals reveal, and need 
to be balanced by signal interpreters, who are both signal monitor and detector, and 
decision makers who are responsible for determining response strategies.  
 
The WST, to date, does not deal with or provide a means to deal with these matters. 
However, this research, through literature review about various information theories 
and monitoring and evaluation theory and empirical data collected and interpreted by 
this study, discovers that there is a prospect of improving the WST by integrating 
relevant theories that explain the value of information, rational relationships between a 
chain of events, causes of problems and problems. By integrating relevant and related 
theories into the WST, its subjective nature of signal interpretation can become less 
subjective and therefore there will be a better chance of getting consensus between 
signal observers, who are also interpreters, and decision makers involved in the early 
warning process. It will also be able to provide a better means of detecting weak 
signals, in other words early warning indicators, because problems, causes of 
problems and interrelationships among different problems could be more understood 
due to their improved predictability.  
 
As mentioned above, the WST was, originally, developed and applied for the fields 
and organisational settings where risks, challenges and changes are highly 
unpredictable and the speed of changes are also very high. However, gradually, the 
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concept and theory of weak signals has been adopted and adapted by several fields 
and organisational structures where their risks, problems and changes are less 
predictable and their environments are less turbulent. In the same vein, the basic 
rationale of this research is that the concept and theory about weak signals could be 
applicable in M&E system of public sector although risks, challenges, changes and 
problems of public sector are less uncertain and its business environments are 
relatively stable and predictable. The predictable and stable nature of their problems, 
challenges and risks makes the process of monitoring, detecting, interpreting weak 
signals in these organisations and their operational environment easier and more 
effective than in other fields and organisations in which the weak signals concepts and 
theory was originally and initially applied. 
 
Another important shortcoming of WST is its lack of discussion on the cost of mis-
warning. Since signals are weak, fragmented and incomplete in providing an accurate 
estimation of their meaning, sources, impacts, and, in turn, determining responses, 
the interpretation of these signals and declarations are not definite in their 
predictions—predictions, and therefore, warnings could be right as well as wrong. 
However, there is no discussion in the theory on the costs of wrong predictions, and 
preparation and planning to address risks or problems that are unpredictable. 
However, this point is discussed in in literature of early warning system (Choo, 2009). 
It is, therefore, worth making the point that the theory of weak signals has a prospect 
of becoming more vigorous and useful by integrating the ToC and logic model, which 
are essential concepts of M&E. Furthermore, it is reasonable to anticipate that by 
incorporating essential elements of EWS, information theory, ToC and logic model 
into the WST, an integrated theory of Weak Signals could be achieved.   
 
It is possible to overcome the problems of wrong warnings or mis-warnings, by having 
a clear guideline and policy regulation that allows signal observers and interpreters to 
make reasonable, but accountable mistakes in their warnings. Comprehensive 
training as well as complete consultation and communication between EWS teams 
and decision makers should get as much consensus as possible on issues about what 
kinds of warning-mistakes are acceptable. Moreover, there should be a hearing 
section with a committee of stakeholders to get fair and just decisions whenever there 
is a dispute over a warning decision. 
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7.4 Extended M&E territory 
This study discovered that the fundamental objectives and functions of M&E and 
those of an EWS are different. An EWS is more related to Strategic Management, 
Risk Management and Disaster Management as they relate to the considerations, 
anticipation and preparation of possible risks in their plans and allot or budget 
necessary resources for the purpose of addressing those risks. On the other hand, 
M&E does not have the aspect of anticipation, planning and preparation for the worst 
possible risks in its plan, and the concept of early warning is not present in it.  
 
M&E has a “retrospective nature” with the aim to learn and analyse what has been 
done (Wilson, 2002), while an EWS has an “anticipative nature” that looks to the 
future situations or conditions, watching for possible problems based on a pre-
established set of problems that can occur in the processes or programmes. M&E 
does provide “early indications of progress or lack thereof in the achievement of 
intended results”, means of tracking the actual performance or measuring the situation 
against what was planned or expected according to pre-determined standards 
(UNDP, 2002: 102).  
 
One participant of the focus-group discussion gave an illustration of what M&E is. His 
example is memorable and clear. He said, for example when we are going from 
Johannesburg to Pretoria, there are a number of landmarks along the way, such as 
big buildings of international companies, DBSA (Development Bank of Southern 
Africa) office in Midrand, the Tollgate, and UNISA (University of South Africa) at the 
entrance of Pretoria. By seeing these landmarks, we know that we are on the right 
track. However, his M&E system does not provide any information or instructions 
about any hurdles or problems that can be experienced along the journey.  
 
7.4.1 The birth of proactive M&E (pM&E or eM&E)  
This is where a proactive M&E system fills the gap. By incorporating an EWS in it, the 
Proactive EWS system can anticipate possible problems, understand their early 
warning indicators, and build and prepare capacity to address or solve those possible 
problems. 
 
There is another illustration about what a proactive M&E (pM&E) is. pM&E is like 
bringing (or having) life-saving equipment such as a parachute, or a life-boat when 
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taking a flight or ship.  It is because of the knowledge that there is a possibility   of a 
problem during the journey. Conventional types of M&E such as iM&E and rM&E only 
bring a map and other necessary articles, hoping that the journey will be smooth. It is 
true that conventional types of M&Es can provide early indications of whether or not 
they will arrive at their destinations on time. But there is no information about possible 
problems or dangers. 
 
7.4.2 Different types of M&E: iM&E, rM&E and eM&E 
M&E is divided into different types. The two main types are implementation-focused 
M&E and result-based M&E (Kusek, & Rist, 2004). There will be a new type of M&E 
(the proactive one), when the EWS concept and components are incorporated in it. 
For the sake of terminology (or jargon), let us use the names implementation-focused 
(iM&E), result-based M&E (rM&E), and EWS incorporated M&E (eM&E, it can also be 
called (pM&E) which stands for “proactive M&E”. EWS incorporated M&E (eM&E) and 
proactive M&E (pM&E) are the same thing.)  
 
The differences among these three M&E types are the stages (or phases) they watch 
for (or monitor); and questions they ask. An EWS incorporated M&E (eM&E) covers 
three stages of a programme or project: planning, inputs, and processes (or activities) 
stages. A results-based M&E (rM&E) covers two stages: Processes (activities), and 
outputs stages. Another difference between a traditional M&E and eM&E is the timing 
of interpreting or evaluating the data and information collected through monitoring. In 
M&E, monitoring is conducted routine, daily and on-going, while evaluation is episodic 
(Wilson, 2002). But in M&E incorporated with an EWS, both monitoring and evaluation 
are required to be routine, daily and on-going activities. Data are collected and 
interpreted (or evaluated) “simultaneously” because of time-sensitive nature of an 
EWS. 
 
The types of questions they ask are also different. Implementation-focused M&E 
systems are designed to answer the ‘accountability’ questions. Results-based M&E 
systems are designed to address the “so what” questions. EWS incorporated M&E 
systems are designed to respond to the “what if” questions. Questions different M&E 
types ask are stated in Figure 7.7. 
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Moreover, their identifications are also varied. iM&E identifies itinerary throughout the 
processes. rM&E identifies rationalé and justifies the significance or importance of 
intervention. eM&E identifies barriers and problems that could be encountered during 
the process. 
 
Based on those differences of the three M&E types, this thesis argues that the current 
M&E system cannot function as an early warning system (EWS). In order to be able to 
serve as an EWS, the municipal M&E system has to be transmuted into a proactive 
system, by incorporating the concept and components of an EWS. It means that the 
M&E system needs to have components of risk (or problems) anticipation, 
identification and response preparations in the way of strategic management, risk 
management, and disaster management. 
 
Figure 7.7 Three types of M&E and their stages and questions  
EWS incorporated M&E (eM&E)  
  Results-based M&E (rM&E) 
 Implementation-focused M&E (iM&E) 
Planning Inputs 
Processes 
(Activities) 
Outputs 
What barriers and 
problems could be 
encountered? 
Did they mobilised 
the needed inputs 
So what  activities 
have taken place? 
So what about the 
fact that outputs 
have been 
generated? 
If when barriers or 
problems are 
encountered, what 
are the solutions 
and how can we be 
prepared? 
What are the 
limitations and 
weaknesses in the 
needed inputs 
Did they undertake 
and complete the 
agreed activities? 
So what that the 
outputs from 
these activities 
have been 
counted? 
What capacity 
needs to be 
developed 
 Did they deliver the 
intended outputs 
(the products or 
services to be 
produced)? 
What are the 
goals of the 
organisation? 
What warning 
signs do those 
barriers or 
problems have 
  Are they being 
achieved? 
   How can 
achievement be 
proven? 
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Source: Based on Kusek & Rist, 2004). 
 
As discussed in the Chapter 2 and Chapter 6, there are two kinds of EWS definition: 
narrow definition and broad one. Because of these two definitions, there are also two 
kinds of EWS: Gross EWS and specific one. The conventional M&E serves as a gross 
EWS, i.e., providing information of whether or not the set objectives or goals of 
programmes, projects or work would not be achieved. In order to make an M&E 
system to be able to serve as a specific EWS, it has to be integrated the application or 
the methods of weak signals theory, as well as the early warning components (i.e., 
four essential elements of an EWS). A new kind of M&E (i.e., pM&E or eM&E) 
extends the M&E territory, which has functions and objectives of both strategic 
management, risk management and disaster management. Figure 7.8 shows the 
extended territory of M&E, in which EWS (a function of risk and disaster management) 
as well as the use of WST (applied by strategic management). Because of its 
extended territory and added functions and objectives, the new M&E (or eM&E or 
pM&E) can now serve as an EWS, as required by legislation of South Africa’s local 
government. 
Figure 7.8  Extended territory of M&E 
 
LEGEND 
WST: Weak Signals Theory, which is originally used in strategic management but 
later adopted by many other fields. 
LEGEND
WST:         Weak Signals Theory, which is exclusively used in strategic management.
EWS:         Early Warning System, which is primarily used in risk and disaster managements 
                  (RM & DM).
pM&E:        Proposed Model of proactive M&E (pM&E) that is Integrated with EWS components, and therefore serve as an 
                  EWS.
WST
pM&E
EWS
Risk and Disaster
Managements
Strategic
Management
Risk management is the continuing 
process to identify, analyze, evaluate, 
and treat loss exposures and monitor 
risk control and resources to mitigate 
the adverse effects of loss. 
Disaster Management is the 
organisation and management of 
resources and responsibilities for 
dealing with all humanitarian aspects 
of emergencies, preparing, 
responding, and Recovering, with an 
aim to lessen the impact of disasters.
An integrated process of continual 
gathering and assessing information to 
make judgments about progress towards 
particular goals and objectives, as well as 
to identify unintended positive or negative 
consequences of action, and to provide 
insight into why success or failure has 
occurred (Woodhill, 2005).
(1) accountability, 
(2) supporting strategic management, 
(3) Supporting operational management, 
(4) knowledge creation and 
(5) empowerment 
M&E
Besides its conventional five key functions, 
the new M&E also serves as an EWS.
the continuous planning, monitoring, 
analysis and assessment of all that is 
necessary for an organization to meet 
its goals and objectives. 
It involves analyzing cross-functional 
business decisions prior to 
implementing them.
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EWS: Early Warning System, which is primarily used in disaster management (DM). 
pM&E: Proposed Model of proactive M&E (pM&E) that is Integrated with EWS 
components, and therefore serve as an EWS. 
Source: My own conceptualisation 
 
7.5 Conclusion  
This chapter contains discussions on two topics: factors affecting municipal service 
delivery performance, and different types of M&E. There are three main points in this 
chapter. First is the suggestion that municipal problems are more about public 
participation than other factors. Second is the argument that problematic personality 
and psychological aspects of municipalities are originated in a mild state of alienation. 
The third point is the interdiction of Proactive M&E (pM&E), which is M&E 
incorporated with EWS. In the following chapter, the research questions would be 
answered and conclusion will be presented.  
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Chapter 8 
 
ANSWERS AND CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
This chapter has three main parts. First, it presents answers to three research 
questions posted in the beginning of the thesis (Chapter 1). Second, it discusses three 
contributions made by this study. Finally, it provides suggestions for future studies.  
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
The research examined the extent to which the current M&E system of the City of 
Johannesburg contains the components of an EWS. The purpose is to design and 
propose a model of M&E system that can serve as an EWS and enable municipalities 
to receive advance information about potential problems, and then to implement the 
necessary corrective interventions. There are three main questions this study tried to 
answer. The first question is a theoretical question: whether or not the Weak Signals 
Theory can contribute to the effectiveness of an M&E to serve as an EWS, as 
required by legislation. The second question asks to what extend the current M&E 
system of CoJ has EWS characteristics and components. And the third question is 
about modification of the current M&E system in order to integrate the components 
and characteristics of an EWS, so that it can serve as an EWS. This chapter presents 
answers to the research questions. Knowledge contributions of this study and 
suggestions for further researches are also discussed.  
 
8.2 Answers to the research questions 
The research posted three main questions, as stated in the Chapter 1 (Introduction 
Chapter). This section discusses those questions and answers revealed by the 
research, followed by contributions made by this study. 
 
8.2.1 Question 1: Weak Signals Theory  
The central research question is: 1. Can the effectiveness of M&E system be 
improved by integration of the weak signals theory, and why? 
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Answer: The effectiveness of M&E system can be improved by integration of the 
Weak Signals Theory (WST). 
 
The findings state that the rationale of the Weak Signals Theory (WST) is applicable 
to an M&E and an EWS. And the WST theory can contribute in the effectiveness of an 
M&E system by integrating its approach into an Early Warning System. The limitation 
of the current M&E system is its inability to inform municipalities about incoming (or 
emerging) problems, i.e., providing early warning signals of these problems. The WST 
provides means to capture weak signals (early warnings), to interpret and use the 
information. The basic idea of WST is that “strategic surprises” (problems) do not 
appear out of the blue, weak signals (early warning of these surprises or problems) 
exist, and can be detected. Although weak signals (early warning) are weak, 
imprecise and difficult to analyse, it is still possible to take some actions to defuse or 
mitigate, or at least lessen the impacts of, problems on organisation. Another 
contribution of WST in the effectiveness of an M&E system is its active scanning 
(monitoring) approach, which is different from conventional monitoring in M&E system 
(Guillaume, 2011:). Moreover, Ansoff’s three levels of filters (between signals and 
observers) and four kinds of delays (between detecting and understanding signals 
and taking preventive actions) are also useful and important in planning and 
implementing an M&E system (Ansoff, 1979, 1984) (see Section 2.4.1 for discussion 
on the WST). 
 
However, this study finds out that it would be hard to apply the WST to an early 
warning system (EWS) for “a municipal service delivery process”, and to use it in the 
current local government context, for three reasons: capacity constraint, political, and 
multi-sectorial nature of municipal system.  
 
EWS is a group-activity. A good flow of information and work processes is essential. 
The key word in an EWS is “early”. Expedition is key and indispensable in an EWS. 
Time is thus a determining factor for a system to be effective or not, or successful or 
failed. All steps and a chain of events are linked together in physiological 
interdependence and operate as a functioning whole. Only one delay in one step can 
mean an opportunity is lost to prevent or address an approaching problem. When the 
theory was first introduced, Ansoff (1979) discusses four kinds of delays that can 
make the use of weak signals theory ineffective. They are identification delay, 
verification delay, political delay, and cultural delay. Similarly, Choo (2006) also states 
  232 
four gaps: knowledge gap, capacity gap, knowing-doing gap, and communication Gap 
(See Section 2.4.1 for the discussion on Ansoff’s four delays and Choo’s four gaps). 
 
Communication Gap is wider in a local government context than other organisational 
contexts. This study identified ten joints (fault-lines)—within the local government 
structure—that connect different sectors and groups of municipalities, which cause the 
communication process to be difficult and long. These joints or fault-lines exist (1) 
among councillors from different parties; (2) between councillors and Mayoral 
Committee; (3) between the municipal council and the municipal administration; (4) 
between management and staff; (5) between the council (the city) and communities; 
(6) between councillor and ward committee members; (7) between ward committees 
and communities (CDWP, 2014: Case No. 21); (8) among ward committees in 
regions; (9) between the municipality (the council) and municipal entities; (10) labour 
union (such as South African Municipal Workers’ Union) and the municipality or 
municipal entities. Such barriers or layers become more challenging when the working 
relationships between and among those sectors and levels are not smooth. 
 
The political dimension and relationship tensions occurred between councillor and 
ward committee members stated by one respondent, who himself is a councillor is 
instructive and memorable. He said:  
Ward committee members are supposed to advise and assist the 
councillor. But they are not advising the councillor. They are now 
competing with the councillor, as some of them they come from political 
parties. They see themselves as better than councillor. That is how they 
are supposed to work but currently they are not working because 
meetings are not taking place. Those meetings are supposed to 
empower councillors when they go the Council (Interview: C4, 19 Feb 
2015). 
 
8.2.2 Question 2: Characteristics of an EWS in the current M&E systems  
The second research question is: To what extent does the current M&E system of 
municipalities have the characteristics of an EWS?  
 
Answer: The finding indicates that the four essential elements of an EWS do not exist 
in the current M&E system. An evidence that the municipality and municipal entities 
have established a knowledge data-base has not been found in all (26) interviews, 
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two focus group discussions, or official documents of the CoJ and three municipal 
entities. The data indicate that early warning signals exist and there are people who 
detect and understand those early warning signals and indicators (Interviews: M&EP, 
22 April 2014; Con, 28 Jan 2014; SOCoJ5, 4 March 2014; FGD, 23 June 2014 and 24 
November 2014) (see appendix O, the list of Early Warning Signals). When early 
warning information is communicated, for example CDW reports that warn about the 
possibility of community unrest and protests, adequate actions are not always taken 
(Interview: DCogta, 21 Aug 2014).  
 
And a systematic procedure to utilise those early warning signs in order to defuse, 
prevent or mitigate the future problems, is not in place. A budget is also not allocated 
for EWS purposes, such as to mitigate the upcoming problems (Interviews: SOCoJ5, 
4 March 2014; 24 November 2014). Most importantly, there is no evidence that 
response capability is developed (Interview: DCogta, 21 Aug 2014). In short, the 
current M&E systems of municipalities have very little characteristics of an early 
warning system (Interviews: DDPME, 19 July 2011; DDBSA, 6 July 2011). Findings 
about the municipal M&E systems are discussed in Chapter 7. 
 
The prime reason for lack of EWS components is the current M&E system was not 
designed to provide EWS functions. An M&E system has to be a proactive type, which 
is incorporated with an early warning system. Discussion about Proactive M&E 
(pM&E) system is presented in Chapter 6. 
 
8.2.3 Question 3: How to modify the current M&E Systems so that it serves as 
an EWS 
The third research question is: Can the current M&E system of municipalities be 
modified and upgraded to integrate the components and characteristics of EWS in it, 
so that it can alert key players and stakeholders of developing problematic trends in 
the last stage of municipal service delivery processes, i.e., the implementation stage?    
 
Answer: The current M&E system of municipalities can be modified and upgraded so 
that it can serve as an EWS and can alert key players and stakeholders of developing 
problematic trends in the last stage of municipal service delivery processes, i.e., the 
implementation stage.  
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In order to modify it, three things need to be done. The first step is to establish an 
EWS teams with qualified staff. Two full-time staff and two part-time staff, seconded 
from the M&E team would be enough for the beginning stage. Resources required for 
an EWS are described in Chapter 5. The second step is to incorporate an EWS 
system into the existing M&E system. The existing municipal M&E frameworks have 
to include an extra section, articulating the direction and guide-lines of how to 
integrate the EWS components into the framework, and also the budget for this. Also 
the EWS activities have to be allocated. A discussion on how to integrate an EWS 
system into the current M&E system is presented in Chapter 7. A sample EWS 
framework is also presented in Chapter 7. The third step is to make sure to get all 
stakeholders to buy-in into the process, and political commitment from the leadership. 
According to Wilson (2002), “widespread stakeholder buy-in” is indispensible to make 
a system effective and sustainable. Without it, a sound and perfectly designed M&E 
system will fail. Thus, a large-scale, participatory process is essential to build 
ownership and buying from the start. One of the essential parts in making EWS work 
in an organisation is to have a champion who has the power and authority in the 
organisation and is also willing to take the ownership of the system (Gilad, 2004). The 
Mayor, or the Municipal Manager should be the champion.  
 
In order to be able to detect and know in advance of any deviations, problems, threats 
and barriers, municipalities need to have a Proactive M&E system that can serve as 
an EWS. The EWS process is discussed in Chapter 6, and a Proactive M&E system 
(pM&E) is described in Chapter 7.  
 
8.3  Contributions to knowledge 
The most important and necessary part of a PhD thesis is presenting new knowledge 
to the world, saying something, and then proving it, that has never been said or 
demonstrated before. This chapter tries to serve that purpose. First, it briefly presents 
three statements, or claims, that are related to the research problem and research 
questions posted at the beginning of this research project as well as at the beginning 
of this thesis. Second, it tries to substantiate those three statements or claims 
primarily with primary data collected and attained from interviews, focus group 
discussions, observations from field, and document study, followed by supplementing 
with secondary data such as media reporting, articles and previous studies and 
research reports. Since detailed discussion of findings and discussions have been 
presented in the previous chapters, the discussion in this chapter will be brief, with the 
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simple aim of highlighting and repeating some main points, in other words the 
contributions, made by this research. 
 
8.3.1  Contribution to the understanding of municipal problems: introducing 
the concept of alienation as a cause of the municipal problems 
All municipal problems, challenges and factors are discussed in literature, various 
studies, reports as well as with or by respondents. There is a general understanding 
and agreement on what the problems are but the systematic and complete data-base 
of problems, or risk data-base has not been developed or established. One of the 
findings or discoveries this research reveals as an underlying cause, through 
conducting root cause analysis is the state of alienation in the country as well as in 
organisations and municipalities. Nature of alienation is observed, albeit subtly, 
relationship both between the political sectors and administrative sectors of local 
government, and also between the municipalities and their constituents or 
communities. 
 
One of the contributions this study made is the extension of the notion or concept of 
alienation from economic discovered and discussed by Hegel and Marx to a broader 
social phenomenon. The bridge, albeit tiny, to this wider application is the concept of 
alienation between municipalities and their constituent communities, as well as 
between broader government, including small numbers of well-connected and 
economically benefitted new rich, and the general population, who are generally 
disappointed and unhappy about their lives and lack of hope for their future as well as 
for their children. 
 
Moreover, studies on local government, municipalities or municipal service delivery 
have not revealed or discussed the concept or notion of alienation as one of the root 
causes of municipal service delivery problems as well as tensions both between the 
political sector and the administrative sector of municipalities and between 
municipalities and their constituents or communities.  
 
8.3.2  Contribution to the application of Weak Signals Theory 
Another contribution this study made is the extension of the use of Weak Signals 
Theory. The WST has been, since its inception in the1960s, tested and applied in 
various fields, such as military and intelligence science, strategic management, 
  236 
disaster management, business management, financial management, international 
politics and future studies. 
 
As discussed in the Chapter 2: Conceptual Framework, the Weak Signals Theory 
does not apply the risk knowledge database as the way the early warning system of 
natural disaster management uses. The integration of risk knowledge database into 
the Weak Signals Theory could make the monitoring and interpreting the weak signals 
more efficient. The suggestion to apply the risk knowledge database in the Weak 
Signals Theory, as well as the Decision Support Model of Early Warning (DSMEW) 
(discussed in the Chapter 2), can be also regarded as a theoretical contribution made 
by this study. 
 
Another bridge, albeit tiny but important, to this wider application is the use of WST in 
public sector management, in general, and in the management of municipal service 
delivery processes as well as the public sector, more specifically in municipal M&E 
systems. This study could be regarded as the first study on the feasibility of applying 
WST in such public sector domain, which has never been tried, although the public 
sector has been trying to use or apply many management techniques and tools 
applied by the private sector.  
 
As a very first study to explore the feasibility or suitability of the use of WST in the 
municipal sector as well as in the M&E field, the findings and analysis of this study are 
by no means regarded as comprehensive or exhaustive. Many more, systematic, 
carefully-structured and administered studies are expected and should be encouraged 
to work on this issue, i.e., the use of WST in local government or the municipal sector 
and also in the M&E field.  
 
8.3.3 Contribution to M&E domain and its functions 
Another contribution this research made is the need to extend or redefine the M&E 
domain and its functionalities in order to have EWS purpose as one function of M&E 
system. The current functions and objectives of M&E system do not have an EWS 
purpose. EWS is more related to Risk Management. However, the legislation requires 
municipalities to have an EWS function in their M&E frameworks and functionalities.  
 
Moreover, the environments municipalities operate in may be different, but the roles, 
responsibilities, functionalities, challenges and problems faced by them during their 
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service delivery processes are essentially the same, and the findings, lessons learnt, 
recommendations and the model and framework of an EWS and its roles and place in 
M&E systems discussed and outlined in this research and provided in this thesis could 
be regarded as universal, adaptable and useful for all municipalities. 
 
Table 8.1 Contributions 
1 Introduction of the concept of alienation to the municipal service delivery problems 
2 
Introduction of weak signals theory and approaches in local government context, 
and the integration of risk knowledge database in the Weak Signals Theory 
3 
Integrating EWS components into M&E domain, and proposition of a new section 
of EWS in a M&E framework 
8.4 Suggestions for further researches (future studies) 
Naturally this research cannot be regarded as the definitive research in this area. As a 
result of the research findings, potential areas for further research can be identified 
three areas that should be explored in future research.  
 
8.4.1  Comprehensive, but narrowly focused studies 
The field of local government is wide, complex and intricate with multifaceted 
components interrelated and connected with different sectors and stakeholders. 
Comprehensive studies should be conducted by narrowly focusing on just one 
particular issue, challenge or problem faced by local government or municipalities. 
Such studies should be organised, planned and arranged by the national government, 
with complete cooperation from provincial and local governments, and also 
cooperation with research and educational institutions.   
 
While conducting this research, an impression was developed that officials and 
employees as well as leaderships and politicians from local government and 
municipalities were not willing to reveal their experiences, views and information they 
have and know. It took the researcher more than three months, 16 emails and five 
phone calls, just to get a letter allowing the researcher to do research about the CoJ. 
Five officials in senior management positions declined to meet and answer the 
researcher’s interview questions. The typical reasons they gave were that they were 
not directly related to the issues that the research was studying or exploring; and they 
did not have enough experience and in turn information and knowledge that was 
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useful for the research. The reasons for their unwilling or lack of interest should also 
be explored and understood. But, again, it is impossible to study those reasons 
without the full authorisation, assistance and cooperation from the national and 
provincial governments. 
 
8.4.2  Comprehensive root cause analysis 
Root cause analysis discussed in this research is intended to serve as a sample one 
that could be used as a starting point. The experience of this study reveals that RCA 
is more appropriate for group study rather than single or individual studies. Therefore, 
in order to be able map-out and understand all factors related to municipal problems 
and challenges, a systematic and comprehensive RCA should be conducted by 
municipal officials and staff who have long working experiences and therefore have 
the tactic knowledge about the municipal structures, the dynamic and tensions among 
various separated sectors and stakeholders that are impossible for external 
researchers to understand or study within short period of times.  
 
The point is that any studies on local government municipalities to be systematic and 
comprehensive, and in turn useful and valuable, have to be conducted by people who 
are in the inner cycle of municipalities. Without the assistance and cooperation of the 
people from municipalities, it is difficult to study and understand the true picture and 
realities of municipal working systems, structures, challenges, and problems, factors 
underlying and causing the challenges and the problems. 
 
8.4.3  Causes and effects of alienation  
The effects of alienation on local government performance have not been in the 
mainstream of local government and municipal studies. The focus of this study is on 
an early warning system (EWS) for municipal service delivery processes. In order to 
understand about early warning signals related to municipal problems, it is necessary 
for this study to explore the factors behind municipal problems. While studying these 
factors, the issue of alienation emerged. Data revealed that there are some tensions 
or distance in the relationships between municipal workers and municipal 
managements as well as politicians. It was also discovered that the relationships 
between municipalities as a whole entity and communities or the public are not 
harmonious and in many instances, misunderstandings, unhappiness and grievances 
exist.  
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At the very beginning of this thesis, a quotation of Mac Maharaj was stated. Maharaj 
(2009) observes that public servants are demoralised and devalued, and asks how 
they can be transformed to become efficient, proud and caring public servants. This 
study would like to conclude that such mental state or personalities of public servants 
that include municipal staff and employees, as well as unresponsive and poor-
participative nature of municipalities that communities and the public perceive could 
be understood as an outcome of the ‘mild’ state of alienation that society and the 
municipal working environment experience. The word ‘mild’ is used to imply that the 
state of alienation is at a developing or beginning state. But it is intended to stress that 
that ‘mild’ state of alienation could develop into a state of alienation unless necessary 
corrective or preventative actions are taken in time. 
Table 8.2 Suggestions for future research 
1 Comprehensive and narrowly focused studies on each municipal problem 
2 Comprehensive Root Cause Analysis for each municipal problem 
3 
On causes and effects of alienation on municipal processes particularly in 
municipal workers and public participation 
 
8.5 Conclusion and overall messages 
The municipal Performance Management and M&E systems are required by various 
legislation to serve as an early warning system (EWS). The preliminary study of this 
research, however, discovered that the current municipal (M&E) systems do not have 
the essential components of an EWS and, as a result, cannot alert key players and 
stakeholders of developing problematic trends in municipal service delivery 
processes.   
 
Based on two premises—first, the current level and quality of municipal service 
delivery performance could be improved and in turn become better capable of fulfilling 
its constitutional obligations; and second, the existing M&E systems are not 
functioning or serving as an EWS—this study examined the extent to which the 
current M&E system of the City of Johannesburg contains the components of an 
EWS. To this end, three research questions were formulated (Section 1.4) and a 
theoretical framework (Section 2.4) was constructed with three main theories—the 
theory of weak signals, four roots of service delivery problems and four essential 
components of an EWS—to explore and understand the functionalities and 
performance of municipal service delivery, and the roles played by M&E systems, 
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which are by legislation required to serve as EWSs.  The main theory this study uses 
is the Weak Signals Theory, which argues that it is possible to detect, foresee or 
predict problems or changes or surprises by means of an EWS which can indicate 
that these problems, changes or surprises transmit or hint that they are imminent, well 
before their actual arriving. Two more theories are also applied to supplement the 
Weak Signals theory. The first complementary theory is that the four roots of service 
delivery are related to the root causes of problems in the municipal service delivery 
process. The second complementary theory is the four essential components of an 
EWS, used in order to design an EWS. 
 
This study reviewed the literature on M&E, early warning systems (M&E), weak 
signals theory (WST), the service delivery processes of local government in South 
Africa and factors affecting the municipal service levels and performance. The 
literature on M&E, EWSs and WST were reviewed in order to explore and understand 
the essential components, characteristics and functionalities of an EWS and 
approaches and mechanisms to monitor and detect early warning indicators or 
signals. The literature on municipal service delivery processes, their challenges and 
problems, and their factors and causes were also reviewed with an aim to understand 
the municipal service delivery processes, problems and challenges, the causes and 
factors behind these problems and challenges, and their early warning signals or 
indicators. 
 
It is necessary to reiterate that this study is not about the quantities and levels of 
municipal service delivery performance, but rather about the municipal M&E systems 
and its functionalities as EWSs. And the main pillar of the research on how an EWS 
could improve performance regardless of the nature of service delivery. This research 
is thus primarily situated in a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework. 
 
This study revealed that, firstly, by integration the approaches and methods of the 
WST, municipal M&E systems can improve their effectiveness and also can serve as 
EWSs. The answer to the first research question, therefore, is that The effectiveness 
of M&E system can be improved by integration of the WST. It, however, notes that the 
current “municipal” M&E systems are not conducive to fully apply the WST, for three 
reasons: capacity constraint, a highly politicised culture, and the multi-sectorial nature 
of the municipal system. 
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Moreover, the finding indicates that early warning signals exist and there are people 
who detect and understand those early warning signals and indicators. But a 
systematic procedure to utilise those early warning signs in order to defuse, prevent or 
mitigate future problems, is not in place. A budget is also not allocated for EWS 
purposes. And this study found no evidence that a knowledge (risk) data-base has 
been established or that a response capability has been developed. The answer to 
the second research question, thus, that the current M&E system of the CoJ does not 
have the four essential elements of an EWS. 
 
Furthermore, the study also observes that there are different kinds of M&E systems, 
for example reactive or proactive M&E systems. One of the main differences between 
a reactive M&E system and a proactive M&E system is that different questions are 
asked and different indicators are developed at the planning stage of the M&E 
process (see Section 7.4.2). The answers to the third research question is that in 
order to be able to detect and know in advance of any deviations, problems, threats 
and barriers, municipalities need to have a Proactive M&E system (pM&E), and this 
study proposes a new section on EWSs that should be integrated into the current 
M&E framework of the CoJ (Section 6.3). 
 
As contributions to knowledge, the overall messages of the thesis are fourfold. The 
first is a new explanation or interpretation of the root causes of municipal problems, 
stating that a mild state of alienation due to the nature of the highly politicised culture 
is prevalent amongst office workers and is one of the root causes of many problems 
which municipalities have. The implication of that observation suggests that when 
there is a state of alienation, there will be problems regardless how many resources 
are provided and available, how skilful and capable municipal officials and workers 
are, and how perfect policies, legislation, and systems are. The discussion on the 
effects of alienation on municipal functionalities and performance can be regarded as 
a point of departure from the four roots of service delivery theory of Devarajan and 
Reinikka (2004), as that theory does not discuss the psychological and social 
dimensions of municipal service delivery problems. 
 
Second, this study identified the two main areas in municipal service delivery 
problems as expectation gaps and municipal personalities. The finding indicated that 
although there are gaps between communities’ and consumers’ expectations and the 
actual quality and performance of municipal service delivery as well as some 
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inefficiency issues in municipal operations, the levels and performance of the 
municipality—CoJ, City Power, Johannesburg Water and Pikitup—are adequate and 
above the acceptable levels, according to the internal benchmarks and standards. 
And the public are generally satisfied with municipal performance, except in the areas 
of customer service and relations. One of the important findings this study made is 
that it is the personality of municipalities, rather than their performances, that is source 
of communities’ and the public’s unhappiness and disappointment. 
 
The third is its finding that a conventional M&E system does not serve as an early 
warning system, although it provides early warning indicators. The implication of that 
finding is that the territory of M&E needs to be redesigned, extending its purposes, 
objectives and functionalities; so that it can accommodate the concept of an EWS and 
serve EWS functions, as required by municipal legislation. The discussion on narrow 
and broad definitions of an EWS is worth paying attention to when drafting laws and 
legislation. The integration of an EWS section, provided in this thesis (in Chapter 6), 
into the municipal M&E framework will enable the municipal M&E system to be 
capable to serve as an EWS, as stipulated by the municipal legislation (Treasury, 
2012; RSA, 1998, 2000, 2001. See Section 1.1, at page 34National).  
 
The fourth point is its discussion on the applicability of weak signal approach or 
methods in a local government context. This study argues that although the rational 
and fundamental principles and ideas of weak signal theory are applicable to a local 
government context, and to municipal M&E systems, the application of its methods 
and approaches, such as to observe weak signals, to interpret the signals, to 
disseminate and communicate the knowledge about impending problems, and to 
make decisions about responses to those incoming problems, would be hard, even if 
not impossible, to use in municipal M&E systems, for three reasons: capacity 
constraint, political, and the multi-sectorial nature of the municipal system. 
 
Although the full application of the approach and method provided by the Weak 
Signals Theory, might be hard to apply in the “current” evolutional stage of 
municipalities’ operational development (for the three reasons discussed in Section 
8.2.1), at least the components of the WST approach and methodology are still 
applicable in the M&E system of municipalities, for example exploring and 
understanding the weak signals (early warnings) of municipal problems and crises, 
conducting active monitoring or scanning, applying the decision support model of 
  243 
early warning (DSMEW), and understanding and overcoming Ansoff’s three levels of 
filters between signals and observers, delays between identifying and understanding 
warning signals and implementing mitigative actions, and Choo’s four gaps (discussed 
in 2.4.1 and 8.2.1). 
 
Moreover, there is a hope that in the near future the full application of WST approach 
and method could be applicable in municipalities for three reasons. The first reason is 
the existence of many good, ethical, honourable people, workers, leaders and 
managers all over the country, who have, sincerely, good intentions and good will for 
the country and the general public. Throughout this study, and long data-collection 
periods, I have met many good and respectable public servants as well as many 
politicians who, genuinely, love the country, and really want to improve the living-
standards and well-being of the general public. The second reason is the functioning 
education system, which is, although its performances are faltering compared to 
international standards, still in a good state, still provides good educational qualities 
and standard, and produces world standard leaders in different fields and areas. The 
third reason is the well-functioning institutions, such as the justice system, although 
law enforcement has to be strengthened radically; the civil society is still strong and 
vibrant; and the democratic system, with its limitations, flaws and weaknesses, is still 
functioning pretty well and it is still an exemplary system for fellow African countries. 
These are the things South Africa has to be proud of, and to have faith, optimism and 
inspiration on which necessary, much-needed, reforms and the restructuring of some 
parts of government institutions, departments and social structure should be based 
and grounded on. 
 
I would like to conclude the thesis with one interesting wish expressed by one 
respondent. He said, “If possible, I would like to mix all races and nationalities in a big 
wok and make all look the same and feel the same” said one respondent (Interview: 
CM5, 6 February 2015). Another respondent also states his wish as “I want all of us to 
be colour-blind or to become colourless” (Interview: SOG2, 12 March 2014). I am 
also, at the same time, remembering a poem of a 4th grader in New York City, which 
won a prize in the NYC Elementary Schools a few years back (plf515, 2012). It asks: 
 
Would a rainbow of one colour be wonderful? 
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Appendix B: Ethics clearance certificate 
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Appendix C: Interview guide 
(1) What are the common problems and barriers during the service delivery 
processes? 
(2) What are the signs, signals, or indicators that precede and indicate the 
approach of these problems, challenges and crises? 
(3) What are the ways to know and communicate these signs, signals and 
indicators? 
(4) What are the factors affecting the performance of municipal service delivery 
processes: resource constraint, which includes skills-shortage, management 
weakness, regulatory burdens? 
(5) What normally goes wrong in the service delivery processes? 
(6) What are the common problems and challenges that hinder  the service 
delivery process 
(7) The underlying situation and root causes of these problems 
(8) What mistakes do they make often and regularly? 
(9) How do they know that they are on track to deliver? 
(10) How are M&E information on service delivery processes, activities, 
functionalities, outputs and outcomes reported and analysed? 
(11) What are the likely blockages and plans to solve them? 
(12) What are the key performance indicators (KPI) and measures (revenue, 
quantity, quality, access) 
(13) What are the key areas of concern (from communities’ view and experiences) 
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Appendix D: Numbers of persons interviewed, and dates of interviews 
 
Twenty six persons from four different groups—public servants and municipal officials 
and staff; Civil Societies; Community members; and researchers and academics—
were interviewed. Their positions, ranks and groups they belong to, as well as Code 
numbers referred to them are described in the following table. In coding the name, the 
following system of code formulation was devised and applied: 
C refers to councillor 
SO refers to senior official 
SOG refers to senior official from the Gauteng provincial government 
SOCoJ  refers to senior official from the City of Johannesburg (CoJ) 
SOME refers to senior official from municipal entity 
D  refers to Director 
DDPME  refers to director from DPME 
DDBSA  refers to director from DBSA 
DCogta refers to director from Cogta 
CM  refers to community member 
R  refers to researcher 
M&EP  refers to M&E practitioners 
 
Table D1 Numbers and descriptions of interviewees, and their code names 
Persons Descriptions: Positions, ranks, and groups Codes 
6 
councillors (one is former councillor, and six are 
current councillors) 
C1—CG  
2 
senior officials from the Gauteng provincial 
government 
SOG1—SOG2  
6 senior officials from CoJ SOCoJ1—SOCoJ6 
1 senior official from municipal entities SOME1 
1 director from DPME DDPME 
1 director from DBSA DDBSA 
1 director from CoGTA DCogta 
6 community members CM1 – CM6 
1 researchers  R 
1 M&E practitioners M&EP 
Total numbers of interviewees  26 
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Table D2 Dates of interviews and codes 
Numbers, description Codes Interview Date 
5 Councillors  C1—C5  
C1, 31 July 2014 
C2, 26 August 2014 
C3, 23 Jan 2015 
C4, 19 Feb 2015 
C5, 25 March 2015 
2 Senior Officials from the Gauteng 
provincial government  
SOG1—SOG2  
SOG1, 18 Feb 2014 
SOG2, 12 March 2014 
6 Senior Officials from the City of 
Johannesburg (CoJ) 
SOCoJ1—
SOCoJ6 
SOCoJ1, 6 Nov 2013 
SOCoJ2, 6 Nov 2013 
SOCoJ3, 6 Nov 2013 
SOCoJ4, 6 Nov 2013 
SOCoJ5, 4 March 2014 
SOCoJ6, 9 April 2014 
1 Senior Officials from Municipal Entity (JW) SOME1 SOME1, 13 Nov 2015 
1 Director from DPME DDPME DDPME, 19 July 2011 
1 Director from DBSA DDBSA DDBSA,  6 July 2011 
1 Director from CoGTA  DCogta DCogta, 21 Aug 2014 
5 Community Members  CM1 – CM5 
CM1, 19 March 2014 
CM2, 11 April 2014 
CM3, 17 June 2014 
CM4, 20 Sep 2014 
CM5, 6 Feb 2015 
1 Consultant Con Con, 28 Jan 2014 
1 Researcher R R, 1 May 2014 
1 Academic A A, 8 August 2014  
1 M&E practitioners M&EP M&EP, 22 April 2014 
26 persons in total   
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Appendix E: Note of preliminary interview 
 
 
Date:  6 November 2013 
Place:  Thuso House, 66 Siemens Street, Johannesburg  
Time:  10:00 – 11:15 am 
Interviewees:  SOCoJ1, SOCoJ2, SOCoJ3, SOCoJ4, 
 
This is a note of an Preliminary study or interview and a quick on-site-observation. In 
order to maintain anonymity and confidentiality, the names of interviewees and 
respondents are always, as is consistent with responsible research practice, withheld. 
When necessary, the code numbers are used to refer persons and to discuss the 
interrelatedness of his or her discussions. A visit was paid only to meet and chat in a 
friendly way with municipal staff and officials and also to familarise myself with the 
office. There was also an intention to establish rapport with respondents before 
conducting actual interviews (Chadwick, Bahr & Albrecht, 1984). 
 
When I arrived at the office, we took our seats at a big round table. Then, the 
respondent (SOCoJ1) disappeared for a few minutes. Then he came back with three 
other people—two were women and one was a young man. We made introductions, 
in a very friendly and warm way. I then talked about my research briefly. Since I 
thought this was just a normal chatting to arrange for conducting interviews in 
sometime in the near, I did not audio-record the conversation. But it turned out that 
they were answering my research questions and suggesting how I should narrow 
down. The respondent SOCoJ2 knows about the research process as she has 
recently completed a research project—she stressed that it was not for a PhD. 
 
The following are the main points of our conversation. 
 
(1) Municipal service delivery process is wide. I should limit my study 
components of it.  
I realised that what I thought about the municipal service delivery process is not what 
they are really doing. In the municipal service delivery process, there are many steps 
that involve   consultation with the community, which was introduced recently—I did 
not ask when it was introduced but I will follow up with that question later. After 
consultation, prioritisation was discussed and decided. The IDP for the next five years 
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was drawn. Based on the IDP, yearly prioritisation and detailed operational plans were 
discussed and drawn.  
 
Now I understand that what I meant by the “municipal service delivery process” is not 
the whole process but day to day operational steps of providing services—I will only 
study four basic services, i.e., electricity, water, waste refusal and sanitation—through 
observation and interviews with community members. In other words, what I am going 
to study is the last stage of service delivery process. It is about day-to-day 
functionalities or operations of delivering services to end users, i.e, community 
members. 
 
(2) The City of Johannesburg (CoJ) recently started taking a wider role in the 
operations of municipal entities.  
The CoJ established the municipal entities and is the main share-holder of them, 
owning 55% of their shares. The respondent SOCoJ1) added that he does not know 
who own the other 45%. (It should be noted that according to the IDP 2012-2016 
report of CoJ, the CoJ is the sole owner of the City Power and Joburg Water.  
 
The municipal entities used to be independent and the CoJ did not involve or micro-
manage them. But because of their inefficiency in operation, now the CoJ involves 
itself and micro-manages in the planning and operations of the municipal entities. It is 
good news for my study because the purpose of my study is to give the CoJ a better 
overview and over-sight  powers to manage and lead the delivery of services. The 
EWS (Early Warning System) designed and proposed by my research will be a useful 
tool or mechanism for the CoJ in managing municipal entities. 
 
(3) The main problem is the issue of non-payment for service 
The respondent SOCoJ1 said in his view, the main problem that municipalities are 
facing is the issue of non-payment for service. He also stressed the underlying factors 
of this issue, which involve poverty, unemployment, urbanisation, mushrooming 
informal settlements—slum, the effect of the financial crisis that entails job-losses or 
retrenchments of many people. I noted non-payment issues in the literature. I can 
relate it to expenditure leakage issues such as avoidable wasteful expenditure and not 
strictly or systematically following due legal process to collect debt and revenue as 
well as fee-collection processes that are in place in the municipal system. I will follow 
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up with these interrelated issues. I think that these issues could be related to skills-
shortages, which is one component of the resource-misallocation factor. 
 
(4) Provision of houses (this is not relevant to my research. But it is good to 
know about it too.) 
It is not related to my study. But I took note of the discussion. The respondent 
SOCoJ2 said municipalities are not directly providing houses to community. The 
municipalities, i.e, the government, no longer build houses and give them to 
community members directly. Instead, they are provided indirectly. The municipalities 
are supporting businesses to be successful and thrive by providing an enabling 
environment such as infrastructure. When businesses thrive and grow, they can 
create many jobs for communities and community members will get jobs and regular 
incomes and then will be able to buy and own houses.  
 
(5) Municipalities also study common problems of their operations and 
functionalities 
The respondent SOCoJ3 said municipalities also study common problems and 
challenges of their operations and functionalities. In annual reports of municipalities, I 
could find problems and challenges that municipalities noted and discussed. She said 
I should look up reports of all six metropolitan municipalities—she gave me the 
website address where I can get their reports—and also compare the problems and 
challenges against each metropolitan. She also pointed out that I can also find these 
questions, i.e., common problems, challenges and barriers, in Mayoral speeches. 
Then one person left and returned with three thick books, and showed me some 
pages about problems and challenges. The respondent No. SOCoJ1 joked that 
Comrade Myo, you must not be afraid of thick books, a PhD is too much reading. 
 
(6) Another problem facing municipalities is environmental degradation.  
The respondent SOCoJ 2said one of the problems municipalities are facing and have 
to address is environmental degradation. There will be a seminar on it next year. She 
said I should also look at these problems. She said they can introduce me to people 
who are working on that issue. The respondent SOCoJ4 also said that they will 
introduce me to a strategic department of the CoJ that is dealing with problems and 
challenges and finding way to address and tackle them. He added that I should detail 
my questions so that they could know exactly what I wanted to know and can answer 
clearly and exactly. 
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(7) Researches about municipalities are also valuable for municipalities and the 
government 
One respondent SOCoJ2 pointed out that researches about municipalities are 
valuable for municipalities and the government by making a contribution to improving 
municipal performance. Municipalities as well as the government want to know about 
problems, barriers, challenges and factors that affect the performance of 
municipalities. The kind of win-win-situation attitudes shown by municipal staff is 
encouraging for students and researchers who are studying municipalities and local 
government. 
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Appendix F: Data management 
 
Metadata standards and procedures 
Simple descriptive and administrative metadata was used to store, discover, identify 
and access collected data. Interviews were audio-recorded, in MP3 format. Moreover, 
notes were also taken during all interview sections. Information about each interview 
such as interviewer, interviewee, date, place, duration, main points, follow-up issues 
in next meeting and appointment were kept securely in a confidential password-
protected database.  
 
Each interview followed a questionnaire format. The questionnaire was in a text file. 
Literature such as documents and academic journal articles were either in Microsoft 
Word format are PDF format.  
 
Site-observation notes were taken in the format of Microsoft Word, Microsoft Excel 
and Notepad. Whenever necessary and possible, photographs were taken: 
permissions and consents were taken before taking photographs. All photographs 
were in JPEG image format. The audio files, interviewees’ consent forms, database, 
and text files were stored and saved in one main password-protected folder. 
 
The data were collected in the Microsoft formats for Microsoft Word, Microsoft Excel, 
PDF, Notepad, MP3, MP4, JPEG image, Microsoft Visio. The types of data involved 
site observation notes, transcribed interviews, audio-recordings, pictures, literature 
review notes,  
 
The size of the data was approximately 200 pages of interview transcripts—about 15 
pages for an interview that last between 35 minutes to a little bit more than one hour: 
The average length of interview is approximately 30 minutes; approximately 50 pages 
of site observation notes, approximately 30 audio clips, and 10 pictures. All of these 
data were less than 200 MB.  
 
Confidentiality, anonymity and encryption of the data 
A written memorandum that ensures confidentiality were given to all interviewees. All 
interview data were confidential. Moreover, all data were anonymised. All data were 
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saved in a single password-protected folder. The signed consent forms for interview 
were stored in lockable filing cabinets, separately from the collected research data. 
 
Quality Assurance Plan 
The study was conducted in English and no translation was required. Confidentiality 
was maintained by storing interview recordings and interview transcripts in password-
protected files, and using codes such as numbers rather than persons names and 
locations. Only the researcher had access to all data. When the thesis supervisor and 
examiners need to check the data, there will be no names or personally identifying 
information on any/all interview transcripts and any/all notes. 
 
Some interview transcripts were sent to a number of interviewees who wanted to see 
and check, for accuracy. Although they were requested to add or remove any 
information if they desire to do so, no one did so.  All printed documents, transcripts 
and notes were stored in lockable filing cabinets. The signed consent forms for 
interviews were also stored in lockable filing cabinets. 
 
Data formats, Storage and back-up schedule 
The formats for data were in Microsoft Word, Microsoft Excel, PDF, Notepad, MP3, 
MP4, JPEG, Microsoft office visio. All data were stored in a password-protected folder 
and backed-up in a desktop computer, a lap top, a DVD. The regular back-up DVD 
were kept by one of my friends who lives about 10 kilometre away from my home. Site 
observation notes, interview transcripts, thesis chapters, and important literature and 
papers were stored on-line. All printed documents and notes were stored in lockable 
filing cabinets. 
 
The study uses free open source software such as Stories Matter and Mendeley. 
These two software formats as well as Microsoft office suite will not be expired in the 
foreseeable future. 
 
Directory and file naming convention and ensuring confidentiality 
Code numbers were used for all interview audio clips and transcripts. Names of 
respondents and participants in the study and information collected were kept 
confidential. Permission were however sought for the views to be quoted. In 
transcripts, notes and the dissertation, Names of interviewees were not mentioned. 
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Files of research papers, documents, reports and literature were named using the 
APA referencing system. 
 
Documenting methods and procedures 
Literature review papers were documented with the American Psychological 
Association (APA) style citations and reference APA documentation. Instead of names 
of particular people such as interviewees, code numbers were used in all notes. 
Printed notes were stored in lockable filing cabinets. 
 
Data deposit and duration of data retainment 
The data will be destroyed after five years of successfully completion of the study, in 
front of one or two staff of the Information Technology (IT) department of the 
university.  
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Appendix G: List of municipalities 
whose performance management and M&E frameworks and policies of municipalities 
stress the importance of an EWS in M&E systems  
 
CoJ (2012),  
Gauteng Provincial Government (2010)  
CoGTA, Province of KZN, (2012),  
Swellendam Municipality (2013), 
Amathole District Municipality (2013),   
Frances Baard District Municipality (2006),  
Buffalo City Municipality (2010),  
Nyandeni Local Municipality (2010),  
U-Mas’pala Municipality (2008),  
Mogale City Local Municipality (2010),  
Umdoni Municipality (2009),  
Matatiele Municipality (2012),  
Emnambithi – Ladysmith Municipality (2012)  
Amajuba District Municipality (2013) 
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Appendix H: Personal experience (difficult to get responses from the 
municipality) 
 
Whilst conducting this research, the researcher had the personal experience of trying 
to get permission from the CoJ to conduct interviews, and observation, and also to get 
official documents. More than 10 emails were sent to the Municipal Manager, Mr 
Trevor Fowler, whom I had met at the 2014 Presidential Local Government Summit 
and explained to him about my research and requested that he grant me an official 
letter of permission to conduct my study. He agreed verbally and showed interest in 
my findings. But I received no responses. More emails were sent, weekly, to all email 
addresses found in the CoJ website. Still no response was received again.  
 
I talked about it to one of my friends, who is a deputy director at the CoJ, and he 
advised me not to send an email (the same email) to many persons together, because 
people who received my email would think that another person will respond — the 
typical ‘it‘s not my job syndrome’. So, I sent an email to those email addresses, but 
this time individually, and I got a response, but it did not answer my email. The 
respondent in question is an MEC, and he forwarded my email to another person 
asking him to assist me. Getting that particular contact was a significant break-
through. Eventually, I got a letter of permission to conduct my research at the CoJ and 
its three entities, which is a really nice letter (See Appendix 1), after more than two 
months, and writing more than seven emails. The person who sent that nice letter 
apologised to me and said that they thought I have been assisted. Apart from 
emailing, I also phoned all phone numbers found in the CoJ website, but no one 
answered. Sometimes the phone rang for a long time while sometimes it was busy 
(engaged). I even wrote to the CoJ Faceback page, requesting permission, but to no 
avail. 
 
Another experience was related to Johannesburg Water (JW), concerning the JW 
Water Week Exhibition at the Alexandra Taxi Rank and Alexandra Plaza (on 3 - 6 
February 2014). Four Water Week Exhibition programmes were announced in 
newspapers as well as on the JW website. I wanted to attend them. I went to the 
place where the Water Week Exhibition programme announced that they were to be 
held, i.e., at the Alexandra Taxi Rank and Alexandra Plaza, during the week that was 
announced. I found that no-one from JW was there and no one at those places knew 
about the Exihibition. I phoned the contact number of Johannesburg Water found on 
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its website. I emailed to the advertised email address about the Water Week 
Exhibition programme as I was really interested to attend.  No responses were 
received. 
 
I also had another experience at Pikitup. I had a really helpful and informative 
interview with Pikitup’s Chief Operations Officer. He was really nice, (brotherly) 
friendly and supportive to me. His interest in my research as well as my eventual 
findings was apparent and he even requested me to share my findings with him as 
well as my EWS system once I had completed my study. At the interview, I requested 
to him to allow me to go with a Pikitup refuse collecting truck for a week. He agreed 
and asked me to write a formal letter, which I did. After almost one year, I had not 
received a reply, although I followed up repeatedly. 
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Appendix I: National Treasury’s check list 
 
 
Description 
 
 
Standard 
Service  
Level 
 
Solid Waste Removal    
1 Premise based removal (Residential Frequency)   
2 Premise based removal (Business Frequency)   
3 Bulk Removal (Frequency)   
4 Removal Bags provided(Yes/No)   
5 Garden refuse removal Included (Yes/No)   
6 Street Cleaning Frequency in CBD   
7 Street Cleaning Frequency in areas excluding CBD   
8 
How soon are public areas cleaned after events 
(24hours/48hours/longer) 
  
9 Clearing of illegal dumping (24hours/48hours/longer)   
10 Recycling or environmentally friendly practices(Yes/No)   
11 Licenced landfill site(Yes/No)   
 
    
 
Water Service    
1 Water Quality rating (Blue/Green/Brown/N0 drop)   
2 Is free water available to all? (All/only to the indigent consumers)   
3 Frequency of meter reading? (per month, per year)   
4 
Are estimated consumption calculated on actual consumption over 
(two month's/three month's/longer period) 
  
5 
On average for how long does the municipality use estimates before 
reverting back to actual readings? (months) 
  
 
Duration (hours) before availability of water is restored in cases 
of service interruption (complete the sub questions) 
  
6 One service connection affected (number of hours)   
7 Up to 5 service connection affected (number of hours)   
8 Up to 20 service connection affected (number of hours)   
9 Feeder pipe larger than 800mm (number of hours)   
10 What is the average minimum water flow in your municipality?   
11 
Do you practice any environmental or scarce resource protection 
activities as part of your operations? (Yes/No) 
  
12 How long does it take to replace faulty water meters? (days)   
13 
Do you have a cathodic protection system in place that is operational 
at this stage? (Yes/No) 
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Electricity Service    
1 What is your electricity availability percentage on average per month?    
2 
Do your municipality have a ripple control in place that is operational? 
(Yes/No) 
  
3 
How much do you estimate is the cost saving in utilizing the ripple 
control system? 
  
4 What is the frequency of meters being read? (per month, per year)   
5 
Are estimated consumption calculated at consumption over (two 
month's/three month's/longer period) 
  
6 
On average for how long does the municipality use estimates before 
reverting back to actual readings? (months) 
  
7 
Duration before availability of electricity is restored in cases of 
breakages (immediately/one day/two days/longer) 
  
8 Are accounts normally calculated on actual readings? (Yes/no)   
9 
Do you practice any environmental or scarce resource protection 
activities as part of your operations? (Yes/No) 
  
10 How long does it take to replace faulty meters? (days)   
11 
Do you have a plan to prevent illegal connections and prevention of 
electricity theft? (Yes/No) 
  
12 How effective is the action plan in curbing line losses? (Good/Bad)   
13 
How soon does the municipality provide a quotation to a customer 
upon a written request? (days) 
  
14 
How long does the municipality takes to provide electricity service 
where existing infrastructure can be used? (working days) 
  
15 
How long does the municipality takes to provide electricity service for 
low voltage users where network extension is not required? (working 
days) 
  
16 
How long does the municipality takes to provide electricity service for 
high voltage (HV) users where network extension is not required? 
(working days) 
  
 
    
 
Sewerage Service    
1 
Are your purification system effective enough to put water back in to 
the system after purification? 
  
2 To what extent do you subsidize your indigent consumers?   
 
How long does it take to restore sewerage breakages on average   
3 Severe overflow? (hours)   
4 Sewer blocked pipes: Large pipes? (Hours)   
5 Sewer blocked pipes: Small pipes? (Hours)   
6 Spillage clean-up? (hours)   
7 Replacement of manhole covers? (Hours)   
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Financial Management   
1 
Is there any change in the situation of unauthorised and wasteful 
expenditure over time? (Decrease/Increase) 
  
2 Are the financial statement outsources? (Yes/No)   
3 
Are there Council adopted business process structuing the flow and 
managemet of documentation feeding to Trial Balance? 
  
4 
How long does it take for an Tax/Invoice to be paid from the date it has 
been received? 
  
5 
Is there advance planning from SCM unit linking all departmental plans 
quaterly and annualy including for the next two to three years 
procurement plans? 
  
 
    
 
Administration (Customer services)   
1 Reaction time on enquiries and requests?   
2 
Time to respond to a verbal customer enquiry or request? (working 
days) 
  
3 
Time to respond to a written customer enquiry or request? (working 
days) 
  
4 Time to resolve a customer enquiry or request? (working days)   
5 What percentage of calls are not answered? (5%,10% or more)   
6 How long does it take to respond to voice mails? (hours)   
7 Does the municipality have control over locked enquiries? (Yes/No)   
8 Is there a reduction in the number of complaints or not? (Yes/No)   
9 
How long does in take to open an account to a new customer? (1 day/ 
2 days/ a week or longer) 
  
 
    
 
Procurement process   
1 
How many times does SCM Unit, CFO's Unit and Technical unit sit to 
review and resolve SCM process delays other than normal monthly 
management meetings? 
  
 
    
 
Other Service delivery and communication   
1 Is an information package handed to the new customer? (Yes/No)   
2 
Does the municipality have training or information sessions to inform 
the community? (Yes/No) 
  
3 
Are customers treated in a professional and humanly manner? 
(Yes/No) 
  
 
Source: National Treasury (2015) 
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Appendix J: Factors, causes, problems and EWS from Interviews 
 
 
ACRONYM  
A&M Administration and management 
C&C:  Coordination and communication 
CS:  Customer Service  
DS:  Demand-side 
EWS:  Early Warning signals 
HR: Human Resources (or human capital) 
PP:  Public Participation 
RS:  Revenue Service 
SCM:  Supply Chain Management (Procurement) 
 
Table J1 Summary of factors, causes, problems and EWS from Interviews 
Exogenous  Supply-side factors 151 Demand-side  
 17 Planning 59 Inputs 35 Processes 42 Outputs 15  6 
  Leadership 11 HR 22 A&M 23 Customer service, CoJ 8   
  Governance 13 Finances 4 Supervision 1 Electricity 0   
  IDP 6 Infrastructure 3 Monitoring 7 Water & sanitation 5   
  PP 29 Equipment 0 SCM 5 Refuse removal 1   
    Information 5 C&C 6 Revenue service, CoJ 1   
    Systems 1       
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Table J2 Factors, causes, problems and EWS from Interviews 
DS DS Entitlement of communities, expectations from the government to provide everything 
DS DS High expectation 
DS DS Illegal damping 
DS DS non-payments of people who can afford to pay 
DS DS people do not care about environment and neighbourhood 
DS DS people lack awareness about their roles and responsibilities 
EWS A&M A vision and mission is clearly articulated 
EWS A&M A vision and mission is established 
EWS A&M Attitude of "But we've always managed like this" 
EWS A&M Decisions repeatedly postponed 
EWS A&M Management performance contracts are applied properly 
EWS A&M Management performance contracts are not established 
EWS A&M No of Un-renewed contracts, due to the Sun Set Clause 
EWS A&M Normal basis for staff promotions are not clear 
EWS A&M Normal basis for staff promotions are not followed  
EWS A&M number of disciplinary cases 
EWS A&M Performance contracts are not effectively managed 
EWS A&M Running behind the targets 
EWS C&C Councillors do not report back to BECs regularly 
EWS C&C 
Increasing tension with key stakeholders, whether it is poor credibility with the press, disenchantment with the unions, or 
disaffected pension trustees  
EWS C&C Lack of Communication 
EWS C&C number of meeting held among leaderships and management 
EWS C&C number of meeting held among management and employees 
EWS C&C Public participation policies and plans are not communicated to the committees 
EWS C&C REC does not communicate political decisions to Caucus meetings 
EWS C&C REC does not communicate political decisions to deployees 
EWS C&C REC poorly communicate political decisions to deployees 
EWS C&C REC poorly communicates political decisions to Caucus meetings 
EWS C&C role definitions are not communicated 
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EWS CS Bad Relationship with customers 
EWS CS issues of complaints 
EWS CS number of customer complaints in a day (or a week) 
EWS CS number of trainings provided in a month 
EWS CS percentage of complaints responded or resolved 
EWS CS time duration required to resolve or response to complaints 
EWS CS level of customer satisfaction with affordability of tariffs (score out of 10) 
EWS CS level of customer satisfaction with basic services (score out of 10) 
EWS CS number of calls answered within 20 seconds in a day 
EWS CS number of calls answered within 30 seconds in a day 
EWS CS number of calls dropped (does not include calls dropped within 5 seconds) in a day 
EWS CS number of connection made in less than 14 days in a month 
EWS CS number of connection with no advance on the meter for 90 days 
EWS CS number of disciplinary cases initiated 
EWS CS number of grievances lodged by customer 
EWS CS number of limiter connections with consumption > 200 liters per day 
EWS CS number of queries resolved at first contact 
EWS CS number of street theatre events held in a month 
EWS CS rate calls answered within 20 seconds, in a day 
EWS CS rate calls answered within 30 seconds, in a day 
EWS CS rate calls dropped (does not include calls dropped within 5 seconds) in a day 
EWS CS rate connections made in less than 14 days in a month 
EWS CS rate meters billed on actual readings in a month 
EWS CS rate meters read in a month 
EWS CS rate of complaints resolved 
EWS CS rate of queries resolved at first contact 
EWS CS revenue improvement per customer service agent 
EWS CS total calls answered in a day 
EWS equipment frequency of equipment broken down 
EWS equipment frequency of vehicles broken down 
EWS equipment number of vehicles broken down 
EWS equipment numbers of equipment broken down 
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EWS equipment time of vechiles broken down 
EWS finance age of debt 
EWS finance amount of budget, enough or not 
EWS finance amount of cash flow 
EWS finance amount of debt 
EWS finance amount of profit or loss 
EWS finance amount of revenue 
EWS finance amount of surplus or deficits 
EWS finance amount of unauthorised expenditure 
EWS finance amount of wasteful expenditure 
EWS finance amount spent on overtime, per month (Rand thousand) 
EWS finance bad debt level 
EWS finance Bad debt losses 
EWS finance cash flow level 
EWS finance Declining Profits 
EWS finance Going over budget 
EWS finance Large unpaid bills 
EWS finance level of power losses 
EWS finance level of profit or loss 
EWS finance level of UFW (Unaccounted for Water) 
EWS finance non-payment level 
EWS finance revenue level 
EWS finance Spending exceeds budget 
EWS Governance Accountability of Mayoral Committee to Council is not managed properly 
EWS Governance are there debatings in meetings 
EWS Governance Caucus does not meet, or hardly meets 
EWS Governance Caucus does not provide direction to party deployees on matters before Council 
EWS Governance committee members do not clearly understand what is required of them in the committees 
EWS Governance councillors do not attend council meetings 
EWS Governance frequency of Caucus meetings 
EWS Governance frequency of Mayoral Committee meetings 
EWS Governance frequency of Troika meeting 
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EWS Governance key functionaries do not attend Caucus meetings 
EWS Governance lack of effective coordination of issues between key functionaries 
EWS Governance municipality does not hold scheduled council meetings regularly 
EWS Governance number of councillors attend council meetings 
EWS Governance number of Mayoral Committee meetings 
EWS Governance poor or weak relationship between key functionaries  
EWS Governance Portfolio Committees has not been established 
EWS Governance rate of councillor attendence at council meetings 
EWS Governance role definitions are not clearly  
EWS Governance Speaker does not manage the affairs of Council effectively 
EWS Governance Speaker' office is not managing the outreach programme for Council 
EWS Governance The Committee Chairs do not effective manage the business of the committees 
EWS Governance The Council has not adopted a council procedural bylaw for council meetings 
EWS Governance The municipality has not established ward committees 
EWS Governance Troika does not meet, or hardly meets 
EWS Governance Ward committees are not adequately capacitated in terms of their roles 
EWS Governance Ward committees are not competent in terms of their roles 
EWS HR A vision and mission is not taken serious by management and employees 
EWS HR amount overtime, hours per month 
EWS HR amount spent on workplace training (Rand million) 
EWS HR average time taken to appoint staff from date of request to date post filled 
EWS HR Bad Relationship with customers 
EWS HR budget for trainings 
EWS HR expenditures on consultants 
EWS HR Failure to meet deadlines 
EWS HR Failure to Prepare Timely, Accurate Financial Reports 
EWS HR Inexperienced Management Team 
EWS HR kinds of mistakes 
EWS HR Lack of ability to carry out internal reforms 
EWS HR Lack of willingness to carry out internal reforms 
EWS HR level of budget spent on workplace skills plan 
EWS HR level of budget spent on workplace training 
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EWS HR Management team does not have skills and capabilities 
EWS HR number of consultants hired 
EWS HR number of employees received training 
EWS HR number of grievances loged by staff 
EWS HR number of temporary staff employed 
EWS HR number of trainings completed 
EWS HR number of trainings not completed 
EWS HR number of trainings provided to employees 
EWS HR number of vacancies 
EWS HR percentage of appointments that comply with Employment Equity targets 
EWS HR Poor forecasting or estimation, in planns and budgets 
EWS HR Senior management does not have required commitment 
EWS HR Senior management does not have required experience 
EWS HR Senior management does not have required qualification 
EWS HR Some skill-sets are missing 
EWS HR Some skill-sets are over provided 
EWS HR Staff qualifications are not approprtiate to requirements 
EWS HR staff turnover rate 
EWS Information “Standard” financial reports that do not reflect the personality of the business 
EWS Information Inappropriate or Inadequate Financial Information 
EWS Information Insufficient or lack of timely and meaningful information on which decision making depends  
EWS Information quality of asset register, update or complete 
EWS Information quality of centralised information gathering and system, data-base 
EWS Information quality of infrastructure audit, data reliability 
EWS infrastructure ages of assets 
EWS infrastructure ages of infrastructure  
EWS infrastructure amount of capital expenditure 
EWS infrastructure amount spent on building new infrastructure (Rand million) 
EWS infrastructure amount spent on infrastructure maintenance (Rand million) 
EWS infrastructure frequency of infrastructure audit performs 
EWS infrastructure frequency of lifecycle capital planning 
EWS infrastructure percentage of Cpex budget sepnt 
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EWS infrastructure quality of lifecycle capital planning 
EWS leadership Chief Whip does not provide leadership in Caucus 
EWS leadership Mayoral Committee does not provide effective leadership to municipality 
EWS leadership Mayoral does not provide leadership to Mayoral Committee 
EWS leadership number of instruction given in Caucus meetings 
EWS leadership quality of instruction given in Caucus meetings, constructive or red-tape 
EWS leadership quality of leadership provided by Chief Whip to the Caucus 
EWS leadership quality of leadership provided by Mayoral Committee 
EWS Monitoring frequency of checking asset register 
EWS Monitoring frequency of updating asset register 
EWS Monitoring number of delayed projects 
EWS Monitoring number of mistakes in reports 
EWS Monitoring quality of reports, internal consistency, page numbers, fonts and format 
EWS Monitoring time duration that projects delay 
EWS others Diversion of resources, usually people, pulled off the project to work on something else 
EWS outputs audit opinion 
EWS outputs number of meters read in a month 
EWS outputs rate of billing (CoJ) 
EWS planning Lack of clarity in directions and objectives 
EWS planning Many Year-End Adjustments and/or Write-Offs 
EWS planning Poor forecasting or estimation, in planns and budgets 
EWS planning Unclear responsibilities 
EWS planning variations between budgets and actual expenditures and revenues 
EWS process Delayed decisions caused by Inappropriate or Inadequate Financial Information 
EWS process Failure to meet deadlines 
EWS process Monthly financials delivered after the 15th of the month.  
EWS process No regular (daily or weekly) reporting of the three or four key indicators of the business 
EWS process Overusing the Overtime 
EWS PP A public complaints register and system does not established 
EWS PP average number of people attended in community meetings or gathering 
EWS PP Bad Relationship with communities 
EWS PP number of grievances by public 
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EWS PP number of meeting with communities 
EWS PP The municipality does not have a public communication strategy and systems in place 
EWS PP The municipality does not have public participation plans and policies in place 
EWS SCM interest involved between contractors and decision-makers 
EWS SCM Involvement of REC or its members in tenders or appointment or micro-managing decisions 
EWS SCM quality of management over consultants 
EWS SCM quality of management over contracts  
EWS SCM quality of monitoring over consultants' performance 
EWS SCM quality of monitoring over contractors' performance 
EWS SCM quality of SCM processes 
EWS SCM quality of tender process, properly followed 
EWS SCM quality of tender selection, according to procedures and regulation 
EWS SCM quality of transitions with private sector, competitive, transparent? 
EWS system Inadequate Management Information System (MIS) 
EWS system 
No dynamic measurement of the results of operations and of cash flow — in-depth budget-to-actual comparisons and 
effective cash-flow management 
EWS system No standard cost system 
exogenous exogenous Backlog 
exogenous exogenous Growing demands, because of heavy migration 
exogenous exogenous Growing Migration 
exogenous exogenous Hard to enforce to get paid 
exogenous exogenous Inequality 
exogenous exogenous LG is overly regulated 
exogenous exogenous Poverty 
exogenous exogenous Regulatory burden 
exogenous exogenous Unemployment 
exogenous Problem Billing Issue: lack of supervision and monitoring, low morale, alienation 
exogenous Problem Cable theft 
exogenous Problem Electricity theft 
exogenous Problem Illegal connection 
exogenous Problem illegal dumping 
exogenous Problem Meter tampering by people 
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exogenous Problem Vandalism, high amount of it, breaking water main, tampering meter 
exogenous Problem Water theft 
inputs equipment old equipment, tools and vehicles 
inputs finance Financial constraint 
inputs finance High debt level 
inputs finance insufficient funding for M&E 
inputs HR Appointments of unqualified persons 
inputs HR Brain-drain (exploiting the system by employees) 
inputs HR capability challenges to have an effective M&E 
inputs HR Councillors’ lack of understanding about municipal works 
inputs HR employees’ low morale and work ethics, result of alienation 
inputs HR inability to prioritise 
inputs HR insufficient in-house skills, skills shortage  
inputs HR Lack of apprentice system 
inputs HR Lack of necessary skills to perform their tasks 
inputs HR Lack of preparing response capability 
inputs HR lack of skills and knowledge to monitor and manage consultants 
inputs HR Mistrust of people, people perception 
inputs HR Motive, to exploit the system to get more money 
inputs HR No skills shortage  
inputs HR Poor attitude of municipal staff 
inputs HR Poor customer-relationship 
inputs HR Poor workmanship 
inputs HR silo-mentality 
inputs HR Skills shortage 
inputs HR skills shortage for M&E 
inputs HR Use of consultants 
inputs HR Vacancies, (might be a result of BEE and AA) 
inputs Information Failure to use information in M&E reports effectively 
Inputs Information Inappropriate or Inadequate Financial Information 
inputs Information Lack of information 
inputs Information Loss of institutional knowledge and memory 
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inputs Information Manual data collection, which is inaccurate 
inputs infrastructure Aging infrastructure, old, located in remote locations 
inputs infrastructure Infrastructure backlog 
inputs infrastructure Poor infrastructure maintenance 
inputs system Lack of central registry system 
outputs CS Bad Relationship with customers 
outputs CS Billing issue 
outputs CS Contact numbers do not work 
outputs CS Failure of municipalities to communicate communities about power outage or water outage 
outputs CS It is difficult to know the right contact numbers 
outputs CS No answers of contact numbers 
outputs CS Poor customer relations 
outputs CS slow and rude customer services  
outputs electricity power outage 
outputs 
refuse 
removal 
refuses were not picked up 
outputs 
revenue 
service 
incorrect or inaccurate billings 
outputs sanitation Sewage running in the streets, in poor areas 
outputs water Delay to fix water leak 
outputs water Delay to fix water pipe 
outputs water Wastage because of water leak 
outputs water water outage 
outputs water Water running in the streets, in poor areas 
planning Governance Corruption, wastes of resources 
planning Governance Inefficiency of the boards of directors of entities 
planning Governance lack of accountability 
planning Governance Lack of oversight mechanism 
planning Governance Misallocation, in terms of representative or committee members 
planning Governance No-consequence for non-performers 
planning Governance patronage system in staff appointment  
planning Governance patronage system in tender process 
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planning Governance Political interference 
planning Governance Political intervention in appointment 
planning Governance Poor accountability 
planning Governance Poor governance and administration 
planning Governance Weak Governance 
planning leadership Bad decision 
planning leadership flushing their wealth while there is no delivery to community 
planning leadership Improper motive not to serve communities but to enrich themselves while in offices 
planning leadership Lack of experiences of politicians and their reliance on management 
planning leadership Lack of focused leadership 
planning leadership Losing moral ground 
planning leadership Motive, not to serve but to enrich themselves 
planning leadership Motive, to be in their interest, not to be hold them accountable 
planning leadership patronage system 
planning leadership Political will 
planning leadership unqualified leaders, no skills shortage 
planning leadership We don’t have common ground 
planning planning Failure of municipality to use assets such as land productively 
planning planning inability to prioritise 
planning planning Ineffective resource-sharing system 
planning planning Lack of proper planning 
planning planning Poor investment in resources: skills and financial 
planning planning Unclear power relation and roles of political and administrative sectors 
planning PP Complicated DIP plans and budgets for communities to understand them (use of technical language) 
planning PP Consultation is more necessary when resource is limited 
planning PP Cooperation from public 
planning PP Councillors are not engaging, communicating with communities 
planning PP Disconnection (alienation) between local government and the community 
planning PP Failure of municipalities to communicate and engage with communities 
planning PP Inaccessible to residents 
planning PP Lack of asset-based (community based) development 
planning PP Lack of communication 
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planning PP Lack of dialogue 
planning PP Lack of genuine public participation 
planning PP lack of proper participation system in IDP process 
planning PP Lack of ward-based plan 
planning PP M&E that involves communities and bureaucratised 
planning PP No briefing and reporting to communities about projects and programmes in their communities 
planning PP No community meeting 
planning PP No proactive engagement to the community 
planning PP Not including community’s feedback in IDP 
planning PP Not involving public in performance review process 
planning PP Not involving whole community in DIP meeting 
planning PP People are not allow to talk and discuss in IDP meeting 
planning PP People do not get invitations to attend IDP meeting 
planning PP Planning (IDP), not consulting with communities 
planning PP Poor relationship between councilors and community members 
planning PP They don’t recognise people needs 
planning PP Unresponsiveness 
planning PP Unresponsiveness of the City (communities submit their IDP but do not get replies) 
planning PP Unresponsiveness to councillors about their communities’ information, projects and programmes 
planning PP Weak public participation mechanism, it is ritual or compliance 
process A&M avoidable expenditures 
process A&M Delayed decisions caused by Inappropriate or Inadequate Financial Information 
process A&M Inadequate Management (Rightly or wrongly, management usually is blamed for business failure) 
process A&M Lack of consequence for poor performance 
process A&M Lack of maintenance, causing aging infrastructure 
process A&M Lack of supervision, or internal control 
process A&M Low revenue collection  
process A&M Meter reading 
process A&M No consequence for wrong doers 
process A&M No proper M&E system 
process A&M No template for IDP 
process A&M Not properly repair and maintenance 
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process A&M Poor Administration Procedures causing inefficiency and errors 
process A&M Poor Financial Management 
process A&M Poor implementation 
process A&M Poor insufficient revenue collection 
process A&M Poor maintenance 
process A&M Poor or weak administration 
process A&M They are bullshit. No one really care 
process A&M They cannot be fired 
process A&M Weak Monitoring system 
process A&M Weak Performance Management, Score-card 
process A&M Workers, employees are not treated well 
process C&C Fragmentation  
process C&C Fragmentation: lack of integration between planning and management 
process C&C 
Increasing tension with key stakeholders, whether it is poor credibility with the press, disenchantment with the unions, or 
disaffected pension trustees  
process C&C Labour, union 
process C&C Poor relationship between politicians and administrative or management sector 
process C&C Uncoordinated management 
process Monitoring Internal M&E system 
process Monitoring Lack of community involvement in monitoring and also in the outcomes 
process Monitoring Lack of proper monitoring 
process Monitoring Lack of stakeholder involvement in M&E system 
process Monitoring M&E just for compliance (Compliance check lists) 
process Monitoring No proactive identification of problems within delivery 
process Monitoring Self M&E 
process SCM Delay in supply chain process 
process SCM Delay in tender process 
process SCM Loss of resources (money) to failed (undelivered) service providers 
process SCM Materials do not arrive (for example, smart meters) 
process SCM Unqualified service providers 
process supervision Weak supervision and lack of monitoring 
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Appendix K: Factors, causes, problems and EWS from literature review 
 
 
ACRONYM  
A&M Administration and management 
C&C:  Coordination and communication 
CS:  Customer Service  
DS:  Demand-side 
EWS:  Early Warning signals 
HR: Human Resources (or human capital) 
PP:  Public Participation 
RS:  Revenue Service 
SCM:  Supply Chain Management (Procurement) 
 
Table K1 Summary of factors, causes, problems and EWS from literature review 
Exogenous  Supply-side factors 123 Demand-side  
 12 Planning 33 Inputs 48 Processes 37 Outputs 5  6 
  Leadership 6 HR 18 A&M 6 Customer service, CoJ 1   
  Governance 10 Finances 2 Supervision 4 Electricity 1   
  IDP 14 Infrastructure 3 Monitoring 3 Water & sanitation 1   
  PP 3 Equipment 7 SCM 3 Refuse removal 1   
    Information 11 C&C 21 Revenue service, CoJ 1   
    Systems 7       
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Table K2 Factors, causes, problems and EWS from literature review 
DS DS Entitlement of communities, expectations from the government to provide everything 
DS DS High expectation 
DS DS Illegal damping 
DS DS non-payments of people who can afford to pay 
DS DS people do not care about environment and neighbourhood 
DS DS people lack awareness about their roles and responsibilities 
EWS A&M Lack of review and monitoring of performance reporting processes and controls by internal audit units  
EWS C&C A problematic political/administrative interface,  
EWS C&C Argumentative sessions at meeting 
EWS C&C Communication plan is not followed 
EWS C&C Duplication of effort 
EWS C&C No discussion of task status 
EWS C&C poor intergovernmental coordination 
EWS C&C Poor Political and administrative relationship 
EWS equipment Lack of a back-up server 
EWS equipment low cost material used by many contractors 
EWS equipment No CCTV cameras in sub-stations  
EWS equipment quantity of machines and tools available versus required 
EWS finance Overran costs 
EWS finance spending exceed budget 
EWS finance Unspent budget 
EWS finance volume of electricity bought 
EWS finance volume of electricity sold 
EWS finance volume of water bought 
EWS finance volume of water sold 
EWS governance No consequence for non-compliance  
EWS governance numbers of meeting attendances  
EWS governance numbers of meeting convenced 
EWS HR Excessive reliance on consultants  
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EWS HR Hiring expertise (for example, services of consultants) from outside 
EWS HR Low staff morale 
EWS HR number of vacancies 
EWS HR People are not willing to say things straight out  
EWS HR rates of changes in plans and reports prompted by mistakes and errors  
EWS HR rates of reworks  
EWS HR turnover rate of personnel 
EWS HR vacancy rate 
EWS information Conflictive information 
EWS information Different baseline data between departments 
EWS information Different versions of similar data (examples, from reports) 
EWS information Incorrect document revisions 
EWS information Not-enough information available to stakeholders 
EWS information 
poor quality of reports and business plans, for example, figures and numbers contradicted in the reports, without page 
numbers, and poor formets 
EWS information Significant changes in scope, schedule, or budget 
EWS information Vagueness in reports 
EWS infrastructure numbers of infrastructure broken-down 
EWS infrastructure numbers of pipe burst 
EWS monitoring Lack of method to provide feedback on a regular basis 
EWS monitoring Lack of system to provide feedback on a regular basis 
EWS output numbers of billing complaints 
EWS output numbers of meter-reading 
EWS output numbers of power outages 
EWS output numbers of unplanned power outages 
EWS output numbers of unplanned water outages 
EWS output numbers of water outages 
EWS planning Changes in plans 
EWS planning Imprecise project objectives  
EWS planning Lack of a clearly defined long-term development strategy 
EWS planning Lack of an effective project communications plan 
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EWS planning Lack of clear milestones for project 
EWS planning lack of planning to meet the infrastructure and services backlogs  
EWS planning Not all required interactions are included in the communication plan 
EWS planning Plan deviations 
EWS planning Plan with errors 
EWS planning Poorly-drawn business or project plans  
EWS planning Shifting goals and priorities 
EWS planning Sloppily-drawn resource plan 
EWS planning variations between budgets and actual revenues, or expenditures, etc 
EWS process Changes and disturbances in workflow 
EWS process Delays in billing 
EWS process Increase in flow of paper-work  
EWS process Late or even no-submission of reports 
EWS process Late reports 
EWS process Missed deadlines 
EWS process Missed targets 
EWS process numbers of meeting attendances  
EWS process numbers of meetings 
EWS process Numerous disturbances and breaks 
EWS process Repetition of the same work 
EWS PP Lack of effective communication with community members 
EWS PP Low stakeholders involvement 
EWS PP Poor stakeholder representation in meetings 
EWS PP Weak public participation structures 
EWS SCM Failure to timeously renew the meter-reading contract 
EWS SCM poor performing contractors 
EWS supervision General lack of a visible presence of managers at front-line of service facilities 
exogenious exogenious family splitting, that increase the number of households 
exogenious exogenious fast growing informa settlement 
exogenious exogenious homelessness 
exogenious exogenious Impact of SA Developmental Model 
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exogenious exogenious increasing number of immigration 
exogenious exogenious Lack of revenue-raising powers 
exogenious exogenious No or poor patrolling of hot spots 
exogenious exogenious population growth 
exogenious exogenious Poverty, Unemployment, Apartheid legacy 
exogenious exogenious Weakness in policy and regulatory framework   
exogenious problem Cable loss 
exogenious problem Cable theft 
inputs equipment Disconnection of electricity 
inputs equipment ICT systems crash 
inputs equipment Lack of a back-up server 
inputs equipment low cost material used by many contractors 
inputs equipment No CCTV cameras in sub-stations  
inputs equipment System failure that affects metro’s call centre lines, prepaid electricity systems, emails and customer care centre tellers  
inputs equipment Uninspiring or un-enabling working environment 
inputs finance Inadequate funds 
inputs finance Wasteful expenditures 
inputs HR Apathetic attitude of staff (“not my business, somebody else’s”) 
inputs HR Confusion and a loss of enthusiasm and motivation 
inputs HR fluid commitment levels from key participant  
inputs HR Inability to attract and retain suitably qualified staff 
inputs HR Inappropriate staffing  
inputs HR Irregular, inappropriate appointments 
inputs HR Lack of experience in managing the staff  
inputs HR Lack of staff awareness of project importance to the organization 
inputs HR Lack of understanding about business 
inputs HR Low level of involvement and enthusiasm  
inputs HR Low skill levels of staff and management 
inputs HR No commitment to attend meetings regularly 
inputs HR Poor recruitment processes 
inputs HR poor understanding of legislation 
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inputs HR Poor workmanship 
inputs HR Skills deficits,  
inputs HR Staff do not understand their role and tasks 
inputs HR Training does not cover all necessary skills 
inputs information Failure to update the processes 
inputs information Inaccurate cost estimates 
inputs information Incomplete knowledge of process status 
inputs information Incomplete knowledge of the project’s critical issues 
inputs information Loss of institutional memory (because of excessive use of consultants)  
inputs information No central data repositories within departments  
inputs information Poor record-keeping  
inputs information Staff’s unawareness of what data are available within the department 
inputs information Undefined deliverables  
inputs information Unhelpful performance information 
inputs information Unreliable reported performance information 
inputs infrastructure Insufficient spending on infrastructure 
inputs infrastructure Lack of investment in infrastructure, such as roads or sewerage works, 
inputs infrastructure Weak infrastructures 
inputs system Lack of controls and accountability system 
inputs system Lack of enforcement mechanism 
inputs system Lack of proper PMSs to collate, store, document and report performance data;  
inputs system Multiple supervisors or managers that staff have to report to 
inputs system No effective forums or mechanism for staff to ask questions of management 
inputs system Unable to install early warning systems for renewal of contracts (the meter-reading contract) 
inputs system Weak billing and collection systems  
output CS Lack of municipal response to community problems or concerns 
output electricity power outage 
output 
refuse 
removal 
dashbins are not collected, or late  
output 
revenue 
service 
billing problems, inacurate billing 
output water and water outage 
  281 
sanitation 
planning governance Dysfunctional caucuses 
planning governance Fraud and corruption 
planning governance Ineffective handling of / or no resolution of issues brought before meetings 
planning governance lack of accountability,  
planning governance Lack of consequences of Non-Compliance 
planning governance no consequences for transgressions in supply chain monitoring (AG) 
planning governance Non-compliance with regulations and rules 
planning governance Political inference in appointment and dismissals 
planning governance poor understanding of legislation 
planning governance Weak governance 
planning leadership Ineffective leadership 
planning leadership Instabilities in administrative leadership,  
planning leadership Lack of political will 
planning leadership Lack of strong political support 
planning leadership Lack of support from upper management  
planning leadership Low commitment in business objectives and plans 
planning planning Ambiguity in responsibilities and tasks 
planning planning An excessive number of process gaps identified during design. 
planning planning Failure to ensure action plans to address prior year findings  
planning planning Failure to include the person responsible to address the finding in the action plan 
planning planning False starts 
planning planning Lack of a clearly defined long-term development strategy 
planning planning Lack of an effective project communications plan 
planning planning Lack of clear milestones for project 
planning planning lack of planning to meet the infrastructure and services backlogs  
planning planning Sloppily-drawn resource plan 
planning planning The project direction is not aligned with the strategic business objectives 
planning planning Unclear objectives, goals or plans 
planning planning Unrealistic targets or promises 
planning planning weak intergovernmental cooperation 
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planning PP Lack of effective communication with community members 
planning PP Poor stakeholder representation in meetings 
planning PP Weak public participation structures 
process A&M Inappropriate use of resources 
process A&M Lack of review and monitoring of performance reporting processes and controls by internal audit units  
process A&M Uninvolved, disintegrated upper management 
process A&M Weak administration 
process A&M Weak contract management 
process A&M Weak financial management,  
process C&C A problematic political/administrative interface,  
process C&C Argumentative sessions at meeting 
process C&C Communication plan is not followed 
process C&C Disjuncture among the municipality and municipal entities 
process C&C Duplication of effort 
process C&C Ineffective communication 
process C&C ineffective functioning of the Cluster system 
process C&C Ineffective intergovernmental relations 
process C&C lack of coordination and communication between the Committee, municipalities, the provinces and CoGTA 
process C&C 
Lack of detailed reviews, interaction and monitoring by the audit committees on quarterly performance reports and 
reporting processes of performance information;  
process C&C Lack of discussion about project 
process C&C No discussion of task status 
process C&C 
Non-escalation of monitoring findings to Political Principals since some of these findings affect their areas of 
responsibility  
process C&C Poor communication among management and employees  
process C&C Poor coordination among departments 
process C&C poor intergovernmental coordination 
process C&C Poor Political and administrative relationship 
process C&C Project objectives become blurred during the project 
process C&C Tensions in intergovernmental responsibilities,  
process C&C 
Uneasy about sharing data (governmental departments are forced to buy data that should be readily available from a 
sister department [Engela & Ajam, 2010: 25]) 
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process C&C Unsatisfactory labour relations  
process monitoring Lack of method to provide feedback on a regular basis 
process monitoring Lack of system to provide feedback on a regular basis 
process monitoring lack of monitoring of infrastructure projects 
process SCM Contractors’ failures to deliver 
process SCM Failure to timeously renew the meter-reading contract 
process SCM poor performing contractors 
process supervision Lack of coverage for normal business operations 
process supervision Not knowing the status of the project at a high level 
process supervision Poor over-sight 
process supervision Complaints and compliments systems are usually under-utilised 
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Appendix L: Factors, causes, problems and EWS from City Power’s documents 
 
 
ACRONYM  
A&M Administration and management 
C&C:  Coordination and communication 
CS:  Customer Service  
DS:  Demand-side 
EWS:  Early Warning signals 
HR: Human Resources (or human capital) 
PP:  Public Participation 
RS:  Revenue Service 
SCM:  Supply Chain Management (Procurement) 
 
Table L1 Summary of factors, causes, problems and EWS from City Power’s documents 
Exogenous  Supply-side factors 97 Demand-side  
 7 Planning 16 Inputs 24 Processes 25 Outputs 32  4 
  Leadership 0 HR 6 A&M 13 Customer service, CoJ 10   
  Governance 4 Finances 1 Supervision 0 Electricity 17   
  IDP 10 Infrastructure 5 Monitoring 6 Revenue service, CoJ 5   
  PP 2 Equipment 5 SCM 2     
    Information 4 C&C 4     
    Systems 3       
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Table L2 Factors, causes, problems and EWS from City Power’s documents 
EWS process number of unread meters 
exogenous CoJ Lack of reconciliations and resolving reconciling items in the billing environment 
exogenous problem Bypassed meters  
exogenous problem 'Ghost' prepaid vending 
exogenous problem Illegal connections 
exogenous problem theft and vandalism on the network infrastructure, that are persistent and continuous  
exogenous problem Theft of key network components due to criminal activities 
exogenous supply inefficient availability of power supply 
impact impact High impact on operations of SMME's 
impact impact inability to deliver surplus to subsidise non generating profitable services of the CoJ 
input equipment faulty meters 
input equipment poor controls which do not detect or prevent recoverable consumption usage resulting financial instability 
input equipment Poor security visibility 
input equipment system updates that are not updated on time on SAP (System Application and Production in Data Processing)  
input equipment Technology not adapted to change in environment 
input finance Inefficient Capital potentially deployment 
input HR inability to fill vacancies 
input HR Insufficient training of staff on policy changes 
input HR Lack of qualified staff 
input HR No training on existing disaster recovery plan 
input HR poor workmanship 
input HR staff’s substance abuse problem 
input information Inability to have asset register on SAP 
input information material misstatement such as achieving high instances of meter reads 
input information material misstatements, finding on the annual performance report  
input information Poor network data in existing GIS and other BI platforms 
input information Un-located addresses for manual read meters; 
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input infrastructure High instance of unplanned maintenance 
input infrastructure Inadequate, Incomplete maintenance plans and controls on plant maintenance SAP workflow to ensure task completion 
input infrastructure Poor network  
input infrastructure 
The risk of further network deterioration due to an ineffective maintenance plan and execution resulting in financial loss 
and poor capital investment planning  
input system Lack of customer segmentation and profiling 
input system Lack of early warning detection systems 
input system Lack of systems in place to ensure that predetermined objectives are implemented;  
output CS Customer perception of CP not being capable of delivering services 
output CS Customer uncertainty in existing processes 
output CS Customer unsure of whether to contact CoJ or CP call centres 
output CS Inaccurate billing of customers 
output CS inadequate brand management  
output CS Inadequate marketing of CP's positive impact on supporting basic community needs 
output CS Ineffective end to end resolution of customer queries 
output CS Negative messaging by CP, e.g. Faulty meter, inaccessible billboards, radio advertisements etc. 
output CS Repeated customer calls 
output CS Unclear CP Brand 
output finance declining revenues 
output finance financial losses because of litigation 
output finance power losses (non-technical)  
output finance power losses (technical) 
output finance Repeated costs of purchasing replacement equipment 
output operation failure to continue operations and services 
output operation failure to implement National Key Points Act across the organisation 
output operation Inability to implement existing policies 
output operation loss of operating license 
output reputation Failure to get 'clean' audit  
output reputation Loss of Stakeholder confidence 
output reputation Negative market perception; 
output reputation Negative stakeholder reputation 
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output reputation poor stakeholder and investor confidence  
output reputation poor stakeholder perceptions  
output reputation Reputational damage 
output risk Increased fatalities 
output risk increased litigation 
output risk Increased threat of fatalities 
output SD Increased outages 
output SD Increased unplanned maintenance 
output SD interrupted distribution of electricity,  
planning governance Failure to address repeat audit findings such as change meters, deleted reads which result in excessive estimates; 
planning governance Inadequate processes to resolve internal audit findings 
planning governance non-compliance to legislations, regulations and governance  
planning governance Weak implementation of Auditor General findings 
planning planning delayed capital deployment 
planning planning inability of the capital programme to respond to the future business model 
planning planning ineffective response plan  
planning planning Ineffective targeting of capital programme; 
planning planning No alternative cost effective alternative 
planning planning No portfolio management to deliver strategic outcomes 
planning planning Outdated existing disaster recovery plan 
planning planning strategic uncertainty  
planning planning Unaligned short and medium term objectives to long term asset management programme 
planning planning Weakness in long term capital planning, because CoJ budgeting process does not allow for long term capital planning 
planning PP inadequate public relations  
planning PP weak stakeholder confidence  
process A&M Corruption and fraud on the side of utility or distributer's employees 
process A&M delayed capital deployment 
process A&M ineffective implementation of the integrated security management strategy including the National Key Point requirements  
process A&M Inefficiency in staff utilisation 
process A&M Key sub-stations that not declared national key points; 
process A&M Lack of inspection regime  
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process A&M meter unread 
process A&M Poor data capturing of meter readings 
process A&M Poor maintenance of customer data 
process A&M Poor management of meter installations and maintenance 
process A&M Staff utilisation is not optimal 
process A&M weak crisis management 
process A&M weak implementation  
process C&C inadequate proactive communications,  
process C&C Inadequate systems between CP and COJ to manage customer queries 
process C&C Ineffective communications strategy 
process C&C Insufficient internal communications and  
process monitoring Inadequate continuous monitoring of controls 
process monitoring Inadequate control environment 
process monitoring Ineffective monitoring of SAP workflow system to enable the business deliver customer services. 
process monitoring Ineffective scanning processes to change in legislative environment which results in policies becoming outdated 
process monitoring 
Lack of performance monitoring to identify and respond to material misstatement such as achieving high instances of 
meter reads; 
process monitoring poor examination (vetting) of critical employee positions within the organisation 
process SCM Fruitless and wasteful expenditure highlighted in the SCM processes 
process SCM supplier dependency,  
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Appendix M: Factors, causes, problems and EWS from Johannesburg Water’s documents 
 
 
ACRONYM  
A&M Administration and management 
C&C:  Coordination and communication 
CS:  Customer Service  
DS:  Demand-side 
EWS:  Early Warning signals 
HR: Human Resources (or human capital) 
PP:  Public Participation 
RS:  Revenue Service 
SCM:  Supply Chain Management (Procurement) 
 
Table M1 Summary of factors, causes, problems and EWS from Johannesburg Water’s documents 
Exogenous 8 Supply-side factors 27 Demand-side 2 
  Planning 2 Inputs 15 Processes 4 Outputs 6   
  Leadership 0 HR 5 A&M 3 Customer service, CoJ 1   
  Governance 1 Finances 2 Supervision 0 Water & sanitation 5   
  IDP 1 Infrastructure 5 Monitoring 0     
  PP 0 Equipment 3 SCM 0     
    Information 0 C&C 1     
    Systems 0       
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Table M2 Factors, causes, problems and EWS from Johannesburg Water’s documents 
DS DS inaccessible meters 
DS DS Poor payment levels of water and sanitation services 
EWS DS number of meters that are inaccessible 
EWS equipment number of faulty meters 
EWS equipment number of meters with technical faults 
EWS equipment number of smart meter installed 
EWS finance audit opinion 
EWS finance cash balance 
EWS finance debt, total 
EWS finance level of revenue collection 
EWS finance payment level 
EWS finance profit before bad debt 
EWS finance profit, net 
EWS finance revenue service fee 
EWS HR number of employee over 50 
EWS HR number of employee trained 
EWS HR number of professionally registered engineers and technologists 
EWS HR number of vacancies 
EWS HR rate of employee over 50 
EWS HR vacancy rate 
EWS infrastructure % capital budget spent 
EWS infrastructure % expenditure on MIG budget 
EWS infrastructure capital budget spent, amount 
EWS infrastructure expenditure of MIG allocation 
EWS infrastructure length of aging pipelines 
EWS output amount of spills & overflows at wastewater treatment works per year 
EWS output drinking water quality, % of compliance 
EWS output final effluent compliance 
EWS output level of UFW, commercial 
EWS output level of UFW, physical 
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EWS output number of cleaning of mainline sewer blockages within 24 hours 
EWS output number of households access to sanitation 
EWS output number of households access to water 
EWS output number of restoration of mainline water bursts within 48 hours 
EWS output number of sewer blockages cleared within 24 hours of notification 
EWS output number of sewer blockages experienced per 100km 
EWS output number of water pipe burst experienced per 100 km of water networks 
EWS output overall performance score 
EWS output rate of cleaning of mainline sewer blockages within 24 hours 
EWS output rate of restoration of mainline water bursts within 48 hours 
EWS output rate of sewer blockages cleared within 24 hours of notification 
EWS output response times of sewer blockage, within 24 hours of notification 
EWS output response times of water bursts, within 48 hours of notification 
EWS output water quality standard (SANS 241) compliance level 
EWS process billing level % 
EWS process electrical consumption at Wastewater Treatment Works 
EWS process number of unread meters 
EWS process revenue collection, amount, 2013 
EWS output days taken to install water connection from an initial request 
EWS output number of water connections done in a month 
EWS output number of water disconnections done in a month 
exogenous CoJ Under billing 
exogenous CoJ weak revenue collection (by CoJ's the Revenue and Customer Relations Management department) 
exogenous DS rapid urbanisation 
exogenous finance escalating bulk services costs 
exogenous finance Rising electricity prices 
exogenous HR jobless rate, 24.7% (in the 3rd Q of 2013) 
exogenous HR number of people with work, 4.66million (in the 3rd Q of 2013) 
exogenous input Deteriorating river water quality  
impact impact inability to deliver surplus to subsidise non generating profitable services of the CoJ 
Input equipment aging and obsolete equipment 
input equipment faulty meters 
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Input equipment meter errors 
Input finance Capital budget shortfall 
Input finance debt, total, 2013 
Input HR Aging workforce 
Input HR high vacancy rate 
Input HR low productivity of staff 
Input HR strikes, increased in size and in duration with no clear indication of abating 
Input HR tense relationship between employers and employees 
Input infrastructure Ageing network infrastructure 
Input infrastructure aging water infrastructure, such as water pipes 
Input infrastructure infrastructure backlog, insufficient infrastructure  
Input infrastructure insufficient infrastructure 
Input infrastructure slow renewal rate of water infrastructure 
output CS Dissatisfied customers 
output finance level of UFW, commercial 
output finance level of UFW, physical 
output operation Failure to reduce Non-Revenue Water to acceptable levels 
output operation number of meters read 
output reputation Weak branding 
planning governance Fraud and Corruption 
planning planning Inadequate integrated planning 
process A&M Fraud and Corruption 
process A&M meter estimation 
process A&M meter unread 
process C&C Inadequate Stakeholder Management 
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Appendix N: Factors, causes, problems and EWS from Pikitup’s documents 
 
 
ACRONYM  
A&M Administration and management 
C&C:  Coordination and communication 
CS:  Customer Service  
DS:  Demand-side 
EWS:  Early Warning signals 
HR: Human Resources (or human capital) 
PP:  Public Participation 
RS:  Revenue Service 
SCM:  Supply Chain Management (Procurement) 
SD:  Service delivery 
 
Table N1 Summary of factors, causes, problems and EWS from Pikitup’s documents 
Exogenous 8 Supply-side factors 64 Demand-side 12 
  Planning 2 Inputs 21 Processes 29 Outputs 12   
  Leadership 0 HR 6 A&M 14 Customer service, CoJ 4   
  Governance 1 Finances 1 Supervision 3 Refuse removal 8   
  IDP 1 Infrastructure 4 Monitoring 7     
  PP 0 Equipment 7 SCM 2     
    Information 2 C&C 3     
    Systems 1       
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Table N2 Factors, causes, problems and EWS from Pikitup’s documents 
DS DS Community disputes through the Environmental Impact Assessment processes 
DS DS 
Low participation rate in Pikitup programmes, such as Separation at Source (currently at 21%, although the target is 
70%) 
DS DS 
Many respondents knew about recycling and understood its benefits, but financial expectations are unrealistic (Very 
High).  
DS DS Many community members do not know what to do with garden waste. 
DS DS people do not care about environment and neighbourhood 
DS DS Poor waste handling behaviours 
DS DS 
Public's lack of understanding. There was a reasonable understanding that solid waste has a negative health impact but 
the mechanisms of disease transfer are not understood well.  
EWS equipment frequency of vehicles broken down 
EWS equipment High cost for repair and maintenance 
EWS equipment number of incidents of illegal damping, commercial 
EWS equipment number of incidents of illegal damping, public 
EWS equipment number of vehicles available 
EWS equipment number of vehicles broken down 
EWS finance audit opinion 
EWS finance cash balance 
EWS finance debt, total 
EWS finance expenditures, amount 
EWS finance profit before bad debt 
EWS finance profit or loss 
EWS finance profit, net 
EWS finance revenue service fee 
EWS finance revenue, amount 
EWS finance surplus or deficit 
EWS HR number of employee over 50 
EWS HR number of employee trained 
EWS HR number of professionally registered engineers and technologists 
EWS HR number of training provided to employees 
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EWS HR number of vacancies 
EWS HR rate of employee over 50 
EWS HR vacancy rate 
EWS output number of accidents of spillages on streets 
EWS output number of days that collect refuse late, (Some trucks often collect late at night when residents are asleep). 
EWS output number of days that fail to collect refuse 
EWS PP Frequency of stakeholder meetings (engagements)  
EWS PP Number of attendance at stakeholder meetings (or engagements) 
Exogenous CoJ 
Delay authorization process from CoJ (The total fleet complement is currently 418 vehicles; authority to refurbish ten 
compactors has not been received from the City of Johannesburg so this process is still on hold 
Exogenous CoJ lack of information from CoJ (for the required provisions on the domestic revenue) 
Exogenous CoJ System glitch during the migration process from venus to SAP 
Exogenous exogenous  high level dumping tonnages 
Exogenous exogenous  Informal settlement 
Exogenous infrastructure Long turnaround times to acquire land for construction.  
Exogenous problem 
Illegal dumping (Most respondents knew that dumping or burning waste was illegal but just insisted due to strikes or non-
arrival of refuse trucks.) 
Exogenous SCM short supply of specialised equipment in the market 
input equipment Ageing fleet  
input equipment High incidence of breakdown / repair requirements of fleet 
input equipment Inadequate IT Facilities and Environmental Controls 
input equipment Inadequate or lack of tools of trade 
input equipment Insufficient properly equipped (specialized) fleet available 
input equipment Insufficient vehicle (fleet) 
input equipment Older fleet not geared for RFID devices 
input finance Budgetary constraints,  
input HR Insufficient staff 
input HR Lack of key IT skills and management layer within the department 
input HR Shortages of skilled human resource, resulting in poor and inefficient delivery.  
input HR Staff’s frustrating due to health and safety initiativesm and inadequate or lack of tools of trade) 
input HR staff’s substance abuse problem 
input HR strike 
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input information Information not submitted for audit (Employee Cost) 
input information Loss of customer data, accounts of a quarter of about 752 customers were lost 
input infrastructure Ageing infrastructure 
input infrastructure Inadequate infrastructures 
input infrastructure Insufficient landfill sites 
input infrastructure 
lack of facilities and supports for reclaimers (Pikitup estimated that there are at least 8,000 reclaimers/waste pickers 
operating within the City of Johannesburg) 
input system insufficient tool and machine replacement programme 
output CS Dissatisfied customers 
output 
CS 
high amount of queries (relating to requests for replacement of stolen, damaged, additional, broken of 240L wheelie bins 
and new service) 
output CS increasing calls 
output CS low query resolution rate 
output finance Deficit R27 m at the end of September 2013 
output finance high repair and maintenance costs 
output finance Revenue loss, as accounts of a quarter of about 752 customers were lost 
output HR labour unrest, strike 
output reputation Weak branding 
output SD failure to collect refuse 
output SD Late collection (Some trucks often collect late at night when residents are asleep). 
output SD Most of the spillages on streets are alleged to be caused by Pikitup staff.  
planning governance Non-compliance with SCM regulations 
planning planning unhealthy reliance on long term or ad-hoc rentals that is inefficient and prohibitively expensive 
process A&M Absorbed employees not included in the costing report/payroll 
process A&M Absorbed employees with different salary scales than those of CCMA settlement agreement. 
process A&M Absorption: Foreign employees absorbed without work permit 
process A&M Awards made to persons in the service of the state 
process A&M Awards not advertised on the website for at least seven days 
process A&M Employees of Pikitup own companies and have not declared their interest 
process A&M Inadequate IT Security Management 
process A&M Insufficient internal control systems 
process A&M Legal non-compliances, threatening organizational integrity and responsible authority 
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process A&M Performance contracts were not signed on time 
process A&M Poor management of fleet 
process A&M Suppliers in the database owned by employee working for other state department (no contract awarded) 
process A&M Targets per business plan differ with targets reported in the annual performance report 
process A&M unhealthy reliance on long term or ad-hoc rentals that is inefficient and prohibitively expensive 
process C&C interference by ward councilors in Pikitup programmes, for example at the roll out of S@S (separate at source) 
process C&C labour unrest, strike 
process C&C tensed relationship with labour union 
process monitoring Baseline per business plan differs with baseline reported in the annual performance report. 
process monitoring No direct link between the budgets, objectives and targets 
process monitoring Performance target that do not meet the characteristics for defining a good performance indicator 
process monitoring Reported achievements not relevant and targets not achievable 
process monitoring Reported outcomes not accurate 
process monitoring Targets not measurable 
process monitoring The performance baseline that did not meet the SMART criteria 
process SCM Extended project timelines due to adherence to procurement process (90 days) 
process SCM Poor contracts management, resulting in increased challenging of contracts/ awards. 
process supervision Non prevention of fruitless and wasteful expenditure 
process supervision poor historical maintenance 
process supervision spillages on streets 
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Appendix O: Early warning signals 
revealed from interviews, document study and literature review  
 
 
ACRONYM  
A&M Administration and management 
C&C:  Coordination and communication 
CS:  Customer Service  
DS:  Demand-side 
EWS:  Early Warning signals 
HR: Human Resources (or human capital) 
PP:  Public Participation 
RS:  Revenue Service 
SCM:  Supply Chain Management (Procurement) 
 
Table O1 Summary of EWSs revealed from interviews, document study and literature review 
Exogenous 3 Supply-side factors 369 Demand-side 1 
  Planning 66 Inputs 140 Processes 76 Outputs 87   
  Leadership 7 HR 48 A&M 13 CoJ and MoEs 2   
  Governance 29 Finances 40 Supervision 1 Customer service, CoJ 40   
  IDP 17 Infrastructure 16 Monitoring 7 Electricity 16   
  PP 13 Equipment 18 SCM 12 Water & sanitation 24   
    Information 15 C&C 18 Refuse removal 3   
    Systems 3 Operation 3 Revenue service, CoJ 2   
      other 22     
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Table O2 EWSs revealed from interviews, document study and literature review 
1 EWS 1 administration A vision and mission is clearly articulated I 
2 EWS 2 administration A vision and mission is established I 
3 EWS 3 administration Attitude of "But we've always managed like this" I 
4 EWS 4 administration Decisions repeatedly postponed I 
5 EWS 5 administration Lack of review and monitoring of performance reporting processes and controls by internal audit units  L 
6 EWS 6 administration Management performance contracts are applied properly I 
7 EWS 7 administration Management performance contracts are not established I 
8 EWS 8 administration Number of Un-renewed contracts I 
9 EWS 9 administration Normal basis for staff promotions are not clear I 
10 EWS 10 administration Normal basis for staff promotions are not followed  I 
11 EWS 11 administration number of disciplinary cases I 
12 EWS 12 administration Performance contracts are not effectively managed I 
13 EWS 13 administration Running behind the targets I 
14 EWS 1 C&C A problematic political/administrative interface,  L 
15 EWS 2 C&C Argumentative sessions at meeting L 
16 EWS 3 C&C Communication plan is not followed L 
17 EWS 4 C&C Councillors do not report back to BECs regularly I 
18 EWS 5 C&C Duplication of effort L 
19 EWS 6 C&C 
Increasing tension with key stakeholders, whether it is poor credibility with the press, disenchantment with 
the unions, or disaffected pension trustees  I 
20 EWS 7 C&C Lack of Communication I 
21 EWS 8 C&C No discussion of task status L 
22 EWS 9 C&C number of meeting held among leaderships and management I 
23 EWS 10 C&C number of meeting held among management and employees I 
24 EWS 11 C&C poor intergovernmental coordination L 
25 EWS 12 C&C Poor Political and administrative relationship L 
26 EWS 13 C&C Public participation policies and plans are not communicated to the committees I 
27 EWS 14 C&C REC does not communicate political decisions to Caucus meetings I 
28 EWS 15 C&C REC does not communicate political decisions to deployees I 
29 EWS 16 C&C REC poorly communicate political decisions to deployees I 
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30 EWS 17 C&C REC poorly communicates political decisions to Caucus meetings I 
31 EWS 18 C&C role definitions are not communicated I 
32 EWS 1 CS % calls answered within 20 seconds, in a day I 
33 EWS 2 CS % calls answered within 30 seconds, in a day I 
34 EWS 3 CS % calls dropped (does not include calls dropped within 5 seconds) in a day I 
35 EWS 4 CS % connections made in less than 14 days in a month I 
36 EWS 5 CS % meters billed on actual readings in a month I 
37 EWS 6 CS % meters read in a month I 
38 EWS 7 CS average time taken to appoint staff from date of request to date post filled I 
39 EWS 8 CS Bad Relationship with customers I 
40 EWS 9 CS issues of complaints I 
41 EWS 10 CS level of customer satisfaction with affordability of tariffs (score out of 10) I 
42 EWS 11 CS level of customer satisfaction with basic services (score out of 10) I 
43 EWS 12 CS level of UFW (Unaccounted for Water) I 
44 EWS 13 CS number of calls answered within 20 seconds in a day I 
45 EWS 14 CS number of calls answered within 30 seconds in a day I 
46 EWS 15 CS number of calls dropped (does not include calls dropped within 5 seconds) in a day I 
47 EWS 16 CS number of cases (issues) of complaints 
I, CP, P, 
JW 
48 EWS 17 CS number of complaints 
I, CP, P, 
JW 
49 EWS 18 CS number of connection made in less than 14 days in a month I 
50 EWS 19 CS number of connection with no advance on the meter for 90 days I 
51 EWS 20 CS number of customer complaints in a day (or a week) I 
52 EWS 21 CS number of disciplinary cases initiated I 
53 EWS 22 CS number of grievances lodged by customer I 
54 EWS 23 CS number of limiter connections with consumption > 200 liters per day I 
55 EWS 24 CS number of queries resolved at first contact I 
56 EWS 25 CS number of schools visited in a month I 
57 EWS 26 CS number of street theatre events held in a month I 
58 EWS 27 CS number of trainings provided in a month I 
59 EWS 28 CS percentage of appointments that comply with Employment Equity targets I 
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60 EWS 29 CS percentage of complaints responsed or resolved I 
61 EWS 30 CS rate calls answered within 20 seconds, in a day I 
62 EWS 31 CS rate calls answered within 30 seconds, in a day I 
63 EWS 32 CS rate calls dropped (does not include calls dropped within 5 seconds) in a day I 
64 EWS 33 CS rate connections made in less than 14 days in a month I 
65 EWS 34 CS rate meteres billed on actual readings in a month I 
66 EWS 35 CS rate meters read in a month I 
67 EWS 36 CS rate of complaints resolved I 
68 EWS 37 CS rate of queries resolved at first contact I 
69 EWS 38 CS revenue improvement per customer service agent I 
70 EWS 39 CS time duration required to resolve or response to complaints I 
71 EWS 40 CS total calls answered in a day I 
72 EWS 1 demand-side number of meters that are inaccessible 
CP, JW, 
L 
73 EWS 1 equipment frequency of equipments broken down I 
74 EWS 2 equipment frequency of vehicles broken down I, P 
75 EWS 3 equipment High cost for repair and maintenance P 
76 EWS 4 equipment Lack of a back-up server L 
77 EWS 5 equipment low cost material used by many contractors L 
78 EWS 6 equipment No CCTV cameras in sub-stations  L 
79 EWS 7 equipment number of equipment breakdown CP 
80 EWS 8 equipment number of equipment required to be replaced CP 
81 EWS 9 equipment number of faulty meters CP, JW 
82 EWS 10 equipment number of incidents of illegal damping, commercial P 
83 EWS 11 equipment number of incidents of illegal damping, public P 
84 EWS 12 equipment number of meters with technical faults JW 
85 EWS 13 equipment number of smart meter installed JW 
86 EWS 14 equipment number of vehicles available P 
87 EWS 15 equipment number of vehicles broken down I, P 
88 EWS 16 equipment numbers of equipments broken down I 
89 EWS 17 equipment quantity of machines and tools available versus required L 
90 EWS 18 equipment time of vechiles broken down I 
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91 EWS 1 finance age of debt I 
92 EWS 2 finance amount of budget, enough or not I 
93 EWS 3 finance amount of cash flow I 
94 EWS 4 finance amount of costs and expense CP 
95 EWS 5 finance amount of debt I 
96 EWS 6 finance amount of profit or loss I 
97 EWS 7 finance amount of revenue 
I, CP, P, 
JW 
98 EWS 8 finance amount of surplus or deficits I 
99 EWS 9 finance amount of unauthorised expenditure I 
100 EWS 10 finance amount of wasteful expenditure I 
101 EWS 11 finance amount spent on overtime, per month (Rand thousand) I 
102 EWS 12 finance audit opinion JW, P 
103 EWS 13 finance bad debt level I 
104 EWS 14 finance Bad debt losses I 
105 EWS 15 finance cash balance 
I, CP, 
JW, P 
106 EWS 16 finance cash flow level I 
107 EWS 17 finance costs of purchasing replacing equipment CP 
108 EWS 18 finance debt, total JW. P 
109 EWS 19 finance Declining Profits I 
110 EWS 20 finance expenditures, amount P 
111 EWS 21 finance Going over budget I 
112 EWS 22 finance Large unpaid bills I 
113 EWS 23 finance level of Power losses I 
114 EWS 24 finance level of profit or loss I 
115 EWS 25 finance level of revenue collection JW 
116 EWS 26 finance level of UFW (Unaccounted for Water) I 
117 EWS 27 finance non-payment level I 
118 EWS 28 finance Overran costs L 
119 EWS 29 finance payment level JW 
120 EWS 30 finance profit before bad debt CP, JW, 
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P 
121 EWS 31 finance profit or loss 
CP, JW, 
P 
122 EWS 32 
finance profit, net 
CP, JW, 
P 
123 EWS 33 finance revenue level I 
124 EWS 34 finance spending exceed budget I, L 
125 EWS 35 finance surplus or deficit P 
126 EWS 36 finance Unspent budget L 
127 EWS 37 finance volume of electricity bought L 
128 EWS 38 finance volume of electricity sold L 
129 EWS 39 finance volume of water bought L 
130 EWS 40 finance volume of water sold L 
131 EWS 1 Governance Accountability of Mayoral Committee to Council is not managed properly I 
132 EWS 2 Governance are there debates in meetings I 
133 EWS 3 Governance Caucus does not meet, or hardly meets I 
134 EWS 4 Governance Caucus does not provide direction to party deployees on matters before Council I 
135 EWS 5 Governance committee members do not clearly understand what is required of them in the committees I 
136 EWS 6 Governance councillors do not attend council meetings I 
137 EWS 7 Governance frequency of Caucus meetings I 
138 EWS 8 Governance frequency of Mayoral Committee meetings I 
139 EWS 9 Governance frequency of Troika meeting I 
140 EWS 10 Governance key functionaries do not attend Caucus meetings I 
141 EWS 11 Governance lack of effective coordination of issues between key functionaries I 
142 EWS 12 Governance municipality does not hold scheduled council meetings regularly I 
143 EWS 13 Governance No consequence for non-compliance  L 
144 EWS 14 Governance number of councillors attend council meetings I 
145 EWS 15 Governance number of Mayoral Committee meetings I 
146 EWS 16 Governance numbers of meeting attendances  L 
147 EWS 17 Governance numbers of meeting convened L 
148 EWS 18 Governance poor or weak relationship between key functionaries  I 
149 EWS 19 Governance Portfolio Committees has not been established I 
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150 EWS 20 Governance rate of councillor attendance at council meetings I 
151 EWS 21 Governance role definitions are not clearly  I 
152 EWS 22 Governance Speaker does not manage the affairs of Council effectively I 
153 EWS 23 Governance Speaker' office is not managing the outreach programme for Council I 
154 EWS 24 Governance The Committee Chairs do not effective manage the business of the committees I 
155 EWS 25 Governance The Council has not adopted a council procedural bylaw for council meetings I 
156 EWS 26 Governance The municipality has not established ward committees I 
157 EWS 27 Governance Troika does not meet, or hardly meets I 
158 EWS 28 Governance Ward committees are not adequately capacitated in terms of their roles I 
159 EWS 29 Governance Ward committees are not competent in terms of their roles I 
160 EWS 1 HR A vision and mission is not taken serious by management and employees I 
161 EWS 2 HR amount overtime, hours per month I 
162 EWS 3 HR amount spent on workplace training (Rand million) I 
163 EWS 4 HR average time taken to appoint staff from date of request to date post filled I 
164 EWS 5 HR Bad Relationship with customers I 
165 EWS 6 HR budget for trainings I 
166 EWS 7 HR Excessive reliance on consultants  L 
167 EWS 8 HR expenditures on consultants I 
168 EWS 9 HR Failure to meet deadlines I 
169 EWS 10 HR Failure to Prepare Timely, Accurate Financial Reports I 
170 EWS 11 HR High rates of changes in plans and reports prompted by mistakes and errors  L 
171 EWS 12 HR High rates of rework  L 
172 EWS 13 HR High turnover rate of personnel L 
173 EWS 14 HR High vacancy rate L 
174 EWS 15 HR Hiring expertise (for example, services of consultants) from outside L 
175 EWS 16 HR Inexperienced Management Team I 
176 EWS 17 HR kinds of mistakes I 
177 EWS 18 HR Lack of ability to carry out internal reforms I 
178 EWS 19 HR Lack of willingness to carry out internal reforms I 
179 EWS 20 HR level of budget spent on workplace skills plan I 
180 EWS 21 HR level of budget spent on workplace training I 
181 EWS 22 HR level of employees over 50 CP 
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182 EWS 23 HR Low staff morale L 
183 EWS 24 HR Management team does not have skills and capabilities I 
184 EWS 25 HR number of consultants hired I 
185 EWS 26 
HR number of employee over 50 
CP, JW, 
P 
186 EWS 27 
HR number of employee trained 
CP, JW, 
P 
187 EWS 28 HR number of employees received training I 
188 EWS 29 HR number of grievances lodged by staff I 
189 EWS 30 HR number of professionally registered engineers and technologists JW, P 
190 EWS 31 HR number of temporary staff employed I 
191 EWS 32 HR number of training provided to employees P 
192 EWS 33 HR number of trainings completed I 
193 EWS 34 HR number of trainings not completed I 
194 EWS 35 HR number of trainings provided to employees I 
195 EWS 36 HR number of vacancies 
I, L, CP, 
JW, P 
196 EWS 37 HR People are not willing to say things straight out  L 
197 EWS 38 HR percentage of appointments that comply with Employment Equity targets I 
198 EWS 39 HR Poor forecasting or estimation, in plans and budgets I 
199 EWS 40 
HR rate of employee over 50 
CP, JW, 
P 
200 EWS 41 HR Senior management does not have required commitment I 
201 EWS 42 HR Senior management does not have required experience I 
202 EWS 43 HR Senior management does not have required qualification I 
203 EWS 44 HR Some skill-sets are missing I 
204 EWS 45 HR Some skill-sets are over provided I 
205 EWS 46 HR Staff qualifications are not appropriate to requirements I 
206 EWS 47 HR staff turnover rate I 
207 EWS 48 HR vacancy rate 
I, L, CP, 
JW, P 
208 EWS 1 Information “Standard” financial reports that do not reflect the personality of the business I 
209 EWS 2 information Conflictive information L 
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210 EWS 3 information Different baseline data between departments L 
211 EWS 4 information Different versions of similar data (examples, from reports) L 
212 EWS 5 Information Inappropriate or Inadequate Financial Information I 
213 EWS 6 information Incorrect document revisions L 
214 EWS 7 Information Insufficient or lack of timely and meaningful information on which decision making depends  I 
215 EWS 8 information Not-enough information available to stakeholders L 
216 EWS 9 information 
poor quality of reports and business plans, for example, figures and numbers contradicted in the reports, 
without page numbers, and poor formats L 
217 EWS 10 Information quality of asset register, update or complete I 
218 EWS 11 Information quality of centralised information gathering and system, data-base I 
219 EWS 12 Information quality of infrastructure audit, data reliability I 
220 EWS 13 information 
quality of reports and business plan, sometime there is no page numbers, figures are different, no 
acronyms CP 
221 EWS 14 information Significant changes in scope, schedule, or budget L 
222 EWS 15 information Vagueness in reports L 
223 EWS 1 infrastructure % capital budget spent JW 
224 EWS 2 infrastructure % expenditure on MIG budget JW 
225 EWS 3 infrastructure ages of assets I 
226 EWS 4 infrastructure ages of infrastructure  I 
227 EWS 5 infrastructure amount of capital expenditure I 
228 EWS 6 infrastructure amount spent on building new infrastructure (Rand million) I 
229 EWS 7 infrastructure amount spent on infrastructure maintenance (Rand million) I 
230 EWS 8 infrastructure capital budget spent, amount JW 
231 EWS 9 infrastructure expenditure of MIG allocation JW 
232 EWS 10 infrastructure frequency of infrastructure audit performs I 
233 EWS 11 infrastructure frequency of lifecycle capital planning I 
234 EWS 12 infrastructure length of aging pipelines JW 
235 EWS 13 infrastructure numbers of infrastructure broken-down L 
236 EWS 14 infrastructure numbers of pipe burst L 
237 EWS 15 infrastructure percentage of Cpex budget spent I 
238 EWS 16 infrastructure quality of lifecycle capital planning I 
239 EWS 1 leadership Chief Whip does not provide leadership in Caucus I 
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240 EWS 2 leadership Mayoral Committee does not provide effective leadership to municipality I 
241 EWS 3 leadership Mayoral does not provide leadership to Mayoral Committee I 
242 EWS 4 leadership number of instruction given in Caucus meetings I 
243 EWS 5 leadership quality of instruction given in Caucus meetings, constructive or red-tape I 
244 EWS 6 leadership quality of leadership provided by Chief Whip to the Caucus I 
245 EWS 7 leadership quality of leadership provided by Mayoral Committee I 
246 EWS 1 Monitoring frequency of checking asset register I 
247 EWS 2 Monitoring frequency of updating asset register I 
248 EWS 3 Monitoring Lack of method to provide feedback on a regular basis L 
249 EWS 4 Monitoring number of delayed projects I 
250 EWS 5 Monitoring number of mistakes in reports I 
251 EWS 6 Monitoring quality of reports, internal consistency, page numbers, fonts and format I 
252 EWS 7 Monitoring time duration that projects delay I 
253 EWS 1 operation amount of financial losses due to litigation CP 
254 EWS 2 operation amount of power losses, non-technical CP 
255 EWS 3 operation amount of power losses, technical CP 
256 EWS 1 others Diversion of resources, usually people, pulled off the project to work on something else I 
257 EWS 1 output amount of spills & overflows at wastewater treatment works per year JW 
258 EWS 2 output audit opinion CP, I 
259 EWS 3 output days taken to install electricity connection from an initial request CP 
260 EWS 4 output days taken to install water connection from an initial request JW 
261 EWS 5 output drinking water quality, % of compliance JW 
262 EWS 6 output duration (total) of power outage CP 
263 EWS 7 output final effluent compliance JW 
264 EWS 8 output frequency of power outage CP 
265 EWS 9 output level of power losses, non-technical CP 
266 EWS 10 output level of power losses, technical CP 
267 EWS 11 output level of UFW, commercial JW 
268 EWS 12 output level of UFW, physical JW 
269 EWS 13 output number of accidents of spillages on streets P 
270 EWS 14 output number of cleaning of mainline sewer blockages within 24 hours JW 
271 EWS 15 output number of days that collect refuse late, (Some trucks often collect late at night when residents are P 
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asleep). 
272 EWS 16 output number of days that fail to collect refuse P 
273 EWS 17 output number of electricity connections done in a month CP 
274 EWS 18 output number of electricity disconnections done in a month CP 
275 EWS 19 output number of fatalities CP 
276 EWS 20 output number of households access to sanitation JW 
277 EWS 21 output number of households access to water JW 
278 EWS 22 output number of licenses lost CP 
279 EWS 23 output number of litigation CP 
280 EWS 24 output number of meters read in a month I 
281 EWS 25 output number of power outages CP 
282 EWS 26 output number of restoration of mainline water bursts within 48 hours JW 
283 EWS 27 output number of sewer blockages cleared within 24 hours of notification JW 
284 EWS 28 output number of sewer blockages experienced per 100km JW 
285 EWS 29 output number of unplanned maintenance CP 
286 EWS 30 output number of water connections done in a month JW 
287 EWS 31 output number of water disconnections done in a month JW 
288 EWS 32 output number of water pipe burst experienced per 100 km of water networks JW 
289 EWS 33 output numbers of billing complaints L 
290 EWS 34 output numbers of meter-reading L 
291 EWS 35 output numbers of power outages L 
292 EWS 36 output numbers of unplanned power outages L 
293 EWS 37 output numbers of unplanned water outages L 
294 EWS 38 output numbers of water outages L 
295 EWS 39 output overall performance score JW 
296 EWS 40 output power restoration time CP 
297 EWS 41 output rate of billing (CoJ) I 
298 EWS 42 output rate of cleaning of mainline sewer blockages within 24 hours JW 
299 EWS 43 output rate of restoration of mainline water bursts within 48 hours JW 
300 EWS 44 output rate of sewer blockages cleared within 24 hours of notification JW 
301 EWS 45 output response times of sewer blockage, within 24 hours of notification JW 
302 EWS 46 output response times of water bursts, within 48 hours of notification JW 
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303 EWS 47 output water quality standard (SANS 241) compliance level JW 
304 EWS 1 planning Changes in plans L 
305 EWS 2 planning Imprecise project objectives  L 
306 EWS 3 planning Lack of a clearly defined long-term development strategy L 
307 EWS 4 planning Lack of an effective project communications plan L 
308 EWS 5 planning Lack of clarity in directions and objectives I 
309 EWS 6 planning Lack of clear milestones for project L 
310 EWS 7 planning lack of planning to meet the infrastructure and services backlogs  L 
311 EWS 8 planning Many Year-End Adjustments and/or Write-Offs I 
312 EWS 9 planning Not all required interactions are included in the communication plan L 
313 EWS 10 planning Plan deviations L 
314 EWS 11 planning Plan with errors L 
315 EWS 12 planning Poor forecasting or estimation, in planns and budgets I 
316 EWS 13 planning Poorly-drawn business or project plans  L 
317 EWS 14 planning Shifting goals and priorities L 
318 EWS 15 planning Sloppily-drawn resource plan L 
319 EWS 16 planning Unclear responsibilities I 
320 EWS 17 planning variations between budgets and actual expenditures and revenues I, L 
321 EWS 1 PP A public complaints register and system does not established I 
322 EWS 2 PP average number of people attended in community meetings or gathering I 
323 EWS 3 PP Bad Relationship with communities I 
324 EWS 4 PP Frequency of stakeholder meetings (engagements)  P 
325 EWS 5 PP Lack of effective communication with community members L 
326 EWS 6 PP Low stakeholders involvement L 
327 EWS 7 PP Number of attendance at stakeholder meetings (or engagements) P 
328 EWS 8 PP number of grievances by public I 
329 EWS 9 PP number of meeting with communities I 
330 EWS 10 PP Poor stakeholder representation in meetings L 
331 EWS 11 PP The municipality does not have a public communication strategy and systems in place I 
332 EWS 12 PP The municipality does not have public participation plans and policies in place I 
333 EWS 13 PP Weak public participation structures L 
334 EWS 1 problem amount of cable loss CP 
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335 EWS 2 problem number of incidents of illegal connection CP 
336 EWS 3 problem number of meter tampered CP 
337 EWS 1 process billing level % JW 
338 EWS 2 process Changes and disturbances in workflow L 
339 EWS 3 process Delayed decisions caused by Inappropriate or Inadequate Financial Information I 
340 EWS 4 process Delays in billing L 
341 EWS 5 process electrical consumption at Wastewater Treatment Works JW 
342 EWS 6 process Failure to meet deadlines I 
343 EWS 7 process Increase in flow of paper-work  L 
344 EWS 8 process Late or even no-submission of reports L 
345 EWS 9 process Late reports L 
346 EWS 10 process Missed deadlines L 
347 EWS 11 process Missed targets L 
348 EWS 12 process Monthly financials delivered after the 15th of the month.  I 
349 EWS 13 process No regular (daily or weekly) reporting of the three or four key indicators of the business I 
350 EWS 14 process number of contracts that fail to delivery services CP 
351 EWS 15 process number of unread meters CP, JW 
352 EWS 16 process numbers of meeting attendances  L 
353 EWS 17 process numbers of meetings L 
354 EWS 18 process Numerous disturbances and breaks L 
355 EWS 19 process Overusing the Overtime I 
356 EWS 20 process Repetition of the same work L 
357 EWS 21 process revenue collection, amount, 2013 JW 
358 EWS 1 SCM Failure to timeously renew the meter-reading contract L 
359 EWS 2 SCM interest involved between contractors and decision-makers I 
360 EWS 3 SCM Involvement of REC or its members in tenders or appointment or micro-managing decisions I 
361 EWS 4 SCM poor performing contractors L 
362 EWS 5 SCM quality of management over consultants I 
363 EWS 6 SCM quality of management over contracts  I 
364 EWS 7 SCM quality of monitoring over consultants' performance I 
365 EWS 8 SCM quality of monitoring over contractors' performance I 
366 EWS 9 SCM quality of SCM processes I 
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367 EWS 10 SCM quality of tender process, properly followed I 
368 EWS 11 SCM quality of tender selection, according to procedures and regulation I 
369 EWS 12 SCM quality of transitions with private sector, competitive, transparent? I 
370 EWS 1 supervision General lack of a visible presence of managers at front-line of service facilities L 
371 EWS 1 system Inadequate Management Information System (MIS) I 
372 
EWS 
2 system 
No dynamic measurement of the results of operations and of cash flow — in-depth budget-to-actual 
comparisons and effective cash-flow management I 
373 EWS 3 system No standard cost system I 
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Appendix P: City Power’s financial performance (2010-2013)  
 
Description 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 
R thousands 
Audited 
Outcome 
Audited 
Outcome 
Audited 
Outcome 
Financial Performance       
Property rates                –                  –                  –   
Service charges 
    
9,144,630  
  
10,908,871  
  
11,555,483  
Investment revenue                –                  –                  –   
Transfers recognised - operational                –   
      
182,879  
      
133,000  
Other own revenue 
      
777,961  
    
1,309,167  
    
1,035,092  
Total Revenue (excluding capital transfers and 
contributions) 
    
9,922,591  
  
12,400,917  
  
12,723,575  
Employee costs 
      
649,538  
      
696,754  
      
689,374  
Remuneration of Board Members                –                  –                  –   
Depreciation and debt impairment 
    
1,057,733  
      
705,499  
      
689,011  
Finance charges                –                  –                  –   
Materials and bulk purchases 
    
5,984,046  
    
7,638,806  
    
8,194,936  
Transfers and grants                –                  –                  –   
Other expenditure 
    
1,031,164  
    
1,084,408  
    
1,574,471  
Total Expenditure 
    
8,722,481  
  
10,125,467  
  
11,147,792  
Surplus/(Deficit) 
    
1,200,110  
    
2,275,450  
    
1,575,783  
Transfers recognised - capital 
      
393,237  
      
375,276  
      
353,176  
Contributions recognised - capital & contributed 
assets 
      
191,538  
      
192,397  
      
220,176  
Surplus/(Deficit) after capital transfers & 
contributions 
    
1,784,885  
    
2,843,123  
    
2,149,135  
Taxation 
      
260,832  
      
424,571  
        
44,396  
Surplus/ (Deficit) for the year   1,524,053    2,418,552    2,104,739  
Capital expenditure & funds sources       
Capital expenditure 
    
1,089,834  
      
702,663  
    
1,288,536  
Transfers recognised - capital 140,346  130,174  120,403  
Public contributions & donations 
      
383,547  
      
263,108  
      
293,209  
Borrowing 
      
542,000  
      
297,399  
      
399,069  
Internally generated funds 
        
23,942  
        
11,982  
      
475,855  
Total sources of capital funds 
    
1,089,834  
      
702,663  
    
1,288,536  
        
Financial position       
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Total current assets 
    
4,751,715  
    
5,072,116  
    
5,336,024  
Total non current assets 
    
6,802,468  
    
7,264,561  
    
8,015,756  
Total current liabilities 
    
3,754,441  
    
2,804,757  
    
2,857,538  
Total non current liabilities 
    
3,868,972  
    
4,190,192  
    
4,166,291  
Community wealth/Equity 
    
3,930,770  
    
5,341,728  
    
6,327,951  
        
Cash flows       
Net cash from (used) operating 
    
1,633,938  
         
(9,380) 
    
2,633,204  
Net cash from (used) investing 
   
(1,089,834) 
     
(586,500) 
   
(1,118,446) 
Net cash from (used) financing                –                  –                  –   
Cash/cash equivalents at the year end 
    
1,786,501  
    
1,190,621  
    
2,705,379  
 
Source: City Power (2014d).  
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Appendix Q: Johannesburg Water’s financial performance (2010-2013)  
 
Description 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 
R thousands 
Audited 
Outcome 
Audited 
Outcome 
Audited 
Outcome 
Financial Performance       
Property rates 
               
–   
               
–   
               
–   
Service charges 
    
4,638,224  
    
5,112,513  
    
5,871,968  
Investment revenue 
               
–   
               
–   
               
–   
Transfers recognised - operational 
               
–   
      
219,563  
      
379,565  
Other own revenue 
               
–   
      
227,730  
      
350,018  
Total Revenue (excluding capital transfers and 
contributions) 
    
4,638,224  
    
5,559,806  
    
6,601,551  
Employee costs 
      
569,491  
      
628,060  
      
693,738  
Remuneration of Board Members 
               
–   
               
–   
               
–   
Depreciation and debt impairment 
      
752,368  
      
855,367  
      
909,879  
Finance charges 
        
19,738  
        
49,047  
        
47,412  
Materials and bulk purchases 
    
2,125,270  
    
2,465,733  
    
2,839,333  
Transfers and grants 
               
–   
               
–   
               
–   
Other expenditure 
      
653,818  
      
838,507  
      
912,745  
Total Expenditure 
    
4,120,685  
    
4,836,714  
    
5,403,107  
Surplus/(Deficit) 
      
517,539  
      
723,092  
    
1,198,444  
Transfers recognised - capital 
      
268,930  
      
254,028  
      
421,014  
Contributions recognised - capital & contributed 
assets 
               
–   
        
34,465  
        
41,449  
Surplus/(Deficit) after capital transfers & 
contributions 
      
786,469  
    
1,011,585  
    
1,660,907  
Taxation 
               
–   
               
–   
               
–   
Surplus/ (Deficit) for the year 
      
786,469  
    
1,011,585  
    
1,660,907  
      
Capital expenditure & funds sources       
Capital expenditure 
      
614,502  
      
539,632  
      
741,950  
Transfers recognised - capital 
               
–   
          
3,632  
            
784  
Public contributions & donations 
      
164,378  
      
232,825  
      
397,363  
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Borrowing 
      
450,125  
      
303,175  
      
342,222  
Internally generated funds 
               
–   
               
–   
          
1,581  
Total sources of capital funds 
      
614,502  
      
539,632  
      
741,950  
        
Financial position       
Total current assets 
    
1,639,465  
    
2,092,471  
    
1,512,719  
Total non current assets 
    
5,431,403  
    
6,011,646  
    
6,787,123  
Total current liabilities 
    
1,432,882  
    
1,894,187  
    
1,841,264  
Total non current liabilities 
    
2,625,861  
    
2,629,453  
    
2,555,388  
Community wealth/Equity 
    
3,012,125  
    
3,580,477  
    
3,903,191  
        
Cash flows       
Net cash from (used) operating 
     
(373,195) 
      
359,152  
      
239,776  
Net cash from (used) investing 
     
(477,950) 
     
(701,542) 
     
(571,764) 
Net cash from (used) financing 
      
698,799  
      
265,110  
      
385,499  
Cash/cash equivalents at the year end 
        
96,498  
        
19,217  
        
72,729  
        
 
Source: Johannesburg Water (2014b)  
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Appendix R: Pikitup’s financial performance (2010-2013) 
 
Description 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 
R thousands 
Audited 
Outcome 
Audited 
Outcome 
Audited 
Outcome 
Financial Performance       
Property rates 
               
–   
               
–   
               
–   
Service charges 
      
213,633  
      
214,014  
      
237,568  
Investment revenue 
          
2,483  
          
1,881  
          
3,714  
Transfers recognised - operational 
      
920,662  
    
1,071,629  
    
1,147,067  
Other own revenue 
          
7,237  
          
4,962  
          
2,093  
Total Revenue (excluding capital transfers and 
contributions) 
    
1,144,015  
    
1,292,486  
    
1,390,442  
Employee costs 
      
418,376  
      
525,705  
      
709,113  
Remuneration of Board Members 
               
–   
               
–   
               
–   
Depreciation and debt impairment 
        
84,325  
        
41,647  
        
38,366  
Finance charges 
               
–   
               
–   
               
–   
Materials and bulk purchases 
               
–   
               
–   
               
–   
Transfers and grants 
               
–   
               
–   
               
–   
Other expenditure 
      
640,294  
      
711,459  
      
660,881  
Total Expenditure 
    
1,142,995  
    
1,278,811  
    
1,408,360  
Surplus/(Deficit) 
          
1,020  
        
13,675  
       
(17,918) 
Transfers recognised - capital 
               
–   
               
–   
               
–   
Contributions recognised - capital & contributed 
assets 
               
–   
               
–   
               
–   
Surplus/(Deficit) after capital transfers & 
contributions 
          
1,020  
        
13,675  
       
(17,918) 
Taxation 
               
–   
               
–   
               
–   
Surplus/ (Deficit) for the year 
          
1,020  
        
13,675  
       
(17,918) 
      
Capital expenditure & funds sources       
Capital expenditure 
               
–   
               
–   
        
41,582  
Transfers recognised - capital 
               
–   
               
–   
        
41,582  
Public contributions & donations 
               
–   
               
–   
               
–   
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Borrowing 
               
–   
               
–   
               
–   
Internally generated funds 
               
–   
               
–   
               
–   
Total sources of capital funds 
               
–   
               
–   
        
41,582  
        
Financial position       
Total current assets 
      
123,588  
      
270,748  
      
502,935  
Total non current assets 
      
386,430  
      
750,820  
      
720,833  
Total current liabilities 
      
356,827  
      
222,723  
      
504,370  
Total non current liabilities 
      
506,231  
    
1,125,987  
    
1,091,956  
Community wealth/Equity 
     
(353,041) 
     
(327,142) 
     
(372,559) 
        
Cash flows       
Net cash from (used) operating 
        
82,900  
       
(45,541) 
       
(39,870) 
Net cash from (used) investing 
       
(40,193) 
       
(48,527) 
       
(41,132) 
Net cash from (used) financing 
       
(42,706) 
        
94,068  
        
80,990  
Cash/cash equivalents at the year end 
              
11  
              
11  
                
0  
        
 
Source: Pikitup (2014b). 
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Appendix S: Auditor General 2015 Reports on Joburg Water and Pikitup 
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Source: AG, 2015jw: 13-4  
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Source: AG, 2015p:1   
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Appendix T: CoJ’ Request for Quotation 
for Research and Compilation of its Integrated Annual Report for 2013/14  
 
Source: CoJ Website, http://www.joburg.org.za/images/stories/2014/July/rfq%20-
%20r0297%2014.pdf 
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“Education never ends, Watson. It is a series of lessons 
with the greatest for the last. This is an instructive case. 
There is neither money nor credit in it, and yet one would 
wish to tidy it up. When dusk comes we should find 
ourselves one stage advanced in our investigation.” 
Sherlock Holmes 
 
 
In The Adventure of the Red Circle  
by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle 
 
